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ABSTRACT 
 
A Failed Emancipation? The Struggle for Freedom in Hispaniola during the Haitian 
Revolution, 1789-1809 
 
by 
 
Graham Townsend Nessler  
 
 
 
Chair: Richard L. Turits  
 
 This thesis examines conflicts over the terms and boundaries of “liberty” and 
“citizenship” that transpired in the colonies that became Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic during the Haitian Revolutionary era (1789-1809). As the world‟s only 
successful slave uprising, the Haitian Revolution culminated in the transformation of the 
French slaveholding colony of Saint-Domingue into the modern nation of Haiti. Santo 
Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic) also underwent profound political and social 
changes during this period, passing from Spanish to French rule in 1795 and therein from 
a staunchly pro-slavery regime to one that preached universal emancipation.  
Drawing upon a rich corpus of correspondences, notarial records, petitions, 
periodical articles, and other sources preserved in Spanish, French and North American 
repositories, I argue that Santo Domingo became a crucible in the political, military and 
ideological conflicts that reshaped the political terrain of the “Atlantic World” during 
these years. In the first chapter, I examine the centrality of Santo Domingo in the 
xv 
 
dismantling of slavery in the French empire (1793-1794). I then explore the ways in 
which those claimed as “slaves” in both parts of the island asserted their rights as French 
citizens after 1794 despite coercive labor codes, widespread clandestine slaving of French 
citizens to Cuba and elsewhere, and successive French regimes‟ ill-starred efforts to 
establish a profitable plantation economy in both colonies. Conflicts over the rights of 
these freed people encompassed the legal and perceived moral legitimacy of holding 
human beings in bondage.  
The final part of my dissertation analyzes the attempts of the Napoleonic regime 
of General Jean-Louis Ferrand to place thousands of individuals back into bondage in 
Santo Domingo from 1804 to 1809. Using numerous notarized freedom acts, 
governmental correspondences, and other sources, I argue that many freed individuals in 
Santo Domingo under Ferrand devised innovative ways to secure and preserve their 
freedom in the face of a massive project of attempted re-enslavement. Throughout this 
thesis, I situate Santo Domingo within broader Caribbean and Atlantic contexts of 
migration, “emancipation,” and enslavement, emphasizing Santo Domingo‟s salience as a 
central battleground in struggles to define the meaning of freedom. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction
 
 
In 1796, the Martinican lawyer, scholar and politician Médéric-Louis-Elie 
Moreau de St Méry put the finishing touches on a two-volume, 620-page treatise on the 
first land colonized by Europeans in the so-called “New World.” Writing in exile from 
his home office near the waterfront in Philadelphia, Moreau de St Méry had become 
obsessed with recreating a past that had never existed: an imagined colonial world that 
had become shattered by violent tumult. Though he had composed most of this scholarly 
work in the years preceding the outbreak of revolution, Moreau felt motivated to 
complete and publish it by a special sense of urgency. “When would it be more important 
to offer this depiction” of a colonial society, Moreau asked rhetorically, “than at the 
moment when the original will vanish?”1  
In crafting a portrait of a disappearing world, Moreau aspired to accomplish at 
least two goals: to provide the deep historical context for the revolutionary 
transformations that had forced him into exile and to preserve, if only on paper, 
something that might soon be lost. As a man who had grown wealthy and powerful at the 
apogee of French imperial power in the Caribbean, Moreau‟s choice of subject was at 
first glance quite surprising: the neglected and impoverished eastern two-thirds of the 
                                                 
1 M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle 
Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 1:5. In the original text: “Mais quand peut-
il être plus important d‟offrir ce tableau qu‟au moment où l‟original va disparaître?” I retain all original 
punctuation and orthography in my transcriptions of excerpts from French and Spanish primary sources. 
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Caribbean island of Hispaniola that had long been formally ruled by administrators in its 
capital city of Santo Domingo in the name of the Spanish crown.
2
  
Moreau nonetheless had chosen this specific territory for at least three reasons. 
First, its status as the first site of European colonialism in the Americas in fact made the 
Spanish colony of Santo Domingo a logical choice of topic for an erudite man steeped in 
this history who was seeking to reform and protect his own colonial system, which was 
then facing a variety of internal and external threats. Second, despite (or perhaps in part 
due to) its poverty, Spanish Santo Domingo had seemingly embodied a stability that must 
have seemed quite distant and appealing to refugees such as Moreau. Finally and most 
importantly, this Martinican exile recognized that the histories of Santo Domingo and its 
neighbor, French Saint-Domingue, had been deeply intertwined ever since some intrepid 
French buccaneers had carved the latter colony out of land abandoned by Spanish 
authorities in Hispaniola in the seventeenth century. As the subject of another massive 
study which Moreau was simultaneously scrambling to finish, French Saint-Domingue 
was the locus of revolutionary turmoil in the French Caribbean. In August 1791, 
hundreds of slaves in French Saint-Domingue initiated the world‟s only successful slave 
revolt, which in 1804 transformed this wealthiest of France‟s overseas possessions into 
the independent emancipationist nation of Haiti.
3
 Moreau realized that in order to 
                                                 
2 The varied meanings of the term “Santo Domingo” represent a source of considerable confusion for 
scholars, as the term is variously used to indicate the entire island of Hispaniola, the colony that occupied 
the eastern two-thirds of the island in the eighteenth century (which later became the Dominican Republic), 
and the capital city of both the Spanish colony and the modern Dominican nation.  In order to minimize 
ambiguity, I will use the term “Santo Domingo” only in the second of these three senses unless I 
specifically state otherwise. I will reserve the term “Saint-Domingue” (used in many primary sources to 
indicate the entire island) for the French colony that in 1804 became Haiti. 
3 Moreau‟s study of French Saint-Domingue, originally published in 1797, is better known to scholars of 
the Haitian Revolution than his work on Santo Domingo and is frequently cited in scholarship on colonial 
and revolutionary Saint-Domingue. See M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, La description topographique, 
physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de Saint-Domingue (1797; reprint, Saint-
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understand the trajectory of what would become known as the Haitian Revolution, one 
must take into account the interconnected histories of both parts of the island and 
comprehend the Spanish/Dominican as well as the French/Dominguan context.
4
 
Moreau‟s insight forms the foundation of this dissertation. One year before he 
finished his work on Santo Domingo, Spain ceded its oldest colony to the French 
Republic by a treaty signed in the town of Basel in faraway Switzerland. By the stroke of 
a pen, the Treaty of Basel transferred Santo Domingo from rule by slaveholding Spain to 
formal control by a French Republic that professed universal emancipation.
5
 This 
precipitated a political crisis of sovereignty concerning the precise status of Santo 
Domingo (French or Spanish) that intersected with a legal crisis regarding the status and 
condition (slave versus free) of the approximately fifteen thousand people who were 
claimed as slaves there.
6
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Denis: Société Française d‟Histoire d‟Outre-mer, 2004), 3 vols. Born into an influential family in 
Martinique in 1750, Moreau earned a law degree in Paris and became a lawyer in the mid-1770s in French 
Saint-Domingue. In an effort to improve governance there, he composed several scholarly works (including 
the two Descriptions of the French and Spanish parts of Hispaniola) in the 1780s. His prominent role in 
political struggles in revolutionary Paris led to his exile to Philadelphia, where he finished his two books on 
Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo. Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the 
Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 8-11. 
4 Following the practice used by John Garrigus in Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-
Domingue (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), I will use the adjective “Dominguan” in reference to 
French Saint-Domingue. The term “Dominican” in the context of this dissertation will concern the colony 
of Santo Domingo.  
5 The French Republic had decreed the abolition of slavery in all its domains by an act of the National 
Convention on 4 February 1794. See “Decree of the National Convention...That abolishes the Slavery of 
Blacks in the Colonies,” 16 Pluviôse an 2 (4 February 1794), Centre d‟Accueil et de Recherche des 
Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, Colonies CC/9a/9. 
6 Though population figures for Santo Domingo in this era are rather scarce and often unreliable, fifteen 
thousand represents a reasonable estimate of the slave population as of 1789. Moreau de St Méry estimated 
that fifteen thousand slaves lived there among an overall population of 125,000 souls. Moreau de St Méry, 
Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:44. In a report dated 1 October 1797, the 
French official Philippe-Rose Roume also stated that 125,000 people resided in the colony of Santo 
Domingo; this included fifteen thousand individuals whom Roume labeled “newly free[d]” (nuevos libres). 
Report submitted by Roume to “French Government Commission in the [Caribbean] Islands,” 1 October 
1797, in Cesión de Santo Domingo a Francia (correspondencia de Godoy, García, Roume, Hedouville, 
Louverture, Rigaud y otros, 1795-1802), ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo [Santo 
Domingo]: Impresora Dominicana, 1958), 279. A copy of this report exists in Archives Nationales d‟Outre-
mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, France, Collection Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 
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How did these men, women and children react to their predicament? Why would 
one woman purchase her own daughter in French Saint-Domingue with the express 
purpose of freeing her, and how would this daughter deploy the documentary proof of 
this purchase in Santo Domingo under a slaveholding regime?
7
 What impelled many 
formally freed individuals to flee the regime of “emancipation” in Saint-Domingue after 
1794 in order to resettle across the border in a land where pro-slavery authorities still 
retained much power? These people‟s stories and those of many others hint that a 
reinterpretation of the Haitian Revolution as an island-wide struggle for (and against) 
freedom can yield important new insights that build on a new body of scholarship that 
has sought to better understand this revolution‟s reverberations outside of Saint-
Domingue/Haiti.
8
 
As an impoverished land that had become all but forgotten by its metropole, 
Spanish Santo Domingo in 1789 hardly appeared a propitious place for a revolution. 
                                                                                                                                                 
201. In a tract on Santo Domingo written for the Spanish monarch, the priest Antonio Sánchez Valverde 
estimated that twelve to fourteen thousand slaves lived in that colony as of 1785. Antonio Sánchez 
Valverde, Idea del valor de la isla española (1785; reprint, Ciudad Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editora 
Montalvo, 1947), 169. The former Saint-Domingue colonist Jean Barré de Saint-Venant offered a figure of 
fifteen thousand slaves in Santo Domingo in Des colonies modernes sous la zone torride, et 
particulièrement celle de Saint-Domingue (Paris: Brochot, 1802), 207. 
7 See dépôt of Rozine dite Alzire, 17 October 1806, ANOM Dépôt des Papiers Publics des Colonies, 
Notariat de Saint-Domingue (hereinafter DPPC NOT SDOM) 705. 
8 Of this scholarship, the most influential on my own writing has been the work of Ada Ferrer on the impact 
of the Haitian Revolution in Cuba and that of Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard on migration, re-
enslavement, and their intersections with the law and written documentation. See María Dolores González-
Ripoll, Consuelo Naranjo, Ada Ferrer, Gloria García, and Josef Opatrny, El rumor de Haití en Cuba: 
Temor, raza y rebeldía, 1789-1844 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004); Ada 
Ferrer, “Speaking of Haiti: Slavery, Revolution, and Freedom in Cuban Slave Testimony,” in The World of 
the Haitian Revolution, ed. David Geggus and Norman Fiering (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), 223-247; Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard, “Servitude, liberté et citoyenneté dans le monde 
atlantique des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles: Rosalie de nation Poulard…” Revue de la Société Haïtienne 
d‟Histoire et de Géographie no. 83 (July-September 2008): 1-52; and Rebecca Scott, “„She…Refuses to 
Deliver Up Herself as the Slave of Your Petitioner:‟ Émigrés, Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest 
of the Civil Laws,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum no. 24 (2009): 115-136. Several edited volumes 
of essays on the impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Caribbean and Atlantic spheres have also appeared 
in recent years. See for instance Geggus and Fiering, The World of the Haitian Revolution; David Geggus 
and David Gaspar, eds., A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean 
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Nonetheless, in the twenty years to 1809 Santo Domingo became a central arena in 
struggles over the meaning and boundaries of “liberty” and “citizenship.” The thirteen 
years of foreign and internal wars that gave birth to the first emancipationist nation in the 
Americas where at least in theory all were equal before the law grew in part out of a 
distinct historical context in which the advent of the French Revolution and its attendant 
political and intellectual changes transformed the struggles of the slaves and free people 
“of color” who comprised ninety-five percent of Dominguan society.9 The trajectory of 
the Haitian Revolution was also influenced by the specific history of Spanish Santo 
Domingo. In this colony, a free peasantry that was largely of African descent had come to 
constitute the majority of the population a full one hundred and fifty years before the 
abolition of slavery.
10
  
Many of these peasants and their ancestors had for centuries sought and often 
attained liberty by fleeing from their masters, purchasing their freedom, and a variety of 
other means. Their example informed and inspired the enslaved and formally freed 
people from both parts of the island in the Haitian Revolutionary era who similarly 
pursued their own ideas of liberty, which often clashed with those of administrators in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); and David Geggus, ed., The Impact of the Haitian 
Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001). 
9 The population figure is from Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 30. In using the term “of color” and 
other racial designations, I follow the lead of Laurent Dubois and Ada Ferrer, who employ racial terms 
used by individuals in the time and place under study (as both terms of self-identification and labels applied 
by others) while recognizing the artificial and historically-constructed nature of these terms. My use of 
these words thus aims not to reify them but rather to highlight the spatially- and temporally-contingent 
nature of racial labels. For incisive discussions of these matters, see Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 5-
6; and Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1999), 10-12.  
10 Richard Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican 
History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), chapter 1; and Richard Turits, “Par-delà les 
plantations: Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo,” Genèses 66 (March 2007): 51-68, 
esp. 51-54. See also Ruben Silié, Economía, esclavitud y población: Ensayos de interpretación histórica 
del Santo Domingo español en el siglo dieciocho (Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de 
Santo Domingo, 1976), esp. chapters 4-5. 
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both colonies. In many other respects as well, the histories of Santo Domingo and Saint-
Domingue converged in the Haitian Revolutionary period. This dissertation will examine 
these convergences in its advancement of the central argument that Santo Domingo 
became a crucible in the political, military and ideological conflicts that reshaped the 
political terrain of the “Atlantic World” during these years. 
At the heart of this study are the individuals from both colonies who found 
themselves straddling the line between “slave” and “free” after the Treaty of Basel 
delivered Spanish Santo Domingo to France. During a war between France, Spain and 
Britain for control over Saint-Domingue and its extraordinary plantation wealth that 
lasted from 1793 to 1795, numerous enslaved workers on the French side of the border 
became the targets of intensive military recruitment campaigns by all three powers that 
strategically appealed to potential recruits‟ aspirations for freedom. Several of these 
recruits who attained not only freedom but high military ranks under the Spanish in Santo 
Domingo composed numerous impassioned correspondences to other officials in which 
they advanced new concepts of political legitimacy and liberty. Fusing aspects of 
monarchism and republicanism, they presented the Spanish king as the fount of just 
governance and as the true guarantor of freedom; this prompted their French rivals to try 
to supersede these liberation discourses by condemning their Spanish and British enemies 
as royalists and enslavers. This in turn provided many of the ideological underpinnings 
for the 29 August and 31 October 1793 emancipation decrees that formally abolished 
slavery in French Saint-Domingue.
11
  
                                                 
11 These decrees, which abolished slavery first in the North and subsequently in the West and South of 
French Saint-Domingue, were issued by the French Civil Commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and 
Étienne Polverel largely as a means to stabilize and preserve this colony. These decrees formed the basis 
for the 4 February 1794 metropolitan law that legally abolished slavery throughout the French empire. 
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Following the 1795 cession of Santo Domingo, those who had been held as slaves 
under Spanish rule there found themselves the targets of widespread illegal slaving to 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and other places. Repressive labor codes sought to tie them to the few 
productive enterprises that existed in the colony. Violent reprisals from both French and 
Spanish officials followed a 1796 plantation uprising. Moreover, Dominican “masters” 
sought to force their alleged slaves to emigrate with them as their “property” to territories 
where slavery was still the law of the land. During his brief reign over Santo Domingo 
(January 1801-February 1802), the ex-slave general Toussaint Louverture strove to build 
a profitable plantation infrastructure using the labor of freed individuals, who had begun 
to tap into centuries-old Haitian and Dominican practices of slave and peasant 
smallholding in their pursuit of economic and political autonomy.  
 In late 1801, Napoleon deployed a military expedition that aimed to depose 
Toussaint Louverture and re-conquer Hispaniola. Upon Napoleon‟s partial legal 
revocation in 1802 of the 1794 emancipation law, this expedition also adopted the goal of 
the restoration of slavery on the island.
12
 Following the expedition‟s defeat by an army of 
ex-slaves and formerly free people of color, Jean-Louis Ferrand, a general who had 
served in the doomed French enterprise, established a regime in Santo Domingo that 
sought to place thousands of men, women and children back into bondage. This renewed 
colonial regime tried to recreate slavery in the notary‟s ledger and on the auction block. 
Ferrand and his allies not only attempted to re-inscribe slavery into the law and the 
                                                 
12 On 20 May 1802, Napoleon‟s legislature passed a law which stipulated that “slavery will be maintained 
in accordance with the laws and regulations prior to 1789” in the colonies that Britain had “returned” to 
France per the Treaty of Amiens (Saint-Lucia and Martinique). This restoration of slavery would also apply 
to France‟s Indian Ocean colonies. Despite the fact that this law did not apply to Saint-Domingue, Santo 
Domingo, Guadeloupe, or Guyana, Napoleon tried to forcefully re-impose slavery in each of these areas. 
See Pierre Branda and Thierry Lentz, Napoléon, l‟esclavage et les colonies (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 121-122. 
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documentary record through such means as sanctioning the sale of “slaves” and their 
bequeathal as estate “property” in testaments, but also authorized slaving expeditions into 
Haiti, whose victims would then be sold, retained as “slaves,” or simply executed. 
Potential or actual victims of these practices devised a variety of strategies to 
secure their freedom or to at least ameliorate their condition as captives. These ranged 
from seeking notarized safeguards of their freedom to compelling purported owners to 
call them as witnesses in disputes to appealing to potentially sympathetic authorities to 
simply fleeing to the free soil of independent Haiti. These strategies and their contexts 
comprise a central focus of this dissertation. Multiple “degrees of freedom,” or gradations 
of unfreedom, existed in French Santo Domingo.
13
 This dissertation explores notarial 
acts, petitions, governmental and private correspondences, periodical articles, military 
records, and other sources preserved in French, Spanish and North American repositories 
to examine these gradations of unfreedom.  
Scholars of slavery in the Americas have long understood that the law and written 
documentation were central aspects of all American slave societies and constituted a 
principal terrain of contestation over the meaning and terms of bondage. While would-be 
masters exploited the legal uncertainties born of Santo Domingo‟s ambiguous political 
situation after 1795 in their efforts to keep their “slaves” in servitude, those vulnerable to 
enslavement skillfully maneuvered within a sedimented and hybrid legal system in which 
both French and Spanish law influenced administration and the resolution of legal 
disputes. I build upon a new wave of legal-historical studies by Sue Peabody, Vernon 
Palmer, Rebecca Scott, and numerous others which have delved into the many legal 
                                                 
13 Rebecca Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press/Harvard University Press, 2005).  
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contests that arose outside of the French empire over the legitimacy, applicability, and 
universality of the 1794 French emancipation law when those claimed as slaves in other 
lands invoked this law in defense of their freedom.
14
 This study also owes much to the 
scholarship of the legal historian Malick Ghachem, and his analyses of the uncertainties 
over the contours of manumission in colonial French Saint-Domingue and the centrality 
of conflicts over manumission to race relations, governance and social order in that 
colony. In particular, Ghachem‟s emphasis upon the deep continuities within the legal 
history of this colony after the outbreak of revolution—especially as concerns the integral 
role of the 1685 compilation of slave laws known as the Code Noir (Black Code) and 
what he terms the “prudential” (as opposed to “moral”) rationales for the reform and 
abolition of slavery—resonate with my own findings on the many continuities from the 
slave regime in “revolutionary” French Santo Domingo.15 
“Freedom” and “slavery” were as much social as (purported) legal categories in 
French Santo Domingo. In all American slave societies, complex sets of social norms, 
practices, and often unspoken assumptions marked some individuals as free and others as 
                                                 
14 See for instance Sue Peabody, “„Free Upon Higher Ground:‟ Saint-Domingue Slaves‟ Suits for Freedom 
in U.S. Courts, 1792-1830,” in Geggus and Fiering, The World of the Haitian Revolution, 261-283; Agnès 
Renault, “Les conditions d‟affranchissements des esclaves appartenant aux immigrés français résidant à 
Santiago de Cuba entre 1791 et 1825,” paper presented at conference entitled Affranchis et descendants 
d‟affranchis dans le monde atlantique (Europe, Afrique et Amériques) du XVe au XIXe siècle: Statuts 
juridiques, insertions sociales et identités culturelles (Musée d‟Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France, 13-16 May 
2009; publication forthcoming; paper cited with the author‟s written permission); Vernon Palmer, “The 
Strange Science of Codifying Slavery—Moreau Lislet and the Louisiana Digest of 1808,” Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum no. 24 (2009): 83-113; and Scott, “She…Refuses to Deliver Up Herself.” 
15 Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: Haitian Variations on a 
Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002) (quotes are from p. 16). See also Malick 
Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). An 
abridged and translated copy of the Code Noir can be found in Laurent Dubois and John Garrigus, Slave 
Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804: A Brief History with Documents (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 
chapter 1. For a version of the Code in its original language, see Louis Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, ou le 
calvaire de Canaan (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). 
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slave, independent of written documentation.
16
 Such dynamics acquired an even greater 
importance in the unclear legal landscape of French Santo Domingo. Drawing upon 
several dozen notarized freedom acts and other sources, I demonstrate that some freed 
people in this colony re-created “free person” as a social status in the absence of written 
proof of their free condition by calling influential witnesses who attested to their 
conformity to the central markers of non-slave status. These included freedom from the 
control of a master, ownership of property (especially “slaves” and plantations), success 
in a trade, and the ability to call upon prominent members of the free community in one‟s 
defense. Building on the work of Kathryn Burns on the social and historical contexts of 
notarial acts‟ production and that of Natalie Zemon Davis on the historically-contingent 
creation of narratives for the legal record, I show that in using such methods to secure 
notarized acts attesting to their free status, some individuals created an archive of liberty 
that undermined the attempts of General Ferrand to erase all traces of the era of 
“emancipation.”17 
                                                 
16 Recent scholarship has emphasized the continuities after abolition of many social practices that had 
developed within the context of slavery. See for instance Sandra Lauderdale Graham, House and Street: 
The Domestic World of Servants and Masters in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). In this work Graham highlighted the ways in which “[l]aw and custom, 
the formally stated and the informally understood, intermeshed to elevate the will of the master as the 
paramount authority within the basic Brazilian social unit of the household” around the turn of the 
twentieth century (p. 4). She also argued that “[a]lthough slavery no longer supplied the defining 
relationship for a paternal order [after its abolition in Brazil in 1888], the overall patterns of culture had 
seemingly stretched to accommodate the change. Slavery‟s end had not cut away those fundamental notions 
that distinguished patrões [patrons] from laboring people or the connections that tied them together. A 
tolerable sense of order had prevailed despite abolition” (p. 130). See also Sueann Caulfield, Sarah 
Chambers, and Lara Putnam, eds., Honor, Status and Law in Modern Latin America (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005). 
17 Kathryn Burns, “Notaries, Truth, and Consequences,” The American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (April 
2005): 350-379; and Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in 
Sixteenth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). See also Kathryn Burns, Into the 
Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). As in many other 
slaveholding societies, freed people did not necessarily oppose slavery and indeed sometimes owned 
slaves, while the freedom of some individuals came at the cost of continued bondage for others. See for 
example the testament of Étienne Gouin, a French-born cooper living in Santo Domingo city who in 1805 
bequeathed his “Slave” (Esclave) Rosalie to the “négresse” (black woman) Zaïre in recompense for “her 
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The problem of uncertain legal categories in French Santo Domingo grew in part 
out of liminal statuses between slave and free that had developed in both French Saint-
Domingue and Spanish Santo Domingo. In the French part of the island, for instance, 
some masters had sought to avoid manumission taxes by granting their slaves a form of 
de facto freedom known as “liberté de savane” (savannah freedom).18 Furthermore, in 
both colonies maroon communities (which were often composed of fugitive slaves from 
both areas) created new spaces of relative autonomy and semi-independent economic 
activity that they would fiercely defend against both Spanish and French Republican 
authorities in the revolutionary period.  
The vanishing colonial world that Moreau de St Méry sought to describe and 
recover had been defined by the subjugation of nine-tenths of the population of French 
Saint-Domingue to perpetual servitude in order to produce a multitude of plantation 
products for France. Since its origins in the seventeenth century as a fledgling settlement 
based on raiding, cattle-raising and tobacco cultivation by French-speaking buccaneers 
who found abundant land in the abandoned western part of Hispaniola, French Saint-
Domingue had been a world marked by both great danger and great opportunity, where 
many Frenchmen (and it was usually men) traveled to seek their fortunes in the hopes of 
returning to France to live in luxury.
19
 The wealth that attracted these migrants was 
                                                                                                                                                 
troubles and care in multiple illnesses” (pour ses peines et soins dans diverses maladies). Testament of 
Étienne Gouin, 17 December 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1698. Furthermore, the father of Chonne 
Martin, a former inhabitant of Léogane (southern Saint-Domingue) whom I discuss in chapter 6, purchased 
his daughter with the purpose of freeing her. As payment he offered two “nègres” (blacks) named 
Réchange and L‟Espérance. Freedom act of Chonne Martin, 26 February 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 
704. 
18 For more information on “liberté de savane,” see Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 66-67. 
19 Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 17-18. While exact white immigration figures to French Saint-
Domingue are unavailable, evidence suggests that many if not most such immigrants were young men. 
According to Stewart R. King, “[t]he white population [of French Saint-Domingue towards the end of the 
eighteenth century] consisted largely of migrants, mostly young men in relatively good health.” King‟s 
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created by their unfree or semi-free fellow travelers: indentured and enslaved individuals 
(also disproportionately male) whose labor powered the tobacco, cacao, coffee, indigo, 
and sugar enterprises that, from modest beginnings in the seventeenth century, came to 
constitute the world‟s wealthiest colonial economy by the 1780s.20 
In the century following Spain‟s cession of what became French Saint-Domingue 
via the 1697 Treaty of Rhyswick, a combination of entrepreneurial plantation 
development, the ever-increasing importation of laborers, access to numerous (though 
often illicit) trade routes, and the colony‟s rich and varied terrain (including mountains 
ideal for coffee cultivation and plains on which sugar thrived) gave rise to an extremely 
profitable plantation system.
21
 French Saint-Domingue was, in the words of historian 
                                                                                                                                                 
census figures for this colony indicate a 2.25 percent per year growth rate in the white population from 
1775 to 1788. King also noted that the colony‟s population of adult white males increased by seventy-seven 
percent from 1752 to 1775, while the population of free-colored men (presumably mostly locally-born) 
increased by only forty-eight percent. Stewart R. King, Blue Coat or Powdered Wig: Free People of Color 
in Pre-Revolutionary Saint-Domingue (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 42-44, 288 n. 17. 
20 Generally, the gender ratio in the transatlantic slave trade during the four centuries of its operation was 
skewed towards males, though significant variations existed across time and space. Based on an exhaustive 
study of French slave trading records encompassing most of the eighteenth century, David Geggus found 
an overall gender ratio of 179 males to one hundred females, which he called “entirely average for the 
Atlantic slave trade.” Geggus also stated that “males constituted between 60 and 70 per cent of captives in 
almost all slave trades across the Atlantic.” David Geggus, “Sex Ratio, Age and Ethnicity in the Atlantic 
Slave Trade: Data from French Shipping and Plantation Records,” Journal of African History 30, no. 1 
(1989), 25. Geggus has also argued that records covering the entire period of French slave trading indicate 
a gender ratio in which two-thirds of the captives were male. David Geggus, “The French Slave Trade: An 
Overview,” William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 1 (January 2001), 122. In a study of 1,740 engagés 
(indentured servants) who departed from a variety of places in France for diverse parts of the Americas 
between 1682 and 1715, Gabriel Debien found that “the ordinary age is around twenty years.” Debien also 
found only nine women in his entire sample. Gabriel Debien, Le peuplement des Antilles françaises au 
XVIIe siècle: les engagés partis de la Rochelle (1683-1715) (Cairo: Les Presses de l‟Institut Français 
d‟Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1942), 38-39. For more information on early labor developments in 
French Saint-Domingue, see Charles Frostin, Les révoltes blanches à Saint-Domingue aux XVIIe et XVIIIe 
siècles (Paris: L‟École, 1975), chapters 1-2.  
21 John Garrigus has argued that illicit commerce in indigo on Saint-Domingue‟s southern coast in the 
eighteenth century was integral in the rise of some of the most powerful and wealthy free-colored planters 
and political activists, including the famed leader Julien Raimond. John Garrigus, “Blue and Brown: 
Contraband Indigo and the Rise of a Free Colored Planter Class in French Saint-Domingue,” The Americas 
50, no. 2 (October 1993): 233-263. Furthermore, some of the earliest illegal trading routes from French 
Saint-Domingue were to Spanish Santo Domingo. Moreau for instance pointed to cattle trading with the 
Spanish side of the island as one of the main economic roots of French Saint-Domingue. According to 
Moreau, the first French “hattes” (cattle ranches), founded via trade with Santo Domingo in the late 
seventeenth century, were important in enabling the establishment of the first sugar plantations in the North 
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John Garrigus, “one of the most profitable and exploitative systems of plantation slavery 
in world history” where by the 1760s illness, extreme labor demands, and poor nutrition 
killed an estimated one-half of newly-arrived Africans within eight years.
22
 Due to its 
privateer roots and the centrality of illegal commerce, French Saint-Domingue always 
exhibited an independent streak, which would manifest itself particularly severely in 
bitter disputes concerning militia service in the 1760s and in the efforts of many 
upwardly-mobile colonists on the eve of the Haitian Revolution to loosen or even 
eliminate the notorious exclusif, the mercantilist system of commercial restrictions 
devised in the seventeenth century which sought to tightly control colonial trade.
23
  
Any pretensions towards emulation of the North American revolutionaries of the 
1770s, however, were muffled by the perceived imperative to maintain firm control over 
the massive enslaved labor force. While in 1687 the colony had contained 4,411 whites 
and 3,358 slaves, by 1750 the 150,000 slaves were over ten times more numerous than 
whites, and in 1789 the colony was home to half a million slaves who comprised ninety 
percent of the population.
24
 By the time of the storming of the Bastille prison in Paris, the 
labor of those held in abject servitude in French Saint-Domingue had made that colony 
the globe‟s premier sugar and coffee exporter. These slaves‟ toil produced half of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Saint-Domingue, of which there were three in 1698. This also set precedents for continual squabbles 
among French and Spanish officials over illegal animal trading throughout the eighteenth century. Moreau 
de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 2:99-125. 
22 Garrigus, Before Haiti, 53. 
23 On these conflicts over the militia and their implications for race relations and the law in the colony after 
1763, see Garrigus, Before Haiti, chapters 4-5. See also King, Blue Coat or Powdered Wig, chapter 4; and 
Frostin, Les révoltes blanches. 
24 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 30; and Garrigus, Before Haiti, 2-3. 
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coffee on world markets and as much sugar as several of the colony‟s leading competitors 
combined.
25
  
For Moreau, all this meant that a sound understanding of all aspects of French 
Saint-Domingue, ranging from its fairly short history of French rule to its demography 
and environment, was essential not only to restore its status as France‟s crown jewel but 
also to improve governance and productivity in the entire Francophone sphere. “The 
French Part of the island of Saint-Domingue,” Moreau wrote in the introduction to his 
now-canonical Description of French Saint-Domingue, “is, of all the French possessions 
in the New-World, the most important by the wealth that it renders to its Metropole and 
by the influence that it has over its agriculture and its commerce.” This importance also 
extended to the realm of administration, for the challenges of ruling French Saint-
Domingue made it “worthy of observation by all men who engage in the study of 
governments,” and lessons learned there could help to “enlighten government, and to 
show the real bases of a superior system of public prosperity.” Yet studying this French 
colony in isolation was not sufficient. All of his arguments concerning the importance of 
French Saint-Domingue would, Moreau insisted, “acquire a still newer force when one 
notes that possession of the island is shared among two nations, that have had to adopt 
views particular to each, as concerns their colonies, because they have in their principles 
of government, and even in their character, considerable differences.” Therefore, “an 
exact portrait of the entirety of the island of Saint-Domingue, should have the double 
                                                 
25 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 21. On the economy of French Saint-Domingue before and during 
the revolution, see also Carolyn Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: From Plantation Labour to Peasant 
Proprietorship,” Slavery and Abolition 21, no. 2 (August 2000): 11-39; Garrigus, Before Haiti, esp. 
chapters 2 and 6; King, Blue Coat or Powdered Wig,  esp. chapters 2 and 6-7; and Mats Lundahl, 
“Toussaint L‟Ouverture and the War Economy of Saint-Domingue, 1796-1802,” Slavery and Abolition 6, 
no. 2 (1985): 122-138. 
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advantage of acquainting [the reader] with the French and Spanish genius, acting at great 
distances, and of showing the means by which each carried out its designs.”26   
If French Saint-Domingue was Moreau‟s archetype of the lucrative plantation 
colony, he recognized that Spanish Santo Domingo had constituted the original on which 
the archetype was modeled. As “the prototype of all the sugar and slave colonies” in the 
hemisphere, Santo Domingo was the first site of the “transplantation of ideas from the old 
world, in the new,” and the “first European vestige marked on a vast part of the globe,” 
which for that reason alone “has the right to attract the gazes of the philosophical 
observer.”27  
Moreau understood that European conquest and colonization in Santo Domingo 
had involved the transfer of much more than just ideas, though. Following his landing on 
Hispaniola in 1492, Columbus instituted a short-lived regime that sought to utilize the 
                                                 
26 Moreau de St Méry, La description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie 
française, 1:25. In the original text: “La Partie Française de l‟île Saint-Domingue est, de toutes les 
possessions de la France dans le Nouveau-Monde, la plus importante par les richesses qu‟elle procure à sa 
Métropole et par l‟influence qu‟elle a sur son agriculture et sur son commerce. Sous ce rapport, la Partie 
Française de Saint-Domingue est digne de l‟observation de tous les hommes qui se livrent à l‟étude des 
gouvernemens, qui cherchent dans le détails des différentes parties d‟un vaste état, les points capitaux qui 
peuvent en éclairer l‟administration, et montrer les bases réelles du meilleur système de prospérité 
publique...Mais tous les motifs que je viens de rappeller, comme propres à faire désirer la Description de 
la Partie Française, acquièrent encore une nouvelle force quand on remarque que la propriété de l‟île est 
partagée entre deux nations, qui ont dû adopter des vues particulières à chacune d‟elles, relativement à 
leurs colonies, parce qu‟elles ont dans les principes de leur gouvernement, et même dans leur caractère, 
des différences remarquables. Ainsi, une peinture exacte de la totalité de l‟île Saint-Domingue, doit avoir 
le double avantage de faire connaître le génie Français et le génie Espagnol, agissant à de grandes 
distances, et de montrer quel genre de moyen l‟un et l‟autre a fait servir à ses desseins.” 
27 Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:5 and 2:99. In the 
original text: “Elle doit montrer les preuves de la transplantation des idées de l‟ancien monde, dans le 
nouveau, et de leur naturalisation plus ou moins parfaite dans ce sol étranger...En un mot, la colonie 
espagnole de St-Domingue est le premier vestige européen empreint sur une vaste partie du globe, et avec 
tant de titres réunis, elle a doit d‟attirer les regards de l‟observateur philosophe...Mais la situation actuelle 
de St.-Domingue espagnol, qui a été le prototype de toutes les colonies à sucre et à esclaves, ne lui permet 
plus de revendiquer son antériorité.”  
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labor of the native Taínos to extract the island‟s limited but precious gold reserves.28 
Despite Columbus‟s removal from power, the exhaustion of the gold supply, and 
numerous ineffective measures by Columbus‟s onetime sponsors King Ferdinand and 
Queen Isabella of Spain (and their successors) to ameliorate the condition of the 
indigenous population, warfare, overwork and disease virtually destroyed the Taínos in 
the first half-century of European presence on the island.
29
 This prompted Spanish 
authorities to turn to enslaved African labor and to seek new sources of revenue. In 1503 
if not before, the first African slaves to reach the Americas landed on this island‟s shores, 
while enterprising colonists found in the sugar plantations of the Canary Islands and 
elsewhere a prototype that might profitably be replicated in the tropical Americas.
30
 
By the middle of the sixteenth century this lucrative and lethal experiment of 
combining forced African labor with the infrastructure of the plantation had made 
Spanish Santo Domingo a rich sugar exporter, which by some accounts produced several 
thousand tons annually. The twenty thousand or so slaves who labored in the sugar mills 
as well as in other agricultural enterprises and in domestic labor by the late 1560s greatly 
outnumbered the six thousand Spanish colonists and five hundred indigenous survivors. 
                                                 
28 See Lynne Guitar, “No More Negotiation: Slavery and the Destabilization of Colonial Hispaniola‟s 
Encomienda System,” Revista Interamericana 29, no. 1-4 (1999): http://www.sg.inter.edu/revista-
ciscla/volume29/guitar.html. 
29 While scholars dispute the extent of the destruction of the indigenous population, the magnitude of the 
depopulation was undeniably severe. According to Suzanne Austin Alchon, over ninety percent of the 
indigenous population of the Caribbean perished within the first sixty years of European colonialism. 
Suzanne Austin Alchon, A Pest in the Land: New World Epidemics in a Global Perspective (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 64. 
30 For evidence of African slaves in Hispaniola in 1503, see Juan de Ayala, A Letter to Ferdinand and 
Isabella, 1503, trans. Charles E. Nowell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965), 45. On the 
Canary Islands as a prototype for American plantation slavery, see Anthony Stevens-Arroyo, “The Inter-
Atlantic Paradigm: The Failure of Spanish Medieval Colonization of the Canary and Caribbean Islands,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 3 (July 1993): 515-543; and Felipe Fernández-Armesto, 
Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229-1492 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), esp. chapters 6-9. For an authoritative study of the 
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This was the first example of the grossly disproportionate slave-to-free ratio that would 
characterize the tropical American plantation complex, but it was not destined to endure 
long. By the end of this century the confluence of Spanish commercial restrictions and a 
decisive shift in colonial policy towards silver-rich Mexico and Peru doomed the 
Dominican plantation economy.
31
 In one indication of this dramatic reversal, a 1606 
colonial census listed only eight hundred slaves employed in sugar and 9,696 slaves 
overall among a total population of perhaps sixteen thousand souls.
32
 
The collapse of the sugar boom led to political and economic shifts that would 
shape subsequent Dominican and Haitian history. Even in the central areas of Mexico and 
Peru, the Crown and local colonial authorities from the onset of colonialism experienced 
continual difficulties in subordinating outlying regions to state control, despite inheriting 
significant state apparatuses from the indigenous empires. In Santo Domingo, the site of 
neither a pre-Columbian empire nor (after the late sixteenth century) of a prized 
commodity that would attract thousands of fortune-seekers, metropolitan neglect 
translated into a situation in which both Church and state were among the weakest in 
Spanish America. Throughout the countryside the sugar plantations gave way to assorted 
                                                                                                                                                 
economic and political importance of sugar from the time of Columbus to the present, see Sidney Mintz, 
Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in World History (New York: Viking, 1985). 
31 Moreau devoted significant attention to exploring the reasons behind the dramatic economic divergence 
of the two parts of the island in the eighteenth century. He noted that while the Spanish had controlled “the 
largest and most fertile part of this island,” they had long been unsuccessful in deriving revenue from it, 
whereas French Saint-Domingue had produced three-fifths of France‟s total colonial revenue, a share that 
was around 250 million livres tournois annually. Moreau located the main reason for this difference in the 
“Character and Customs of the Spanish Creoles” (Caractère et Moeurs des Créols Espagnols), which he 
described as a “rather bizarre blend of debasement and pride.” Moreau de St Méry, Description 
topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:45-47. In the original text: “Les espagnols possèdent, 
comme on le voit, la plus grande et la plus fertile partie de cette île, et l‟on a bientôt comparé leur génie, à 
celui des français, lorsqu‟on fait que cette possession ne leur est d‟aucune utilité, tandis que la portion 
française fournit à elle seule les trois cinquièmes du produit de toutes les colonies françaises d‟Amérique: 
produit qui s‟élève annuellement à 250 millions tournois...Le caractère des espagnols de Saint-Domingue, 
est en géneral un mélange assez bizarre d‟avilissement et d‟orgueil.” 
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cattle ranches, tobacco estates, and numerous subsistence plots worked by freed people 
and their descendants far from significant direct state control. “The Spanish part of St-
Domingue conducts almost no commerce,” wrote Moreau. Partly as a result of this 
poverty, Santo Domingo “has almost no relation with the metropole [Spain],” while the 
resources of most colonists were “extremely limited.” In Moreau‟s depiction, Spanish 
Santo Domingo possessed poor to nonexistent educational facilities, almost impassable 
roads, and a very modest agricultural base which included generally unprofitable coffee 
and indigo estates and just twenty-two sugar plantations (sucreries) of any importance, 
which employed a mere six hundred “blacks” (nègres). Aside from meat, hides, and 
limited mahogany production, the only commodity of any quality produced in that colony 
was tobacco, but even this crop was concentrated in only one area (in the north near the 
colony‟s second city Santiago) and grown mostly for domestic consumption and 
contraband with neighboring islands.
33
 
In French Saint-Domingue, the misery of men and women who were often 
literally worked to death created the famed wealth that made this colony such a coveted 
prize. In Spanish Santo Domingo by contrast, the relative lack of a productive 
infrastructure after 1600 occasioned a radically different outcome. By the end of the 
seventeenth century a free peasantry comprised largely of freed people and their 
descendants constituted a majority of the colony‟s population. These freed individuals 
had employed a variety of legal and extralegal means to escape from enslavement, 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 27-29, 276 n. 13; and Carlos Esteban Deive, La esclavitud del negro 
en Santo Domingo (1492-1844) (Santo Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 1980), 604-605. 
33 Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:61-66. In the 
original text: “Indiquer la nature des chemins, c‟est avoir dit que la partie espagnole de St-Domingue ne 
fait presque aucun commerce; car le commerce veut des routes, des canaux où son génie puisse circuler les 
productions de la nature et de l‟art, qui sont son aliment et sa vie. La partie espagnole n‟a presque aucune 
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including self-purchase, flight, and occasionally open rebellion. Moreover, free people of 
color in urban areas sometimes attained prominent positions in institutions such as the 
Church and the military in contravention of legal interdictions.
34
 French Dominguan 
slaves for their part adopted their own strategies to gain their freedom, while from the 
1760s free people of color in French Saint-Domingue engaged in a bitter struggle against 
racist laws that sought to disenfranchise and subordinate them. In the Haitian Revolution, 
conceptions of citizenship and freedom intersected to create new political ideologies, 
grounds for claims-making, and spaces of freedom.  
Twenty years of warfare and revolution on the island also witnessed the rise of 
new forms of coercion that brought these colonies together in various ways. This 
dissertation has benefitted from several decades of scholarship on “post-emancipation 
societies.” This literature has closely examined the economic, political, ideological, and 
social dimensions of claims to citizenship in lands ranging from Jamaica to Brazil to 
Louisiana, insisting upon the centrality of the distinct developments that emerged after 
the formal end of slavery in understanding the continuing inequalities in these societies.
35
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34 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, chapter 1; Turits, “Par-delà les plantations,” 58-59; and Richard 
Turits, “New World of Color: Slavery, Freedom and the Making of Race in Dominican History,” paper 
presented at CUNY Graduate Center, 23 November 2010 (cited with author‟s written permission).  
35 Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott, and Thomas Holt forcefully advanced an argument for such a 
perspective in the introduction to their Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor and Citizenship in 
Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Among the many 
works on “post-emancipation societies” published in the last few decades, the ones that have influenced 
this dissertation the most are: Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica 
and Britain, 1832-1938 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Rebecca Scott, Slave 
Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985); and Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). See also Scott, Degrees of 
Freedom; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990); and Mimi Sheller, Democracy after Slavery: Black Publics and 
Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000).  
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In most of the cases studied in this literature, a clear legal demarcation separated 
slavery from its sequels: a regime of formal emancipation, however flawed, unequal and 
exploitative it may have been, came into being in these territories by virtue of an 
imperial- or national-level law abolishing formal slavery. In French Santo Domingo, by 
contrast, a profoundly ambiguous legal situation existed wherein slavery‟s legal abolition 
was not assumed as a given. Though I argue that, legally speaking, those held in bondage 
there ought to have been free by virtue of the 1794 French emancipation law and the 
1795 Treaty of Basel, the political crisis of sovereignty imbued the legal condition of 
those claimed as slaves with an ambiguity that was not present in other “post-
emancipation societies.” In the United States after 1865 and Brazil after 1888 for 
instance, few if any cases existed in which even the most racist or greedy individuals 
argued that slavery had not been abolished in law.
36
 But in Santo Domingo after 1795 a 
nearly invisible emancipation occurred, such that many men, women and children 
remained in de facto slavery even as many of their number asserted their rights to French 
citizenship.
37
 While their claims often met with violent reprisals, they also sparked heated 
disputes among French and Spanish officials on the justice of holding human beings in 
servitude. Though the Haitian Revolution was driven by a multitude of forces, the 
question at its heart was: Could (and should) a society exist without slaves? Santo 
Domingo became one of the principal sites of contestation over this question.  
                                                 
36 This is not, of course, to deny that repressive labor and social relations developed in many of these 
societies which in many ways closely resembled slavery. On the United States, see Douglas A. Blackmon, 
Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black People in America from the Civil War to World 
War II (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 
37 I thank Laurent Dubois (personal communication, 24 September 2010) for helping me come up with the 
concept of an invisible emancipation.  
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The operation of American slave societies relied to a considerable extent upon 
legal, racial, and social categories, and many of the conflicts that emerged in such 
societies involved attempts to subvert, contest, redefine, renounce, or impose these 
categories. Much of the scholarship on “post-emancipation” societies has accordingly 
concerned itself with the viability and coherence of these categories within and across 
disparate territories or nations. For instance, could one who had been formally freed by 
manumission or by a blanket emancipation law be properly claimed as a “slave” after 
being forced by a would-be master to migrate to a jurisdiction where slavery was still 
regnant or where authorities cared little for manumissions granted in other jurisdictions? 
In their analyses of such matters, Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott and Thomas Holt 
eschew the presumption of a “sharply distinctive category of slavery” in favor of “asking 
questions about the history of the category itself and its relationship to forced labor and to 
those categories of labor...that many of the governments that abolished slavery did not 
want considered in the same breath.”38 In French Santo Domingo after 1795 (and 
especially after 1802), many authorities and would-be masters strove to create a “sharply 
distinctive category of slavery” in contradistinction to the emancipation law. While many 
pro-slavery Spanish leaders after the cession tried to re-create “slave” as a coherent and 
unproblematic category in their correspondences and treatises, the Napoleonic regimes of 
1802-1809 strove to rewrite slavery into the legal and documentary record. In effect, the 
political, economic and moral meanings of “slave” were on trial in revolutionary Santo 
Domingo.
39
 
                                                 
38 Cooper, Scott and Holt, Beyond Slavery, 4. 
39 In the first decade of the nineteenth century, thousands of Saint-Domingue refugees traveled to Cuba, 
Louisiana and other places. Among them were several thousand individuals claimed as slaves (and 
sometimes noted as such in the secondary literature) despite the 1794 emancipation edict. In its 
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What follows is a social, political, intellectual and legal history of “emancipation” 
and re-enslavement in Santo Domingo from the advent of the French Revolution in 1789 
to the expulsion of the French from Hispaniola in 1809. It contributes to a body of 
scholarship on the Haitian Revolution and its wider reverberations produced in the last 
few decades by Laurent Dubois, David Geggus, Carolyn Fick, Ada Ferrer and others.
40
 
Much of this literature has both emerged out of and helped to shape a paradigm shift 
towards adopting an “Atlantic” lens rather than (or in addition to) that of empire or 
nation-state. This in turn has prompted reevaluations of the viability of “empire” as a 
coherent analytical and historical framework.
41
 In the Haitian Revolution, intertwined 
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French and Spanish imperial crises transformed the nature of empire in the Atlantic world 
and beyond, yet the revolution‟s trajectory was substantially rooted in local conditions. In 
a recent article, historian Lara Putnam has argued that scholars have begun to combine 
the seemingly wildly disparate scales of Atlantic history and microhistory in order to 
“elucidate historical processes transcontinental in scope.” This has entailed “researchers‟ 
purposive manipulation of their scale of observation, so that reconstructing the trajectory 
of a Yoruba Muslim and his kinsmen may occasion a reevaluation of the dynamics of 
slave rebellions across the nineteenth-century Atlantic world.”42  
Following Putnam‟s lead, I depart from previous studies on the Haitian 
Revolution by proposing a reinterpretation of this revolution grounded in the deep history 
of the entire island of Hispaniola. Such a perspective blurs lines of colony and empire 
without denying their existence or salience. It also encompasses far-reaching political and 
intellectual shifts while remaining moored in on-the-ground circumstances.
43
 Building on 
these methodological approaches, I offer a close reading of a twenty-year span of history 
on a single island to illuminate novel aspects of a pivotal episode in modern political 
history. 
The Haitian Revolution drew upon European and African concepts and traditions 
of both democratic governance and authoritarianism, bequeathing a profoundly 
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paradoxical legacy to the two modern nations that share Hispaniola. While the 
scholarship of Dubois and others has presented the Haitian Revolution as a watershed in 
the development of modern concepts of democracy and human rights, Geggus has 
roundly criticized this perspective, contending that the Haitian Revolution “was 
authoritarian from beginning to end.”44 Much of this debate has centered on the visions 
and priorities of this revolution‟s leaders and their importance in creating enduring 
patterns of governance for the new Haitian nation. The most important of these leaders 
was François Dominique Toussaint Louverture, a man born into slavery in Saint-
Domingue‟s rich northern province who had gained his freedom in the 1770s and who 
would become the most powerful individual on the island by the end of the century.
45
  
Toussaint‟s legacy takes on a somewhat different character in light of his 
experiences in Santo Domingo. This former Spanish colony was integral to Toussaint‟s 
meteoric rise, while his fateful decision to invade and occupy Santo Domingo city in 
1801 contributed to his fall. During his brief reign over the island‟s eastern part, 
Toussaint tried to achieve what Spanish administrators for two centuries had failed to 
manage: the establishment of a profitable plantation economy based on a strictly-
controlled labor force. Though Toussaint justified his coercive labor codes as necessary 
measures to preserve the liberty of the island‟s freed people, his relatively conservative 
vision was sharply at odds with their aspirations for plots of land to call their own and 
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autonomy from the structures of economic and political domination (especially the 
plantation) that had controlled their lives and those of their enslaved ancestors. In his 
efforts to quash traditions of collective smallholding that had developed over centuries of 
slavery across the island, Toussaint left a deeply ambiguous legacy for the lands that 
became Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  
The Haitian Revolution was a Caribbean, Atlantic and indeed a global story—but 
it was also a story of how struggles for freedom transpired across two colonies with 
dramatically different economies, plantation infrastructures, relationships to their 
metropoles, and systems of slavery. During these twenty years, the historical trajectory of 
the world‟s wealthiest colony became even more closely interconnected with that of one 
of the hemisphere‟s poorest. Distracted by other theaters of conflict on several continents, 
the French Republic stationed relatively few officials in Santo Domingo after 1795, while 
many prominent politicians and citizens (Moreau among them) argued that the cash-
strapped and militarily-overextended Republic would be much better off abandoning this 
colony in favor of a more lucrative land such as Louisiana, which Spain had wrested from 
France several decades before.
46
  
Yet precisely due to this relative neglect, Santo Domingo became a crucial 
battleground over the meaning of freedom. Following the cession a political situation 
characterized by what Malick Ghachem terms “divided sovereignty” emerged in Santo 
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Domingo, for neither France nor Spain exercised full control over the colony.
47
 While the 
Spanish old guard retained substantial authority in the capital until Toussaint‟s invasion 
in 1801, French officials (along with hundreds of French settlers) exerted a degree of 
influence. Into this relative power vacuum stepped unscrupulous slavers who sold 
thousands of French citizens from the island into servitude in diverse points in the 
circum-Caribbean region, even as some of these captives sought to claim their rights as 
free men and women under emancipation law. The social history of enslaved and freed 
communities in French Saint-Domingue/Haiti is incomplete without the inclusion of such 
communities in Santo Domingo/Dominican Republic (and vice-versa). This dissertation 
details the histories of some of these communities, their (re)constitution, and their roles in 
the transformative political conflicts of this era. The individuals comprising these 
communities struck intellectually as well as physically at their subjugation, and in this 
they left an enduring legacy that contributed to the formation of the modern political 
order.
48
 
 
*  *  * 
 
In the late 1780s and early 1790s a fatal confluence of conflicts destabilized the 
prized plantation colony of French Saint-Domingue. The calling of the Estates-General, 
the destruction of the Bastille, and the promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen in France (1788-1789) irrevocably altered that nation‟s political and 
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social structure. When news of these events reached the colonies it ignited intense 
speculation on their possible reverberations among colonial authorities, slaves and 
everyone in between. The powerful new discourses of freedom and citizenship that were 
emerging provided new bases for claims-making by free-colored leaders from Saint-
Domingue and other colonies who had for over a decade been engaged in an embattled 
campaign for the repeal of racist laws that imposed all manner of indignity on free non-
whites and stripped them of most political rights. Those in bondage seized upon this 
dissent among the elite and propertied classes to carry out a massive revolt in August 
1791 that commenced in the rich sugar-producing heartland near Saint-Domingue‟s 
commercial capital, Cap Français. 
The advent of revolution to French Saint-Domingue and its spread to Spanish 
Santo Domingo is at the heart of chapter 1, which situates the Haitian Revolution within 
the island‟s “long” eighteenth century. Deeply-rooted conflicts over the extradition of 
fugitive slaves, the colonial boundary, maroon communities, and numerous other issues 
influenced Dominican authorities‟ responses to racial conflict and slave revolt. The ill-
fated quest for legal reform of the famous free-colored leader Vincent Ogé emerges with 
new clarity from the vantage point of Spanish Santo Domingo. Ogé led an unsuccessful 
movement in Saint-Domingue in 1790 in pursuit of the abolition of racist laws. After 
vainly seeking refuge in Santo Domingo, he was executed by French officials in early 
1791. Extant correspondences and reports by Ogé and several French and Spanish 
authorities reveal that Ogé strategically appealed to the royalist political convictions of 
his Spanish captors, while his extradition from Santo Domingo owed in part to racial 
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ideologies and anxieties that had developed in the Spanish colony as well as to 
longstanding patterns of interaction between leaders from both sides of the island.  
After a discussion of the effect of such patterns on the Spanish response to the 
1791 slave revolt and to the French colonial state‟s futile attempts to quash it through 
violence and calculated diplomacy, I discuss the pivotal role of enslaved and freed 
warriors and their political discourses in the Franco-Spanish-British war for Hispaniola 
(1793-1795).
49
 Rather than dismissing royalist sentiment among slaves and freed people 
as an aberration or evidence of some type of “false consciousness,” I argue that these 
individuals drew upon elements of both royalism and republicanism. In so doing, they 
created new concepts of freedom and political legitimacy that contributed to the 
declarations of the abolition of slavery in French Saint-Domingue by the Civil 
Commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel in 1793. In 
contextualizing the numerous letters and proclamations of several freed leaders and those 
of the Civil Commissioners within military and political events on the ground, I present a 
political and intellectual history of the coming of “emancipation” to Hispaniola.  
The French National Convention, dominated by the radical Jacobins, ratified the 
commissioners‟ general emancipation orders of 1793 and proclaimed their extension to 
all French colonies in the landmark emancipation law of 4 February 1794. The resulting 
surge in recruitment among the newly freed enabled the embattled French Republic to 
turn the tide of war and not only expel the Spanish from French Saint-Domingue but also 
gain formal control over Spanish Santo Domingo under the 1795 Treaty of Basel. Yet it 
                                                 
49 The execution of the French king in January 1793 helped to impel Britain and Spain to declare war on 
France the following month. The Spanish in Santo Domingo mobilized against French armies on the island 
starting in May 1793, while the British (who were based in nearby Jamaica and other islands) invaded 
Hispaniola in September 1793.  
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remained unclear to what extent, if any, this would portend a change in the condition of 
those claimed as slaves in the eastern part of the island. Chapter 2 argues that the crisis of 
sovereignty in Santo Domingo made it a central proving ground in the battles over the 
terms of freedom.  
Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Basel, the French Republic promulgated 
a new constitution that consolidated the hard-won legislative gains of the first half of the 
decade in its declaration that the inhabitants of all French realms would henceforth enjoy 
equal citizenship rights. Nonetheless, efforts to incorporate Santo Domingo into this new 
legal framework met with mixed results. On the one hand, the attempts of many 
Dominican emigrants to force those whom they claimed as slaves to accompany them out 
of the colony prompted some French officials to compose some of the most eloquent 
defenses of the “natural right” of liberty ever offered in the Haitian Revolutionary era. 
Yet when these freed individuals took their rights into their own hands through such 
means as rising up on Santo Domingo‟s largest plantation, joining “maroon” 
communities in the borderlands, or simply attempting to escape the restrictions on their 
freedom in Saint-Domingue by migrating to the eastern part of the island, these same 
Republican officials‟ responses often differed little from the actions that their 
predecessors had taken under slavery. In this period the French Republic was engaged in 
a multifaceted struggle to redefine citizenship rights, the relationship between metropole 
and colony, and the boundaries of freedom. Santo Domingo turns out to have been 
integral to all of these matters.  
In chapter 3, I foreground Santo Domingo in the military history of Hispaniola 
from 1795 to 1801. This history was in many ways that of the rise of Toussaint 
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Louverture, who after joining the slave rebels in November 1791 enlisted with the 
Spanish two years later, only to defect to the ranks of the Republic in the spring of 1794. 
In the six years following the conclusion of war with Spain in 1795, Toussaint out-fought 
and out-maneuvered powerful internal and foreign adversaries to become the supreme 
leader of the entire island. This chapter illustrates Santo Domingo‟s importance in 
Toussaint‟s consolidation of authority. As he led thousands of soldiers into battle against 
the slaveholding British who occupied many parts of the island, Toussaint fought for and 
won control over numerous strategic Dominican towns that connected once-prosperous 
parts of French Saint-Domingue with cattle trading routes to the Dominican interior. 
Moreover, the British refusal to abolish slavery in their zones of occupation worked as a 
potent recruiting tool for Toussaint, who pointed to pervasive illegal slaving through 
Santo Domingo as a justification for military incursions there. This slaving was a grave 
threat to the credibility of the French Republic. This led Republican authorities to impose 
a variety of mostly ineffective measures, including the establishment of a tribunal to 
judge slaving cases. Events eventually compelled the Governor-General of Santo 
Domingo to issue an order that forbade notaries and other public officials from 
authorizing slave sales. 
After Toussaint negotiated the surrender of the British and their departure from 
the island in 1798, he sought to subdue General André Rigaud, his main rival for control 
over Saint-Domingue, and to establish an independent foreign policy while professing 
loyalty to France. An island-wide perspective sheds new light on these developments. 
Following the defeat of Rigaud, Toussaint turned his attention to asserting his control 
over Santo Domingo as the final military stage of his plan to unite the entire island under 
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his rule. Indeed, his January 1801 invasion of Santo Domingo city owed largely to his 
strategic concern with preventing a French or foreign invasion force from disembarking 
in the vulnerable eastern part of the island.  
Toussaint‟s accession to power in Santo Domingo also entailed a complex 
interplay between concepts of egalitarianism and racism that had developed in the slave 
societies of both parts of the island. While some French thinkers and strategists took 
Santo Domingo to be a virtually color-blind society that could offer lessons for the 
construction of a Republican multiracial democracy, others argued that in order to 
assuage the presumed racial anxieties of many Dominicans, “French” and “Spanish” 
“blacks” ought to be restricted to “their own” parts of the island. This effort to map racial 
ascriptions onto imagined political identities would leave a terrible legacy for the next 
two centuries of Haitian and Dominican history.
50
  
In rallying followers to help him take Santo Domingo, Toussaint appealed to the 
aspirations of many fellow freed Dominguans for the economic and political liberty that 
had largely eluded them in French Saint-Domingue even after 1794. After taking power 
in Santo Domingo city in 1801, however, Toussaint would bitterly disappoint these 
hopes. Chapter 4 is a reexamination of his reign over that colony. Several of Toussaint‟s 
decrees, along with many governmental and private correspondences and eyewitness 
accounts, reveal that he pursued the central objective of establishing a viable plantation 
infrastructure in Santo Domingo. To this end, he issued decrees that sought to tie ex-
slaves (or cultivateurs) to the colony‟s few productive estates and that tried to create 
economic incentives for plantation entrepreneurs.  
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In explicitly attempting to concentrate large amounts of capital in few hands, 
Toussaint advanced a vision that was anathema to that of many of the men and women 
who had endured slavery on the island. I present Toussaint as a Dominican as well as a 
Haitian leader whose vision of a united Hispaniola was as much economic as political. 
Though this vision was centered on a commitment to formal emancipation, the line 
between slavery and freedom became especially blurred in Santo Domingo under 
Toussaint. Numerous petitions brought by Dominican emigrants to Spanish authorities 
show that the controversy over emigration with “slaves” persisted under Toussaint, as 
many petitioners argued that they ought to be granted safe passage and monetary 
assistance to resettle in a Spanish dominion with those whom they claimed as their 
slaves. While these petitions show that Toussaint had partial success in curtailing such 
emigration, they also contain evidence of the persistence of involuntary servitude in 
Santo Domingo on Toussaint‟s watch.  
Partly in response to Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo Domingo city—contrary to the 
First Consul‟s orders—Napoleon deployed a huge military expedition to Hispaniola in 
late 1801 and early 1802. Its main aims were the overthrow of Toussaint and the 
imposition of Paris‟s unequivocal authority. Though the expedition deposed Toussaint 
and carted him off to France to die in a remote mountain prison, it failed to retake Saint-
Domingue, as the French expeditionary force could not overcome the resistance of 
thousands who fought desperately to avoid the re-imposition of slavery. The expedition‟s 
defeat led to the creation of two states: the new nation of Haiti, constructed on the ruins 
of the old Saint-Domingue, and an aggressively racist regime based in Santo Domingo 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 For a well-argued article on the historical roots of race relations in modern Haiti, see Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot, “Culture, Color, and Politics in Haiti,” in Race, ed. Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek (New 
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city, ruled by General Jean-Louis Ferrand, a survivor of the expedition who sought to re-
enslave thousands of individuals.    
The legal order in Santo Domingo under Ferrand rested upon the questionable 
presumption that Napoleon had legally authorized the reestablishment of slavery there. In 
chapter 5, I assess slavery‟s dubious legality in Santo Domingo in the Ferrand period and 
examine some of the ways in which freed people in the colony resisted Ferrand‟s 
attempts to erase the emancipationist past. While Ferrand issued a series of racist orders 
that sought to disenfranchise all those deemed non-white and to enslave those among this 
group who could not document their freedom, linguistic and legal evidence reveals that 
those targeted by this repression drew upon prior struggles against injustice in asserting 
their claims to freedom and equality. In particular, linguistic clues from notarial acts and 
other sources such as legal records suggest that these individuals grounded some of their 
claims-making in earlier campaigns for the realization of the 1685 Code Noir‟s promise 
of equal rights for all free persons. Those claimed as slaves also made use of tactics such 
as compelling authorities to call them as witnesses in disputes over their purported 
ownership and fleeing to independent Haiti.  
Santo Domingo emerges as an important locale in circuits of captivity in these 
years. During a decade perhaps best known to scholars of Atlantic slavery for the 
abolition of the British and United States Atlantic slave trades, numerous slaving vessels 
plied the waters of the circum-Caribbean area. Those held in captivity on these vessels 
sometimes found themselves sold into “slavery” in Santo Domingo after their slaving 
ship had been captured by a French vessel or had shipwrecked on Dominican shores. In 
addition, some individuals forcibly taken from Haiti and enslaved by the Ferrand regime 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 146-174. 
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were sold to South Carolina in exchange for slave-produced rice. Governmental 
correspondences and other records that detail such cases hint at hidden stories of captivity 
and migration during a decade in which slavery was facing severe challenges in some 
areas, while becoming even more entrenched in others. 
Some of those who were targeted by Ferrand‟s policies came before French 
notaries in order to create notarized acts attesting to their free status. These acts are the 
focus of chapter 6. These individuals employed three types of strategies: presenting prior 
evidence of free status such as a manumission act, offering monies for self-purchase, and 
summoning witnesses to vouch for one‟s condition as a non-slave. Such acts of liberty 
hint that these notaries, their freed clients, and those who claimed to grant liberty to the 
latter were embedded in complex social and familial networks, many of which were 
rooted in the former Saint-Domingue. Moreover, their strategies reflected both legal and 
customary practices and processes of attaining liberty that had developed in both parts of 
the island. Exploiting small openings in the legal system, these individuals archived their 
liberty in the creation of these acts. 
As a historian and a participant in two revolutions, Moreau understood that 
writing history is a profoundly political act. “It is in tracing it, this history [of 
Hispaniola], that I remind myself, almost on every line, that the historian possesses true 
authority,” Moreau declared, “and that he should cast aside his pen in terror, if he has 
forgotten, for a single instant, that one day posterity will want to cast judgment on a deed 
or on an individual, having access to no testimony to invoke but his [the historian‟s], and 
that if his judgment fails [his pen], it makes him guilty of irreversible injustices.”51 
                                                 
51 Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:7. In the original 
text: “C‟est en la traçant, cette histoire, que je me rappelle, presque à chaque ligne, que l‟historien remplit 
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Moreau understood the importance of an integrated and detailed history of the island for 
the posterity who would surely puzzle over why such monumental transformations 
occurred there in the 1790s. Similarly, I offer this thesis as a means by which to promote 
a more comprehensive understanding of the French and Haitian Revolutions, which in 
turn offers new insights on the historical roots of contemporary Haitian-Dominican 
relations. This dissertation aims to place the quite distinct historiographies of these two 
nations into greater dialogue. It also responds to Laurent Dubois‟s call for scholars to 
“seek to construct a picture of an integrated space of debate over rights, of universalism, 
over governance and empire” so that they may “understand the Atlantic as an integrated 
intellectual space” in which people in Europe, the Americas and Africa all actively 
shaped emergent discourses on rights, citizenship and democracy.
52
 The island of 
Hispaniola in the Haitian Revolutionary era was one such “integrated space.” Though 
“emancipation” in Santo Domingo in 1795-1802 was in many ways “invisible,” and the 
French regimes that claimed authority there from 1802 until 1809 tried to not only 
reverse but efface the gains of the emancipation period, many freed people there left 
traces of an alternative history in the archival record.   
In his effort to reconstruct his vanishing colonial world through his writing, 
Moreau knew that the past, present and future of the island were inextricably connected. 
What follows is a narrative that ties together the stories of slaves, freed people and others 
from both parts of the island so that we may better understand these histories and their 
role in the making of the modern world.
                                                                                                                                                 
une vraie magistrature, et qu‟il doit jeter sa plume avec effroi, s‟il a oublié, un seul instant, qu‟un jour la 
postérité voulant porter un jugement sur un fait ou sur un individu, pourrait n‟avoir d‟autre témoignage à 
invoquer que le sien, et que si son jugement la trompe, il se rend coupable d‟injustices irréparables.” 
52 Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment,” 7. 
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Chapter One 
“I Am the King of the Counter-Revolution:” The Advent of Revolution and 
“Emancipation” in Hispaniola, 1789-1795 
 
 
 My lord: If something has moved me, to place in your hands the present letter, it 
 is not for any other end than to manifest the truth, and [to] affirm religion. I have 
 directed these Arms for two years now, and it has been two more years since I 
 have undertaken to detain the progresses [of the] one thousand two-hundred 
 criminals that there were, seeking to transform the entire World; and that without 
 flattering myself I dare to say that I am the king of the counter-revolution… that I 
 undertook a war, almost without arms, without munitions, without provisions, and 
 in the end without any means.
1
  
 
With these words, Georges Biassou, “General of the Conquered Part of the North 
of Santo Domingo [Saint-Domingue]” (Gral de la Parte Conquistada del Norte de Santo 
Domingo), opened a letter which affirmed his passionate defense of the Spanish king and 
his willingness to “shed [his] last drop of blood” (derramar hasta la ultima gota de mi 
sangre) for his sovereign.
2
 In this letter, Biassou presented his distinct political 
philosophy, which asserted the validity of European kingship but sought to redefine the 
bases of political legitimacy in part by contesting assumptions formed through centuries 
of European colonialism in the Caribbean. Biassou was in fact only one of several 
prominent former slaves who, in the extraordinary circumstances of what has become 
                                                 
1 Georges Biassou to Governor-General Joaquín García, 24 August 1793, Archivo General de Simancas 
(hereinafter AGS), Simancas, Spain, Guerra Moderna (hereinafter GM) 7157, f. 12. In the original 
Spanish: “Si algo me ha determinado, a poner en vuestras manos la presente memoria, no es otro el fin que 
para manifestar la verdad, y aclarar la religión. Hace ya dos años que manejo las Armas, y otros dos 
también que emprehendí el detener los progresos que mil y doscientos facinerosos que habían, procurando 
trastornar el Globo entero; y que sin lisongearme me atrevo a decir soy el gefe de la contra-rebolucion, 
assi es quando pienso, que emprendí una guerra, casi sin armas, sin municiones, sin víveres, y en fin sin 
medios algunos.” The title of this chapter is inspired by this source, as well as by John Thornton‟s article 
“„I Am the Subject of the King of Kongo:‟ African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution,” Journal 
of World History 4, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 181-214.  
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known as the Haitian Revolution, employed his hard-won literary abilities to undermine 
racial hierarchy and challenge some longstanding intellectual justifications for slavery 
and racism. Indeed, even as Biassou proclaimed his unswerving commitment to serve the 
Spanish king, his letter represented a demand for greater political representation on the 
part of individuals of African descent who had long been subjected to servitude and 
disfranchisement in both French Saint-Domingue and Spanish Santo Domingo.  
Why did Biassou depict the world‟s only successful slave rebellion as a “war to 
save my King” and to “liberate such a great King from the tyranny to which he was 
reduced?”3 Why did he and many other onetime slaves in the Haitian Revolution fight 
under the banners of Spanish royalism against a French Republic that came to profess 
universal liberty and equal citizenship? Any answer must involve decoupling dyads that 
are often assumed in modern thought, such as slavery-racism or republicanism-liberty, in 
favor of an interpretation grounded in the profoundly uncertain political context of 
Hispaniola in the 1790s. The power of these dyads indeed derives in part from concepts 
of freedom and citizenship in whose development Caribbean slaves and freed people—
even those who did not seek an immediate end to the slave system—played important 
roles. Though Biassou for instance never advocated the wholesale dismantling of slavery, 
the resonance of the political discourses that he and other freed military leaders crafted 
proved important in bringing about the abolition of slavery in French Saint-Domingue in 
1793-1794. While the radical demands for freedom advanced by the thousands of slaves 
who had risen against their masters in French Saint-Domingue in August 1791 were 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Biassou to García, 24 August 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 12. 
3 Biassou to García, 24 August 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 12. In the original text: “…emprehendì una guerra 
para salvar a mi Rey…nadie havia todavìa atrevìdose a tomar las Armas para livertar a tan gran Rey de la 
tiranía a que estava reducido.” 
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indispensible in forcing the new French Republic to move beyond what Fernando Coronil 
has termed the “provincial universalism” of a polity that professed the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man for the metropole and slavery for the colonies, the heterogeneous 
liberation discourses of ex-slave officers such as Biassou impelled key French 
Republican officials in Saint-Domingue to recapture the intellectual and moral high 
ground from their Spanish enemies by abolishing slavery.
4
  
From the island‟s formal separation into French and Spanish zones at the end of 
the seventeenth century, French Saint-Domingue and Spanish Santo Domingo had 
developed in ways that were at once interdependent and quite distinct. While 
dramatically different systems of slavery and agricultural production emerged in each 
colony, frequent migration by slaves and others, licit and illicit economic exchange, 
continuing disputes over the colonial border, and the formation of cross-border “maroon” 
(or fugitive slave) communities bound these colonies together in the century preceding 
the revolution. These patterns influenced the course of events on the island after 1789, 
and one can see the 1793 decrees proclaiming an end to slavery in Saint-Domingue as a 
realization of struggles against slavery that had transpired in both parts of the island. 
Vernacular conceptions of citizenship, freedom and race that had developed in both 
colonies, as well as the recurring conflicts between the French and Spanish colonial 
regimes in the eighteenth century, influenced the trajectory of revolutionary conflict on 
the island in the first half of the 1790s. 
In late August 1791, thousands of slaves in the rich northern province of French 
Saint-Domingue took advantage of the upheaval of the French Revolution to carry out a 
                                                 
4 Fernando Coronil, “After Empire: Reflections on Imperialism from the Américas,” in Imperial 
Formations, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue (Santa Fe, NM: School for 
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massive uprising that Biassou would later frame as a “counter-revolution.” Less than two 
years later, geopolitical shifts would transform the unsuccessful military campaigns 
undertaken by French forces aiming to crush this insurgency. When Spain and France 
went to war in 1793, both powers (in addition to the British who also declared war on 
France in 1793 and who invaded Saint-Domingue in September of that year) attempted to 
enlist these slaves-in-arms as soldiers and officers in their armies, promising freedom in 
exchange for military service.
5
 In their efforts to win over these insurgents, these powers 
competed to offer them a superior version of “liberty.” Within this context, Biassou and 
other men who had attained not only freedom but high military ranks in the service of 
Spain appealed to many slaves‟ aspirations for freedom as well as to the royalist 
sentiments that many appear to have held, helping the Spanish to recruit thousands of 
them as soldiers during this war. In their attempts to defuse the potency of these appeals, 
some French Republican leaders condemned both African and European kings as 
enslavers and as determined enemies of liberty, juxtaposing these monarchs with a 
Republic whose 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man now extended to all who lived in 
French territories. This helped to bring about the proclamations of general emancipation 
in Saint-Domingue that the French Civil Commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and 
Étienne Polverel issued in the latter half of 1793. 
Understanding the political context of the rise of Biassou and Toussaint 
necessitates taking seriously the royalist sympathies held by many slaves in both 
colonies. On 21 April 1792, a former plantation owner from Grande Ravine (Saint-
Domingue) named Peyredieu informed the Municipality of Cap Français (Le Cap) that, 
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during his two months of captivity among the “rebels” (révoltés), he had heard the ex-
slave rebel leader Jean-François state that these insurgents “did not fight for Freedom but 
to restore the [French] executive power as it was before the new constitution.”6 Why 
might an ex-slave claim that he was not fighting for “Freedom?” This is closely related to 
a question that historian David Geggus posed in a critique of Laurent Dubois‟s thesis that 
the Haitian Revolution represented a key moment in the foundation of modern 
democracy: why was the presence of royalist slaves and freed people in the Haitian 
Revolution a paradox at all? Geggus argued that early freed leaders such as Jean-François 
consistently shunned both universalist concepts of freedom and the goal of the complete 
elimination of slavery in Saint-Domingue in favor of the narrower objectives of securing 
freedom and a degree of material security for themselves and their followers. Even after 
the issuance of the 1793-1794 emancipation decrees, the revolution‟s leaders, according 
to Geggus, “never displayed the slightest regard for democracy.”7  
In seeking to explain why monarchical loyalties existed among slaves and freed 
individuals in this period, the secondary literature has offered numerous hypotheses 
related to both the circumstances of 1790s Hispaniola and broader Caribbean and Atlantic 
political currents. According to Laurent Dubois, slave rebels in the early 1790s in Saint-
Domingue had varied motivations for invoking “kingly” symbols and language, including 
the fact that the French king had indeed undercut the power of masters in various ways 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The present chapter discusses the British presence only peripherally. I examine the British occupation of 
parts of the island more closely in chapter 3. 
6 Declaration of M. Peyredieu to the Municipality of Le Cap, 21 April 1793, Centre d‟Accueil et de 
Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, Comité des Colonies (hereinafter CC) 
D/XXV/46, dossier 439. In the original French : “…Jean François qui lui disait qu‟ils ne se battaient pas 
pour la Liberté mais pour remettre le pouvoir exécutif comme il était avant la nouvelle constitution.” 
Emphasis in original.  
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during the eighteenth century; calculations as to the benefits of alliance with the royalist 
Spanish in Santo Domingo against the French Republic prior to the French abolition 
decrees of 1793-1794; and political ideas that had emerged in the African polities from 
which the majority of Saint-Domingue‟s slaves had come.8 John Thornton has illustrated 
that royalism among slaves and ex-slaves in the Haitian Revolution indeed had deep roots 
in African as well as European political history. For instance, conflicts over the proper 
extent of a king‟s powers fueled many of the eighteenth-century wars in the central 
African kingdom of Kongo which in turn led to the taking of thousands of captives, many 
of whom found themselves on slave ships bound for Saint-Domingue and other parts of 
the Americas.
9
  
Furthermore, notwithstanding the rhetoric of Sonthonax and Polverel, the history 
of the Americas in the century after 1789 shows quite clearly that republicanism did not 
always go hand-in-hand with abolitionism, while royalist powers did not always maintain 
slavery in their territories. Places such as the republican French Caribbean from 1792 to 
1794 and the United States until 1865 retained slave labor, while the royalist British 
empire was the first to permanently end slavery in its domains (1834-1838). Within the 
context of what Thornton has called the “dynamic tension” between absolutism and more 
representative forms of government that characterized politics in much of Africa, Europe 
and the Americas during the late eighteenth century, those held in captivity in Hispaniola 
and elsewhere struggled to negotiate the best possible circumstances for themselves.
10
 As 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 David Geggus, “The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution,” in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, 
c. 1760-1840, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 96-
97. 
8 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2004), 104-109, esp. 106-109.  
9 Thornton, “„I Am the Subject of the King of Kongo.‟”  
10 Thornton, “„I Am the Subject of the King of Kongo,‟” 187. 
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Dubois has written, “both royalist and republican discourses were deployed, indeed 
subsumed, by insurgents in the articulation of their central goal: a reform and, eventually, 
an abolition of slavery.”11 Those slaves and freed individuals who espoused ideas 
associated with monarchism had their own distinct visions of “liberty” that helped to 
bring about the formal end of slavery in Saint-Domingue (and subsequently Santo 
Domingo).  
Through their words and their actions, slaves and former slaves in revolutionary 
Hispaniola mounted rhetorical and political challenges to the old colonial order that 
reverberated far beyond the island to influence the formation of modern ideas of political 
legitimacy. At the core of the definition of political legitimacy lies the question of who 
can exercise authority over others, and on what terms. The political discourses of 
individuals such as Biassou emerged within the context of the options they faced and the 
choices they made during the wars of the early 1790s. With the partial exception of 
several U.S. states, Hispaniola after 1793 was the site of the hemisphere‟s first 
experiment with general emancipation, where administrators, former slaves, ex-masters, 
and others grappled with the notion of a society where all possessed citizenship and the 
rights to their own bodies.  
In the Haitian Revolution, slaves, freed individuals, and free-born persons “of 
color” infused republican and royalist discourses with the example of their struggles and 
the ideas born of these struggles. Those former slaves like Biassou who were fortunate 
enough to have the opportunity to record their thoughts left a lasting written record of 
their political ideas, but their counterparts without such privilege left their own record by 
                                                 
11 Laurent Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French 
Atlantic,” Social History 31, no. 1 (February 2006), 11. 
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means of their actions. During the first half of the 1790s in Hispaniola, multiple local and 
international forces created radical new political possibilities in a world that had been 
largely defined by racial subjugation and the reduction of human beings to units of 
labor—possibilities epitomized by former slaves‟ reworkings of the images and ideas of 
colonialism to create new spaces of liberation and broader political participation. 
 
The Shadow of the “Long” Eighteenth Century: Santo Domingo and the Ogé 
Rebellion 
  
 On 23 February 1791, executioners working in the service of the French colonial 
regime in Saint-Domingue tortured and executed Vincent Ogé and Jean-Baptiste 
Chavannes, placing their heads on pikes afterwards as grisly warnings to those who 
would emulate them. A wealthy merchant from the northern Dominguan town of 
Dondon, Ogé had been in Paris on business in 1789 when he became involved in a 
struggle led by another rich Dominguan man of color, Julien Raimond, to secure voting 
rights for propertied free men of color and to enable them to serve in the French National 
Assembly. During his stay in Paris, Ogé met with several prominent lawyers and political 
figures including the Marquis de Lafayette and the British abolitionist Thomas Clarkson. 
He also filed a cahier de doléances (petition of grievances) to the National Assembly in 
an attempt to eliminate laws that disenfranchised people of color. Ogé then departed Paris 
following the Assembly‟s passage of a law on 28 March 1790 whose ambiguous wording 
Ogé and others interpreted to grant political rights to all male property owners regardless 
of race. After arriving in Saint-Domingue in October 1790, Ogé and the free-colored 
militia officer Chavannes wrote to Governor Philibert François Rouxel de Blanchelande 
demanding that he immediately recognize the political rights for free men of color 
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ostensibly granted in the 28 March law. Following Blanchelande‟s rebuff, Ogé and 
Chavannes raised an armed force of over three hundred free men of color in the parish of 
Grande Rivière, about a dozen miles from Le Cap. Despite winning several victories 
against troops sent by the colonial regime to crush their uprising, Ogé and Chavannes 
eventually disbanded their army and departed Grande Rivière. They sought refuge in 
Spanish Santo Domingo but were extradited by Governor-General Joaquín García in 
January 1791. The following month, French authorities executed Ogé and twenty-three of 
his followers and sentenced another thirteen to slavery.
12
  
 While scholars have mostly framed the Ogé affair within the context of the 
struggle for racial equality in Saint-Domingue and the French empire, it also emerged 
from a distinct Dominican political and racial context. In both of the island‟s colonies 
some non-whites had long managed to create and exploit certain avenues for relative 
social mobility; these histories converged in the Ogé affair and other episodes in the 
Haitian Revolution. As a prominent member of the most economically and politically 
influential free-colored population in the history of the colonial Americas, Ogé himself 
epitomized the unique power of this intermediate group in French Saint-Domingue. 
Although there was an enormous degree of economic diversity within this group (called 
gens de couleur libres, or “free people of color,” in local parlance), by 1790 the gens de 
couleur libres represented about half of the free population in Saint-Domingue. Among 
their number were men and women who owned plantations and slaves; gens de couleur 
libres also practiced a number of urban and rural trades. They also constituted the bulk of 
                                                 
12 John Garrigus, “„Thy coming fame, Ogé! Is sure:‟ New Evidence on Ogé‟s 1790 Revolt and the 
Beginnings of the Haitian Revolution,” in Assumed Identities: The Meanings of Race in the Atlantic World, 
ed. John Garrigus and Christopher Morris (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 19-
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the colonial militia or maréchaussée which was dedicated to defending internal order—a 
task which often translated into keeping slaves docile and productive as well as 
recapturing those who refused and fled the plantations.
13
  
Historians such as John Garrigus, Laurent Dubois and others have attributed the 
emergence of this relatively wealthy segment of the free-colored population partly to 
patterns of manumission, marriage and inheritance that enabled some freed people and 
their descendants to accumulate significant resources over time. Many free-colored 
individuals also profited greatly from their entrepreneurship in the cultivation of coffee, 
the basis of Ogé‟s wealth, which was favored by much of the colony‟s mountainous 
topography and which required little start-up capital relative to sugar.
14
 Furthermore, as 
Garrigus has shown, the cultivation of indigo proved integral in the rise of a “prosperous 
free colored class” in parts of Saint-Domingue‟s remote southern province by 1760.15  
 Tensions gradually emerged between members of this “prosperous free colored 
class” and the influx of poor white settlers who traveled to the colony from France 
seeking their fortune. These conflicts help account for the racist turn of colonial politics 
and law starting in the 1760s. Many of the racist laws and practices against which Ogé 
protested derived in part from a fierce backlash against free-colored social and economic 
mobility that transpired in the latter part of the eighteenth century in French Saint-
                                                                                                                                                 
45; John Garrigus, Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 236-249; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 80-88. 
13 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 30 and 64-67; Garrigus, Before Haiti, 2-3, 100-109 and 201-213; 
and Stewart R. King, Blue Coat or Powdered Wig: Free People of Color in Pre-Revolutionary Saint-
Domingue (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), xv-xvi. According to Stewart R. King, the French 
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Domingue. Garrigus has argued that as the plantation complex in Saint-Domingue 
solidified after the end of the Seven Years‟ War in 1763, the relatively high degree of 
racial tolerance that had prevailed earlier became undermined by a wave of new 
legislation (passed by colonial authorities and supported by many white settlers) that 
ranged from restrictions on interracial dining to prohibitions on non-whites holding 
public office. These laws had several interrelated aims: to ensure the political 
disfranchisement of free people of color; to curb their rising economic power; to weaken 
the deep familial, social and economic ties that many whites had shared with many gens 
de couleur libres; and to limit the free-colored population‟s numbers by means of taxes 
and other hindrances to manumission.
16
  
Not surprisingly, many free people of color had angrily protested these 
restrictions and the racist logic which underlay them. Several influential representatives 
of this group had worked in Paris to further the cause of racial equality, of which the two 
best-known were Ogé and Julien Raimond, a wealthy indigo planter of French and 
African ancestry from the southern part of Saint-Domingue.
17
 Raimond, Ogé and their 
partisans had demanded the repeal of these racist laws and the granting of full political 
rights to free men of color to match their contributions in taxes and defense to Saint-
Domingue. Nonetheless, many free-colored activists had refused to advocate the 
immediate end of slavery in Saint-Domingue or in any other French colony, hoping to 
defuse white opponents‟ constant accusations of undermining the slaveholding order by 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 John Garrigus, “Blue and Brown: Contraband Indigo and the Rise of a Free Colored Planter Class in 
French Saint-Domingue,” The Americas 50, no. 2 (October 1993): 233-263 (quote is from p. 237). 
16 Garrigus, Before Haiti, esp. Introduction and chapters 5 and 8. See also Dubois, Avengers of the New 
World, chapter 3, esp. 60-65.  
17 For information on Julien Raimond‟s background and role in struggles against institutionalized racism in 
Saint-Domingue in the 1780s and early 1790s, see Garrigus, Before Haiti, esp. Introduction and chapters 4-
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framing their attainment of juridical equality as a means by which to strengthen 
authorities‟ and masters‟ control over the huge slave population.18 The campaign of Ogé 
and Raimond for racial equality acquired new meanings—and, the two men hoped, a 
greater chance of success—upon the advent of the French Revolution with the king‟s 
summoning of the Estates General (1788), the fall of the Bastille prison (14 July 1789), 
and the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in late August 
1789. Nevertheless, free-colored demands for equality continued to meet with ferocious 
opposition in both metropolitan France and in the colonies. The escalation of the white-
free-colored conflict into an armed struggle in Saint-Domingue the first years of the 
1790s led some to seek refuge from the racial violence across the border in Santo 
Domingo. For instance, one man on 24 February 1790 fled an armed confrontation in the 
western town of Saint-Marc to “take refuge in the Spanish part.”19 
Though these free-colored activists walked a political tightrope in arguing for 
race-neutral laws for the colony‟s free population while often defending a slave system 
that by the late eighteenth century had become intensely racialized, their actions helped to 
enable the passage of metropolitan laws that abolished first institutionalized racism and 
then slavery. The advancement of demands for equality and access to the institutions of 
governance by the counterparts of the gens de couleur libres in Santo Domingo likewise 
                                                                                                                                                 
9; and John Garrigus, “Opportunist or Patriot? Julien Raimond (1744-1801) and the Haitian Revolution,” 
Slavery and Abolition 28, no. 1 (2007): 1-21.  
18 Free-colored activists working against discriminatory legislation split over the question of slavery. While 
some joined or supported the abolitionist Society of the Friends of the Blacks (founded in 1788 by the 
activist and politician Jacques-Pierre Brissot), others such as Raimond (who owned dozens of slaves) 
argued that granting free men of color equal citizenship rights would reward and ensure their vital role in 
protecting the slave system. Garrigus, Before Haiti, chapters 7-8 (esp. 234-263). 
19 Notes from San Rafael, 1 March 1790, Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI), Seville, Spain, 
Audiencia de Santo Domingo (hereinafter ASD) 1027. In the original text: “El dìa siguiente llegñ…a 
refugiarse en la parte Española.” On these armed white-free-colored conflicts, see Carolyn Fick, The 
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influenced Spanish authorities‟ responses to the crises in Saint-Domingue and laid some 
of the groundwork for the claims-making of formally freed Dominicans after the advent 
of formal emancipation there in 1795. While Dominguan authorities had passed these 
racist laws in late colonial Saint-Domingue largely in response to perceived non-white 
mobility, in Spanish Santo Domingo the frequent inability of colonial authorities to 
enforce the multiplicity of racist statutes that had been on the books for centuries, along 
with the relative paucity of white settlers, provided openings for many free individuals of 
African heritage. According to Richard Turits, such individuals sometimes attained 
important positions in the military, Church, government, and other institutions in defiance 
of laws that barred non-whites from these posts.
20
 
From the vantage point of those targeted by racial repression in Saint-Domingue, 
this relative mobility sometimes appeared to constitute evidence of Dominican society‟s 
greater egalitarianism. In one extended argument against racist legislation written to the 
French Minister of the Navy in 1786, Raimond had contended that the inhabitants of 
Spanish Santo Domingo did not share the “contempt” that the French in Saint-Domingue 
held towards free people of color, who “enjoy in this part of the island [Santo Domingo] 
the consideration that every honest citizen ought to expect from society.”21 Yet Ogé 
quickly discovered that Santo Domingo‟s own entrenched racial order strongly 
influenced his reception in the eastern part of the island.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1990), chapter 5. 
20 Richard Turits, “Par-delà les plantations: Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo,” 
Genèses 66 (March 2007), 58-59.  
21 Raimond to Minister of the Navy Castries, 1786, Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), 
Aix-en-Provence, France, Collection Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 91. In the original text: 
“Les Espagnols qui partagent avec nous l‟Isle de St Domingue, ne font point éprouvée aucune espèce de 
mépris aux sujets semblables à la classe des suppliants. Ils jouissent dans cette partie de l‟isle de la 
considération que tout citoyen honnête doit attendre de la société.” 
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Ogé and his contingent of survivors (who numbered twenty-six according to a 15 
July 1791 report by the Council of the Indies, Spain‟s principal governing body on 
colonial matters) had crossed the border into Santo Domingo in the hopes that Spanish 
authorities, who had long quarreled with their French counterparts on a variety of issues, 
might grant these men asylum or even military support.
22
 Both the language and context 
of Ogé‟s appeal to these Spanish leaders and the justifications offered by the latter for 
rejecting these entreaties reflected the centrality of Spanish Santo Domingo in these 
struggles to open the arena of citizenship.  
As a well-off property owner who had rejected some sympathizers‟ suggestions 
that he mobilize slaves, Ogé gambled on winning the support of some elite Dominicans, 
yet in the end he could not escape his association with the ferment in the neighboring 
colony.
23
 In a 12 November 1790 letter to Spanish colonial officials, Ogé presented 
himself not as a rebel leader but as an “Ambassador” who along with other “men of color 
from the French part” had been sent to Santo Domingo to “swear an Oath of Loyalty” as 
“faithful subjects of the King of Spain as of the King of France.” In Ogé‟s recounting, he 
and his followers had been wrongfully arrested and detained in Hincha (near the colonial 
border) after soliciting a “Passport” from the “Commandant of San Rafael.” While Ogé 
had hoped that the French government would make good on the promises implicit in the 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to abolish the racist laws that had 
consigned even wealthy slaveholding non-whites in Saint-Domingue to second-class 
citizenship, he was savvy enough to appeal to the political convictions of his Spanish 
                                                 
22 Report on Ogé affair by Spanish Council of the Indies, 15 July 1791, AGI ASD 1029. 
23 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 134-135. See also Julius Scott, “The Common Wind: Currents of 
Afro-American Communication in the Era of the Haitian Revolution” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1986), 
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hosts during his stay in Santo Domingo. “The disappointments that men of color have 
experienced in the French part for two hundred years,” Ogé asserted, “[and] the aid and 
the refuge that they have had in the Spanish part unites them more than ever to your 
Fatherland.”24 
In presenting his plight as part of a long history of racial conflict and assistance-
granting that had transpired across the entire island, Ogé suggested that the stakes of his 
campaign involved Spanish Santo Domingo. On this point Governor García and other 
Spanish authorities agreed, but for very different reasons. In offering asylum to Ogé and 
his partisans, García worried that he would “violate the general treaties of alliance of both 
nations” on “reciprocal restitutions” of fugitives and on the “demarcations of Limits” 
between the two colonies that both monarchs had signed. “I would have made myself 
guilty,” García wrote, “if I had lent acquiescence and shelter to this wicked attempt of 
Ogé…betraying the obligations of friendship and mutual aid which the treaties of the 
sovereigns impose on these Governments.” Such assistance would moreover prove 
particularly egregious due to Ogé‟s lack of real political authority in García‟s eyes. 
According to García, Ogé and Chavannes had presented themselves as “ambassadors, as 
if there were already a Mulatto state within the French Part, capable of sending a 
                                                                                                                                                 
179-180; and Carlos Esteban Deive, La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492-1844) (Santo 
Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 1980), 191-200. 
24 Ogé to Spanish authorities, 12 November 1790, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: “Yo tengo el honor 
de escribiros la presente para preveniros que yo soy enviado de la parte de los hombres de color de la 
parte francesa para prestar juramento de fidelidad en vuestras manos como que nosotros somos tan fieles 
súbditos del Rey de España como del Rey de Francia…Nosotros habemos suplicado un Pasaporte del 
Senor Comandante de San Rafael, nosotros nos hemos puesto en camino para Santo Domingo, y en Hincha 
nosotros hemos sido detenidos, constituidos prisioneros y en Bánica nosotros hemos tenido el disgusto 
vernos poner los Grillos. Tengo el honor de representar a VM mi Senor que nuestra misión nos hace 
exentos de disgustos siendo enviados como Embajadores acerca de VM para prestar el Juramento de 
Fidelidad…Los disgustos que los hombres de color han probado en la parte francesa desde doscientos 
años, los socorros y refugio que ellos han tenido en la parte Española los une más que nunca a vuestra 
Patria.” 
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delegation, full powers, and sovereign elections.”25 Spanish officials also acted against 
Ogé due to anxieties that he might incite Santo Domingo‟s own free-colored majority to 
revolt. According to the Council of the Indies, these authorities sent Ogé back to Saint-
Domingue partly out of their concern to “avoid sparking the fire of sedition among the 
many people of castes that there are in the Spanish part.” “Although nothing has been 
discovered against the loyalty of the Spanish Mulattos,” the authors of this report 
continued, “it was suitable to continue the confidential investigations and detain the 
Guilty ones.”26 
Why did Spanish colonial authorities condemn Ogé to certain death at the hands 
of their French counterparts and then proceed to offer material assistance to some of the 
slaves who carried out the August 1791 revolt? In Santo Domingo, Ogé found himself the 
victim of a confluence of racial fears, ideological distrust, and political expediency. 
Reinterpreting his ill-fated struggle and death as an island-wide story hints at its larger 
reverberations and significance beyond the French world and raises new questions 
concerning the course of events. It also illustrates the importance of eighteenth-century 
                                                 
25 García to don Antonio Porlier, 31 December 1790, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: “…Ogé y 
Chavanne infelizmente alucinados se llegaron a imaginar con prerrogativas de embaxadores, como que ya 
huviese un estado de Mulatos dentro de la Parte Francesa, capaz de expedir embajada, plenos poderes, y 
actos de elecciones de soberano…No pudieron creer que la espaðola aceptase su ofrecimiento sin 
aprontarse al instante a romper los tratados generales de alianza de ambas naciones, los municipales o 
contraìdos a este Dominio, ya sobre restituciones recìprocas, ya sobre demarcaciones de Lìmites…Yo me 
huviera hecho reo si hubiera prestado aquiescencia y abrigo a esta malvada tentativa de 
Ogé…traicionando los deberes de amistad y mutuo socorro que imponen a estos Gobiernos los tratados de 
los soberanos. ” According to Carlos Esteban Deive, the French official Cambefort demanded Ogé‟s 
immediate extradition from Santo Domingo in accordance with the “police treaty of 1777.” Carlos Esteban 
Deive, “Les réfugiés français dans la partie espagnole de l‟ile Saint-Domingue au temps de la fronde des 
Grands Blancs et de la révolte des Mulâtres,” in Saint-Domingue espagnol et la révolution nègre d‟Haïti 
(1790-1822), ed. Alain Yacou (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 131. 
26 Report on Ogé affair by Council of the Indies, 15 July 1791, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: 
“…deseando evitar q[ue] encendiese el fuego de la sedicion entre la mucha gente de castas que hay en la 
parte Española: Mandó a los comandantes de la Frontera que arrestasen y conduxesen presos a Sto 
Domingo los que entrasen en ella…aunque no se descubrìa cosa alguna contra la lealtad de los Mulatos 
Españoles, convenia continuar las indagaciones reservadas y retener los Reos.” The term “casta” had 
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precedents in shaping this episode‟s outcome. Ogé for instance seems to have hoped to 
exploit contentious relations between the two colonial regimes, which throughout the 
century had engaged in continual disputes over matters such as the extradition of fugitive 
slaves, the precise definition of the inter-colonial border, and French settlements on what 
Spanish authorities deemed to be Spanish land.
27
 These dynamics would take new form 
when thousands of slaves laid waste to the plantation infrastructure of northern Saint-
Domingue in late summer 1791.  
 
“A Global Upheaval:” The 1791 Slave Revolt and Santo Domingo 
                                                                                                                                                 
varied meanings in colonial Spanish America, but it typically referred to those who were not identified as 
either Spanish or Indian.   
27 According to Moreau de St Méry, the problem of fugitive slaves crossing the colonial border had 
provoked spats between the two powers since at least the early eighteenth century. On 1 December 1710 
for instance the rulers of French Saint-Domingue issued an order that entrusted an official named M. 
Beaussan de Petit-Bois to arrest all “fugitive French blacks” (nègres fugitifs français) in Santo Domingo 
and to bring legal suits against “Spaniards” (espagnols) who had captured these fugitives or “granted them 
freedom” (leur auraient donné la liberté). M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et 
politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 
2:172-174. France and Spain had also signed several treaties in the 1760s and 1770s that had stipulated the 
extradition of fugitives from one territory to the other and the punishment (by fines) of those who sheltered 
slave runaways. These accords also attempted to proscribe unauthorized settlements. For instance, one 
treaty drawn up on 11 December 1766 by the Captain General of Santo Domingo, don Manuel de Azlor, 
and Saint-Domingue‟s Governor M. de la Valtière stipulated in its first article that all “Black fugitives, 
called maroons of one or another Nation, will be exactly and in good faith returned….paying always the 
same price of twenty five pesos that the treaty of seventeen sixty two stipulated.” Article III stated that the 
“most appropriate means” were to be employed against “Black maroons, united and fortified in the 
untamed lands, near the Border” in order to capture them and to “totally destroy their establishments.” 
Article IV prohibited residents of either colony from undertaking any work “on lands beyond the limits that 
are conceded, nor on uncertain or disputed land” on pain of a one-hundred peso fine. Franco-Spanish treaty 
of 11 December 1766, AGI ASD 1101. In the original text: “Que los Negros fugitivos, llamados 
cimarrones, de una y otra Nación, serán exactamente y de buena fe restituidos, como tambien los Negros 
[illegible], pagando siempre el mismo precio de veinte y cinco pesos que fue estipulado por el tratado de 
mil setecientos sesenta y dos…Sobre los Negros cimarrones, unidos y fortificados en los Montes, cerca de 
las Fronteras…se tomaran los medios más propios para aprender los d[ichos] Negros, y destruir 
totalmente sus establecimientos…Se prohìbe a todos los Havitantes de las Fronteras…de hacer trabajo 
alguno sobre sus terrenos más allá de los límites que están concedidos, ni sobre el terreno dudoso o 
disputable, vajo la pena de cien pesos de multa.” The Treaty of Aranjuez, signed in 1777 by French and 
Spanish colonial officials, represented a compilation of earlier accords which attempted to resolve 
continuing boundary disputes and mandated the prompt return of fugitive slaves to their masters. See 
Carlos Esteban Deive, Los guerrilleros negros: Esclavos fugitivos y cimarrones en Santo Domingo (Santo 
Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1989), 191-194; and Treaty of Aranjuez, 3 June 1777, AGI 
ASD 1019. On the French settlements, see Joseph Solano to don Julián de Arriaga, 25 November 1774, 
AGI ASD 1019. 
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In September 1791, Governor García wrote to a count named Alange with 
frightening news. An armed uprising had erupted in the environs of Le Cap (called 
“Guárico” by the Spanish) in the northern part of the neighboring colony in which “black 
slaves, some free mulattos,” and even some whites had in García‟s recounting undertaken 
a campaign to kill planters, burn the plantations, and ultimately murder “every white 
man” in the area (except, presumably, those involved in the revolt). Clearly shocked at 
the extent of the rebellion and unnerved at its potential implications for his own 
slaveholding colony, García informed Alange that the “public enemies,” by virtue of their 
superior numbers and zealous determination to wreak havoc in Saint-Domingue, had 
neutralized almost all French officials‟ attempts to suppress them. The only individual 
who had experienced less than complete failure against these rebels, García wrote, was 
the Marquis de Rouvray, who at the head of six hundred men had “succeeded in 
destroying a large number of blacks,” but only at the cost of the “dismembering” of many 
of his men. García further wrote that “in this confederation [of rebels], one finds many 
blackened whites, which are those who direct the most atrocious deeds, and the most 
severe crimes.”28 Although García thus appears to have initially credited white leaders 
with a significant if not the dominant role in fomenting this violence, in reality this revolt 
was the result of meticulous planning and execution by a well-organized cadre of slaves.  
                                                 
28 Joaquín García to conde del campo Alange, September 1791, AGS GM 7149, f. 439. In the original text: 
“La noche del 22 al 23 de Agosto último, se manifestñ en las inmediaciones del Guarico…una sublevacion 
de los negros esclavos, algunos mulatos libres, y blancos (según aseguran) dando principio con el 
depravado hecho de Incendiar las Habitaciones Azucarerías; matando a todo hombre blanco, y 
proclamando la libertad…En esta confederacion, se hallan muchos blancos tiznados, que son los que 
dirigen los hechos más atroces, y delitos de la mayor gravedad…los enemigos públicos son muchos, y los 
secretos suponen son de consideración. El Mariscal de Campo Marqués de Rouvray es el único que al 
frente de seiscientos hombres se halla acampado, y él que ha tenido algunos choques, que aunque he 
conseguido destruir mucha porción de negros, ha sido a costa de desmembracion de sus tropas.” 
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García did get part of the story right, though: during the night of 22-23 August 
1791, hundreds of forced laborers in the northern part of Saint-Domingue rose up, 
destroyed the plantations on which they had toiled, and killed many of their masters. 
Though it had arisen in part as a result of rumors that the French king had granted all 
slaves three free days a week and decreed other reformist measures such as the 
elimination of the hated whip, the revolt soon transformed into a campaign for more 
capacious aspirations for freedom. The leaders of this revolt were generally relatively 
privileged slaves who exercised authority over other bonded laborers and who enjoyed a 
comparative autonomy which surpassed that of most other slaves.
29
 These advantages 
enabled them to organize the rebellion efficiently and to recruit other slaves to their 
cause.  
The early leadership of the rebellion also drew political, moral and spiritual 
strength from its connections to Vodou, a complex Afro-Caribbean religion which 
developed in eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue out of a mixture of Catholicism and the 
African religions that slaves brought with them across the Middle Passage and reinvented 
in America.
30
 The first major leader of the great revolt, a slave named Boukman Dutty, 
possessed not only the secular authority of coachman on an important plantation but also, 
according to many accounts, exercised spiritual authority as a Vodou priest who was 
alleged to have presided over a ceremony which many Haitian national histories claim to 
have ignited the 1791 rebellion.
31
 While the precise connection between Vodou and the 
                                                 
29 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 97-98.  
30 For a discussion of Vodou and its effects on slave resistance and the August 1791 revolt, see Fick, The 
Making of Haiti, 41-45 and 91-94.  
31 Conventionally referred to as the Bois-Caïman (Alligator Woods) Ceremony, this event is said to have 
involved a secret gathering of many slaves on the night of 14 August 1791. Boukman allegedly oversaw a 
pig sacrifice and a public declaration to make war on the masters and to fight for freedom. For an 
evaluation of the historical evidence on this event, see David Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies 
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22-23 August insurrection remains hotly debated, Afro-Caribbean religious symbols and 
traditions fostered unity among slaves divided by birthplace, ethnicity, and language; this 
would help prevent the movement‟s disintegration following Boukman‟s death in 
November 1791. Among the men who vied for leadership of the insurrection were 
Georges Biassou, who also was reportedly a Vodou devotee, and a black creole 
(Dominguan-born) slave known as Jean-François.
32
  
 After receiving word of the rebellion in Saint-Domingue, Governor García acted 
promptly to secure the Spanish portion of the island, deploying several regiments of 
troops under his most trusted lieutenants to the most sensitive border areas in order to 
secure the “defense of the border.”33 As time wore on, García observed with dismay the 
inability of French authorities to put down the rebellion and restore order in the colony. 
This owed in part to bitter divisions within Saint-Domingue‟s free population, which 
became splintered along three principal axes of conflict: political ideology (monarchism 
versus republicanism); race and opinions concerning the question of free-colored 
equality; and economic philosophy (mercantilism versus freer trade). Under these 
conditions, many colonists chose to abandon the lives they had known in French Saint-
Domingue and emigrate. In an emotional letter to her daughter dated 4 September 1791, 
Madame de Rouvray, the wife of the planter who killed many rebel slaves with a force of 
six hundred men, exhorted her daughter to seek refuge outside of the island, preferably in 
Spanish Cuba, a colony only a short distance across the Windward Passage from Saint-
                                                                                                                                                 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), chapter 6. For a controversial intervention positing that 
extant historical records do not justify the claim that such a ceremony even took place, see Léon-François 
Hoffman, “Un mythe national: La cérémonie du Bois-Caïman,” in La République haïtienne: Etat des lieux 
et perspectives, ed. Gérard Barthélemy and Christian A. Girault (Paris: Karthala, 1993), 434-448. 
32 Fick, The Making of Haiti, 113.  
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Domingue, and one where slavery and racial hierarchy remained firmly entrenched. 
Detailing the burning of the plantations and the death of many planters, Madame de 
Rouvray posed a question which many of her counterparts were no doubt also asking 
themselves: “How [does one of the planter class] remain in a country where the slaves 
have raised their hand against their masters?”34 On 31 August 1791, her husband 
implored an unnamed “Spanish commander” to send him “aid” in his fight against the 
slave rebels, arguing that the lack of such assistance would contribute to the “end” of 
both colonies in Hispaniola in three months and the loss of all of Spain‟s colonies within 
two years.
35
 
 Other French authorities also called on Spanish officials to intervene, invoking 
accords signed earlier in the eighteenth century. In a letter to Governor García composed 
in the immediate aftermath of the 1791 slave revolt, Saint-Domingue‟s Governor 
Blanchelande for instance requested assistance in suppressing the rebellion. Declaring 
that “the white race, and the class of people of color, and free blacks are united, and it is 
only slaves that are in open revolt, and that kill their masters, and burn the plantations,” 
Blanchelande invoked Article IX of a recent Franco-Spanish treaty, which had stipulated 
that “in case of war or of unforeseen attack on one of the two parts of the Island, the 
nation [that was] not attacked will provide to the other all the assistance possible in men 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 García to Alange, September 1791, AGS GM 7149, f. 439. In the original text: “Yo he prevenido la 
defensa de la frontera, y todo nuestro Territorio poniendo sobre las Armas las milicias, arreglados, y 
urbanos.” 
34 Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 4 September 1791, in Une correspondance familiale au temps des 
troubles de Saint-Domingue, ed. M. E. McIntosh and B. C. Weber (Paris: Société de l‟Histoire des 
Colonies Françaises et Librairie Larose, 1959), 27. In the original text: “Cela nous fait toujours un grand 
tort pour le revenu de cette année et pour l‟autre et pour l‟avenir, car comment rester dans un pays où des 
esclaves ont levé la main sur leurs maîtres?” 
35 Marquis de Rouvray to “Spanish commander,” 31 August 1791, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: 
“Carta al comandante español el 31 de Agosto de 1791. Tengo el honor de prevenir a VM muy señor mio, 
que si VM no nos envía socorro, y prontamente, la colonia de Santo Domingo es acabada tanto por lo que 
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as well as in money.” In Blanchelande‟s eyes, four hundred to five hundred thousand 
“internal enemies” threatened to “decapitate” sixty thousand free Dominguans, and their 
Dominican counterparts might then suffer a similar fate. “After the defeat of the French,” 
the Dominguan governor wrote, “if [the slave rebels] are able to carry this out, the 
Spanish could have the same luck.”36 In response to these entreaties, García in a 25 
September 1791 letter to the Marquis de Bajamar denied that Article IX applied to the 
situation, which was in his mind a “domestic dispute” among “many whites and 
mulattos.”37 Political developments in Europe also influenced García‟s thinking. With the 
coming of the French Revolution, the French state had, according to García, “disrupted 
the order of its primary Laws,” and was now paying the price.38 
 In devising a response to the slave revolt in French Saint-Domingue, Spanish 
administrators were caught between the wish to suppress a possible threat to their own 
slaveholding territory and the presence of an opportunity to undermine their longstanding 
rivals. In the early 1790s, these authorities became involved in a delicate diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                 
toca a VM como para nosotros antes de tres meses. Así mismo prevengo a VM que en término de dos años 
Espana no tendrá más colonias, esto es un trastorno del globo.” 
36 Blanchelande to García, no date, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: “La raza blanca, y la clase de las 
gentes de color, y negros libres están reunidos, y no hay sino los esclavos que estén en el levantamiento 
abierto, y que matan a sus amos, e incendian las habitaciones…Que en case de guerra o de ataque 
imprevisto de una de las dos partes de la Isla, la nación no atacada proveerá a la otra todos los socorros 
posibles tanto en hombres como en dinero… Seguramente la parte francesa está bien atacada y en un 
grande peligro pues que tiene de cuatrocientos a quinientos mil enemigos dentro de sí. V.E. puede 
considerar bajo todos los respetos posibles su situación, y se verá siempre empeñada a socorrerla; aunque 
ella no fuese obligada (y ello lo debe), la humanidad debería traerla a impedir que sesenta mil almas sean 
degolladas por sus esclavos. Por otra parte no se engañe V. Yo no sé muy bien si después de haber 
conducido la muerte en la parte francesa, estos esclavos no formarían proyectos criminales sobre el 
Gobierno de V.E. Hay todo motivo de creerlo, por que después de la derrota de los franceses si ella se 
efectuase, los españoles deberían tener la misma suerte si ya no la sufriesen.” 
37 García to Bajamar, 25 September 1791, AGI ASD 1029. In the original text: “…le hacía ver que los 
disgustos de la colonia y desavenencias domésticas nacían entre sí por sus súbditos sobre dros [derechos] 
recíprocos, y por consiguiente no estaba en el caso de lo prevenido en el artículo 9… no ser el alboroto y 
sublevación de Negros esclavos, sino de muchos blancos y mulatos de consideración y de partidos 
enteros.” 
38 García to Alange, September 1791, AGS GM 7149, f. 439. In the original text: “No sé cómo deba mirar 
las colonia desde que la Francia en General, ha trastornado el orden de sus primeras Leyes.” 
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game of trying to minimize the adverse effects of the Saint-Domingue revolt on their own 
society while often tacitly aiding the Saint-Domingue rebels, who had taken up arms 
against the rival colonial power that had wrested the western third of Hispaniola from the 
Spanish crown a century earlier. After August 1791, García thus adopted a policy of 
official neutrality towards the neighboring colony while permitting the provision of 
assistance to the slave rebels.  
In Santo Domingo, Dominguan insurgents found that they could exchange items 
taken from ransacked plantations for much-needed arms and food. These economic and 
military incentives to trade became complemented by ideological ties. Even before news 
of the Franco-Spanish war reached the island in May 1793, many French slave rebels 
made appeals to God and King, partly out of a desire to foment collaboration with the 
Spanish. This in turn led some members of the Dominican clergy to herald these slave 
warriors as agents of divine retribution against the supposedly godless Republican 
regime.
39
 For instance, according to a 6 March 1793 account of battles between French 
colonial armies and slave rebels in northern Saint-Domingue, numerous captured 
insurgents had claimed that “they fight for the king, who has promised them general 
liberty, and that they will die with weapons in their hand.” Perhaps due in part to such 
royalist leanings, “the principal rebel leaders withdraw towards Spain [Santo 
Domingo].”40 
                                                 
39 David Geggus, “Slave Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean in the mid-1790s,” in A Turbulent Time: The 
French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, ed. David Geggus and David Gaspar (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 139; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 107-108. Dubois on these pages 
notes that “Spanish officers” sometimes visited insurgent camps on the border.  
40 “Extract from a particular letter from Cap Français, dated 6 March [1793],” ANOM CMSM F3 197. In 
the original text: “Les plus acharnés disent qu‟ils combattent pour le roi, qui leur a promis la liberté 
générale, et qu‟ils mourront les armes à la main…c‟est vers l‟Espagne que se retirent les principaux chefs 
des révoltés.” 
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The extent of the Spanish monetary and military aid to slave insurrectionists 
remains unclear, but the French General Pamphile de Lacroix would later write of an 
“infernal Machiavellianism” in which both parties worked together against a common 
enemy.
41
 For their part, Governor Blanchelande and some of his subordinates angrily 
protested that the material benefits accruing to both the Spanish in Santo Domingo and to 
the insurgent slaves had fueled this clandestine trade which these French officials 
demanded that their Spanish counterparts suppress. “[Many Dominicans] have not ceased 
to trade with the brigands,” wrote one French military officer. These Dominicans 
continued to “encourage [the slave rebels] in their crime; to give them provisions, arms 
and munitions; [and] to export the furniture of the burned plantations and the product of 
the slaves‟ thefts.” 42 
 By 6 December 1791, according to one report, ten to twelve thousand slave 
“rebels” were fighting under assorted chieftains; two to three thousand of these answered 
to Jean-François and Biassou who were based in Grande Rivière. The Comte de Gaston, 
this report‟s author, further argued that the “Mulattos” were the “hidden leaders of the 
revolt” who “had spread out easily and quickly in traversing the Spanish Lands with their 
Comrades and their brothers from Mirebalais [western Saint-Domingue].”43 For the next 
year and a half, the war between the French armies and the rebel slaves would remain a 
bloody stalemate despite compromises proposed by some rebel leaders to end the 
violence. Around the time of Boukman‟s demise in November 1791, Jean-François had 
                                                 
41 Pamphile de Lacroix, La Révolution d‟Haïti (Paris: 1819; reprint, Paris: Karthala, 1995), 92. 
42 Quoted in Deive, Los guerrilleros negros, 198-199.  
43 Comte de Gaston, “Summary of the Current Situation in the Colony of St Domingue,” 6 December 1791, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/5. In the original text: “Ces différents Camps sont occupés par environ 2 à 5 mille 
Nègres encore portant armes, ce qui élève le nombre total des révoltés à 10 ou 12 Mille actuellement…les 
Mulâtres chefs cachés de la révolte, se sont étendus facilement et promptement en traversant les Terres 
Espagnoles avec leurs Camarades et leurs freres de Mirebalais.” 
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through an intermediary presented a series of conditions for surrender to the Colonial 
Assembly: freedom for several hundred of the principal insurgents; complete amnesty for 
all rebels; and the prohibition of the use of the whip. French colonial authorities rejected 
these demands.
44
  
 News of the continuing bloodshed helped to enable the passage by the French 
National Assembly of a 4 April 1792 law that finally granted equal political rights to free 
people of color in Saint-Domingue in unequivocal terms following a fitful series of 
legislative reversals and armed clashes between whites and free coloreds.
45
 The law‟s 
framers had designed it largely with the aim of ending the acrimonious struggle between 
these two groups so that they might put aside their differences to confront a common 
enemy. Yet anticipating the difficulties that would arise as authorities tried to enforce the 
new law, the National Assembly deployed a warship christened America to Saint-
Domingue that contained six thousand troops (more than France had sent several decades 
earlier to assist in the liberation of the Thirteen Colonies), a new Governor-General, and 
three members of a Civil Commission named Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, Étienne Polverel, 
and Jean-Antoine Ailhaud. The vessel arrived in the harbor of Le Cap on 13 September 
1792.
46
 
Sonthonax and Polverel (having been abandoned by Ailhaud soon after their 
arrival on the island) confronted an adversary that was perennially threatened by disunity 
in spite of its numerical superiority. Leaders such as Jean-François, Biassou, and an 
obscure but strong-willed and militarily- and politically-gifted former slave named 
                                                 
44 Fick, The Making of Haiti, 112-117. 
45 For a copy of the 4 April 1792 law, see “Law Relative to the Colonies and to the means to pacify the 
troubles there,” 4 April 1792, CARAN Comité de la Marine (hereinafter CM) D/XVI/16. 
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François Dominique Toussaint Louverture (who had joined the rebellion in November 
1791) competed for authority over the movement.
47
 At first, it appeared that Sonthonax 
and Polverel would prove no more willing than their predecessors to make meaningful 
concessions that might bring the warfare to a halt. In a 24 September 1792 proclamation 
to the “Free Men of Saint-Domingue,” the Civil Commissioners had declared that 
“slavery is necessary to agriculture and to the prosperity of the colonies, and it accords 
with neither our principles, nor the will of the national assembly and of the king, to affect 
in this regard the prerogatives of the colonists.”48 Nonetheless, several months of military 
setbacks against foreign enemies as well as both enslaved and freed warriors led these 
men to reconsider this position. 
The violence also thrust difficult choices upon more ordinary folks, who weighed 
whether to leave behind their homes, properties and former lives in the name of safety or 
to stay and attempt to survive a war whose outcome was uncertain. Many who chose the 
former option sought refuge in nearby Santo Domingo. This choice in large part reflected 
the simple fact that several of the Dominguan parishes which formed the locus of the 
August 1791 revolt were located on or near the border with Santo Domingo, as were 
important parts of the French colony‟s western province that had witnessed many white-
free colored battles. On 18 November 1792, García informed a man named Pedro Acuña 
that in late October several of García‟s subordinates had helped to resettle numerous 
“Free mulattos” from Saint-Domingue who were “requesting asylum in our lands to free 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Jeremy Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23. 
47 Fick, The Making of Haiti, 116-117. 
48 Sonthonax, Polverel and Ailhaud to “Free Men of Saint-Domingue,” 24 September 1792, ANOM 
Correspondance au départ (hereinafter CD) B 277. In the original text: “Nous déclarons que l‟esclavage 
est nécessaire à la culture et à la prospérité des colonies, et qu‟il n‟est ni dans les principes, ni dans la 
volonté de l‟assemblée nationale ou du roi, de toucher à cet égard aux prérogatives des colons.” 
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themselves from the furor of the Blacks who pursue their lives.” “The Blacks traverse the 
entire frontier [with Santo Domingo] pursuing families of Mulattos, free Blacks, and 
Whites that they encounter,” García wrote. “Neither women, nor young children are 
pardoned, and people look from the Spanish land with great vigilance and caution.” In 
their efforts to assist these refugees, Spanish authorities resettled near Marmelade (a 
northern parish in Saint-Domingue on the colonial border) seventy-two “Persons of color 
of both sexes, fleeing the harshness of the Blacks.”49 Such flight appears to have had 
significant demographic effects in Santo Domingo. In 1793 Fernando Portillo y Torres, 
the archbishop of Santo Domingo, described that colony as “a dominion on Spanish land 
almost more populated by Frenchmen than by Spaniards.” Many of these refugees had 
according to Portillo arrived on “unarmed Boats…loaded with Frenchmen, and French 
women, who flee from the colony [Saint-Domingue].”50 
Enslaved refugees also made their way across the border to Santo Domingo, 
prompting some Spanish and French colonial authorities to temporarily close ranks for 
the sake of peace and stability. In November 1792, Gaspar de Casasola, a Spanish official 
in the town of Dajabón near the border with Saint-Domingue, promised the acting 
governor of Saint-Domingue, Donatien Marie Joseph de Rochambeau, that he would 
return to French officials the nearly one hundred fugitive slaves under his control plus 
                                                 
49 García to Pedro Acuña, 18 November 1792, AGS GM 7157, f. 71. In the original text: “El 27 se 
presentaron en el Limite…veinte y seis mulatos Libres con quatro mugeres suplicando el asilo de nuestros 
terrenos para libertarse del furor de los Negros que perseguìan sus vidas…Los Negros recorren toda la 
parte de frontera persiguiendo a las familias de Mulatos, Negros libres y Blancos que encuentran; no son 
perdonados ni mugeres, ni los niños de menor edad, y se miran desde el terreno español con una vigilancia 
y cuidado grande. En los días siguientes han pasado por Villarubia setenta y dos Personas de color de 
ambos sexos, huyendo del rigor de los Negros, los quales han sido recibidas y pasadas a la Mermelada 
como los antecedentes.” 
50 Fernando Portillo y Torres to Pedro Acuña, 25 September 1793, AGI ASD 1110. In the original text: 
“Muy Señor mio, una colonia dominada, y débilmente sostenida por Negros, y Mulatos, y un dominio en 
terreno Espaðol mas poblado casi de franceses, q[ue] de Espaðoles…Se han hecho varias presas, o por 
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any who fled to Dajabón in the future in order to preserve “the strongest union of the two 
nations” and to “return to the colony [Saint-Domingue] its former happiness.”51 In a 
report on military victories against the “brigands” in this border area dated 9 November 
1792, Rochambeau asserted that Casasola had exhibited the “happiest dispositions” 
towards his request for the prompt return of “many blacks who have taken refuge in 
Laxavon [Dajabón], that I have claimed from the governor by virtue of [several] treaties” 
signed between the two powers.
52
  
 The vicissitudes of race, imperial rivalry, and ideological conflict thus produced 
contradictory colonial policies in Santo Domingo with respect to the crisis in Saint-
Domingue. The outbreak of war between France and Spain in Europe in 1793 would 
transform this situation and reshape the political geography of the island.  
 
Slave-Based Realpolitik
53
 and the War for Hispaniola, 1793-1795 
 
 On the eve of the August 1791 slave uprising, a piece in a periodical based in Le 
Cap called Les Affiches Américaines had compared French soldiers under the ancien 
régime to “such perfect slaves,” who were subject to the most “cruel prejudice.” By 
                                                                                                                                                 
mejor decir sorpresas de Barcos desarmados, y casi sin tripulacion, cargados de franceses, y francesas, 
que huyen de la colonia.” 
51 Gaspar de Casasola to Rochambeau, 9 November 1792, AGS GM 7157, f. 70. In the original Spanish: 
“Yo daré cuenta a S.E. el Señor mi Gral que espero me aprovará esta mi determinacion a favor de los 
desgraciados proprietarios en obsequio de V.E. y de la mas estrecha union de las dos naciones…yo espero 
que V.E. hara volver a la colonia su antigua felicidad.”  
52 Report by Rochambeau on military events in northern Saint-Domingue, 9 November 1792, CARAN CC 
D/XXV/113, dossier 896. In the original text: “…il y a beaucoup de nègres réfugiés à Laxavon, que j‟ai 
reclamés du gouverneur en vertu des traités, et qui seront remis aux maîtres, en justifiant de la propriété, 
sans rétribution, ainsi que les mulets, chevaux et autres animaux. J‟ai trouvé à cet égard les plus heureuses 
dispositions de la part de Don Cassazola, gouverneur Espagnol à Laxavon.” 
53 I borrow the concept of realpolitik within an early-modern Caribbean context from Philip Boucher‟s use 
of the term to describe the role of the so-called “Island Carib” Amerindians in the imperial rivalries 
between the British, French and Dutch in the Caribbean, especially the Lesser Antilles. See Philip Boucher, 
Cannibal Encounters: Europeans and Island Caribs, 1492-1763 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), 2.  
64 
 
contrast, under the new order a man of even the humblest of backgrounds could acquire 
full citizenship following sixteen years of military service.
54
 On both sides of the Atlantic 
in the first years of the 1790s, uprisings against repressive old regimes in the French 
world and beyond gave rise to numerous rhetorical and armed contests over the shape of 
a new social order and the relationship that ought to exist between a state and its citizens. 
As this article‟s publication in a colonial periodical implies, these struggles in mainland 
France and in the outre-mer (overseas) territories became closely intertwined.
55
 As the 
efforts of slaves and free-coloreds were bringing about the end of institutionalized racism 
in the colonies, those who sometimes invoked the image of the “slave” as a rhetorical 
device for political ends were helping to effect radical change in the French political 
structure.   
In September 1792, just as Sonthonax and Polverel were disembarking in Saint-
Domingue, political leaders in France had abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the 
birth of the French Republic, replacing the National Assembly with a new legislative 
body called the National Convention. The execution of the French King Louis XVI on 21 
January 1793 following a trial by the National Convention helped to provoke Britain and 
Spain to declare war on France the following month.
56
 News of the advent of war reached 
                                                 
54 “Variétés: Parallèle entre la situation actuelle du Soldat, et celle de l‟ancien régime,” Les Affiches 
Américaines, no. 62, 3 August 1791, microfilmed at University of Florida‟s Special Collections. In the 
original text: “Il était si parfaitement esclave, qu‟un citoyen n‟osait parler de son fils soldat sans réveiller 
l‟idée d‟un mauvais sujet, et les lois de police contre le soldat favorisaient ouvertement ce cruel préjugé.” 
55 Scholarship in recent decades in French and English has foregrounded the “outre-mer” dimensions of the 
French Revolution, departing from earlier scholarship on this revolution which had largely ignored this. 
See for instance Laurent Dubois‟s two books cited in this chapter as well as Yves Bénot, La Révolution 
Française et la fin des colonies (Paris: Découverte, 1988); and Yves Bénot, La démence coloniale sous 
Napoléon, 2nd ed. (Paris: Découverte, 2006).  
56 Though this act of regicide was the immediate catalyst for Spain‟s declaration of war against France, the 
decision of Spain‟s rulers to abandon their longstanding alliance with their neighbor resulted from a 
confluence of geopolitical and diplomatic developments. For details on this decision, see Barbara Stein and 
Stanley Stein, Edge of Crisis: War and Trade in the Spanish Atlantic, 1789-1808 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009), chapter 2. 
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the Caribbean that spring; this prompted the Spanish in Santo Domingo and the British in 
nearby Jamaica to seize this opportunity to try to conquer France‟s prized colony whose 
leaders were still in the throes of their battle against the slave rebels. All three 
belligerents soon discovered that the tropical, disease-ridden climate and the distance 
from Europe impeded their efforts to take or retain Saint-Domingue, which led them to 
turn to recruiting soldiers and officers among the thousands of slaves who had honed 
their fighting skills in one and a half years of battle against the French. Forced to appeal 
to these slaves‟ aspirations for freedom, these powers offered liberty to those who would 
enlist in their colonial armies; this entailed intense ideological competition between 
divergent concepts of political legitimacy. The concept of “liberty” thus became a major 
point of contention among the warring factions in Hispaniola and other Caribbean 
islands.  
 To the initial consternation of French authorities and masters, many slaves, free 
non-whites, and others in Hispaniola closely followed the unfolding of revolution in 
France and the political discourses of egalitarianism and freedom that appeared in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and other documents. After 1793 these same authorities 
would attempt to harness the power of such ideologies by presenting the French Republic 
as the only guarantor of these values. The colonial press frequently printed politically-
charged tracts, extracts from legislative sessions, and correspondences such as a 
passionate exhortation to the Spanish King Charles IV for reform contained in the 13 
March 1793 edition of the Saint-Domingue-based Moniteur Général. In a 20 December 
1792 letter, an unnamed “gentleman from Fraga [Spain]” (gentilhomme de Fraga) 
bemoaned the “religious despotism” and “holy barbarism of the tribunals of the Faith” 
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which the Spanish monarch supposedly championed, calling upon the sovereign to “give 
us [the King‟s subjects] the liberty to think and to write.” “Only a tyrant could dread the 
light,” this man wrote, “and you without a doubt do not want this miserable name [of a 
tyrant] to accompany yours to the tomb.”57 
Enslaved men and women in Saint-Domingue were engaged in their own struggle 
against oppression, and their actions would take the French Revolution farther than the 
Fraga “gentleman” or even the Jacobins had intended. While the Jacobins‟ act of regicide 
in the name of political liberty played a central role in enabling the emancipation of 
slaves in Saint-Domingue, Dominguan slaves ultimately made the Haitian Revolution on 
their own terms.  
If in 1791 many slaves had taken up arms partly due to the belief that King Louis 
had interceded on their behalf, then the news of this king‟s death (and the ensuing 
declarations of war) would have even greater implications for their conquest of freedom 
and political rights. Governor García in Santo Domingo reported receiving word of these 
events on 9 May 1793, at which time he promptly mobilized three militia companies of 
whites and two of morenos (dark-skinned individuals).
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Yet even before García learned of the war declaration, he had begun to move 
beyond his previous policy of providing tacit aid to the insurgents behind a veneer of 
official neutrality to an even more audacious plan: the active recruitment of these rebels 
based on the extension of offers of freedom in exchange for military service. As news of 
                                                 
57 “Letter from a gentleman from Fraga, to the king of Spain, 20 December 1792,” Moniteur Général de 
Saint-Domingue, 13 March 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 108. In the original text: “Ton auguste père mérita la 
reconnaissance de la nation Espagnole; il nous gouverna avec douceur et modération; son règne fut 
marqué par des bienfaits dont nous ne perdrons pas la mémoire. Il affaiblit le despotisme religieux, il 
adoucit la barbarie sacrée des tribunaux de la Foi…rends-nous la liberté de penser et d‟écrire: il n‟y a 
qu‟un tyran qui puisse redouter la lumière, et tu ne veux pas sans doute que ce nom exécrable accompagne 
le tien au tombeau.” 
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a growing diplomatic crisis with France reached the island, García proclaimed on 19 
April 1793 that, with the blessing of the Spanish monarch, he was implementing a policy 
that would “admit under [the king‟s] sovereign protection all the [Saint-Domingue] 
Blacks who have sustained the war against the diabolical maxims of the whites.”59 In a 14 
May 1793 letter to don Pedro de Acuña, García detailed the successes of three emissaries 
in their overtures to the three “Chiefs” (Gefes) Jean-François, Georges Biassou, and 
Hyacinthe. “All [of these black leaders] with their soldiers are disposed to follow the 
royal standards of His Majesty, live under his royal Protection, and [they are] ready to 
sacrifice their lives in honor of his crown,” García told Acuña.60 These leaders‟ 
allegiance to García nonetheless emerged within the context of their own calculations of 
their possibilities for freedom.  
Jean-François, Biassou, Toussaint Louverture, and other onetime rebel leaders 
who accepted Spain‟s offer became part of a military unit known as the “Black 
Auxiliaries of Carlos IV” that Spanish colonial authorities kept segregated from the 
“Spanish militias” that had long defended Santo Domingo.61 The French under 
Sonthonax, Polverel, and a military officer named Étienne Laveaux soon followed suit, 
coupling their offer of liberty for slaves who chose to enlist with the attempt to achieve a 
greater degree of racial integration within the military in the spirit of the 4 April 1792 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 García to Pedro de Acuña, 24 May 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 129. 
59 García to Gaspar de Casasola, 19 April 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 120. In the original text: “Las últimas 
noticias y órdenes que recibo de la corte manifiestan un próximo rompimiento de n[uestra] corte contra la 
Francia. El Rey se digna confiar de mi zelo los aciertos y el buen éxito en todos los casos, y me faculta 
para admitir bajo su soberana Protección, a todos los Negros que han sabido sostener la guerra contra las 
diabólicas máximas de los blancos.”  
60 García to Pedro de Acuña, 14 May 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 124. In the original text: “…tengo el honor 
de hacer presente a V.E. que todos con sus soldados están dispuestos a seguir los reales estandartes de 
S.M., vivir bajo su real Protección, y prontos a sacrificar sus vidas en honor de su corona.” 
61 Jorge Victoria Ojeda, Tendencias monárquicas en la revolución haitiana: El negro Francisco Petecou 
bajo las banderas francesa y española (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 2005), 57. 
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law.
62
 The imperial conflict thus transformed the thousands of rebel slaves from despised 
insurgents to coveted targets of intensive military recruitment campaigns. In the words of 
Julius Scott, this battle between the Spanish and the French in the Caribbean “involved a 
struggle for hearts and minds as much as a military contest.”63 John Garrigus has argued 
that the pen was as important as the sword in starting the Haitian Revolution; similarly, 
the battleground of ideas was at least as important as the field of martial combat in the 
Revolution‟s unfolding.64  
Nonetheless, these warriors needed weapons. Jean-François and other black 
officers repeatedly requested and often received arms and provisions from other Spanish 
officials, though financial stringencies and other considerations resulted in the 
inconsistent distribution of these items.
65
 European powers had been waging armed 
struggles against each other on American battlefields for centuries before 1793, and some 
of these battles had involved the arming of slaves. Yet according to David Geggus, the 
1793-1795 war between France and Spain in the Caribbean marked a significant 
departure from previous instances in which authorities had armed New World slave 
populations. While prior official sanction of martial activity among slaves had chiefly 
                                                 
62 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 146. 
63 Scott, “The Common Wind,” 233.  
64 Garrigus, Before Haiti, 227. 
65 The continual rivalry between the leaders of these “black auxiliaries,” which perpetually undermined 
their unity, appears to have been related to the distribution of resources by the Spanish high command to 
these leaders. In a letter dated 16 September 1793, Biassou‟s subordinate Charles Belair complained that 
while Jean-François‟s men had received “considerable sums” from Spanish authorities, Biassou‟s forces 
had only obtained a very small recompense for their “two years” of “fight[ing] without any interest other 
than for the King.” This caused much “envy” among Biassou‟s men and prompted many of them to 
“desertion” to the ranks of Jean-François. Belair to Joaquín García, 16 September 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 
21. In the original text: “Tengo el honor también de exponer a vuestra grandeza q[ue] después de dos años 
también que yo combato sin ning[ún] otro interes q[ue] p[or] el Rey nuestro amo sin haver tocado el 
menor sueldo hasta este momento…Mr. Juan Fran[cisco] ha tocado hasta este momento sumas 
consideradas y de las que él ha esparcido en parte en nuestros campos, y de que ha resultado q[ue] 
muchas de nuestras gentes han sido exitadas a la desercion. Los oficiales igualmente del Mr. Juan 
Fran[cisco] han tocado su paga lo que no ha dejado de causar alguna embidia entre nuestros oficiales.” 
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involved arming them in a condition of clear subjugation, in 1793 French and Spanish 
colonial authorities appealed to slaves who had “effectively already freed themselves.”66 
Moreover, the political and ideological terrain was for the first time amenable to the 
possibility of general liberty. “With the greatest ardor they speak in [Le Cap] of granting 
Freedom to all the Blacks, and expatriating them so that they carry the lighted fuse in one 
hand and in the other the revolution to this entire new world,” García had warned Pedro 
de Acuña on 13 January 1793. According to García, many partisans of the revolution in 
France wished to “achieve, or put in motion the treacherous ideas that the first moments 
of the French Revolution displayed in its seditious Public Papers.”67 
The coming of war with France impelled García and other Spanish authorities to 
appeal to groups with seemingly diametrically opposed interests. While they were forced 
to recognize the aspirations of some of these “Blacks” for “Freedom,” they also sought to 
attract French royalist émigrés. Moreover, they refused to consider the possibility of a 
general emancipation in Santo Domingo. On 13 July 1793, an official in the city of Santo 
Domingo (probably García) explained to a subordinate (likely a man named don Luís 
Quero) that the writer understood “the arduous undertaking of reconciling the wills of the 
French whites, with the Blacks our allies upon whom [the whites] yesterday looked with 
a superiority and scorn that is evident.”68  
                                                 
66 David Geggus, “The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution,” in Arming Slaves: From Classical 
Times to the Modern Age, ed. Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 220.  
67 Joaquín García to Pedro de Acuña, 13 January 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 83. In the original text: “Con el 
maior calor se habla en el Guarico de dar Libertad a todos los Negros, y expatriarlos para que ellos lleven 
la mecha en una mano y en otra la revolucion por todo este nuevo mundo, y conseguir, o poner en 
execucion las perfidas ideas que los primeros momentos de la revolucion Francesa manifestaron en sus 
sediciosos Papeles Publico.” 
68 Letter contained in Antonio del Monte y Tejada, Historia de Santo Domingo (1890-1892; reprint, Ciudad 
Trujillo [Santo Domingo], 1953), 4: 62-63. In the original text: “Comprendo la ardua empresa de 
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In their efforts to “reconcile the wills” of these groups, Spanish officials drew 
upon one of the oldest and most respected forms of traditional authority: the clergy. 
García deployed religious authorities in Santo Domingo in an attempt to bridge the 
seemingly insurmountable divide between former slaveholders and those whom they had 
once held in bondage and to a large extent still regarded as no more than rebel slaves.
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García and his peers probably reasoned that this strategy would also serve to counteract 
the influence of the purportedly godless and anarchic radicals responsible for destroying 
the French monarchical regime. Above all, Spanish officials aimed to utilize religion as a 
form of social cohesion to lessen the dangers to the colonial regime and former masters 
of arming these former bondsmen. While the use of spiritual control to buttress political 
and military authority may not surprise those familiar with Spanish colonialism in the 
Americas, this would prove to be no ordinary colonial war. 
In April 1793, García had entrusted don José Vázquez, a curate from Dajabón, 
with the task of not only ministering to but effectively recruiting the services of Jean-
François. According to a detailed account composed by García, Vázquez departed to 
meet with Jean-François on the night of 30 April 1793. After traveling to several 
plantations in search of the elusive leader, the priest finally met Jean-François when the 
latter presented himself with over two hundred men in tow; the fact that the enigmatic 
officer also arrived with twelve close advisors may not have been lost on the Catholic 
priest. In any event, with much pomp and circumstance on both sides, Jean-François met 
his interlocutor with “veneration” (veneración) and pledged his loyalty to the cause of 
                                                                                                                                                 
reconciliar los ánimos de los blancos franceses, con los Negros nuestros aliados que ayer miraban con una 
superioridad y desprecio qual es notorio.”  
71 
 
God and King, while Father Vázquez accepted his allegiance and promised that he and 
his men would be amply rewarded.
70
  
Although Catholic doctrine had long provided certain rudimentary rights for 
slaves throughout Spanish America, rarely had prominent religious officials interacted 
with slaves or ex-slaves on terms of equality or near equality.
71
 In Santo Domingo in 
early 1793, Father Vázquez and Jean-François engaged in a complicated ritual which 
suggests that this was no simple story of subordination. Not only did Jean-François keep 
the priest waiting for several hours and only appear (in elegant clothes and on horseback) 
after the latter sent an underling out to find him, the black leader also obtained promises 
of munitions, food, clothing, and high military ranks for himself and his followers. 
Though Jean-François and his partisans did show a certain amount of deference as well as 
“love and loyalty” to the priest and his cause, offering to “sacrifice their lives for the 
Spanish Crown,” this was no different than what white Spanish subjects at the time might 
have pledged in a political crisis.
72
 Furthermore, Vázquez played the role of not just a 
religious leader but also a political ambassador and military advisor. Thus, even as the 
Spanish sought to reaffirm their power through the figure of the priest, Jean-François in 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 This utilization of religious authorities caused some Spanish officials on the island to complain that the 
conflict with France had become a “war of Pater Noster and Ave Maria.” Quoted in Geggus, Haitian 
Revolutionary Studies, 175. 
70 García to Acuña, 14 May 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 124.  
71 The thirteenth-century Castilian collection of laws known as the Siete Partidas held slavery to be against 
“natural reason” and enumerated certain rights for the enslaved as well as means by which those in bondage 
might become free. Robert J. Burns, ed., and Samuel Parsons Scott, trans., Las Siete Partidas (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 4:977 (Partida IV, Title XXI, Law I). While high Catholic 
officials in both Europe and America mostly refused to speak openly against slavery before the nineteenth 
century, an Afro-Brazilian leader of the Lisbon-based Confraternity of Our Lady of the Rosary named 
Lourenço da Silva persuaded the papacy in a visit to Rome in the 1680s to issue an anti-slavery declaration 
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papacy.” Richard Gray, “The Papacy and the Atlantic Slave Trade: Lourenço da Silva, the Capuchins and 
the Decisions of the Holy Office,” Past and Present no. 115 (May 1987): 52-68 (quote is from p. 52). 
72 García to Acuña, 14 May 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 124. In the original text: “Juan Fran[cisco] como los 
demás dieron muestras de amor y lealtad, ofreciendo sacrificar sus vidas por la corona española.” 
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his actions and words created new possibilities for the assertion of political will by those 
who had only months or years earlier toiled in servitude. Religious doctrines, political 
ideas, and material and military circumstances combined in unique ways to empower this 
leader to negotiate on equal terms with a priest sent to recruit him to defend a colonial 
regime. Jean-François acceded to these entreaties, but on his own terms and largely for 
his own ends.  
Spanish appeals to traditional authority may well have resonated with ideas of 
monarchy and religion rooted in not only European but also African traditions. The 
kingdom of Kongo, from which thousands of slaves came to Saint-Domingue, had been 
Christianized by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, but the participants in the wars in 
Hispaniola in the early 1790s drew upon other ideas as well. Black leaders sometimes 
deployed language and symbols considered subversive by European colonial authorities 
even as they appealed to the latter for assistance. Sometime around February 1793, the 
black general Hyacinthe had informed Governor García that while he desired to serve the 
King of Spain and fight the French Republicans, his enemies had forced him into retreat. 
“I have the honor of assuring you,” Hyacinthe wrote, “that I am a maroon in the woods 
awaiting your response [to my letter].”73 In his appeal to a high-ranking Spanish colonial 
official affirming his existence as a “maroon,” this young Vodou priest and military 
leader rhetorically challenged the political underpinnings of colonialism even as he 
claimed fidelity to the Spanish monarch. Hyacinthe‟s language illustrates that ex-slaves 
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“cimarrón.” Joaquín García to Ignacio Caro, 19 April 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 122. Cimarrón is a word 
that referred to slaves who had fled from their masters and is related to the English word “maroon.”  
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sometimes combined symbols of subversion forged out of colonialism and slavery with 
professions of adherence to a European monarch.
74
   
Hyacinthe deployed powerful language to affirm his freedom in a correspondence 
with a representative of a colonial regime committed to the maintenance of slavery. His 
French adversaries meanwhile, in response to the continued militancy of black rebels and 
military losses to the Spanish and British, adopted the most daring tactic of all—complete 
emancipation.   
 
“The [Rebels’] Disposition is to Die before being Slaves:” The Coming of 
Emancipation to the Island 
 
“The Sword of vengeance is suspended above your heads: a fatal error enchants 
you: what blind fury animates you, arms you against your protectors, your brothers, 
against your Friends, against your fatherland?” On 8 August 1793, an anonymous author 
or authors sympathetic to the French Republic composed a polemical tract addressed to 
formerly enslaved insurgents from Saint-Domingue who had taken up arms for the 
Spanish enemy. This author called upon these warriors to “Open your eyes, and know 
your true interests” by renouncing the Spanish “yoke of oppression” and proclaiming 
loyalty to the French Republic so that they might achieve a “perfect equality” with all 
other men. While declaring liberty to be an “inherent right of man,” this letter stated that 
                                                 
74 Hyacinthe was involved in a series of conspiracies and rebellions, such as two revolts among slaves in 
January 1793. He also made entreaties to both the Spanish and the British for support. In a September 1793 
letter, García detailed Hyacinthe‟s capture by a “mulatto” serving the French. Joaquín García to Alange, 13 
September 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 39. According to Polverel in an 18 August 1793 letter to his colleague 
Delpech, the “arrest of the famous Hyacint[h]e” (l‟arrestation du fameux hyacinte) on 13 August 1793 was 
integral in the French retention of the western Dominguan town of Croix-des-Bouquets. Polverel to 
Delpech, 18 August 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/12, dossier 114. This capture led to Hyacinthe‟s trial on 
charges of collaborating with the British, which ended with his acquittal by Sonthonax. Hyacinthe then met 
his end in mid-1794 in disputed circumstances. For more information on Hyacinthe, see Fick, The Making 
of Haiti, 139-140, 157-158, and 185-186. See also Lacroix, La Révolution d‟Haïti, 481. 
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these soldiers would only enjoy this right “when you submit to order, when you put 
yourselves under the protection of the Law, [and] when you make yourselves useful to 
your Fatherland in the type of work in which it judges you ought to be employed.” 
Failure to do so would risk a perilous descent into an “immoral liberty” which could lead 
to the ruin of the Republican state itself.
75
 
This letter appears in the archival record copied and translated by Governor 
García and thus must be approached with caution, but it nonetheless allows one to gain a 
sense of the intensity of the effort to recruit ex-slaves. The men and women to whom this 
impassioned statement was addressed seemingly had had little reason to identify with the 
French Republic that had held many of them in bondage, let alone to claim an affinity 
with it as strong as the terms “brothers” and “protectors” imply. Yet by August 1793, the 
French Civil Commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel initiated a process of general slave 
emancipation in order to combat Spanish and English threats to the colony of Saint-
Domingue. The French had to free the slaves who had built the colony‟s prosperity in 
order to save the colony itself; at the heart of this seeming paradox lay the slaves‟ own 
determination and military strength.  
In May 1793, just as word of the commencement of hostilities with Britain and 
Spain arrived on the island, the Civil Commissioners faced a new internal threat in the 
                                                 
75 “Sentimental Letters on the Santo Dom[ingo] revolution. Thursday 8 August 1793, year 2 of the French 
republic. Sixth Letter To the Rebels,” 8 August 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 13. In the original text: “Abrid los 
ojos, y conoced vuestros verdaderos intereses…La Espada de la venganza está suspendida sobre vuestras 
cabezas: un error fatal os encanta: que furor ciego os anima, os arma contra vuestros protectores, 
vuestros hermanos, vuestros Amigos, contra v[uestra] Patria...La ley, la razon, la Justicia, os aseguran el 
goce en medio de un Pueblo livre donde reyna una igualdad perfecta. Quanto es imposible que el fuego 
[illegible] con el agua, otro tanto es imposible que vosotros poseáis estos bienes preciosos entre un Pueblo 
de Esclavos arruinado bajo el Yugo de la opresión…La Livertad es un bien vosotros la gozareis; ella es un 
derecho inherente al hombre, pero vosotros la gozareis quando os sometais al orden, quando os alisteis 
bajo la proteccion de la Ley quando os hagais útiles a vuestra Patria en el genero de trabajo al qual ella 
juzgue aproposito de emplearos. Una Livertad licenciosa conduce a la ociosidad.” Emphasis in original. 
75 
 
form of Governor François-Thomas Galbaud du Fort, who soon became a figure around 
whom the commissioners‟ many enemies began to rally. Though Galbaud, a Saint-
Domingue-born property owner with pro-slavery sympathies, had been sent by 
metropolitan officials to Le Cap with orders to enforce the 4 April 1792 law on racial 
equality, he quickly became allied with factions that opposed this law and that sought to 
block its implementation. This brought him into direct conflict with the Civil 
Commissioners, who briefly imprisoned Galbaud. Following Galbaud‟s release, he led an 
armed force of thousands into Le Cap on 20 June 1793 with the aim of deposing 
Sonthonax and Polverel. The schism between Galbaud and the Civil Commissioners 
reflected the colony‟s deep racial and political divisions. While Galbaud relied upon the 
support of sailors and others who according to Jeremy Popkin “seem to have been almost 
entirely white,” the commissioners‟ partisans included some white troops and many free 
citizens of color.
76
 Forced to flee the city, Sonthonax and Polverel issued a proclamation 
on 21 June 1793 that emancipated all “black warriors who will fight for the republic” and 
that sought to improve the condition of those still in slavery.
77
 These measures won many 
new allies for the Republic, who helped the commissioners to expel Galbaud‟s forces 
from Le Cap.
78
 
In the midst of this fighting, a fire ignited that virtually destroyed this once-great 
city. According to Popkin, the violence and the fire claimed an estimated three thousand 
                                                                                                                                                 
Julius Scott cites an apparent copy of this document from the Archivo General de Indias in “The Common 
Wind,” 246. 
76 Jeremy Popkin, Facing Racial Revolution: Eyewitness Accounts of the Haitian Insurrection (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 180-181. 
77 “Proclamation” of Sonthonax and Polverel, 21 June 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the original text: 
“Déclarons que la volonté de la république française et celle de ces délégués, est de donner la liberté à 
tous les nègres guerriers qui combattront pour la république.” 
78 For more details on the Galbaud affair, see Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 155-159; and Popkin, 
Facing Racial Revolution, chapter 10. 
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to ten thousand lives. This episode was in Popkin‟s words “the most murderous instance 
of urban conflict in the entire history of the Americas.”79 Extant accounts of these events 
composed by the rival parties reveal that this bitter conflict also intersected with the onset 
of war with Spanish forces based in Santo Domingo. In a 10 July 1793 letter to the 
National Convention, Sonthonax and Polverel discussed the pillage and looting of Le 
Cap, wherein “brigands of all colors fought over the fruit of their rapine, [and] fired their 
guns indiscriminately.” Amidst this chaos, the commissioners found themselves among 
“several troops of insurgent slaves” who despite possessing numerous “Spanish 
cockades” had “abandoned the royal colors to take those of the republic,” vowing to 
“serve the [French] nation against kings.” “We explained to them, and they understood 
very well that it was kings who sold men, that the republic by contrast only wanted free 
men,” proclaimed the commissioners. Following Galbaud‟s defeat, many of his former 
partisans who had sought to arrest the commissioners fled to Santo Domingo, where 
according to this account they collaborated with about a thousand “traitors” to the 
Republic to take three key posts in the border area.
80
  
In a letter that Galbaud composed on 17 July 1793 in defense of his actions, 
Galbaud presented himself as having engaged in a valiant struggle against the 
interconnected threats of the “Rebel blacks” (nègres Révoltés) and the Spanish enemy in 
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80 Sonthonax and Polverel to National Convention, 10 July 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/41, dossier 408. In 
the original text: “Les brigands de toutes les couleurs se disputaient le fruit de leurs rapines, se fusillaient 
sans distinction…À notre arrivée, au haut du cap, nous y trouvâmes diverses troupes d‟esclaves insurgés 
qui, depuis un mois avaient quitté les couleurs royales pour prendre celle de la république. Ils vinrent 
audevant de nous, nous demandèrent de servir la nation contre les rois en jurant d‟obéir aux commissaires 
civils en tout ce qu‟ils leur ordonneraient…quelques compagnies se présenterent avec la cocarde 
espagnole, d‟autres avec les cocardes blanches; nous leur apprîmes qu‟il n‟y avait plus de roi en France. 
Nous leur expliquâmes, et ils comprirent très bien que c‟était les rois qui vendaient les hommes, que la 
république au contraire ne voulait que des hommes libres…Sitôt qu‟on a été instruit de sa défaite, tous les 
arrêteurs ont émigré à l‟Espagnol. Leur exemple a été suivi par leurs complices. Trois postes très 
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Santo Domingo. According to Galbaud, deposing the commissioners by military force 
was necessary in order to ensure Saint-Domingue‟s stability and security. With “our 
borders threatened by the Spanish, no army to oppose them, the impotent pain of seeing 
the Rebel Slaves Supported by the Spanish, [and] a universal discontent against the 
Commissioners,” Saint-Domingue was in Galbaud‟s depiction in an acutely vulnerable 
position upon his arrival. Declaring that he was “received in Le Cap as the Savior of The 
Colony,” Galbaud justified appointing his brother Cézar to the post of commander in the 
northern towns of Fort-Dauphin and Ouanaminthe as a necessary measure to combat the 
Spanish threat from nearby Dajabón.
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The military and ideological threats posed by the “Black Auxiliaries” and other 
partisans of the Spanish as well as Galbaud helped to convince the commissioners that 
they must offer freedom to enslaved insurgents in order to vanquish these foes. In stating 
that the French Republic “only wanted free men,” Sonthonax and Polverel were 
responding to both the fusion of “liberty” and monarchism that Biassou and others had 
posited and to the confluence of internal and external military challenges that threatened 
France‟s grip on Saint-Domingue. In their 21 June 1793 proclamation, the commissioners 
had already promised an amelioration of slaves‟ conditions in the colony by offering 
assurances that masters would not “mistreat [slaves] as before;” that slaves would receive 
more ample food rations and have more time for their “own affairs;” and that slaves 
would have “sure means by which to purchase themselves, in return for a predetermined 
                                                                                                                                                 
intéressants de la frontière ont été livrés par trahison et sans bruler une amorce. Mille hommes environ 
tant de troupes de ligne que des volontaires nationaux ont suivi les traitres.” 
81 Galbaud, “Succinct and Preparatory Narration [Récit] of My Conduct in Le Cap,” CARAN CC 
D/XXV/48, dossier 459. In the original French: “Je fus Reçu au Cap comme le Sauveur de La Colonie…nos 
frontières menacées par les Espagnols, aucune armée à leur opposer, la douleur impuissante de voir les 
Esclaves Révoltés Soutenu par les Espagnols, un mecontentement universel contre les Commissaires…” 
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sum.” Perhaps most notably, Sonthonax and Polverel also proposed a scheme of gradual 
emancipation characterized by “gradually giving freedom to blacks who will offer 
superior proof of their good conduct and assiduity to labor, and at the same time giving 
them land in property sufficient for their honest subsistence and that of their families.”82 
This last proposal was a radical idea in the context of the centuries of conflict in 
Hispaniola and other parts of the Caribbean between an economic model centered on 
large-scale plantation production (generally favored by officials and masters) and many 
slaves‟ wishes for economic and personal autonomy that were rooted in the “honest 
subsistence” that ownership of an adequate plot of land enabled. It would remain mostly 
a dead letter during the emancipation era (1793-1802). Furthermore, many of the other 
reforms articulated in this proclamation did not advance significantly beyond those 
proposed in another proclamation issued by the commissioners in May 1793 (which was 
itself mostly a restatement of a 1784 royal edict on improving slaves‟ conditions that had 
been blocked by the planters).
83
 Moreover, Dominguan authorities throughout the 
eighteenth century had sought to regulate self-purchase in order to foment stability in the 
colony.
84
 Sonthonax and Polverel appear to have continued to value stability and order 
                                                 
82 “Proclamation” of Sonthonax and Polverel, 21 June 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the original text: 
“La république et les commissaires civils veulent aussi adoucir le sort des autres esclaves, soit en 
empêchant que l‟on ne puisse les maltraiter comme autrefois, soit en leur donnant de meilleurs vivres, de 
plus grandes places pour leur aisance, plus de rechanges par an, plus de temps par semaine pour 
s‟occuper de leurs propres affaires, plus de douceur et de respect pour les femmes enceintes et les 
nourrices, soit en leur donnant des moyens sûrs de se racheter, moyennant les sommes déterminées, soit 
enfin en donnant graduellement la liberté aux nègres qui auront donné le plus de preuves de leur bonne 
conduit et de leur assiduité au travail, et en leur donnant en même temps des terres en propriété suffisante 
à l‟honnête subsistance d‟eux et de leur famille.”  
83 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 154-155; “Proclamation” of Sonthonax and Polverel, 21 June 1793, 
ANOM CMSM F3 198. For instance, the 21 June 1793 proclamation included a vaguely-worded promise 
of “gentleness and respect for pregnant and nursing women” (douceur et de respect pour les femmes 
enceintes et les nourrices), which was also an element of the May 1793 order. Both documents also 
included promises to curb masters‟ mistreatment of slaves.  
84 According to Sue Peabody, Article XXIX of the Code Noir had made it permissible for slaves to 
accumulate funds to purchase themselves or relatives, though this was contingent upon the master‟s 
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above nearly all else, for they asserted in their account of the Galbaud affair that while 
more than half of the “insurgent slaves” in Saint-Domingue‟s southern province had by 
the spring of 1793 returned to their plantations, motivated by “the hope of improving 
their condition, [and] the certainty of gradually obtaining freedom,” the arrival of 
Galbaud had led them to “cease working” and to “recommence their Pillaging and 
arson.”85 
In the months following the Galbaud affair, and despite the new proclamation, the 
Republicans suffered numerous defeats at the hands of the Spanish and their formerly 
enslaved allies. The formalization of the alliance between García and Jean-François, 
Biassou and Toussaint had garnered some ten thousand men for the Spanish side, and 
with this military assistance much of the northern part of French Saint-Domingue fell to 
the Spanish by the end of 1793.
86
 Julien Raimond would later write that “eight to ten 
                                                                                                                                                 
permission. Sue Peabody, “Négresse, Mulâtresse, Citoyenne: Gender and Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1650-1848,” in Gender and Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World, ed. Pamela Scully and 
Diana Paton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 58. The text of this article reads: “Voulons néanmoins 
que les maîtres soient tenus de ce que leurs esclaves auront fait par leur commandement, ensemble de ce 
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créateurs.” Louis Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, ou le calvaire de Canaan (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1987), 148. 
85 Sonthonax and Polverel to National Convention, 10 July 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/41, dossier 408. In 
the original text: “…l‟espoir d‟un meilleur sort, la certitude d‟obtenir graduellement la liberté, avait fait 
rentrer sur les atteliers plus de la moitié des esclaves insurgés de la partie du Sud; ils ont cessé de 
travailler, ils ont recommencé le Pillage et l‟incendie parce qu‟on leur a persuadé que la France avait 
envoyé un général pour faire couper la tête aux commissaires civils ennemis du roi et de notre saint 
religion.” 
86 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 153; and Deive, Los guerrilleros negros, 207-209. In addition to 
their fighting abilities, these new recruits also provided the Spanish with invaluable intelligence on the 
enemy. For instance, according to Julius Scott these black troops were the “eyes and ears of the Spanish in 
Santo Domingo.” Scott, “The Common Wind,” 244-245. Indeed, in a 22 October 1793 letter, García 
acknowledged that “the Chiefs of our black allies were the first ones who delivered to my hands the 
Proclamation of the Commissioner [Sonthonax].” He was referring to the general emancipation decree of 
29 August 1793. García to Alange, 22 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 66. In the original text: “Como los 
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thousand French blacks under the orders of Jean François, armed for their Liberty at the 
beginning of the revolution; were attracted by the Spanish government” via the bestowal 
of “titles and decorations” on rebel leaders and promises of “Liberty for all black soldiers 
in the name of the King of Spain.”87  
In an effort to change the course of the war, Sonthonax and Polverel issued two 
orders in July and August of 1793 that loosened restrictions on manumission. In the first, 
dated 11 July, the commissioners decreed that a marriage contracted between one free 
and one enslaved partner would liberate the unfree person as well as the couple‟s 
children. Declaring that “the free man who has neither a wife nor children, can only be a 
savage or a brigand,” these men appealed to newly freed people‟s demands for equal 
citizenship rights in Article VIII of the proclamation, which established that “Enslaved 
women who have married as we have specified, and all enslaved children legitimated by 
this marriage, will all become free and genuinely free, and they will gain all the rights 
that belong to citizens; they will not need any other freedom paper [as] the marriage 
paper will suffice to legitimate all of the children.” In the version of this order that they 
translated into Creole, the commissioners employed somewhat more expansive language 
on Republican citizenship than in the French version, but they also more explicitly lauded 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gefes de nuestros negros aliados fueron los primeros que pasaron a mis manos la Proclamacion del 
Comisario…” 
87 Julien Raimond, “Means to Take Possession of the Spanish Part of St Domingue and to form an armed 
force to defend it from the English Enterprises,” 7 Vendémiaire an 4 (29 September 1795), CARAN 
AF/II/64. In the original text: “Environ huit à dix mille noirs français sous les ordres de Jean François, 
armés pour leur Liberté au commencement de la révolution; furent attirés par le gouvernement Espagnol 
dans la Partie de l‟isle qui vient de nous Être cédée. Le gouvernement Espagnol pour Parvenir à se faire 
de ces hommes une force considérable pour nous combattre et conserver son sol, n‟eut besoin que de 
flatter l‟amour propre de quelques uns des chefs, par des titres et des décorations et en promettant la 
Liberté à tous les noirs soldats au nom du Roy d‟Espagne.” Emphasis in original. 
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the “love” that freed people ought to exhibit for their labors.88 Many slaves appear to 
have taken advantage of this mechanism for manumission, as Sonthonax reported on 30 
July 1793 that the Municipal Bureau of Le Cap was receiving at least thirty marriage 
“déclarations” per day. “Weddings follow quickly, and celebrations of the hymn become 
for [the newlyweds] those of Liberty,” Sonthonax wrote.89  
French colonial slave law—codified in the 1685 Code Noir—was somewhat 
unclear on the relationship between marriage and manumission, for while Article IX of 
                                                 
88 For the Creole version of this proclamation on marriage, see Proclamation of Sonthonax and Polverel, 11 
July 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. For the French version, see Proclamation of Sonthonax and Polverel, 11 
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femme à li aque petites à li resté dans z‟esclaves.” The key paragraph of the preamble in Creole is: “Nous 
voit, et toute monde voit tant comme nous, que dans cilà yo qui pas libe, soit n‟homme ou ben femme, cila 
qui marié ben légitime, c‟est cila yo qui meyors, qui plus fidèles, qui plus aimé maitre à yo, qui aimé travail 
passé toutes les zautes; yo gagné meyor quior; yo pas couté mauvais parole, mauvais monde qui vlé 
débauché yo; c‟est nion qui chose qui  ben vrai oui. Et ben, si c‟est mariage qui fait tout ça, qui rende 
toutes z‟esclaves qui ben mariés, meyors, nous cré yo va meyors encore quant toutes z‟esclaves là yo qui 
ben mariés ben légitimes va libes. Yo pas gagné maites encor, c‟est la république qui maite à yo comme à 
nous toutes. Plus yo va aimé femme à yo et petites à yo, plus yo va aimé la république, plus yo va gagné 
quior et la force pour défende li.” This paragraph in French is as follows: “On a remarqué, même parmi les 
hommes non libres, que ceux qui étaient époux et pères, étaient les plus fidèles, les plus affectionnés à leurs 
maîtres, les plus laborieux, les plus incorruptibles. Si le mariage a produit ces effets salutaires sur eux, que 
n‟opérara-t-il pas sur ces mêmes hommes devenus libres? Ils n‟ont plus d‟autres maîtres que la patrie; leur 
amour pour elle deviendra d‟autant plus énergique, qu‟ils auront plus de tendresse pour leurs femmes et 
pour leurs enfans.” The Creole text of Article VIII is: “Femme z‟esclave et qui va marié comme nous sorti 
dire, et toutes petites a li qui z‟esclaves et qui va légitimes par mariage là io toutes va libes et bon libe, et 
io va gagné toutes les droits qui parteni citoyens; io pas lé besoin l‟aute billet liberté passé papier à 
mariage là assez outi io va metté legitime à toutes petite la.” This same article in the French version is: “La 
femme esclave ainsi mariée, et les enfans esclaves ainsi légitimés seront libres et réputés tels, et jouiront de 
tous les droits des citoyens, sans qu‟il soit besoin d‟autre titre de liberté, que l‟acte de déclaration de 
mariage et de légitimation énoncée en l‟article précédent.” Note that the Creole version of this article 
portrays freed people as “winning” their citizenship rights, while the French text depicts them as simply 
“enjoying” these rights. On 21 August 1793, Sonthonax amended this 11 July marriage decree by extending 
by a week the window of time within which it was possible for free men (especially soldiers) to marry and 
thereby manumit enslaved women. This new order also authorized notaries to draw up marriage contracts 
between a free man and a slave woman. Proclamation of Sonthonax, 21 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 
198. 
89 Sonthonax to National Convention, 30 July 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/5, dossier 52. In the original text: 
“Les noces se font en suite, et les fêtes de L‟hymne deviennent pour eux celles de la Liberté.” Sue Peabody 
has argued that in utilizing marriage as a form of social control, Sonthonax was motivated by “Republican 
ideologies of womanhood” that “held that a woman‟s relationship to the state was mediated through her 
husband.” Peabody, “Négresse, Mulâtresse, Citoyenne,” 66. Suzanne Desan also organized a recent study 
of the family in revolutionary France around the contention that the family was “an arena of social and 
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the Code stipulated that when a “free man…will marry his said slave in the forms 
observed by the Church, [she] shall be freed by this means, and the slaves [children] 
rendered free and legitimate,” the wording of this article seems to imply that this only 
applied when the free man was the master of the slave whom he married. Moreover, 
Article XIII made it clear that this principle did not apply when the man was enslaved 
and the woman free and that the children followed the condition of their mother rather 
than automatically gaining their freedom by virtue of their parents‟ marriage.90 The Code 
was nonetheless clearer on the rights of freed persons. In declaring that individuals freed 
under the terms of their 11 July order would “gain all the rights that belong to citizens,” 
the commissioners simply reaffirmed Article LIX of the Code Noir, which had promised 
                                                                                                                                                 
political contestation during the French Revolution.” Suzanne Desan, The Family on Trial in Revolutionary 
France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 2. 
90 The wording of Article IX of the Code Noir is: “Free men who will have one or several children from 
concubinage with their slaves, as well as the masters who will have permitted this, will each be condemned 
to a fine of two thousands pounds of sugar. And if they are the masters of the slave by whom they will have 
had these children, we wish that beyond the fine, they be deprived of the slave and the children, and that 
she and they be confiscated for the profit of the hospital, without ever being able to be manumitted. We do 
not nonetheless intend for this article to apply, when the free man who was never married to another during 
his concubinage with his slave, will marry his said slave in the forms observed by the Church, who shall be 
freed by this means, and the slaves [children] rendered free and legitimate.” Article XIII reads: “We wish 
that if a slave husband has married a free woman, both male and female children shall follow the condition 
of their mother and shall be free like her in spite of the servitude of their father; and if the father is free and 
the mother enslaved, the children shall be slaves in the same manner.” In the original text, Article IX reads: 
“Les hommes libres qui auront eu un ou plusieurs enfants de leurs concubinages avec leurs esclaves, 
ensemble les maîtres qui les auront soufferts, seront chacun condamné en une amende de deux mille livres 
de sucre. Et s‟ils sont les maitres de l‟esclave de laquelle ils auront eu les dits enfants, voulons qu‟outre 
l‟amende, ils soient privés de l‟esclave et des enfants, et qu‟elle et eux soient confisqués au profit de 
l‟hôpital, sans jamais pouvoir être affranchis. N‟entendons toutefois le présent article avoir lieu, lorsque 
l‟homme libre qui n‟était point marié à une autre personne durant son concubinage avec son esclave, 
épousera dans les formes observées par l‟Eglise sa dite esclave, qui sera affranchie par ce moyen, et les 
esclaves rendus libres et légitimes.” Article XIII reads: “Voulons que si le mari esclave a épousé une 
femme libre, les enfants tant mâles que filles suivent la condition de leur mère et soient libres comme elle 
nonobstant la servitude de leur mère [père]; et que si le père est libre et la mère esclave, les enfants soient 
esclaves pareillement.” Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 108 and 116. For recent translations of these articles, 
see Laurent Dubois and John Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804: A Brief History with 
Documents (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 51. See also Peabody, “Négresse, Mulâtresse, Citoyenne,” 57.  
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that “freed persons” would enjoy the same rights as those who had never lived in 
bondage.
91
  
The deep legal history of French Saint-Domingue was also evident in an order 
that Sonthonax issued on 1 August 1793. In an attempt to reverse nearly a century of 
legislative obstacles to manumission, Sonthonax decreed that henceforth a master could 
free his slave “notwithstanding all opposition and without needing to satisfy the formality 
of posting and publication that preceded the ratification of liberties, which is and remains 
abrogated.” Though the master still had to appear before his municipality and present 
either a “title of property” or the testimony of three citizens of the area in order to 
legalize the manumission, there was no requirement to obtain the approval of higher 
authorities.
92
 This countermanded laws from 1711 and 1713 that had removed absolute 
authority over manumissions from masters by requiring colonial authorities and the king 
to approve in writing all proposed manumissions. The legal scholar Malick Ghachem has 
characterized these laws as constituting a transformation in “the understanding of what it 
meant to possess property in slaves in Saint-Domingue.” By implicitly rejecting the view 
that slavery was “characterized in the formal terms of absolute domestic sovereignty,” 
these authorities had decided to “insert themselves into the master-slave relationship.”93 
                                                 
91 Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 200. The original French reads: “Octroyons aux affranchis les mêmes droits, 
privilèges et immunités dont jouissent les personnes nées libres.” 
92 Proclamation of Sonthonax, 1 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the original text: “Article 
Premier. Tout homme habile à disposer de ses meubles pourra affranchir son esclave, non obstant toutes 
oppositions et sans avoir besoin de remplir la formalité des affiches et publication qui précédaient la 
ratification des libertés, laquelle est et demeure abrogée. Art. II. Celui qui voudra affranchir son esclave 
présentera à la municipalité du lieu de sa résidence l‟acte de manumission, et la municipalité sera tenue de 
le viser, si le maître justifie de la propriété. Art. III. A défaut du titre de propriété, le témoignage de trois 
citoyens domiciliés sera admis, ainsi que la preuve par titre d‟une jouissance sans trouble depuis un an.” 
93 Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: Haitian Variations on a 
Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002), 60-61. 
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In this August proclamation, Sonthonax seemingly removed himself from the “master-
slave relationship” in returning to masters much of their authority to free their slaves.  
This proclamation combined liberationist language with a somewhat paternalistic 
view of manumission. “Among a people who esteems liberty to be foremost among 
positive goods,” Sonthonax declared, “the law ought to protect the slave who has earned 
the rights to be Free, and the master who commits an act of justice in granting to society 
an individual worthy of being part of it; that manumissions, finally, ought to be freed 
from the formalities that humanity and the health of the body politic both condemn.”94 
Earlier in the eighteenth century, Dominguan authorities had by contrast justified these 
“formalities” as a means to thwart the perceived grave threat to the “body politic” that 
excessive manumissions were held to represent.
95
 Nonetheless, the underlying logic of 
both of these measures was remarkably similar: that properly-designed manumission 
policies were essential to minimize the risks inherent in a slave society; and that the 
enslaved had to “earn the rights to be Free” in order to attain entrance into society as a 
free citizen.  
Many of the men and women who took up arms against their masters in late 
August 1791 invoking the name of Louis XVI likely understood that since at least the 
promulgation of the Code Noir, a political and legal tradition of “top-down” regulation of 
slavery had existed in tension with the wishes of masters for more complete control over 
those whom they deemed to be their property. In disavowing the authority to make major 
                                                 
94 Proclamation of Sonthonax, 1 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the original text: “Que chez un 
peuple qui compte la liberté pour le premier des biens, la loi doit protéger l‟esclave qui a mérité d‟être 
Libre, et le maître qui commet un acte de justice en donnant à la société un individu digne d‟en faire 
partie; que les manumissions, enfin, doivent être affranchies de ces formalités que réprouvent également 
l‟humanité et la saine politique.” 
95 Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 60-61. 
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legal changes to the slave regime in September 1792 and in granting masters more power 
over manumissions in August 1793, Sonthonax appears to have acted in accordance with 
this long history of planters‟ zealous protection of their privileges even as he expanded 
the possibilities to escape from slavery in Saint-Domingue.  
The combination of continuing military defeats against the Spanish and their ex-
slave allies and the ideological threats posed by freed leaders such as Biassou nonetheless 
pushed Sonthonax to contemplate abandoning his piecemeal and conservative approach 
to regulating slavery in favor of more radical measures. In a letter to the National 
Convention dated 30 July 1793, Sonthonax had argued that the defeat of the “Spanish 
power” in Hispaniola would represent the first step in the “inauguration of Liberty in the 
new world” (l‟inauguration de la Liberté dans le nouveau monde). He went on to 
advance a succinct argument for general emancipation in Saint-Domingue that rejected 
the claims of his royalist enemies to political legitimacy:  
It is now up to you, citizen representatives, to pronounce upon a great matter, 
which is the state of unfree people in the colony. The time of prevarications, of 
false considerations, of hypocritical moderation has passed; [t]he prejudices that 
once blinded the slaves are no more, and the [National] convention is too Just and 
too fond of humanity, to not proclaim great principles. The declaration of rights 
no longer permits [the convention] to tolerate one man being the property of 
another: Slavers and kings should be placed on the same line: they must cease 
their tyranny, and abandon their prey, or they will disappear from the surface of 
the globe.
96
  
 
                                                 
96 Sonthonax to National Convention, 30 July 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/5, dossier 52. In the original 
French: “Notre entreprise est trop glorieuse pour que les obstacles nous effrayent: il s‟agit de ruiner à St 
Domingue la puissance espagnole…Il vous reste maintenant, citoyens représentants, une grande question à 
juger, c‟est l‟état des personnes non libres dans la colonie. Le temps des tergiversations, des faux 
ménagements, du moderantisme hypocrite est passé: Les préjugés qui aveuglaient les esclaves ne sont plus, 
et la convention est trop Juste est trop amie de L‟humanité, pour ne pas proclamer les grands principes. La 
déclaration des droits ne lui permet plus de tolérer qu‟un homme puisse être la propriété d‟un autre: les 
Nègriers et les rois doivent être mis sur la même ligne: qu‟ils cessent de tyranniser, qu‟ils abandonnent 
leur proie, ou bien qu‟ils disparaissent de dessus la surface du globe.” 
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Sonthonax appears to have aimed to disarm the potency of the Spanish arguments 
that merged the royalist sentiments that many slaves possessed with their aspirations for 
freedom. Perhaps in an effort to counter Sonthonax‟s anti-royalist writings, Biassou on 25 
August 1793 issued a proclamation to all those serving under the Spanish in the Spanish-
occupied part of Saint-Domingue. Imploring these individuals to continue to reject the 
“seduction” and “deception” of the French Republican siren song of liberty that was but a 
“chimera,” Biassou portrayed the French Civil Commissioners as representing a 
continuation of the French colonial forces that had fought in vain for two years to “reduce 
us to the most astonishing servitude.” As nothing less than “enemies of the human race,” 
the French Republicans in Biassou‟s mind not only fought against the cause of liberty but 
did not possess the right to grant liberty to anyone, as only “our master,” the Spanish 
king, had that right.
97
  
Defusing these arguments entailed a redefinition of political legitimacy that 
rejected monarchism by implicating it in enslavement. While this was in line with 
political and intellectual developments in continental France, local concerns on the island 
imbued these ideological conflicts with new meanings. In positing close connections 
between royalism, slavery, and their Spanish foes, Sonthonax and then Polverel aimed to 
co-opt the liberation discourses of Biassou and others, creating the ideological 
                                                 
97 “Proclamation” of Georges Biassou, 25 August 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 15. In the original text: “El 
tiempo de la seduccion, y de engaño no deve estar entre nosotros: yo conozco vuestro valor para saber 
vencer todo consejo perfido que se os podria dar…Desconfiaos mucho os digo, de todas sus maniobras, y 
de todas promesas que os hagan semejantes hombres tocante a la libertad, por que todo es quimera, y 
estan muy distantes de pensar del mismo modo que os hacen ver; todo se reduce a engaño, del que se 
sirven industriosamente: y si tenian derecho de acordarnos la libertad, por que trajeron quince mil 
hombres para volvernos a reducir a la mas asombrosa servidumbre?...Dos años conceqütivos sin 
interrupcion contra nosotros, y contra la propia voluntad de S.M. el Rey nuestro amo (quien es solo el que 
puede darnos libertad, y mantenernos en tranquilidad en nuestros hogares) os dicen que ya no existe el 
Rey.” 
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foundations for the decree emancipating all slaves in the North of Saint-Domingue that 
Sonthonax issued on 29 August 1793. 
Though Sonthonax advanced legalistic arguments to explain his decision to 
reverse his previous stance on slavery, he presented this 29 August proclamation as a 
revolutionary triumph for all newly freed people in the colony.
98
 In the preamble to this 
emancipation decree, Sonthonax condemned both African and European kings as 
enslavers, asserting that “kings are only happy in a society of slaves: it is they who, on 
the coasts of Africa, sold you to the whites: it is the tyrants of Europe who would wish to 
perpetuate this notorious traffic. The REPUBLIC adopts you as its children; kings only 
aspire to place you in chains or to destroy you.” Towards the end of this preamble, 
Sonthonax reiterated the enormous stakes involved in the Franco-Spanish conflict: “And 
you, citizens fooled by the notorious royalists; you who, under the flags and the liveries 
of the cowardly Spaniard, fight blindly against your own interests, against the freedom of 
your wives and children, finally thus open your eyes to the immense advantages that the 
Republic offers you. Kings promise you freedom: but do you see that they grant it to their 
subjects?”99 
                                                 
98 Sonthonax argued that the “representatives of this [French] Republic” had “untied the hands of the Civil 
Commissioners in granting them the power to provisionally change police [power] and plantation 
discipline,” citing Article III of a 5 March 1793 decree of the National Convention that had supposedly 
“delegated” to Sonthonax the authority to make these changes. Sonthonax, “Proclamation in the Name of 
the Republic,” 29 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the original text: “Ce sont les représentans de 
cette même République qui, pour venir à votre secours, ont délié les mains des Commissaires Civils en leur 
donnant le pouvoir de changer provisoirement la police et la discipline des atteliers. Cette police et cette 
discipline vont être changées: un nouvel ordre de choses va renaître, et l‟ancienne servitude 
disparaîtra…Exerçant les pouvoirs qui lui ont été délégués par l‟art. III du décret rendu par la convention 
nationale de 5 mars dernier.” Emphasis in original.  
99 Sonthonax, “Proclamation in the Name of the Republic,” 29 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In the 
original text: “La République Française veut la liberté et l‟égalité entre tous les hommes sans distinction de 
couleur; les rois ne se plaisent qu‟au milieu des esclaves: ce sont eux qui, sur les côtes d‟Afrique, vous ont 
vendus aux blancs: ce sont les tyrans d‟Europe qui voudraient perpétuer cet infâme trafic. La 
RÉPUBLIQUE vous adopte au nombre de ces enfans; les rois n‟aspirent qu‟à vous couvrir de chaines ou à 
vous anéantir…Et vous, citoyens égarés par d‟infâmes royalistes; vous qui, sous les drapeaux et les livrées 
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In the key article of this 29 August order, Sonthonax proclaimed that “[a]ll the 
blacks and mixed-bloods, currently in slavery, are declared free to enjoy all the rights 
associated with the title of French citizen; they will nonetheless be subject to a regime 
whose details are contained in the following articles.”100 After issuing a series of gradual 
emancipation orders, Polverel followed Sonthonax and declared the institution of slavery 
dead in Saint-Domingue‟s other two provinces, the West and South, on 31 October 1793. 
The French National Convention ratified these emancipation orders the following 
February and extended them to the entire French empire. As in the case of the 4 April 
1792 decree granting equal rights to free people of color, the coming of general 
emancipation the following year resulted in part from elites‟ realizations that they faced 
few alternatives if they wished to defeat powerful internal and external foes and retain the 
ravaged but still valuable colony of French Saint-Domingue. Yet whereas the 1792 act 
ostensibly did not undermine the foundations of slavery in the colony and indeed merely 
reaffirmed what had been stipulated in the Code Noir over a century earlier, the 1793 
slave emancipations dismantled the slave system which had created much of France‟s 
wealth and transformed the great majority of the colony‟s inhabitants from enslaved 
laborers to citizens. 
On 10 September 1793, Sonthonax composed a letter to Polverel that suggests the 
extent to which the advancement of demands from below that impelled Sonthonax to take 
this measure. Sonthonax wrote to Polverel that he had received in Le Cap a petition with 
                                                                                                                                                 
du lâche espagnol, combattez aveuglement contre vos propres intérêts, contre la liberté de vos femmes et 
de vos enfants, ouvrez donc enfin les yeux sur les avantages immenses que vous offre la République. Les 
rois vous promettent la liberté: mais voyez-vous qu‟ils la donnent à leurs sujets?” Emphasis in original.  
100 Sonthonax, “Proclamation in the Name of the Republic,” 29 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In 
the original text: “Tous les nègres et sang-mêlés, actuellement dans l‟esclavage, sont déclarés libres pour 
jouir de tous les droits attachés à la qualité de citoyen français; ils seront cependant assujettis à un régime 
dont les dispositions sont contenues dans les articles suivans.” 
89 
 
over six hundred signatures—including those of many “landowners”—urging him to 
“declare the general liberty of all the slaves in the Northern Province.” In this same letter, 
Sonthonax decried French royalist émigrés and the “Spanish” for enticing “brigands” to 
fight on their side by appealing to the “liberty that [the would-be French king] Louis 
XVII had accorded them.” “If our armies had disadvantages,” Sonthonax claimed, “it was 
because the black soldiers fought with repugnance against their brothers, who had [as] the 
excuse for their error, the desire to see the black race enjoy the rights of man.”101  
Recognizing the potential implications of these emancipation decrees, Governor 
García struck back. Impelled to act by the possibility that the commissioners‟ “ideas and 
intentions will take their place in the hearts of our black allies,” García promulgated two 
counter-proclamations in October 1793.
102
 While he directed the first proclamation at the 
“whites and people of honor” (blancos y gentes de honor)103 living in Saint-Domingue 
who might be persuaded to swear allegiance to the Spanish monarch, García composed 
the other in order to reassure his black troops that the cause of “God, King and State” 
(Dios, del Rey y del Estado) was just.
104
  
In his first proclamation, García offered a simple and stark choice: submit to the 
will of the Spanish monarch and swear to henceforth “be loyal and obedient Spaniards” 
                                                 
101 Sonthonax to Polverel, 10 September 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/5, dossier 53. In the original text: “Il 
est très vrai que le 25 août la commune du Cap assemblée a arrêté qu‟il me serait fait une pétition 
individuelle pour me demander de prononcer la liberté générale de tous les esclaves de la Province du 
Nord. Vergniaud a été le rédacteur de cette pétition revêtue de plus de six cents signatures dont plusieurs 
ont été données par des propriétaires…Vous savez sur tout que les espagnols et les émigrés n‟obtenaient 
quelque crédit sur l‟esprit des brigands qu‟en leur faisant sonner bien haut la liberté que Louis XVII devait 
leur accorder, que si nos armées avaient des desavantages, c‟était parce que les soldats noirs se battaient 
avec répugnance contre leurs freres, qui avaient pour excuse de leur erreur, le désir de voir l‟espèce noire 
jouir des droits de L‟homme.” 
102 García to Alange, 22 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 66. In the original text: “Viviendo s[iempre] con 
los cuidados que exige la conducta de los comisarios civiles de la colonia y atento a sus invectivas, y que 
no llegue el caso de que sus ideas e intenciones tengan lugar en el corazon de nuestros negros aliados…”  
103 García to Alange, 22 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 66. 
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in exchange for royal protection and the rewards of the king‟s “highest equity and 
benevolence,” or face swift military persecution. García promised that “all good French 
people, without distinction of state or condition” would receive the king‟s protection 
should they join the Spanish side and vowed that Spanish rule would bring about the 
“reflourishing” (reflorencia) of Saint-Domingue and usher in a new era of “prosperity” 
and “stability.”105 While García did not explicitly mention slavery, many of the colonists 
to whom García addressed his communication would doubtless have equated “prosperity” 
and “stability” with the restoration of white supremacy and plantation slavery in Saint-
Domingue.  
While in his first proclamation García spoke of “liberating” Saint-Domingue from 
the French Republicans, he offered a very different definition of liberty to former slaves. 
To his black troops García presented the Civil Commissioners as having recently 
“promised in the Parish Church of [Le Cap] in the presence of the Most Holy Sacrament, 
and with the agreement of the People, that a thousand lives would be lost before 
permitting the Slaves to attain liberty.” García framed the emancipation decrees of 1793 
not as laudatory acts of noble statesmen but rather as desperate and insincere maneuvers 
undertaken by cowards who were motivated by “insatiable ambition and greed” and who 
                                                                                                                                                 
104 García to “the General Commanders, and other Chiefs of our Troops stationed in the North, South and 
West part,” 21 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 68.  
105 Proclamation of Joaquín García, 18 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 67. In the original text: “…ahora 
repito en el mismo Augusto Real nombre que todos serán recibidos generosamente para libertarles de las 
aflicciones que les contristan, confunden y destruyen, para fomentar su prosperidad, recibir su comercio y 
establecer el buen orden y tranquilidad para distinguir a los benemeritos y admitir a todos los buenos 
franceses, sin distincion de estado, calidad, ni condicion bajo el alto asilo y proteccion de S.M. 
concediéndoles todas las gracias y prerrogativas que gozan los de la parte espaðola…aunque estoy bien 
informado que los más de los ánimos están dispuestos y ansiosos de lograr la honrosa suerte de ser 
espaðoles fieles y obedientes a S.M…Que serán protegidas todas las ciudades, villas, y Pueblos, y las 
personas y bienes de todos los que se sometiesen al Rey, N[uestro] Señor y tratados con la mayor equidad 
y benevolencia…” 
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“only aspire to…despotism.”106 In depicting these men as hypocritical tyrants, García 
hoped to remind recruits that only a short time earlier, Sonthonax and Polverel as well as 
their predecessors had fought against many slaves‟ efforts to gain their freedom. In a 
letter to the Marquis de Bajamar composed in January 1792, García had in fact conceded 
(if only to discredit his rivals) that slavery in Saint-Domingue was “horrendous,” and that 
the futility of slave insurgents‟ attempts to extract promises of emancipation from French 
authorities had only made the former more determined. “The disposition [of the rebels],” 
García had stated, “is to die before being slaves.”107 García‟s 1793 proclamation to the 
black warriors urged them to remember the Civil Commissioners‟ attempts to forestall 
emancipation while ignoring García‟s prior staunch support of slavery and strict racial 
hierarchy. Indeed, the January 1792 letter quoted above was written in order to procure 
military supplies to protect Santo Domingo‟s western border from the “black masses 
habituated to the mountain.”108 
The newly liberated “black masses” of French Saint-Domingue soon discovered 
that Sonthonax and Polverel wished to rebuild that colony‟s plantation infrastructure, 
                                                 
106 García to “the General Commanders, and other Chiefs of our Troops stationed in the North, South and 
West part,” 21 October 1793, AGS GM 7151, f. 68. In the original text: “Que aquella libertad de sus 
Proclamaciones es una nueva prueva de su insaciable ambicion, y codicia: Que solo aspiran a su lucro y 
despotismo, y del miedo con que viven del furor de sus enemigos por el evidente peligro de ser cogidos sin 
remedio; de su perfidia, y sacrilega abominable conducta, pues ellos mismos prometieron en la Yglesia 
Parroquial del Guarico a presencia del Santisimo Sacramento, y con concurso del Pueblo, que primero 
perderian mil vidas, que permitir que los Esclavos se hiciesen libres.” 
107 García to the Marquis of Bajamar, 25 January 1792, AGS GM 7157, f. 46. In the original text: “…la 
disposición es de morir antes que ser esclavos. Esta resolución no tiene en mi concepto la menor duda. La 
esclavitud es horrorosa en la colonia.” 
108 García to the Marquis of Bajamar, 25 January 1792, AGS GM 7157, f. 46. In the original text: 
“Entonces han de ser batidos los negros y entonces hemos de ser inundados por esta abierta Linea que 
ofrece mucha estension a una negrada habituada a la montaña y malos pasos.” As a Colonel in Santo 
Domingo in the 1780s, Joaquín García had sought to limit self-purchase by slaves on the grounds that this 
practice deprived masters of productive labor and caused them to lose a valuable investment. García had 
also spoken out against granting manumission upon a slave-owner‟s death and had strongly supported the 
maintenance of a rigid racial order even among the free population. See Turits, “Par-delà les plantations,” 
66 n. 10; and Richard Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in 
Dominican History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 36-37.  
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which would entail a multitude of restrictions on their hard-won freedom. In his August 
29 freedom proclamation, Sonthonax established the foundations of a strict labor code 
that would in turn serve as the basis for subsequent “free” labor regimes in the colony for 
the next eight years. Seeking to generate revenue and procure manpower to fuel the 
French Republican war effort against the Spanish and French royalists, Sonthonax set 
forth a series of instructions that sought to tie ex-slaves to their plantations or enlist them 
in Republican armies. “A new order will be reborn,” Sonthonax declared in this 29 
August order, “and the old servitude will vanish. Do not believe nonetheless that the 
liberty that you will enjoy, is a state of laziness and idleness…Return to your plantations 
or the location of your former owners, you will receive a salary for your troubles; [and] 
you will not be subjected anymore to the humiliating punishment that had once been 
inflicted on you.”109 
In Articles IX-XI of the 29 August proclamation, Sonthonax laid out the crux of 
his labor code: the “blacks currently attached to the plantations of their former masters, 
will be required to remain there; they shall be employed in cultivating the land;” 
currently-enlisted black soldiers could opt for plantation labor, but only if they received 
permission from their commanding officer and found a suitable replacement; and the 
                                                 
109 Sonthonax, “Proclamation in the Name of the Republic,” 29 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In 
the original French: “…un nouvel ordre de choses va renaître, et l‟ancienne servitude disparaîtra. Ne 
croyez cependant pas que la liberté dont vous allez jouir, soit un état de paresse et d‟oisiveté. En France, 
tout le monde est libre, et tout le monde travaille; à Saint-Domingue, soumis aux mêmes lois, vous suivrez 
le même exemple. Rentrés dans vos atteliers ou chez vos anciens propriétaires, vous recevrez le salaire de 
vos peines; vous ne serez plus assujettis à la correction humiliante  qu‟on vous infligeait autrefois; vous ne 
serez plus la propriété d‟autrui; vous resterez les maîtres de la vôtre, et vous vivrez heureux.” Following 
his 31 October 1793 proclamation that freed all remaining slaves in Saint-Domingue, Polverel promised to 
issue his own labor code, but was not able to do so until 7 February 1794 due to illness. Carolyn Fick, 
“Emancipation in Haiti: From Plantation Labour to Peasant Proprietorship,” Slavery and Abolition 21, no. 2 
(August 2000), 18-19. For more information on the labor regimes devised by Sonthonax and Polverel, see 
Fick, The Making of Haiti, chapter 7. For an analysis of similar developments in 1790s Guadeloupe, see 
Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-
1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), chapters 6-7.  
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“formerly enslaved cultivators” must continue to labor on their old plantations for one 
year, unless a judge of the peace granted them permission to change plantations. 
Moreover, within two weeks of the issuance of this proclamation, all men who did not 
own property and were not in the military, working on a plantation, or in domestic 
service were to be arrested and imprisoned, while women who did not have “known 
means of existence” and were not engaged in either plantation work or domestic labor 
were to also be detained. Plantation laborers and domestics also had to remain in their 
local district unless they received written permission from a municipality.  
Along with these restrictions came certain limited rights. While Sonthonax 
followed the old Code Noir in granting the cultivateurs (those now freed from slavery) 
the right to have Sundays to themselves, he surpassed the Code in abolishing the whip 
and in giving these cultivateurs two hours per day to cultivate their own grounds. In 
another departure from the slave regime, these plantation laborers were to receive a salary 
(drawn from one quarter of plantation revenue), and children aged ten to fifteen years 
could only be employed in guarding animals and in gathering and sorting coffee and 
cotton. Article XIX remarkably stipulated that the cultivateurs were to receive small plots 
of land that were to be “divided equitably between each family, with respect to the 
quality of the land and the quantity that should be accorded,” which could potentially 
have served as a basis for the attainment of greater economic independence by former 
slaves. Precisely for this reason, this article was virtually ignored by successive 
Republican administrators in Saint-Domingue.
110
 
                                                 
110 Sonthonax, “Proclamation in the Name of the Republic,” 29 August 1793, ANOM CMSM F3 198. In 
the original French: “IX. Les nègres actuellement attachés aux habitations de leurs anciens maîtres, seront 
tenus d‟y rester; ils seront employés à la culture de la terre. X. Les guerriers enrôlés qui servent dans les 
camps ou dans les garnisons pourront se fixer sur les habitations en s‟adonnant à la culture, et obtenant 
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Resistance to this new plantation regime commenced as soon as news of the 29 
August proclamation became known. In his letter to Polverel dated 10 September 1793, 
Sonthonax complained that “the warriors have constantly refused to force the cultivators 
and the laborers to work.”111 Dominican authorities strove to win over some of these 
discontented individuals by offering their own path to freedom. In a 10 September 1793 
letter to García, Biassou‟s trusted subordinate Charles Belair proposed a plan that would 
eventually manumit new military recruits while maintaining a subservient labor force on 
the plantations of a newly-conquered Spanish Saint-Domingue. Arguing that “a force 
without discipline is a Ship without a rudder,” Belair proposed the formation of three 
“Regiments of Blacks” who would be recruited in all three provinces of Saint-Domingue. 
Each regiment would contain two thousand four-hundred men. Each soldier would “hire 
                                                                                                                                                 
préalablement un congé de leur chef ou un ordre de nous, qui ne pourront leur être délivrés qu‟en se 
faisant remplacer par un homme de bonne volonté. XI. Les ci-devant esclaves cultivateurs seront engagés 
pour un an, pendant lequel temps ils ne pourront changer d‟habitation que sur une permission des juges de 
paix, dont il sera parlé ci-après, et dans les cas qui seront par nous déterminés...XIX. Les cultivateurs 
auront en outre les places à vivres; elles seront réparties équitablement entre chaque famille, en égard à la 
qualité de la terre et à la quantité qu‟il convient d‟accorder…XXI. Depuis l‟âge de dix ans à celui de 
quinze, les enfans ne pourront être employés qu‟à la garde des animaux ou à ramasser et trier du café et du 
coton…XXVII. La correction du fouet est absolument supprimée; elle sera remplacée, pour les fautes 
contre la discipline, par la barre pour un, deux ou trois jours, suivant l‟exigence du cas. La plus forte peine 
sera la perte d‟une partie ou de la totalité des salaires; elle sera prononcée par le juge de paix et des 
assesseurs; la portion de celui ou de ceux qui en seront privés accroîtra au profit de l‟attelier…XXIX. Les 
cultivateurs ne pourront être contraints de travailler le dimanche: il leur sera laissé deux heures par jour 
pour la culture de leur place. Les juges de paix régleront, suivant les circonstances, l‟heure à laquelle les 
travaux devront commencer et finir…XXXIII. Dans la quinzaine du jour de la promulgation de la présente 
proclamation, tous les hommes qui n‟ont pas de propriétés, et qui ne seront ni enrôlés, ni attachés à la 
culture, ni employés au service domestique et qui seraient trouvés errants, seront arrêtés et mis en prison. 
XXXIV. Les femmes qui n‟auront pas de moyens d‟existence connus, qui ne seront pas attachées à la 
culture ou employées au service domestique, dans le délai ci-dessus fixé, ou qui seraient trouvées errantes, 
seront également arrêtées et mises en prison. XXXV. Les hommes et femmes mis en prison dans les cas 
énoncés aux deux articles précédens, seront détenus pendant un mois, pour la première fois; pendant trois 
mois, pour la seconde; et la troisième fois, condamnés aux travaux publics pendant un an. XXXVI. Les 
personnes attachées à la culture et les domestiques ne pourront, sous aucun prétexte, quitter, sans une 
permission de la municipalité, la commune où ils résident; ceux qui contreviendront à cette disposition 
seront punis de la manière déterminée dans l‟art. XXVII.” The proclamation‟s final article declared that 
“the dispositions of the Code Noir remain provisionally abrogated” (Les dispositions du Code Noir 
demeurent provisoirement abrogées). 
111 Sonthonax to Polverel, 10 September 1793, CARAN CC D/XXV/5, dossier 53. In the original French: 
“…les guerriers ont constamment refusé de forcer les cultivateurs et les ouvriers au travail.” 
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himself out,” and after a set period of time (approximately twelve years) of “having 
served His Majesty faithfully,” these soldiers “will be owners of their will” and be 
“recognized as the other vassals of His Catholic Majesty.” During these twelve years 
these recruits would seemingly occupy a liminal position between slave and free man. 
Rather than receiving a stipend, each soldier would instead obtain compensation for his 
services in arms, clothing, and rations from the King, but the greatest reward would come 
from promoting the “happiness and the glory of this Powerful Monarch.”112 
Belair also outlined a labor regime for the rest of the “blacks” in Saint-Domingue 
under Spanish rule that shared significant similarities with the plans of Sonthonax and 
Polverel. In Belair‟s proposal, “[a]ll the blacks who are still in the conquered parts” of 
Saint-Domingue would be “obligated to return without delay to their plantations to 
perform the work that Your Greatness [García]” should deem necessary. Every person, 
including children, who failed to adhere to this rule would be arrested, detained, and 
further penalized according to his or her specific infraction. Finally, no exiled plantation 
                                                 
112 Belair to Joaquín García, 10 September 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 16. In the original text: “V[uestra] 
Grandeza no ignora que una tropa sin disciplina es un Navío sin timón: que de ninguna manera puede 
conducirse una tropa sin disciplina severa; es un rebaño que jamás puede juntar un Pastor. Ahora pues yo 
suplico a V[uestra] Grandeza de permitirnos de levantar tres Regimientos de Negros en la Parte del Norte, 
del Oeste y del Sur. Los tres Regimientos estarán sumisos exactamente a la disciplina de S.M. 
Catholica…Cada soldado de los hombres Negros que componen desde ahora n[uestros] exercitos en la 
parte conquistada de Santo Domingo serán obligado a contratar un enganchamiento que S.M. Catholica 
tasará la duracion del tiempo que no podrá ser mucho menos de doce años; Los quales después de 
espirado dicho tiempo y haviendo servido fielmente a S.M. serán dueños de sus voluntades; es decir de 
continuar su servicio o de retirarse y serán desde aquel momento reconocidos como sus otros vasallos de 
S.M. Católica. Todos serán vestidos, Armados y equipados a expensas de S.M. prometiendo de pagar 
provisoria y exactamente todas las Armas que están en las manos de n[uestros] soldados para formar los 
dichos Regimientos. La Paga de cada soldado empezará a correr desde el día en que ellos havrán 
contratado su engancham[iento]; ellos tampoco reciviran algun salario por su enganchamiento queriendo 
solamente dar señales de n[uestro] reconocim[iento] a S.M. Catholica de sus fieles subditos y que no 
aspiran sino a la felicidad y a la Gloria de este Poderoso Monarca.” 
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owner would be able to return to his property or “command his blacks” until the Spanish 
king authorized this.
113
  
This plan envisioned an island united under the regime of the Spanish king and 
the plantation, and while it did not propose to grant some of the rights that were 
enumerated in Sonthonax‟s 1793 labor code, the similarities between the two programs 
weaken the distinction between the free French Republic and the slaveholding Spanish 
monarchy that Sonthonax and Polverel tried to impress upon potential recruits. The 
survival of both the August 1793 emancipation decree and of the French Republic itself 
was very much in doubt in the fall of 1793; this, combined with the many restrictions that 
Sonthonax placed on freed individuals‟ liberty, may have made the Spanish plan appear 
preferable to French labor codes for some would-be recruits had it been implemented. 
Furthermore, while Belair‟s proposal appears to have emerged at least partly as an 
immediate reaction to the first French emancipation decree, it also ought to be understood 
within the context of the long history of Spanish-American authorities‟ granting some 
slaves their liberty in exchange for military service. This in turn resulted in part from the 
profound dependence of Spanish colonial officials on black military units for the defense 
of numerous parts of the far-flung empire.
114
 
                                                 
113 Belair to Joaquín García, 10 September 1793, AGS GM 7157, f. 16. In the original text: “Todos los 
negros o negras que están ya en los Quarteles (o Partidos) conquistados, de que los primeros que no han 
contratado enganchamiento o que no estén en el caso de servir a S.M., asi como todas las negras y 
negritos estarán obligados a volver sin alguna dilacion a sus Havitaciones para hacer el trabajo que 
V[uestra] Grandeza nos prescrivirá sobre esto. Todos los negros o negras que no estén en sus habitaciones 
y que no estén empleados en el exercito serán arrestados, y conducidos a presencia del Comandante del 
más cercano campo que los interrogara y les impondrá la pena que hubiesen merecido...Ningún Habitante 
de los que estubieren antes sobre sus Haciendas podrá volber a ellas ni mandar a sus negros hasta que se 
haya mandado otra cosa por S.M. Católica.” 
114 On the military recruitment of slaves in Spanish America, see Jane Landers, “Transforming Bondsmen 
into Vassals: Arming Slaves in Colonial Spanish America,” in Brown and Morgan, Arming Slaves, 120-
137. 
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Fundamentally, both the French and Spanish labor regimes tried to limit the work 
options of ex-slaves to either the plantation or the army while offering concessions that 
would entice these individuals to serve one of the belligerent sides. Yet despite these 
similarities, the decrees of general emancipation became an increasingly effective 
recruiting tool for the French Republic in the months after August 1793. In Dubois‟s 
words, general emancipation came to represent the “key weapon of war” that helped to 
reverse the fortunes of the Republic in the Caribbean.
115
 French recruitment efforts 
among the newly freed may have been bolstered by the fact that both the Spanish and the 
British (who invaded the island in September 1793) not only preserved slavery in the 
areas that they conquered but also found eager allies in many planters who had a vested 
interest in maintaining slavery.
116
 Sonthonax also skillfully exploited bitter memories of 
the Ogé affair to win support. In a letter to Pedro Acuña dated 25 September 1793, the 
archbishop Fernando Portillo y Torres accused Sonthonax of distorting recent history to 
suit his own agenda. “You will note, Your Excellence,” wrote the archbishop, “the care 
of Sonthonax in reminding the Mulattos who compose his forces, and the Blacks of ours 
whom he has managed to conquer, of the wretched extradition of Oge, blaming even 
more the Spanish who did it, than the Murderers who took his life, for he knows well that 
this is to rub salt in the wound, that the former [the Mulattos] have not been able to 
forget.”117  
                                                 
115 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 193.  
116 On these alliances, see David Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint 
Domingue 1793-1798 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), chapter 3.  
117 Fernando Portillo y Torres to Pedro Acuña, 25 September 1793, AGI ASD 1110. In the original text: 
“…notará V.E. el cuidado de Santhonax en recordar a los Mulatos q[ue] componen sus fuerzas, y a los 
Negros n[uestros] a quienes procura conquistar, la indigna entrega de Oge, culpando aun mas a los 
Españoles que la hicieron, que a los Asasinos que le quitaron la vida, por que sabe bien que es restregarles 
la llaga, que los primeros no han podido olvidar.” 
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Incessant disputes between rival factions and leaders among the “Black 
Auxiliaries” further undermined the Spanish cause. In the spring of 1794, Toussaint 
Louverture, who had loyally commanded troops under the Spanish flag since joining that 
nation‟s forces in 1793, turned on Jean-François and Biassou and proclaimed his 
allegiance to the French Republic. While the precise reasons for Toussaint‟s “volte-face” 
remain unclear, the decision likely resulted from a confluence of the emancipation 
decrees of 1793-1794, Toussaint‟s personal enmity with both Jean-François and Biassou, 
and the worsening military situation of the Spanish on the island.
118
 The defection of 
Toussaint—who commanded four thousand troops and the talented military leaders Jean-
Jacques Dessalines, Moïse, and Henri Christophe—struck a fatal blow to the Spanish 
campaign for Saint-Domingue.
119
 With Toussaint came control over perhaps half of the 
land that the Spanish had conquered north of the Artibonite River, and by the end of 1794 
Toussaint had captured Jean-François‟s stronghold of Grande-Rivière as well as the 
towns of San Rafael and Saint-Michel.
120
 Despite losing the important posts of Saint-
Marc, Arcahaye, Mirebalais, Léogane, and Grand-Goâve to the British by mid-1794, the 
French Republicans‟ victory over the Spanish became a fait accompli by the end of that 
year.
121
 
During a particularly terrible month for the Spanish war effort in Hispaniola, July 
1794, Jean-François ordered a massacre that created an irreparable rift between the 
Spanish colonial high command and this ex-slave officer. Two months earlier, Joaquín 
del Sasso, the Spanish commanding officer in the key border town of Fort-Dauphin, had 
                                                 
118 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, chapter 8. 
119 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 178-179. 
120 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 131; Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 182. 
121 Fick, The Making of Haiti, 185. 
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written to García to express his fear of a “new nation of barbarians that has Sworn in its 
Heart to decapitate all the whites.” In order to prevent these “barbarians” from 
“recreat[ing] some night in this Place [Fort-Dauphin] the terrible, and tragic scene of the 
fire in [Le Cap],” Sasso urged García to expel all the “blacks, and mulattos” from the 
Fort-Dauphin area and replace them with two companies of “émigré whites.”122 In his 
response, García rejected this proposal, citing the loss of manpower that this would 
entail.
123
 Yet two months later, events in Fort-Dauphin would shatter the already tense 
relationship between García and the “Black Auxiliaries” and further accelerate the defeat 
of the Spanish.  
Located in the rich northern province of Saint-Domingue near the Spanish border, 
the small town of Fort-Dauphin had by the 1780s become an important military base and 
commercial hub. Its proximity to Santo Domingo facilitated (often illicit) trade in French 
manufactures for Spanish horses and cattle, while its sugar- and coffee-producing littoral 
made it a thriving market for those products. Fort-Dauphin‟s location near both the 
commercial nerve center of Le Cap and the Dominican border led French authorities to 
station a significant garrison there, even as this town‟s free population numbered only 
560 souls in 1780.
124
 These factors made Fort-Dauphin a major prize in the Franco-
                                                 
122 Joaquín del Sasso to García, 17 May 1794, AGS GM 7151, f. 222. In the original text: “...se intenta 
repetir alguna noche en esta Plaza la terrible, y tragica escena del incendio del Guarico. El medio de 
impedirlo es sacar de aquí con [illegible] o fuerza a los negros, y mulatos, y formar dos compañías de 
blancos emigrados a quienes su propria conservación ha de precisar a defender sus hogares, y Personas 
con valor, y energía, siendo de infinita importancia. Esta creación para q[ue] los españoles, y franceses 
fieles reúnan sus intereses…y puedan resistir a esta nueva nación de barbaros que tiene Jurado en su 
Corazon degollar a todos los blancos.” 
123 García to Joaquín del Sasso, 17 May 1794, AGS GM 7151, f. 223.  
124 King, Blue Coat or Powdered Wig, 30-32. On 26 December 1796, the French military officer Grandet 
wrote: “the most important and probable Expedition that the Enemy [the British] could undertake is without 
a doubt the capture of Fort-Liberté [the new name of Fort-Dauphin], that would assure it an infinitely 
useful Port in the winds of Le Cap and all the means to entertain the revolt among our cultivators, in 
connecting…its invasions from the West with those from the North.” Grandet, “Defense Project for Fort 
Liberté,” 6 Nivôse an 5 (26 December 1796), ANOM Direction de Fortification des Colonies (hereinafter 
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Spanish war. After a siege lasting several months, the residents and garrison of the town 
and parish of Fort-Dauphin surrendered to the Spanish General Gabriel Aristizával on 28 
January 1794.
125
 The surrender accord signed this same day between these parties 
included a provision specifying that “the Political rights of the men of color, our brothers, 
will be completely preserved,” to which Aristizával had responded that this depended on 
“the intentions of S.M.C. [the Spanish king].”126  
Fort-Dauphin would nonetheless become renowned less as a bastion of racial 
equality than as the site of a gruesome massacre. On 9 July 1794, Nicolás de Toledo 
informed don Joseph Antonio Urízar, a member of the Audiencia (high appeals court) of 
Santo Domingo, that their nominal ally Jean-François had two days earlier entered Fort-
Dauphin with over five hundred heavily-armed followers and proceeded to massacre 
many “French whites,” sparing neither the sick nor the weak. “[We] do not know the 
origins of this attack, nor the number of French whites sacrificed,” Toledo wrote, “only 
                                                                                                                                                 
DFC) 4, no. 310. In the original text: “L‟Expédition la plus importante et la plus vraisemblable que 
l‟Ennemi puisse projeter est sans doute la prise du Fort-Liberté, qui lui assurerait un Port infiniment 
commode au vent du Cap et tous les moyens d‟entretenir la révolte parmi nos cultivateurs, en liant pour 
ainsi dire ses invasions de L‟Ouest avec celles du Nord.” 
125 According to an eyewitness account penned by a French officer named Knapp, Jean-François, who led 
eight thousand “French blacks” and three to four hundred “Spanish infantrymen,” launched a three-month 
siege of Fort-Dauphin (whose garrison contained only three hundred men) on 9 October 1793. On 13 
January 1794, Aristizával led a marine attack on this post with six “line ships” (vaisseaux de ligne), two 
frigates, and assorted other vessels against a French garrison of around four hundred men. Losses suffered 
in these attacks prompted numerous French citizens and military commanders to capitulate to the Spanish 
on 28 January 1794. Knapp, “Items Concerning the Capture of Fort-Dauphin by the Spanish in Saint-
Domingue, January 1794,” Service Historique de l‟Armée de Terre (hereinafter SHAT), Vincennes, France, 
Xi 71. In the original text: “Telle était notre position quand le 8 [octobre] nous fûmes sommés de nous 
rendre pour Jean François chef des révoltés coalisées avec les Espagnols et campées à une lieu et demie de 
la ville, son armée était formée de plus de 8,000 nègres français et d‟environ trois ou quatres cents 
hommes d‟infanterie Espagnols…” 
126 Surrender accord between don Gabriel Aristizával and the “garrison and inhabitants of Fort Dauphin,” 
28 January 1794, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/8. In the original text: “Les droits Politiques des hommes de 
couleur, nos frères, seront conservés dans toute leur intégralité…D‟après les intentions de S.M.C.” 
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that there are so many [bodies] that there are many streets which one cannot cross.”127 
Scholars have answered Toledo‟s question concerning the death toll with a figure of 
around seven hundred, but his speculations on Jean-François‟s motivations for carrying 
out the killing remain unresolved.
128
 As Spanish fortunes declined following Toussaint‟s 
defection, Jean-François may have come to believe that he had less to lose by committing 
such an act and may have seen these seven hundred victims as embodiments of the 
French forces that had persecuted him and his fellow slave rebels earlier in the decade. 
These colonists also might have been unfortunate victims of an atmosphere of intense 
suspicion and enmity in which accusations of disloyalty or sedition were often 
tantamount to a death sentence.
129
  
According to a second-hand account penned by an officer in the 186
th
 French 
Regiment named Grandet, who recounted what had been told to him by a freedman 
named Noël who had recently switched allegiances from Spain to France, the Fort-
Dauphin area‟s “Spanish commander” departed the town the night before the killings, 
after which Jean-François entered with eight hundred “blacks” and Father Vázquez, the 
curate of Dajabón, who delivered a sermon immediately prior to the massacre. Grandet 
placed the number killed at 734, slightly less than the figure of 742 offered by a French 
                                                 
127 Nicolás de Toledo to Joseph Antonio Urízar, 9 July 1794, AGS GM 7159, f. 4. In the original text: 
“Estos Emisarios concuerdan con la primera relacion, mas no saben el principio de este atentado, ni el 
numero de franceses blancos sacrificados, solo sí que son tantos que muchas calles no se podia pasar.” 
128 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 180; Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 180. See also Popkin, 
Facing Racial Revolution, chapter 13.  
129 Though the extremely tendentious nature of the few extant first-hand accounts of the massacre makes it 
quite difficult to separate fact from fiction, one such account suggests that Jean-François may have feared 
that these French colonists were collaborating with rivals. This account was written by an anonymous 
French refugee who fled the burning of Le Cap in June 1793 and then in 1794 returned to the Fort-Dauphin 
area where his family had owned a plantation. This refugee claimed that Jean-François and his men “tried 
to palliate their crime by saying that they had been informed that we [the French colonists] wanted to revolt 
against them and deliver that part of the island to the English, who were already in possession of other 
parts. Another excuse given was that Jean François, outraged at the return of the French proprietors, 
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merchant called Mirande who composed a first-hand account of the event following his 
escape from Fort-Dauphin.
130
 While these accounts interpreted the event as a cowardly 
slaughter of innocent unarmed civilians, Jean-François in an 11 July 1794 letter sought to 
exculpate himself by presenting the violence as an unauthorized overreaction by some of 
his men to the threat of French attacks. According to Jean-François, though these French 
colonists had invited retaliation by having captured and sold several of his officers, the 
violence was caused by a few of his officers and enlisted men who “without reason and 
without understanding fired upon all the French Whites against my orders and 
intentions.” Though Jean-François could not “stop their fury and their rage” for several 
hours, he was able to save “many French people” from death. Despite their differences, 
most of these accounts agreed on one point: that the Spanish officials in the area who 
were not part of the Black Auxiliaries did not intercede to stop the killing. In Jean-
François‟s words, they “abandoned all the posts” prior to the attack.131 
Jean-François‟s accusations of captive-selling suggest that part of the controversy 
that erupted in the aftermath of the Fort-Dauphin violence revolved around the question 
of whether those once held as slaves in Saint-Domingue were now “masters of their own 
                                                                                                                                                 
threatened to start a rebellion of all the Negroes against the Spanish, unless he was promised that we would 
be delivered to him to be done with as he chose.” Quoted in Popkin, Facing Racial Revolution, 263.  
130 Account of Grandet on Fort-Dauphin massacre, 7 July 1794, ANOM CMSM F3 199. In the original 
French: “…il me dit qu‟il y avait tous les jours des Espions, qu‟il savait surement qu‟il n‟y Existait aucun 
blanc français, que le nombre des assassinés se montait à 734, qu‟il y avait à Peu Près 200 espagnols dont 
la moitié était malade…la veille le commandant espagnol est allé à Mont Christ, et on a armé les nègres 
qui ne l‟étaient Pas, jean françois est Entré le lendemain avec huit cent nègres, le curé de l‟axavon a 
Prêché; après le sermon les Espagnols se sont retirés au fort, et le massacre a commencé.” Emphasis in 
original. The Mirande account is discussed in Popkin, Facing Racial Revolution, 252-253. 
131 “Declaration made by the General Jean-François on all the matters that have been the Cause of the affair 
that took place on 7 July in Fort-Dauphin,” 11 July 1794, ANOM CMSM F3 199. In the original text: 
“Mais plusieurs de mes soldats et quelques uns de mes chefs sans raisonnement et sans entendement firent 
feu sur tous les Blancs français contre mes ordres et intentions. Il me fut impossible d‟arrêter leur fureur et 
leur rage jusqu‟à 5 heures après midi que je les ai appaisé, et sauvé beaucoup de français qui se sont 
embarqués…Sieur Commandant Casasola et de tous les chefs Espagnols qui abandonnèrent tous les 
postes…” 
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will,” to use the phrase of the earlier Spanish decree. Though Jean-François in his 11 July 
1794 apologia denied charges of engaging in slaving, declaring that “I Jean-François 
would pay with my blood [for] all their Blacks whom I had taken from the Republicans 
and whom I sold,” strong evidence implicates him and Biassou in slaving during the 
Franco-Spanish war.
132
 Historian Jorge Victoria Ojeda has moreover argued that French 
officials condemned Jean-François for participating in the “sale of French prisoners or 
soldiers to different persons from the Spanish part, which was labeled as an action 
contrary to rights.” García apparently refuted these charges, “saying that the Spanish 
troops (including the auxiliaries) did not capture soldiers, but only enslaved thieves, and 
those who claimed to be free were treated as such.”133 At stake was not simply the 
question of whether Jean-François and others had sold other human beings, but also the 
scope of the rights possessed by “those who claimed to be free.” After 1795, those held in 
bondage in Santo Domingo would advance claims to such rights on the basis of the 1794 
French emancipation decree, which in turn would give rise to disputes that called into 
question the universality of French Republican abolition and equal citizenship.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Fort-Dauphin massacre, García was nonetheless 
less interested in such questions of rights and more concerned with disposing of the man 
who stood accused of slaughtering many landowners and onetime slaveholders. In an 
                                                 
132 “Declaration made by the General Jean-François on all the matters that have been the Cause of the affair 
that took place on 7 July in Fort-Dauphin,” 11 July 1794, ANOM CMSM F3 199. In the original text: 
“…moi Jean François payerais de mon sang tous leurs Nègres que j‟avais pris sur les Républicains et que 
j‟ai fait vendre.” In a letter to the French government, a former Cavalry Captain and General Inspector of 
sequestered plantations in Saint-Domingue named Charles Malenfant asserted that Jean-François had sold 
many “Blacks” (Noirs) to Cuba and Puerto Rico during this war. Charles Malenfant to French government, 
undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/20. Furthermore, on 29 August 1793, Joaquín Cabrera, the Commandant 
of San Rafael, wrote to Biassou to thank him for hunting down and capturing a “black slave” (nègre 
esclave) named André who had fled to French Saint-Domingue. Cabrera to Biassou, 29 August 1793, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/8.  
133 Ojeda, Tendencias monárquicas, 79.  
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October 1794 letter to García, the Republican military commander Étienne Laveaux 
acknowledged a proposal that García had recently made to exchange Jean-François and 
fifty of his most trusted subordinates for a number of Spanish prisoners held by the 
French. Laveaux replied that García would have to sweeten the deal by surrendering fifty 
additional men before he would accept. The Frenchman also rejected García‟s more 
gruesome offer to deliver him the head of Jean-François, insisting that although the black 
officer was indeed an “Enemy of the Republic” (Enemigo de la República) he was more 
valuable to the French alive than dead due to the “powerful influence of Jean-François 
over the Blacks.” While this deal never materialized, this exchange attests to the vital 
importance of leaders like Jean-François to the French Republic. Indeed, Laveaux stated 
in his letter to García that a change in the loyalties of Jean-François would be highly 
beneficial in ensuring that the French Republic “conserve its colonies.”134  
Despite the refusal of Jean-François and Biassou to switch sides, the Republic did 
indeed conserve Saint-Domingue. Led by Toussaint Louverture and Laveaux, the 
Republicans retook the principal parts of Saint-Domingue that the Spanish had captured 
in the year following Toussaint‟s defection and forced this enemy to capitulate in 1795.135 
On 22 July 1795 in Basel, Switzerland, France and Spain signed the Treaty of Basel, 
which ended hostilities between the two powers and ceded the Spanish portion of 
Hispaniola to France. While this year in some respects witnessed the commencement of a 
                                                 
134 Étienne Laveaux to Joaquín García, 21 October 1794, AGS GM 7151, f. 463. In the original text: “La 
republica Francesa quiere conservar sus colonias, estoi enterado del poderoso infuxo de Juan Francisco 
sobre los Negros, que tiene consigo, y su perdon, igualmente que el de su Tropa dependerá del uso que 
querrá hacer de su entendimiento: no quiero de ningun modo la muerte de esos hombres, pero si su 
arrepentimiento.” 
135 In 1794, Sonthonax and Polverel were forced to depart Saint-Domingue for France to defend themselves 
against charges brought by émigré planters that they had usurped legitimate authority in issuing the 
emancipation decrees. Though Polverel died during the proceedings, Sonthonax won his trial and returned 
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series of imperial crises in the Spanish world that led to the loss of most of this power‟s 
colonies in the New World by 1830, for those held in or recently liberated from servitude 
in Hispaniola, the year 1795 represented both a turning point in and the continuation of a 
long struggle for a freedom that they would eventually have to defend against the French 
Republic—and the Napoleonic French empire that followed—in addition to the forces of 
the Spanish and the British. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 The advent of “emancipation” in Hispaniola was a Dominican as well as a Haitian 
story. The major transformative events that transpired on the island in the first half of the 
1790s—including the Ogé episode, the successful free-colored struggle for legal equality, 
the 1791 slave revolt and its aftermath, and the Franco-Spanish war—were rooted in the 
intertwined histories of both sides of the island. While the changes that occurred during 
these years resulted in part from political, intellectual and military developments that 
arose in many corners of Africa, Europe and the Americas, the slave societies of both 
parts of Hispaniola—and the long history of resistance to enslavement in each—formed 
the local context for these transformations.  
Jean-François and Georges Biassou experienced firsthand this linkage between 
the local and the international. Their fate became a delicate political issue once news of 
the cession reached the island, as Spanish colonial authorities became caught between the 
obligation to reward these men and their followers for their military services, and 
racially-charged fears that they would directly or indirectly incite insurrection among free 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Saint-Domingue in 1796 as a member of a new Civil Commission. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 
180 and 196. 
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and enslaved non-whites in disparate parts of the Spanish empire. Though many of the 
former “Black Auxiliaries” received modest pensions, they were sent to places as far-
flung as Honduras, Yucatán (Mexico), Panamá, and Trinidad, as well as Florida, Spain, 
Cuba and Santo Domingo as a result of policies designed to split them up and reduce 
their supposed threat. Biassou relocated to Florida, while his rival Jean-François followed 
a complicated itinerary, ultimately ending up in the southern Spanish city of Cádiz.
136
 
Although they had gained their freedom as well as material rewards and military ranks by 
defending the oldest colonial empire in the Americas, these exiles found mixed 
receptions in different parts of this empire due to the revolution that they had helped 
make.  
In claiming to be the “king of the counter-revolution,” Georges Biassou at once 
defended something very old and helped to create something very new. In the act of 
affirming the rights of freed individuals such as himself as political actors, Biassou‟s 
words and actions undermined race-based subordination and hierarchy. His bold 
statement of political inclusion is emblematic of the ways in which slaves, freed 
individuals, and free-born non-whites created and advanced their own ideas of political 
legitimacy during the period, and draws attention to dynamics that would recur in the 
years to come. 
                                                 
136 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, chapter 12; and Jane Landers, “Rebellion and Royalism in 
Spanish Florida: The French Revolution on Spain‟s Northern Colonial Frontier,” in Gaspar and Geggus, A 
Turbulent Time, 156-177. 
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Chapter Two 
 
“The Courage to Conquer their Natural Liberty:” The Invisibility of Emancipation 
in French Santo Domingo, 1795-1801 
 
On the evening of 30 October 1796, a Sunday (the day of the week often chosen 
by slave rebels in the Americas), approximately 120 “cultivateurs africains” (African 
cultivators) from the Boca Nigua plantation rose up in revolt with the alleged “horrible 
plan” to kill the plantation‟s director Juan Bautista Oyarzával and all of the other whites 
there.
1
 Organized around an elaborate hierarchy headed by a “queen” named Marie-
Anne, these insurgents used drums to incite potential followers to action and often 
resorted to more forceful recruitment measures if this failed. Employing a type of 
guerrilla warfare characterized by the tried-and-true Caribbean pattern of retreat to the 
mountains, the rebels initially succeeded in forcing Oyarzával and his partisans to flee to 
nearby Santo Domingo city by setting fire to buildings and canefields, but they were 
                                                 
1 “Order of the Provisional Agent [Philippe-Rose Roume] on the Praiseworthy Conduct of the Spaniards 
[concerning] a Revolt of blacks [nègres] in the Spanish Part,” 9 Nivôse an 5 (29 December 1796), Archives 
Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, France, Collection Moreau de St Méry 
(hereinafter CMSM) F3 200. The original French reads: “…plus de cent vingt cultivateurs africains de la 
même habitation [Boca Nigua] Endoctrinés Par trois des anciens compagnons du brigand Jean François, 
avaient conçu l‟affreux dessein d‟assassiner le vertueux Jean-Baptiste Oyarzabal fondateur de la dite 
habitation, ainsi que les autres blancs de Boca Nigua.” Emphasis in original. In his “compte rendu” 
(report) to Santo Domingo‟s Governor Joaquín García on the Boca Nigua revolt, the judge Manuel Bravo y 
Bermudez claimed that the “rebels” (révoltés) numbered 110-120, not counting women and children. 
“Report by the Judge Bravo y Bermudez to the President of Santo Domingo [Joaquín García] on the Revolt 
of the Blacks of the Plantation of Oyarzábal or Yranda,” 14 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. 
Roberto Cassá has estimated that over two hundred “slaves” (his word) were involved in the uprising. 
Roberto Cassá, “Les effets du Traité du Bâle,” in Saint-Domingue espagnol et la révolution nègre d‟Haïti 
(1790-1822), ed. Alain Yacou (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 206.  
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eventually routed by the forces of Santo Domingo‟s Governor Joaquín García, who 
oversaw the capture of many of the insurgents and the execution of the ringleaders.
2
  
On 22 July 1795, slaveholding Spain had ceded its oldest colony of Santo 
Domingo to the French Republic by the Treaty of Basel. The French National Convention 
had decreed the abolition of slavery in the entirety of France‟s domains on 4 February 
1794, and the wording of the Treaty of Basel and that of the general emancipation law 
together imply that slavery became illegal in Santo Domingo upon this cession.
3
 
Nonetheless, servitude was apparently not eliminated by this stroke of a pen. The French 
and Spanish authorities who crafted the two most informative extant reports on the Boca 
Nigua episode framed it as a slave revolt, more than a year after apparent emancipation. 
Why did Philippe-Rose Roume, the French government‟s principal envoy to Santo 
Domingo—who in a later letter to municipal authorities in the Dominican town of San 
Juan de la Maguana extolled the virtues of “Our immortal Revolution”—bestow the 
highest praise upon García and other Spanish political and military leaders for their swift 
                                                 
2 “Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. In his report, Bravo y Bermudez 
meticulously listed the “blacks” (nègres) whose dead bodies his troops had recovered in the fighting and 
described in detail the guerrilla-style combat that pitted his forces against elusive rebels. Bravo y Bermudez 
to García, 14 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. 
3 The Treaty of Basel stipulated that Spain “cedes and abandons in all property to the French Republic the 
entire Spanish part of the isle of Saint Domingue, in the Antilles.” Treaty of Bâle (Basel), 4 Thermidor an 3 
(22 July 1795), Centre d‟Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, 
AF/III/61. In the original text: “En échange de la restitution portée par l‟article IV le Roi d‟Espagne, pour 
lui et ses successeurs, cède et abandonne en toute propriété à la République française toute la partie 
Espagnole de l‟isle de Saint Domingue, aux Antilles.” On 4 February 1794, the French National 
Convention passed a law which stipulated that: “THE NATIONAL CONVENTION declares that the 
slavery of Blacks in all the [French] Colonies is abolished: as a result it decrees that all men, without 
distinction of color, residing in the colonies, are French citizens, and shall enjoy all the rights assured by 
the [French] constitution.” “Decree of the National Convention...That abolishes the Slavery of Blacks in the 
Colonies,” 16 Pluviôse an 2 (4 February 1794), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/9. In the original text: “LA 
CONVENTION NATIONALE déclare que l‟esclavage des Nègres dans toutes les Colonies est aboli: en 
conséquence elle décrète que tous les hommes, sans distinction de couleur, domiciliés dans les colonies, 
sont citoyens Français, et jouiront de tous les droits assurés par la constitution.” Emphasis in original.  
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repression of the “slave” revolt while condemning the “crimes” that the cultivateurs had 
supposedly committed in Boca Nigua?
4
 
Boca Nigua was the largest and most profitable plantation in Santo Domingo, 
located near Santo Domingo city. Concentrating principally on sugar, it was coveted for 
its productive capacity by a succession of Spanish and French authorities. Nonetheless, 
these facts alone do not adequately explain the elision of “emancipation” in these 
accounts. While the account of the judge Manuel Bravo y Bermudez, who commanded 
the military force that put down the uprising, explicitly labeled the rebels “slaves,” in his 
report Roume substituted the word “cultivateur” for “slave” and depicted the insurgents 
as enslavers who forced other laborers on the plantation to join the uprising on pain of 
becoming “reduce[ed] to slavery.”5 A student of slave revolts in the Americas who lacked 
specific knowledge of the situation in Santo Domingo under French rule might be 
forgiven for reading these reports as quintessential examples of colonial administrators‟ 
responses to a slave rebellion.
6
  
                                                 
4 Roume to municipal authorities of San Juan de la Maguana, 1 Floréal an 5 (20 April 1797), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/20; “Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. The original French 
from the 20 April 1797 letter is: “…vous allez apprendre à nous Connaître, vous verrez que Jamais nous ne 
confondons Le vertueux Père et fils de famille, égarés par des hommes méchants et Intrigants…remerciez 
le ciel de ce que vous vous trouvez [illegible], même en dépit de votre erreur, à Jouir de tous les bienfaits 
de Nôtre immortelle Révolution.” The text of the relevant portion of Roume‟s 29 December 1796 order is: 
“Enfin tout annonçait que l‟espagne ne pourrait remettre à la France cette colonie [Santo Domingo], que 
dans un État de dévastation totale que [illegible] de tous les crimes, que l‟on a vu commettre dans 
l‟ancienne partie française, car le complot, les moyens, les actes étaient parfaitement semblables.”  
5 “Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200; Bravo y Bermudez to García, 14 
December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. The original French in the 29 December 1796 document is: “Que 
les révoltés comptaient ensuite forcer les autres cultivateurs de la colonie, à porter comme eux le fer et le 
feu sur toutes les propriétés territoriales, en réduisant à l‟esclavage, ceux qui s‟y refuseraient.” See also 
the 14 December 1796 report that Bravo y Bermudez submitted to García on the Boca Nigua uprising, 
which is preserved in Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI), Seville, Spain, Audiencia de Santo 
Domingo (hereinafter ASD) 1033.  
6 Many aspects of the Boca Nigua rebellion appeared in numerous slave revolts in the Americas. These 
included rebels‟ appointment of a leader bearing a royal title, the salience of drums, the rebels‟ guerrilla 
tactics, and authorities‟ savage repression of the uprising. While the literature on slave rebellions in the 
hemisphere is vast, two particularly illuminating analyses of major revolts are: David Gaspar, Bondmen 
and Rebels: A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985); and 
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The Boca Nigua affair and other episodes suggest that “emancipation” was in 
many ways invisible in French Santo Domingo. Nonetheless, the conflicts that ensued 
when numerous men and women advanced claims to their rights as French citizens 
against those who would hold them as slaves came to encompass not only the legality of 
slavery in that colony but also the perceived moral legitimacy of enslavement itself. I 
argue that this colony became a crucial battleground in the political and philosophical 
conflicts over the terms and meaning of liberty and citizenship that transpired on this 
island and beyond during the second half of the 1790s.   
Was there an “emancipation” in Santo Domingo after 1795? Despite the 
seemingly radical rupture of the French declaration of universal emancipation, much 
continuity existed in both parts of the island between the slave regime and what followed. 
In French Saint-Domingue, the legal consignment of most freed people to the roles of 
plantation laborer or soldier impelled many onetime slaves to seek freedom on their own 
terms by armed resistance, flight, and other means. Some of these individuals sought this 
freedom across the border in Santo Domingo, even as those still in bondage in the eastern 
part of the island often found that their conditions were very similar to what they had 
known under slavery. 
Slavery had been an important factor in the intricate diplomatic negotiations in 
which Spain and France engaged on the question of sovereignty over Santo Domingo and 
other colonies. Theory and practice were not one and the same, however, as became clear 
                                                                                                                                                 
João José Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia, trans. Arthur Brakel 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). Moreover, in his discussion of the Boca Nigua revolt, 
David Geggus attempted to place it roughly within a typology of slave rebellions. David Geggus, “Slave 
Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean in the Mid-1790s,” in A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and 
the Greater Caribbean, ed. David Geggus and David Gaspar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1997), 147-149. 
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in the Boca Nigua rebellion and other violent conflicts that transpired over the extent of 
freed Dominicans‟ rights. These rights also became the subject of political and discursive 
contests whose political, moral, economic and intellectual stakes were enormous. While 
scholars have devoted considerable attention to the complicated application of French 
universal emancipation in such places as Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe, this matter in 
Santo Domingo has not attracted the same scrutiny.
7
 Several factors account for this 
relative scholarly neglect, including the lesser emphasis that French authorities placed on 
Santo Domingo relative to other places and the strikingly distinct historiographical 
traditions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While Saint-Domingue was the more 
lucrative prize for the many political and military factions that competed for power on the 
island, their relative inattention to Santo Domingo in fact made it a crucible in contests 
over the nature and boundaries of freedom and equality. Rather than existing as a mere 
blank spot on a map besides revolutionary Saint-Domingue, Santo Domingo was a 
central theater in the unfolding of French Republican emancipation (1793-1802).
8
 Santo 
Domingo‟s peculiar status after 1795—and the status of the thousands of people whom 
many planters and others still claimed as slaves there—had significant implications for 
                                                 
7 For Saint-Domingue, among the best-known works are: C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint 
L‟Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. (1938; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1963); Carolyn 
Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990); and Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004). On Guadeloupe, see Laurent Dubois, A Colony of 
Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Frédéric Régent, Esclavage, métissage, liberté: La Révolution 
française en Guadeloupe 1789-1802 (Paris: Grasset, 2004). David Geggus and Carlos Esteban Deive are 
among the few scholars who have examined “emancipation” in Santo Domingo after 1795. See (among 
other works) Geggus, “Slave Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean,” and Carlos Esteban Deive, La 
esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492-1844) (Santo Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 
1980), chapters 10 and 19. 
8 For such a map, see Philip Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic 
History, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 159. This map, entitled “Saint Domingue 
about 1790,” presents the eastern portion of Hispaniola as simply “Spanish Santo Domingo” next to a 
detailed depiction of the main cities and sugar-growing areas in French Saint-Domingue.  
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the central questions that emerged from and drove one of the great revolutions in world 
history.  
 In some ways, Santo Domingo‟s political situation during this time was not so 
different from that of other parts of the French empire such as Martinique and La 
Réunion, where foreign invasions and local opposition combined to thwart the 
application of the 1794 emancipation decree.
9
 Nonetheless, several factors distinguished 
Santo Domingo from these other places: its physical proximity to Saint-Domingue, the 
focal point of revolutionary ferment in the Caribbean; Santo Domingo‟s lack of a prior 
history of French colonization; and the many connections that this colony shared with the 
far-flung possessions of Spain, its longtime colonial master. These facts—along with the 
conspicuous absence in Santo Domingo of plantation infrastructure on any appreciable 
scale since the sixteenth century—make its story under French rule quite distinct.  
In July 1795, the Treaty of Basel formally ended two years of armed conflict 
between republican France and royalist Spain. While the origins of this conflict lay in 
events in Europe, its outcome was strongly influenced by the actions of thousands of 
slaves-turned-soldiers in the Caribbean. For both formally freed Dominicans and the 
numerous Dominguan ex-slaves who ventured across the border for political and 
economic reasons, the proper application of French Republican law to this territory was 
no arcane diplomatic exercise. The stakes included access to a plot of land to call one‟s 
own; autonomy from the tyranny of the plantation; and control over one‟s own person 
                                                 
9 On Martinique, see Rebecca Schloss, Sweet Liberty: The Final Days of Slavery in Martinique 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); and David Geggus, “The Slaves and Free Coloreds 
of Martinique during the Age of the French and Haitian Revolutions: Three Moments of Resistance,” in 
The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion, ed. Robert Paquette and Stanley Engerman 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 280-301. On La Réunion, see Richard B. Allen, “The 
Constant Demand of the French: The Mascarene Slave Trade and the Worlds of the Indian Ocean and 
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and labor power. The struggles over these matters that emerged in both parts of 
Hispaniola after 1795 had deep roots in Dominican as well as Haitian history. As the 
situation of freed Dominicans became tied to developments across the border in Saint-
Domingue and across the Atlantic in France, the inability—or unwillingness—of 
Republican authorities to effectively free many individuals in Santo Domingo threatened 
to destroy the French Republic‟s credibility, undermining this republic‟s dearest 
professed values and their most radical manifestation.  
In recent decades, a number of scholars have convincingly presented 
“emancipation” in many parts of the Americas as an ongoing process rather than the 
culmination of a series of political and military struggles.
10
 French authorities‟ treatment 
of the Boca Nigua uprising, quasi-independent “maroon” communities, and the 
seemingly intractable problem of illegal slaving in Santo Domingo exposed some of the 
political, social and racial fissures of this process there. At the same time, these issues 
generated an abundance of impassioned if somewhat grandiloquent affirmations of liberty 
and equality from the pens of French officials, pages that now fill cartons of documents 
in Paris and Aix-en-Provence.  
Despite Santo Domingo‟s formal cession to France, Spanish authorities managed 
to retain a substantial amount of power there from 1795 to 1801. While one prominent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Atlantic during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of African History 49, no. 1 (2008): 43-
72. 
10 Among these works, the most directly relevant to this study are: Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and 
Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation 
Societies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: 
Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992); and Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999). For the United States, see the successive volumes under the editorship of 
Ira Berlin, Leslie Rowland and others. See for instance Ira Berlin and Leslie M. Harris, eds., Slavery in 
New York (New York: New Press, 2005); and Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland, eds., 
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scholar has labeled these years a “long and curious twilight period” characterized by the 
effective retention of Spanish law and the institution of slavery, the more optimistic 
French administrators imagined that French rule would usher in not a twilight but a 
dawn—that of the implementation of universal emancipation in Santo Domingo.11 
Ultimately, the epistolary and armed conflicts that arose in the context of the confused 
political situation in Santo Domingo challenged the political and presumed moral bases 
not only of the enslavement of Dominicans but also of the concept of a slave society 
itself.  
 
The Constitutional and Diplomatic Contexts of Santo Domingo’s Political Crisis 
 
The tumultuous political climate of the 1790s in the Atlantic World involved a 
complicated interplay of radical new ideas and centuries-old political and social practices. 
Since the sixteenth century, the Americas in general and the Caribbean in particular had 
been sites of colonial conflict and gamesmanship. This did not change appreciably in the 
revolutionary era. Nonetheless, the military conflagrations of the 1790s and the 
exchanges of territory that they often occasioned depended to a great degree on thousands 
of freed individuals who had won their liberty through military conquest and political 
activism.
12
 These men and women played integral roles in defining and advancing novel 
ideas of citizenship and freedom. Their ability to enjoy these rights in turn depended 
substantially on the outcome of these political and armed struggles. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Freedom‟s Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
11 Geggus, “Slave Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean,” 140. 
12 For succinct accounts of the international political contexts of the upheaval of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, see Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex, chapter 11; and David 
Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), chapter 11. 
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In this light, bringing Santo Domingo under French rule involved much more than 
a simple change in legal jurisdiction; it also entailed the political conversion of its 
inhabitants from Spanish subjects into French citizens. In an assessment of the situation 
in Santo Domingo presented to the French government in 1797, Roume confidently 
predicted that if his readers were to follow his recommendations of reducing taxes on the 
colony‟s impoverished residents and sending “wise and illustrious” French settlers there, 
then within three years, “our new brothers” in Santo Domingo would become “perfect 
[French] republicans.”13 In Roume‟s eyes, one particular subset of these “new brothers” 
merited special attention: the colony‟s newly freed population. Roume suggested that in 
order to integrate them into the new regime, priests in Santo Domingo would “accustom 
the landowners and the cultivators [the former slaves] to the regime of liberty.” In their 
efforts to achieve the “reintegration of the former slaves to the indispensable rights of 
humanity,” these clerics would be aided by the “paternal regime” and “good education” 
that freed Dominicans had received from their former masters.
14
  
                                                 
13 Some evidence suggests that many French settlers already resided in Santo Domingo. David Geggus has 
argued that at the time of the execution of the Boca Nigua ringleaders (December 1796), “French migrants 
from Saint Domingue...outnumbered Spaniards on the [Santo Domingo] city streets.” Geggus, “Slave 
Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean,” 146. Furthermore, according to the French General Antoine 
Chanlatte, many French people of “all colors, all principles and all opinions” had immigrated from Saint-
Domingue to Santo Domingo partly to escape the turmoil in Saint-Domingue. Report of General Antoine 
Chanlatte “to the French government and to all of the Friends of National Sovereignty and of order,” 20 
Prairial an 8 (9 June 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Beaucoup de français de 
toutes les couleurs, de tous les principes [et] de toutes les opinions ont successivement fréquenté la partie 
Espagnole...” 
14 Report submitted by Roume to “French Government Commission in the [Caribbean] Islands,” 1 October 
1797, in Cesión de Santo Domingo a Francia (correspondencia de Godoy, García, Roume, Hedouville, 
Louverture, Rigaud y otros, 1795-1802), ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo [Santo 
Domingo]: Impresora Dominicana, 1958), 280-281. The Spanish translation contained in this compilation 
reads: “La mayor parte de los clérigos criollos son dignos de vuestra estimación, merecen una protección 
especial y serán de una grande utilidad si los confíais la misión de acostumbrar a los propietarios y a los 
cultivadores al régimen de la libertad…Vos los trataréis bien, yo no puedo dudarlo, ciudadanos Agentes, 
no exigiréis de ellos si no es lo impuestos proporcionados a su miseria actual: animaréis sus plantaciones 
y sus hatos; los haréis francos de toda gavela sobre la venta de sus débiles productos; les dejaréis 
francesizarse gradualmente por sí mismos, y por medio de los consejos del exemplo y de franceses sabios e 
ilustrados…que pondreis en cada ciudad y pueblo y que obraran de concierto con los cabildos (o 
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What were the precise terms by which these “new brothers” might become 
“perfect republicans?” The contentious matter of the citizenship rights of the inhabitants 
of both France‟s overseas possessions and of the metropole itself represented one of the 
great political questions of the 1790s. Within a historical context in which political and 
military conflicts on several continents shattered old political arrangements and created 
powerful new ideals and ideologies, France‟s own political transformations were closely 
linked to those of its outre-mer territories. In the year of its formal acquisition of Santo 
Domingo, France underwent the fall of the Jacobin-dominated government headed by the 
Committee of Public Safety and the subsequent creation of a new political order led by 
the five-member Executive Directory. This political crisis at home was intimately tied to 
a destabilizing crisis of empire, as the 1795 French constitution that created the Directory 
also proclaimed the principle of legal integration in an attempt to more forcefully 
incorporate France‟s various holdings into a single legal regime.15   
                                                                                                                                                 
municipalidades). Si vos haréis todo esto, yo me hago responsable de nuestros nuevos hermanos, que antes 
de tres aðos habréis hecho perfectos republicanos…En cuanto a la reintegración de los antes esclavos en 
los derechos imprescindibles del género humano, ellos adquirirán progresivamente la plenitud en menos 
de 18 meses sin que cueste una lágrima a la humanidad, mediante que (yo lo repito) vos lo encarguéis a los 
curas dándoles las instrucciones concernientes…Por este método no experimentaréis la mas ligera 
dificultad, sea por causa de la enorme inferioridad de los nuevos libres, sea en consequencia del régimen 
paternal de sus antiguos amos, y de la buena educación que ellos han recibido.” 
15 This constitution also established a bicameral legislature composed of 750 men. Known simply as the 
corps législatif (Legislative Body), this legislature was divided into the conseil des cinq cents (Council of 
Five Hundred) and the conseil des anciens (Council of the Ancients). The overnight creation of thousands 
of new French citizens by the 1794 emancipation law was an essential factor in the formulation of the 
doctrine of legal integration. Anne Pérotin-Dumon has portrayed as a “paradox” the fact that “the French 
Republic [was] the most assimilationist in the moment when it [lost] contact with its colonies.” For Pérotin, 
the 1794 emancipation edict was the “Cornerstone of the assimilationist edifice” of the new French regime 
(Pierre d‟angle de l‟edifice assimilationniste). Anne Pérotin-Dumon, Ėtre patriote sous les tropiques: La 
Guadeloupe, la colonisation et la Révolution (1789-1794) (Basse-Terre: Société d‟Histoire de la 
Guadeloupe, 1985), 19. Dominique Rogers makes a useful distinction between “integration,” wherein “one 
is allowed to enjoy the same rights and advantages as other members of a society but without being viewed 
as one of them,” and “assimilation,” which entails not only the enjoyment of equal rights but also complete 
acceptance as “an ordinary member of the community.” Dominique Rogers, “On the Road to Citizenship: 
The Complex Route to Integration of the Free People of Color in the Two Capitals of Saint-Domingue,” in 
The World of the Haitian Revolution, ed. David Geggus and Norman Fiering (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 69. The many restrictions on freed people‟s mobility and exercise of political 
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The underlying idea of this document was simple: France‟s colonies constituted 
an “integral part” of its empire, and as such were to be governed by the same corpus of 
laws that applied in France itself.
16
 This had extremely important implications for the 
matter of citizenship rights. Under a single set of laws, no legal distinctions separated the 
inhabitants of the colonies from those of mainland France: all were French citizens with 
the same rights, including the right not to be enslaved or consigned to a distinct social 
and legal status based on perceived color or purported ancestry. This marked a radical 
shift from the legal paradigm that had prevailed under the ancien régime in which the 
presence of different legal situations based on geography had constituted the principal 
framework for confining slavery and specific types of institutionalized racism to the 
colonies.
17
 Accordingly, those with abolitionist leanings generally welcomed the advent 
of legal integration and viewed with trepidation any hint of its dismantling.  
The application of this new legal order to Santo Domingo was fraught with 
conflict. For many, the fate of the “integral part” doctrine was closely tied to that of 
emancipation itself: a return to the old geographically-based legal segregation might 
portend the re-legalization of slavery and/or the racial caste system. The doctrine‟s 
application in Santo Domingo thus held signal importance not only for freed Dominicans 
but also for the legal and political bases of the French Republican emancipationist project 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights in both parts of the island after 1794 meant that they were largely deprived of even the more limited 
rights of “integration.”   
16 Quoted in Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 196. 
17 The legal situation of slavery and racial hierarchies in France in the eighteenth century was complex. The 
standard reference on these matters is Sue Peabody, “There are No Slaves in France:” The Political 
Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Régime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a 
recent discussion of the deep legal history of eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue, especially with respect to 
the contours of manumission, see Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: 
Haitian Variations on a Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002). See also Jennifer 
Heuer, The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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itself. Tellingly, in a pro-slavery missive to Napoleon dated 28 April 1800 in which 
several prominent Dominican planters and political leaders decried the supposed “perils” 
of “suddenly calling the slave to an indefinite liberty,” these individuals proposed that 
France apply a set of “particular laws” to Santo Domingo that would place it under a 
legal order separate from that of either Saint-Domingue or France—the precise opposite 
of legal integration.
18
 As a major legal principle of the French empire between its 
proclamation in the 1795 constitution and its formal elimination four years later,
19
 legal 
integration became connected to universal emancipation; developments in Santo 
Domingo presented formidable challenges to both.
20
 Writing from Le Cap, Julien 
Raimond, the former proponent of free-colored rights who went on to occupy influential 
political posts in revolutionary Saint-Domingue, told Napoleon on 19 August 1800 that 
the promulgation of the 1799 French constitution had provoked rumors among the 
                                                 
18 “The Town Council, the President of Justice and the Commandant of the Forces of Santo Domingo” to 
First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte, 28 April 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/17. The authors of this letter 
proposed that these “particular laws” be implemented in Santo Domingo with the aim of establishing a 
system of gradual emancipation in which servitude would be “softened” and eventually eliminated without 
any “spilling of blood.” In the original French: “Il convient de donner à la partie espagnole des loix 
particulières, indépendantes et tout à fait différentes de celles qui ont été adoptées pour la colonie 
française, en songeant aussi aux moyens d‟adoucir la servitude qui s‟abolira par dégrés, sans commotion, 
sans trouble, sans incendie, sans effusion de sang en passant du régime actuel à un autre plus conforme 
aux principes de la philosophie et de l‟humanité.” Among these men was the Boca Nigua plantation‟s 
director Juan Bautista Oyarzával. 
19 Napoleon‟s Constitution of the Year VIII (promulgated in December 1799) revoked the guarantee of 
equal rights for the inhabitants of all French domains, proclaiming that the overseas territories would once 
again be subject to “special laws” based on economic, climatic, and cultural factors. For more on these 
constitutional and legal changes and the developments that brought them about, see Dubois, Avengers of 
the New World, 241-242 (quote is from p. 241); Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 352-353; and Victor 
Schoelcher, Vie de Toussaint Louverture (Paris: Karthala, 1982 [1889]), 302.  
20 One 29 June 1800 letter conveyed some of the potential implications of the “special laws” for Santo 
Domingo. Its author, a businessman and homme de loi (man of the law) named Cottet, proposed the 
creation of a “Prefecture” in Santo Domingo, which he claimed was in line with the 1799 French 
constitution and its “particular laws” for the colonies. According to Cottet, this new prefecture would 
facilitate the consolidation of French rule in Santo Domingo by means of “rally[ing] around [the prefecture] 
the rest of the white population.” This pointedly exclusivist political proposition suggests that the particular 
laws in Santo Domingo could be seized upon by those who sought to undermine emancipation and racial 
equality. Correspondence of Cottet, 10 Messidor an 8 (29 June 1800), ANOM CMSM F3 202. In the 
original French: “Le 1er avantage de la préfecture placée à Sto Domingo serait d‟affranchir la 
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“Blacks” in Hispaniola that “the Spanish Part of the Island would be shortly returned to 
Spain, and that an army would then arrive to reestablish slavery.”21 
Administrators in Saint-Domingue after 1793 sought to oversee the 
transformation into French citizens of the nine-tenths of that colony‟s population who had 
been enslaved prior to that date. Across the border, the continuing influence of pro-
slavery Spanish authorities, as well as the repressive measures to which French officials 
periodically resorted, served to limit the possibilities for meaningful change in the 
condition of Santo Domingo‟s freed population. These challenges became compounded 
by intransigence on the part of even those French officials who were seemingly well-
disposed to the endeavor of ensuring equal rights for all.
22
 
 The principal document that set the formal terms of Santo Domingo‟s 
incorporation into the French empire was the Treaty of Basel, signed on 22 July 1795 by 
representatives of France and Spain in the Swiss town of that name. The tensions 
between the provisions of this treaty that pertained to the cession and the “integral part” 
doctrine proclaimed two months later gave rise to complex legal and political disputes 
that tested French resolve to free those held in bondage in Santo Domingo. Article IX of 
                                                                                                                                                 
répresentation nationale, des avancées sans cesse renouvellées, auxquelles elle se trouve exposée dans la 
partie française. Le 2e [serait] de pouvoir rallier autour d‟elle les restes de la population blanche.”  
21 Julien Raimond to Napoleon, 1 Fructidor an 8 (19 August 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the 
original French: “…on leur dit que les Colonies n‟etant pas comprises dans l‟acte constitutionnel, elles 
seront régies par un sistème particulier, et que les Loix organiques qu‟on leur annonce sera un nouveau 
code noir basé sur l‟ancien…une foule de lettres anonimes, et d‟autres signées de noms de personnes 
connues ajoutent que la Partie Espagnole de l‟Isle serait incessament rendue à l‟Espagne, et que delà on 
ferait arriver une armée pour rétablir l‟esclavage.”   
22 In a 5 March 1797 tract entitled “Means Proposed to Assure the Tranquility of Saint-Domingue,” Étienne 
Laveaux asserted that although the current French constitution had indeed declared the colonies to be 
“integral parts” of the French empire, “their position, their distance [from France], the events that have 
transpired there, since the revolution, and the disasters that have resulted from this necessitate for these 
climates particular regulations.” Laveaux to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 15 Ventôse an 5 (5 March 
1797), ANOM CMSM F3 201. In the original French: “La Constitution déclare les Colonies parties 
intégrantes, mais leur position, leur éloignement, les événements qui s‟y sont succédés depuis la révolution 
et les désastres qui en ont été le résultat nécessitent pour ces climats des règlements particuliers.”  
120 
 
the treaty established the fact and conditions of Santo Domingo‟s cession to France; its 
two most important components were a clause that allowed Dominican emigrants to 
migrate with their belongings to a Spanish colony elsewhere within one year of the 
treaty‟s signing and a provision that stipulated the replacement of Spanish military units 
with French ones, to occur at the earliest possible moment.
23
  
Diplomats entrusted with negotiating the terms of Spain‟s surrender to France 
immediately confronted the issue of the political status of three Spanish territories 
claimed by France: Santo Domingo, the vast Louisiana territory, and Guipúzcoa, a small 
and rugged Basque province in the Pyrenees. While the geopolitical and economic stakes 
involved in the possession of each area varied, the contentious negotiations that France 
and Spain undertook with respect to their montane European frontier were closely tied to 
those that concerned the Caribbean.
24
 “The Guipuzcoans are not mature for liberty as we 
conceive of it,” wrote the French diplomat Bourgoiny to the Committee of Public Safety 
in a 20 March 1795 letter. “They would surely be bad French citizens. Their customs, 
their language, [and] their prejudice would make their amalgamation with the [French] 
Republic very difficult not to say impossible: and it is our principle to consult and not to 
force the wish of peoples to incorporate them to us.”25 This letter attests to a central 
contradiction within the political and intellectual edifice of the French Republic: while 
                                                 
23 For a copy of this treaty, see Treaty of Basel, 22 July 1795, CARAN AF/III/61; and Wenceslao Vega B., 
Los documentos básicos para la historia dominicana (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1994), chapter 10.  
24 Peter Sahlins has proposed an “oppositional model of national identity” in which “the proximity of the 
other across the French-Spanish boundary structured the appearance of national identity long before local 
society was assimilated to a dominant center.” Following the Haitian Revolutionary era, relations between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic (on the official level and sometimes on the popular level) often 
conformed to this logic. Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 9.  
25 Bourgoiny to Committee of Public Safety, 30 Ventôse an 3 (20 March 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. 
Emphasis in original. The original French is: “…les guipuscoans ne sont pas mûrs pour la liberté telle que 
nous la concevons et seraient à coup sûr de mauvais citoyens français. Leurs mœurs, leur langage, leurs 
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professing adherence to supposedly universal values, many French authorities 
simultaneously claimed that certain groups of people possessed deeply-ingrained traits 
that rendered them unfit for French Republican citizenship, at least prior to a process of 
education and adjustment.
26
  
In the Caribbean, such anxieties became infused with the toxin of racism, which 
was in turn closely linked to the question of the applicability of the 1794 emancipation 
edict. In their deliberations over the possible transfer of Santo Domingo and Louisiana to 
France, French and Spanish officials grappled with the potential economic and political 
implications of a change in political authority for each colony‟s slave system and 
enslaved population.
27
 According to a letter by Roume to the French Minister of the Navy 
and Colonies dated 31 December 1795, the Spanish Marquis d‟Iranda, who owned the 
Boca Nigua plantation, had proposed granting Spanish Louisiana to France, instead of 
Santo Domingo, on the grounds that the French “regime of equality” would reduce Santo 
Domingo‟s profitability by liberating the “unfortunate cultivators.”28 By contrast, in a 
series of instructions issued to Bourgoiny on 6 May 1795, the Committee of Public 
                                                                                                                                                 
préjugés rendraient leur amalgame avec la République fort difficile pour ne pas dire impossible: et il est 
dans nos principes de consulter et non pas de forcer le vœu des peuples pour les incorporer à nous.”   
26 In an undated refutation of Bourgoiny‟s claims, an anonymous individual wrote that the Guipozcoans 
were the “same people” (le même peuple) as the French Basques. “Observations on the Letter of Bourgoiny 
of 30 Ventôse,” CARAN AF/III/61. 
27 The Treaty of Basel went through at least one draft before emerging in its final form. Article IX of an 
initial draft stipulated that both Santo Domingo and Louisiana were to be ceded to France. “Treaty Project 
between the French Republic and the King of Spain,” undated, CARAN AF/III/61. Spain retained 
Louisiana in 1795 but formally lost this territory to France by a secret treaty signed on 1 October 1800. For 
a discussion of the importance of developments in Hispaniola for the political status of Louisiana at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, see Robert Paquette, “Revolutionary Saint Domingue in the Making of Territorial 
Louisiana,” in Geggus and Gaspar, A Turbulent Time, 204-225. 
28 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 10 Nivôse an 4 (31 December 1795), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/20. In the original French: “[Le Marquis d‟Iranda] qui préconisait il y a 12 ans la Liberté des 
africains, dit aujourd‟hui que c‟est une injuste folie qui attaque de droit de propriété et qui anéantira le 
commerce français: cet homme qui par le Moyen de privilèges Exclusifs, [illegible] le fruit des travaux et 
des souffrances, des Malheureux cultivateurs de Sto Domingo, ne voit plus dans le Régime de l‟Égalité que 
la diminution de profits excessifs.” 
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Safety contended that Spain would prove less reluctant to relinquish Santo Domingo than 
Louisiana due to the “dangers to which the liberty of our blacks exposes” Spain‟s assets 
on Hispaniola.
29
  
On 9 October 1797, the Council of Five Hundred decreed a reorganization of the 
island‟s political structure that was to reflect the new division of France into 
départements. The North, West and South Provinces that had comprised pre-
revolutionary French Saint-Domingue became transformed into départements bearing 
these names, while the former Spanish colony to the east would henceforth consist of the 
départements of Samaná and Inganno. Samaná‟s jurisdiction was to include much of 
Santo Domingo‟s north, while Inganno would encompass the south and southeast, 
including Santo Domingo city. In an attempt to impose a greater degree of administrative 
control over the eastern part of the island, the Council of Five Hundred also ordered the 
establishment of several tribunals in diverse locales including Santo Domingo city, the 
northern second city of Santiago, and the eastern town of Seybo.
30
  
In seeking to reinvent the island‟s political topography, the Council appears to 
have envisioned the integration of both parts of the island into a new political and legal 
arrangement. For instance, on 15 January 1798 the Council of Five Hundred ordered that 
                                                 
29 “Instructions for the Citizen Bourgoiny, Entrusted [Chargé] by the Committee of Public Safety to 
Negotiate Peace with Spain,” 17 Floréal an 3 (6 May 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. In the original French: 
“[I]l y a grande apparence que l‟espagne, si elle ne consulte que ses intérêts, abandonnera plus facilement 
la première [Santo Domingo] que la seconde [Louisiana]. Les dangers auxquels la liberté de nos nègres 
expose les possessions actuelles à Saint-Domingue, lui font sans doute attacher peu de prix à leur 
conservation.” Similarly, the anonymous author of a tract on the commercial implications of the 1795 
peace with Spain composed around July-August 1795 preferred the acquisition of Louisiana to that of 
Santo Domingo because the “free Regime in that colony [Santo Domingo]” made that colony‟s 
“provisioning in Blacks” next to impossible. Anonymous, “Spain: Commerce, Borders, Alliance,” CARAN 
AF/III/62. In the original text: “...La cession de la Louisiane préférablement à celle du reste de l‟isle St 
Domingue...l‟approvisionnement en Nègres devient presque impossible depuis l‟établissement d‟un Régime 
libre dans cette Colonie.”  
30 Council of Five Hundred order on administrative reorganization, 18 Vendémiaire an 6 (9 October 1797), 
CARAN Assemblées du Directoire (hereinafter AD) C 518. 
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the number of deputies that the “Isle of Saint Domingue” would elect to the corps 
législatif would be determined according to departmental organization, as each of the 
island‟s five départements could send one deputy to the corps in the month of Germinal, 
year 6 (21 March-19 April 1798). This reorganization also brought Dominican towns 
such as Neyba and Dajabón under the jurisdiction of one of the three Saint-Domingue 
départements.
31
 While political schemes formulated in France established the parameters 
of the integration of both colonies into a new legal order, the forms that such attempted 
reorganization would take on the island were conditioned by the longstanding disputes 
over the island‟s political boundaries that remained unresolved in the post-cession years. 
In his assessment of the deliberations of Governor García on the worth of Santo 
Domingo, the French Minister of Foreign Relations in a 19 October 1800 letter to 
Napoleon articulated several reasons why García might be willing to relinquish the 
authority that he still possessed if granted a suitable opportunity. These reasons included 
the colony‟s poverty and administrative expenses; the possibility that García “feared the 
propagation of the principles proclaimed in the French part on the liberty of the blacks;” 
and the frequency of illicit cross-border trading. Underlying all of these matters was the 
recurrence of “violations of territory” after a 1777 Franco-Spanish treaty had supposedly 
resolved the border issue and the persistence of the “desertion of discontented blacks” 
across the old boundary line.
32
 
                                                 
31 Council of Five Hundred order on electoral reorganization, 26 Nivôse an 6 (15 January 1798), CARAN 
AD C 521.  
32 French Minister of Foreign Relations to Napoleon, 27 Vendémiaire an 9 (19 October 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Il craignait la propagation des principes proclamés dans la partie 
française sur la liberté des noirs...J‟ajouterai que pendant longtems les parties française et Espagnole 
avaient eu des contestations sur leurs limites respectives, que, même depuis la convention de 1777, qui 
avait déterminé leur ligne de démarcation, il s‟était élevé entr‟elles des discussions fréquentes sur des 
violations de territoire...Enfin le contact des deux territoires favorisait de part de d‟autre la désertion des 
noirs mécontens, et l‟on n‟en obtenait l‟extradition qu‟avec peine.” 
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Closely intertwined with the uncertainty of boundaries was the question of the 
geographical reach of purportedly universal French Republican rights. Should 
“emancipation” stop at the French Republic‟s borders as they had stood in the spring of 
1795? This idea emerged as a possible means by which to reconcile the goals of 
defending emancipation and promoting commerce with the slaveholding colonies that 
surrounded the French Caribbean‟s outposts of abolition. One tract on the commercial 
situation between France and Spain dated July or August 1795 argued that Santo 
Domingo ought to remain a Spanish possession because it would generate more wealth as 
a meat-producing colony under the “regime of Slavery of the Blacks” (le régime de 
l‟Esclavage des Nègres) than it would under a system of free labor. By this line of 
reasoning, Dominican traders could exchange their meat for assorted French 
manufactures, which in turn would enable these French products to legally reach other 
Spanish colonies in accordance with Spain‟s notoriously strict commercial restrictions.33 
Allowing slavery to flourish in foreign territories while reaping the attendant commercial 
rewards would by this logic absolve the French Republic of its moral obligations towards 
those held in bondage in these lands. Napoleon would later revisit the idea of confining 
general emancipation and slavery to distinct geographical areas in his protracted 
deliberations on the issue of the labor system(s) that would prevail in his domains.  
In their attempts to determine the status of Santo Domingo, French and Spanish 
diplomats confronted a bitter and longstanding point of contention that was rooted in the 
island‟s political and economic history. In a report submitted by the French diplomat 
                                                 
33 “Observations on the New Commercial Links between France and Spain,” Thermidor an 3 (19 July-17 
August 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. This argument was coupled with the racist assertion that the West Indian 
isles were less desirable for France‟s long-term economic prospects than Louisiana because only “Blacks” 
125 
 
Bourgoiny to the Committee of Public Safety on 26 March 1795, Bourgoiny enumerated 
a long list of grievances that he planned to address to his Spanish counterpart. Among 
these was the assertion that most of Santo Domingo‟s land was worked by “our fugitive 
blacks” (nos nègres fugitifs) from Saint-Domingue whom the Spanish had allowed and 
encouraged to immigrate and cultivate the land in flagrant violation of repeated accords 
between the two nations for the swift extradition of enslaved fugitives. Bourgoiny further 
insisted that the Spanish had demonstrably failed to make proper use of this labor force. 
Only the French, with their superior capital and enlightened economic policies, could in 
his estimation fully harness the potential of this colony to produce large quantities of 
sugar, coffee, cotton and other cash crops.
34
 Though he elided the question of the status 
that these laborers would occupy upon the “eventual” cession of Santo Domingo to 
France, Bourgoiny highlighted the degree to which labor practices and economic 
development in the two colonies were interconnected.  
These diplomats were but a few among numerous parties ranging from top 
officials to those claimed as slaves who engaged in heated debates on both sides of the 
Atlantic concerning the economic, social, and political ramifications of bringing general 
emancipation to Santo Domingo, Louisiana, and other territories. Should the drive for 
profit trump the rights of the inhabitants of France‟s newly-acquired lands to their 
persons and to enjoy the fruits of their labor? Did a conflict between these goals even 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Nègres) were supposedly suitable for working in the former areas, whereas Louisiana‟s climate was 
allegedly hospitable to whites as well as blacks.  
34 “Report on the Eventual Cession of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingue to the French Republic,” 
Bourgoiny to Committee of Public Safety, 6 Germinal an 3 (26 March 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. 
Bourgoiny also asserted that Santo Domingo under French rule could generate perhaps three times as much 
wealth as Saint-Domingue. In the original French: “Vous n‟avez dans cette colonie presque d‟autres 
terreins cultivés que ceux qui le sont par nos nègres fugitifs que vous vous êtes plusieurs fois engagés 
formellement à nous rendre et que cependant vous vous êtes toujours obstinés à garder. Vos colons les 
accueillent, reçoivent d‟eux une portion des produits de leur culture et leur abandonnent le reste.” 
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exist, or conversely did the removal of the coercion and deprivation of enslavement 
actually enhance workers‟ productivity? Framed in various ways, these questions were all 
subsets of one overarching issue: could or should a new political unit be configured 
without slavery? Slaves in Saint-Domingue and other French colonies had offered their 
own emphatic answer to this question, and had by their actions compelled Paris to 
dismantle the institution of slavery throughout French domains. When freed people in 
Santo Domingo recognized the limitations of “emancipation” in their own colony, they 
too asserted their rights in ways that varied from relocation to open rebellion. The heavy-
handed French response to the largest of these revolts and to other challenges to the 
persistence of servitude revealed some of the deficiencies of the efforts to incorporate 
Santo Domingo into an order of legal integration and emancipation.  
 
Debates over Emancipation and Citizenship in Santo Domingo 
 
In a letter to the Minister of the Navy composed two days after the start of the 
Boca Nigua revolt, the French official Roume praised the plantation director Oyarzával in 
the highest terms, depicting him as a virtuous defender of both the “regime of general 
Liberty” and of profit maximization on his plantation.35 Those who rebelled at Boca 
Nigua evidently had other ideas. Following the promulgation of the general emancipation 
decrees of 1793-1794, many French administrators such as Roume strove to reconcile the 
objectives of recreating a profitable plantation system and upholding the “regime of 
                                                 
35 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 11 Brumaire an 5 (1 November 1796), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/20. In the original French: “Le [Citoyen Don] Juan Oyarzaval, ce Vertueux Philosophe, cet ami de 
l‟humanité, cet homme qui ne vit que pour faire le bien, et qui répand le bonheur sur Tous ceux qu‟il 
commande…après avoir sacrifié les plus belles années de sa Vie, et dépensé des Sommes que l‟on évalue à 
plus Deux Millions des Colonies, Le [Citoyen] Oyarzaval commençait à Jouir du fruit de ses Travaux et se 
promettait une augmentation de produit, par l‟établissement du régime de la Liberté générale.” 
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general Liberty.” As the case of Boca Nigua attests, their solutions often involved forms 
of force that in some ways recalled the days of slavery. Nonetheless, the formal cession 
of Santo Domingo to France provoked a series of political and philosophical contests 
among French and Spanish officials over the justice of enslaving other human beings.  
Long before the slaves of the northern plain of Saint-Domingue had taken up 
arms against their masters on that fateful evening in August 1791, administrators‟ and 
planters‟ desires to extract profit from a sizeable corps of servile laborers had impelled 
Amerindian and African slaves in Saint-Domingue and other parts of the Americas to 
pursue alternative modes of production that afforded these slaves a substantial degree of 
autonomy and a measure of control over their labor power and the products of their labor. 
The conflicts between these opposed visions continued into the era of emancipation. In 
the course of his varied assignments in Hispaniola during the first decade of the Haitian 
Revolution, Roume devised seemingly contradictory ways to address these tensions. With 
the exception of Toussaint Louverture, Roume was the most influential among all French 
Republican figures based in the Caribbean in the protracted saga of Santo Domingo‟s 
status after 1795. In order to communicate and implement the new legal order organized 
around the “integral part” doctrine and the Treaty of Basel to Hispaniola, the French 
Directory had chosen to follow the precedent of sending a five-man Civil Commission to 
the island. Among this commission‟s members were the architect of Dominguan general 
emancipation, Léger-Félicité Sonthonax; the onetime political activist Julien Raimond; 
and “Particular Agent” Roume, in whom the Directory invested the task of overseeing 
Santo Domingo‟s transfer to France. Despite his prior administrative experience on the 
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island, Roume did not accomplish this objective. He did nonetheless play a consequential 
role, at times undermining emancipation and on occasion promoting it.
36
  
 Boca Nigua was in fact one in a series of servile revolts that transpired in Santo 
Domingo during the revolutionary years.
37
 These uprisings took place in the shadow of 
the upheaval in French Saint-Domingue, and events in the neighboring colony appear to 
have influenced the Boca Nigua insurgents. Both Roume and Judge Bravo for instance 
suspected the hand of Dominguan former slaves (specifically three men who had once 
been allied with the ex-slave leader Jean-François) in instigating the Boca Nigua revolt.
38
  
In the struggles that emerged after 1795 over the rights of those claimed as slaves 
in Santo Domingo, French officials‟ continued reliance upon Spanish authorities to run 
                                                 
36 Roume served in Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo in a variety of capacities from 1791 to 1801; his 
colonial experience was a factor in his appointment in 1795 as the Directory‟s “Particular Agent” in Santo 
Domingo, where he served for eighteen months. As one of the original Civil Commissioners sent to Saint-
Domingue by the French government to ensure the survival of the slave system, Roume had accepted in a 
15 May 1791 letter to Deputy Barnave of the French National Assembly that body‟s reaffirmation of the 
importance of slavery in the overseas colonies. According to this letter, the fact that nine-tenths of Saint-
Domingue‟s population was enslaved meant that varying “gradations” (grades) between white and slave 
ought to exist, such that people who were at least three “degrees” removed from African ancestry should be 
able to claim a “white” racial status. Roume to Barnave, 15 May 1791, CARAN W 13. The original French 
reads: “Il est certain que si les Amis des Noirs avaient été plus conséquents qu‟ils ne l‟ont été, vous 
n‟auriez pu répondre aux raisons contre l‟Esclavage, qu‟en proposant de renoncer à la Souveraineté 
Nationale sur la Colonie…Enfin [mon] Plan conserve deux grades intermédiaires entre les Blancs et les 
Esclaves. Savoir celle composée des Hommes de couleur membres des Assemblées primaires de leur 
classe-et celle des Élus qui ayant Tous les Droits des Blancs se rapprochant néanmoins des Esclaves par la 
teinte de la peau tant qu‟elle n‟est pas effacée, car J‟ajoute qu‟il est ridicule de ne pas classer parmi les 
blancs une Personne qui est éloignée de la touche nègre au 4e degré, ou même au 3e.” Though Roume‟s 
racial views later became more egalitarian, a distinct undercurrent of racial differentiation continued to 
exist in his correspondences. 
37 Scattered revolts broke out in Hincha (in 1793) and in Samaná (May 1795). Reports by Spanish 
authorities who arrested several insurgents in Hincha alleged that the example of Saint-Domingue helped to 
inspire the uprising. See Geggus, “Slave Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean,” esp. 140-141. On the 1795 
uprising, see Joaquín García to conde del campo Alange, 17 May 1795, Archivo General de Simancas 
(hereinafter AGS), Simancas, Spain, Guerra Moderna (hereinafter GM) 7160, f. 126; and Carlos Esteban 
Deive‟s account of the revolt in La esclavitud del negro, 471.   
38 Roume portrayed these rebels as having been “Indoctrinated” (Endoctrinés) by three former companions 
of Jean-François, though rumors abounded that other individuals from Saint-Domingue or even the British 
might also have helped to incite these cultivateurs to revolt. “Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, 
ANOM CMSM F3 200. Judge Bravo asserted that his forces had arrested and detained “3 brigands of Jean-
François” near the Boca Nigua plantation. Bravo y Bermudez to García, 14 December 1796, ANOM 
CMSM F3 200. 
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both Santo Domingo‟s few plantations and the colony‟s central administration impeded 
the prospects for radical change.
39
 “The Minister [of the Navy] is also asked to inform the 
French government; not only of the merit and indomitable courage of our co-citizens 
from Haiti [Spanish landowners and authorities], but also of the necessity (already 
presented numerous times by the Provisional Agent [Roume]) to only proceed with the 
Frenchification of the Country with all appropriate prudence,” counseled Roume in his 
report on Boca Nigua.
40
  
What precisely would this “Frenchification” entail? In Saint-Domingue at this 
time, French authorities were busy attempting to enforce labor regimes that sharply 
circumscribed the rights of cultivateurs and sought to ensure their continued submission 
to political authorities and to their former masters. The French Civil Commissioners 
Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel had devised labor codes in 1793-1794 that 
aimed to ensure a subordinate labor force while granting freed people certain rights and 
                                                 
39 In his report on Boca Nigua, Roume praised the Spanish officials who put down the revolt for enabling 
the “conservation” of the colony for the French, who would soon take possession of Santo Domingo. 
“Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. In the original French: “[L]e Ministre de 
la marine, et des Colonies est [illegible] prié de faire connaître au directoire exécutif les services Rendus à 
la France et à l‟Espagne, à l‟occasion de la révolte des cultivateurs de Boca Nigua, par Monsieur le 
Président [Don] Joaquin Garcia…[list of many other Spansh officials]…tant à l‟effet d‟obtenir, En leur 
faveur les remerciements du Peuple français, votés par ses représentants, qu‟afin de faire solliciter, par 
l‟ambassadeur de france en espagne, les avancements et récompenses qui leur sont dus, pour avoir 
efficacement secondé les intentions de sa majesté catholique, relativement à la conservation d‟une 
colonnie, qu‟il est de son honneur de remettre intacte.”  
40 “Order” of Roume, 29 December 1796, ANOM CMSM F3 200. In the original French: “Le ministre est 
aussi prié de faire connaître au gouvernement français; non seulement le mérite et l‟indomptable courage 
de nos concitoyens de hayti, mais encore la nécessité (déjà présentée plusieurs fois par l‟agent Provisoire) 
de ne procéder à la francisation du Pays, qu‟avec toute la prudence convenable.” Roume‟s references to 
“Haiti” several years before that country‟s birth are a source of curiosity for some scholars. According to 
David Geggus, Roume was influenced by diverse intellectual and political currents, including French 
Republican ideals, notions of the “noble savage,” and enduring anti-Spanish “black legend” prejudices. In a 
July 1796 letter to Santo Domingo‟s archbishop, Roume called ex-slaves “the new French of Haiti,” and in 
a 3 May 1797 letter to the commandant of the national guard and “all the new French [people] of the three 
colors, formerly alleged free people and slaves of Maguana [Santo Domingo],” Roume claimed that the 
“Haitians” in Santo Domingo had “inspired” him with their potential to become good Republican citizens. 
Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 212-216 (quotes are from pp 212 and 216). For the 3 May 1797 
letter, see Roume to “new French” et al, 14 Floréal an 5 (3 May 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/20. In the 
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privileges that they had not possessed as slaves, such as a salary derived from a quarter of 
the plantation revenues. The successors of Sonthonax and Polverel in Saint-Domingue 
continued to pursue these policies, while their counterparts in Santo Domingo likewise 
sought to curtail the liberties of the newly freed. Roume and the few other French 
officials who served in Santo Domingo before 1801 indeed appear to have equated the 
Boca Nigua insurgents with the restive cultivateurs whom they perceived to threaten their 
authority in Saint-Domingue. After all, the French Republican regime could hardly 
expect to establish a profitable plantation society in Santo Domingo if it could not control 
the labor force on its principal plantation. In Boca Nigua, Roume undermined the 
liberation that he professed to bring to this part of the island. In the midst of such a 
transformational revolution, this seeming throwback to an ancien régime mode of 
analyzing a “slave rebellion” provided a significant example of how struggles for and 
against liberty in both colonies were deeply intertwined.
41
 
 Despite the two accounts that portrayed the Boca Nigua uprising as a slave 
rebellion, these cultivateurs appear to have been, juridically speaking, free men and 
women who could claim certain political rights by virtue of having come under the rule 
of emancipationist France. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Basel‟s signing, French and 
Spanish officials clashed in impassioned debates over these rights that tested the 
boundaries of emancipation. Though French officials on the island were not of a single 
mind, Santo Domingo‟s cession elicited a concerted effort on the part of some of these 
officials to institute in that colony a regime that would at once finally realize the colony‟s 
                                                                                                                                                 
original text: “J‟en suis pénétré de joie: D‟un côté j‟y vois l‟attention que vous avez donnée à mes conseils; 
ces conseils sont ceux, du vif intérêt que m‟inspirent les haïtiens...” 
41 The Boca Nigua revolt also shared some similarities with plantation uprisings that occurred in 
revolutionary Saint-Domingue, which I discuss in chapter 3. 
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economic potential and impose a more egalitarian political and social order. In the 
instructions that it gave Agent Roume on 24 December 1795, the Directory had charged 
him with winning over “our new co-citizens” in a bid to curb emigration from the colony 
and secure the support of the political and economic elite. Were freed Dominicans to be 
considered among these “new co-citizens?” These instructions were quite unclear on this 
matter. While condemning the “horrible [former] right of the slavery of one man over 
another,” these orders contended that French emancipation law did not constitute an 
“infraction of the right of colonial property” except in the case of those who were 
“blinded by vile interest.” Entreating the “free slaves” of Santo Domingo to refrain from 
“abus[ing] their freedom,” these orders asserted that the Spanish had treated their slaves 
“with a humanity worthy of winning their friendship.” In a marked departure from the 
treatment of Dominguan planters following the advent of emancipation, the Directory 
took pains to promise abundant land and other material benefits to Dominican former 
slaveholders who had suffered a “real [economic] loss” as a result of the liberation of 
their slaves.
42
  
                                                 
42 “Instructions to the French Government Agent in the Spanish Part of the Island, Roume,” 3 Nivôse an 4 
(24 December 1795), in Rodríguez Demorizi, Cesión de Santo Domingo a Francia, 29-36. The translated 
Spanish text reads: “Importa sobre todo hacer que nuestros nuevos conciudadanos amen la Republica y 
procurar conservar si es posible en la Isla toda aquella parte preciosa de su poblaciñn…Si el acto 
constitucional v. g. aniquila el derecho horrible de la esclavitud de un hombre sobre otro hombre, dotado 
igualmente que él de una alma racional, es claro que este articulo no puede mirarse como una infraccion 
del derecho de propiedad colonial, sino por gentes llenas de preocupaciones, o cegadas por el vil interés. 
Y esta objecion deve tener aun menos fuerza entre los españoles, los que, sobre tener menos esclavos que 
las demas naciones europeas establecidas en América, los han tratado siempre con una humanidad capaz 
de grangearlos por amigos. Deven, pues, los nuevos colonos franceses humanos y generosos, esperar que 
sus esclavos libres ya no abusarán de su libertad, sino que le serán al contrario siempre adictos y que no 
se separaron de su lado como hijos reconocidos. Mas quando la libertad de los esclavos fuese una perdida 
real para sus dueños quedaría esta suficientisimamente compensada con la garantía que la Constitucion 
les ofrese de la propiedad del territorio, la qual era antes precaria en la parte española de la Isla, con la 
perspectiva de las utilidades de un comercio mas extenso que antes y con las demas ventajas que les 
resultarán de un Govierno republicano.” 
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 This rather timid and equivocal defense of emancipation left room for claims-
making by both newly-freed French citizens in Santo Domingo (and their defenders) and 
opponents of abolition. Would “emancipation” in Santo Domingo involve the sudden 
elimination of the legal status of “slave” as in the 1793-1794 French Republican 
emancipations? Would it instead entail a kind of gradual emancipation as envisioned by 
many ancien régime thinkers and by some Dominican landowners and officials? Or, 
would it simply mean no substantial change in the condition of theoretically freed 
Dominicans? The significant out-migration from Santo Domingo that commenced in 
1795 gave rise to a thorny legal question that tested the nature of “emancipation” there. 
Could refugees departing Santo Domingo after 1795 legally transport with them human 
beings whom they claimed as slaves under Article IX of the Treaty of Basel, which 
allowed Dominicans up to one year after the treaty‟s promulgation to migrate to another 
Spanish colony with their belongings?
43
 Or, conversely, did the inalienable rights of these 
French citizens preclude anyone from declaring them to be his or her property, even in 
the case of flight to an area where slavery was still the law of the land?  
 In his 30 September 1795 notes on a mémoire (report) by a general named 
Regnier, Agent Roume outlined this legal conundrum and sided with the anti-slavery 
position. Forcefully condemning slavery as a “violation of natural law” that had become 
unlawful in all French domains following the 1794 emancipation decree, Roume argued 
that the “natural right” of “liberty” superseded the “civil right” of property. Though he 
                                                 
43 The exact wording of the relevant part of the treaty is: “The inhabitants of the Spanish part of Saint-
Domingue who, by motives of [self-] interest or others, would prefer to transport themselves with their 
goods in the possessions of His [Spanish] Catholic Majesty will be able to do so within one year after the 
date of this treaty.” Treaty of Basel, 22 July 1795, CARAN AF/III/61. The original French reads: “Les 
habitants de la partie Espagnole de Saint Domingue qui, par des motifs d‟intérêt ou autres, préféraient de 
se transporter avec leurs biens dans les possessions de Sa Majesté catholique pourront le faire dans 
l‟espace d‟une année à compter de la date de ce traité.” 
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naively expected that Dominicans would “rush to Enjoy the Benefits of the French 
Revolution,” Roume nonetheless anticipated a conflict wherein the “Spanish Property 
Owner” would attempt to transport his or her alleged “Slave” out of Santo Domingo as 
“one of [his or her] Goods” in defiance of the latter‟s claims to possess the right to 
remain in the colony as a “French citizen.” Roume proposed a back-door solution to the 
problem: simply tell a freed Dominican that he or she could travel to Saint-Domingue and 
hide out there during the year allowed by the Treaty of Basel for Dominicans‟ emigration 
with their properties.
44
  
 Fear of freed Dominicans mounting such a bold defense of their rights possibly 
helped motivate landowners and authorities there to adopt a variety of strategies to 
protect their perceived interests. In a 1795 report written for the Committee of Public 
Safety, the Vice-Admiral Trugeot correctly predicted that fear of the “effects of the 
liberty of the blacks” on their social and economic position would impel many 
                                                 
44 Roume, “Reflections on the Report of Regnier,” 8 Vendémiaire an 4 (30 September 1795), CARAN 
AF/II/64. In the original French: “Or, chez les Espagnols les prétendus Esclaves font partie des Biens d‟un 
Habitant; Tandis que chez les français l‟Esclavage était aboli long temps avant le Traité de Paix: Puisqu‟il 
l‟a été, d‟abord implicitement, par la Déclaration des Droits, et, ensuite nominativement par le Décret du 
16 Pluviôse de l‟an Deux. Le Propriétaire Espagnol peut dire, par conséquent, Je veux transporter mon 
Esclave comme faisant partie de mon Bien; Et le Nègre, de son coté, peut répondre, Je veux rester comme 
étant citoyen français…Donc, dans l‟Espèce actuelle, l‟Esclavage étant une violation du droit naturel, Tant 
pis pour l‟Espagne si elle n‟a pas entendu son traité de la même manière que la France: Et l‟on peut dire 
en outre, que la Propriété n‟étant qu‟un Droit civil, la propriété doit être évincée, toutes les fois qu‟elle 
osera lutter contre la Liberté qui est de droit naturel. Par conséquent le Nègre gagnerait sa cause d‟une 
manière péremptoire…J‟espère que cette Difficulté n‟est que Théorique, parce que je suis persuadé que 
Tous les Propriétaires de Sto Domingo s‟empresseront de Jouir des Bienfaits de la révolution française. Il 
est vrai qu‟il se présente un moyen d‟éluder la Question, ce serait de conseiller secrètement au Nègre 
réclamant, de fuir à la Partie française, et d‟y rester caché pendant l‟année du délai fixé pour 
l‟Emigration; mais cette escobarderie me paraît être incompatible avec la majesté du Peuple français.” In 
his 25 September 1795 report to the Committee of Public Safety, Adjutant-General L. Regnier had 
defended the alleged right of Dominicans to emigrate from Santo Domingo with their “slaves” (esclaves) 
per the Treaty of Basel while also proposing the deployment of several French “commissioners” to Santo 
Domingo to “prepare [the colony‟s inhabitants] to enjoy the Benefits of liberty.” Adjutant-General L. 
Regnier, “Report on the Island of St Domingue for the Spanish Part Presented to the Committee of Public 
Safety Section of Foreign Affairs,” 3 Vendémiaire an 4 (25 September 1795), CARAN AF/II/64. In the 
original text: “Je propose donc D‟y envoyer…une certaine quantité Mais en petit nombre des commissaires 
134 
 
Dominicans to try to flee that colony with their possessions, including their “blacks.” 
This development would exacerbate what the vice admiral judged to be France‟s 
fundamental problem in Santo Domingo: that it could only realize the “inestimable 
advantage” of fulfilling this colony‟s significant economic potential when authorities 
succeeded in compelling its “Blacks” to perform agricultural labor. These concerns led 
Trugeot to propose the swift appointment to Santo Domingo of an “Agent of the 
Republic” who would reassure property owners that their fears of “anarchy” were 
misplaced.
45
 In his appeal to former slaveholders rather than to the colony‟s freed 
residents, as well as in his explicit claim that “Black” labor was essential in any effort to 
stimulate the colony‟s agricultural production, Trugeot suggested that no radical change 
in Santo Domingo‟s social order was in the works.  
The rights of the formerly enslaved in Santo Domingo nonetheless became the 
subject of a spirited debate between the French officer Étienne Laveaux and Santo 
Domingo‟s Governor García. As a self-professed “Apostle of Liberty,” Laveaux took 
García to task for his perceived hypocrisy in promoting the Spanish king as the fount of 
liberty in the 1793-1795 Franco-Spanish war and then subsequently claiming that Spain 
                                                                                                                                                 
chargés d‟éclairer ces peuples sur leurs véritables intérêts et les préparer à Jouir des Bienfaits de la 
liberté.” 
45 Vice-Admiral Trugeot to Committee of Public Safety, “approved” by the Committee on 25 Fructidor an 
3 (11 September 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. In the original French: “La possession de la partie espagnole 
de St Domingue sera pour la France d‟un avantage inappréciable, lorsque nos forces navales régénérées 
pourront en protéger l‟étendue, Lorsque l‟énergie du Directoire Exécutif aura pu calmer l‟effervescence 
des passions, rattaché le Noir à la culture par de sages règlements, et rétabli le respect des Lois dans cette 
Colonie si longtemps désolée…D‟un autre part le Gouvernement espagnol est vraisemblement lui-même 
pressé par les Propriétaires qui désirent Evacuer ce territoire et emporter avec eux leurs mobiliers et leurs 
Nègres. Nous devons nous attendre à prendre possession d‟un désert, car les habitants riches, ou 
fanatiques, s‟empresseront de fuir les effets de la Liberté des noirs, de celle du Culte et la présence d‟un 
gouvernement républicain que l‟on a calomnié en l‟associant à toutes les atrocités commises à St 
Domingue. D‟après cette dernière considération, il paraitrait bien essentiel d‟envoyer dans la partie 
Espagnole de St Domingue et le plutôt possible un Agent de la République, estimé par son dévouement et 
ses Talents auquel le nouveau Système Colonial fut parfaitement connu, ainsi que les localités de cette 
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had not abolished slavery. To García‟s assertion that preventing refugees from leaving 
Santo Domingo with their “slaves” would lead to their “ruin,” Laveaux‟s retort was 
simple: free soil trumped property rights. According to Laveaux, after France‟s 
attainment of sovereignty over Santo Domingo, no individual could claim another as his 
or her property there.
46
    
 García‟s response, dated 19 December 1795, drew upon the centuries-old 
Spanish-American practice of conferring manumission upon certain individuals or groups 
for services deemed advantageous to the promotion of imperial and colonial objectives. 
García argued that the liberties granted in the recent Franco-Spanish conflict were no 
different, and that individual emancipations did not in any sense portend an eventual end 
to the institution of slavery in an entire polity.
47
 By this line of argumentation, some 
people in Santo Domingo and other Spanish colonies would continue to remain in a state 
of perpetual bondage, implying that emigration with “slaves” (esclavos) was entirely 
justified.
48
 In a letter to the Spanish Prime Minister Manuel de Godoy composed twelve 
days earlier, García had presented slavery as the “most useful and beneficial asset” to 
Dominicans and accused Laveaux and a French “Deputation” of undermining the 
institution by recklessly disseminating “Printed Decrees about the general Liberty of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Colonie: il y propagerait nos principes de justice, il engagerait les propriétaires à ne rien craindre de 
l‟anarchie.” Emphasis in original.  
46 Laveaux to García, Brumaire an 4 (23 October-21 November 1795), AGI ASD 1033. In the original text: 
“Vos me decís q[ue] el Tratado concede un año para determinarse a la permanencia, q[ue] los súbditos de 
vuestro Rey tienen la mayor parte de sus bienes en esclavos, que las leyes Españolas no han abolido la 
esclavitud, y que violando esta consideraciñn yo he procurado la ruina de los súbditos de vuestro Rey…Yo 
soy un Apóstol de la Libertad.” 
47 There is an extensive literature on slavery and emancipation in colonial Spanish America. For some 
important recent contributions that foreground questions concerning manumission, see Jane Landers, 
“Maroon Women in Spanish America,” in Beyond Bondage: Free Women of Color in the Slave Societies of 
the Americas, ed. David Gaspar and Darlene Hine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3-18; 
and Matthew Restall, ed., Beyond Black and Red: African-Native Relations in Colonial Latin America 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005). 
48 García to Laveaux, 19 December 1795, AGI ASD 1033. 
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Blacks.” Such actions could, García fretted, incite unrest or rebellion among Santo 
Domingo‟s “slaves.”49  
 Behind the Laveaux-García exchange was the central driving question of the 
Haitian Revolution: could a polity exist entirely without slaves—or ought it to? For 
Laveaux, García, Roume and many others, the efficacy of emancipation‟s 
implementation in Santo Domingo had implications far beyond that colony. The 
competing visions of a free society versus a land where some remained enslaved 
represented nothing less than a conflict over the viability of human bondage itself.  
 Joseph Antonio Urízar, a member of Santo Domingo‟s high appeals court, 
recognized this. In a one-hundred page apologia of the slave regime in Santo Domingo, 
Urízar engaged with the liberal ideas of the French and Haitian Revolutions and sought to 
reconcile the power of these discourses with his own conviction that slavery must endure 
in his land. In his 25 June 1795 “Discourse on the Modification, and Limits of Slavery,” 
Urízar urged his fellow Dominican administrators to adopt “certain prudent and tactful 
measures so that the bad example and corruption [of Saint-Domingue]” would not spread 
to Santo Domingo. Explicitly confronting the arguments that “all men are naturally free” 
and that the “right of peoples” meant that no human being ought to be enslaved, Urízar 
responded that while “all peoples concur that men by nature are born free,” the 
                                                 
49 García to “Prince of Peace” [Godoy], 7 December 1795, in Rodríguez Demorizi, Cesión de Santo 
Domingo a Francia, 26-27. In the Spanish original: “Con fecha de 21 de Noviembre ultimo anuncié a V.E. 
de la Diputación que me dirigió M. Laveaux Comandante General de la Parte de la Colonia que posee la 
República Francesa en esta Isla con motivo de instruir a V.E. de su conducta tan impolitica como opuesta 
al sosiego de estos Habitantes Españoles cuyo más util y benefico caudal en el día consiste en la esclavitud 
que ha de emplear desde luego donde quiera que arriben y que han pretendido alborotar con la dispersión 
de Decretos Impresos sobre la Libertad general de los Negros...Há sido necesario verter especies 
contrarias a las suyas con que pretenden que todos los esclavos se escapen o incendien los cañaverales y 
Edificios de Campo.” According to David Geggus, though French Republican authorities in Santo 
Domingo towards the end of 1795 distributed copies of the prior year‟s emancipation edict and affirmed 
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exigencies of Spanish law and especially of the material interests and property rights of 
slave-owners demanded that slavery be maintained.
50
  
 While Spanish and Spanish-American thinkers and political figures had since the 
early sixteenth century grappled with issues concerning the rights of subject populations, 
Urízar confronted the libertarian discourses of the twin revolutions that had engulfed 
Santo Domingo and the demands articulated by thousands of former slaves who had won 
their liberty through military and political struggle. Many of his peers in Santo Domingo 
came to essentially the same conclusions that he did, though with less evident 
deliberation. According to a report issued by a French government commission to the 
Minister of the Navy dated 26 December 1796, “several residents” of Santo Domingo had 
presented to the Spanish king a request that the Treaty of Basel be annulled on the 
grounds that it would deprive these individuals of “their properties founded on 
Slavery.”51 In another correspondence to the Minister of the Navy, one Jean-Baptiste 
Formy contended that Dominican “slave-owners” did not wish to become “Republicans” 
due to their opposition to the “Liberty of the Blacks.” This necessitated “extraordinary 
                                                                                                                                                 
slavery‟s abolition on the entire island, these measures only had a limited effect. Geggus, “Slave Resistance 
in the Spanish Caribbean,” 140. 
50 “Discourse on the Modification, and Limits of Slavery, Formed by D[on] Josef Antonio de Urízar of the 
Supreme Council of the Indies…” 25 June 1795, AGI ASD 1032. In the original text: “Es la libertad hija 
de la naturaleza, y clama esta incesantem[ente] por aquella...Siendo la esclavitud de derecho de gentes, y 
opuesta al derecho natural, hay muchos que juzgan no devia producir efecto contra un derecho 
preponderante qual es el respetable de la naturaleza: Que todos los hombres naturalmente son libres, y así 
el derecho de gentes no puede excluir lo que la naturaleza aborrece…Todas las gentes concuerdan en que 
los hombres por naturaleza nacen libres…la necesidad que hay en las actuales circunstancias de tomar 
algunas prudentes, y políticas medidas para que no transcienda el mal exemplo, y corrupcion… ” Much of 
this liberationist language echoed the Siete Partidas, a thirteenth-century Spanish law code that constituted 
the foundation of slave law (and much else) in colonial Spanish America. In this tract, Urízar also proposed 
a sort of apprenticeship system wherein a slave would earn his or her freedom by working for his or her 
master over the course of a number of years. 
51 “The Commission Delegated by the French Government to the [Caribbean] Islands” to the Minister of 
the Navy and Colonies, 6 Nivôse an 5 (26 December 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. In the original 
French: “Nous avons appris, depuis quelques temps, que quelques habitants de cette partie de l‟Isle avaient 
présenté au Roi d‟Espagne une requête tendant à engager Sa majesté catholique à annuller l‟effet du traité 
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forces” to take proper possession of the colony and thwart such entrenched opposition.52 
In an undated letter, Laveaux was even blunter. “The Spanish have put them [freed 
Dominicans] into slavery,” Laveaux lamented. “They have put them under the torture of 
the whip, [and] they have rendered them even more unfortunate than before.”53 Such 
assertions made a mockery of the naiveté and wishful thinking of officials such as 
Roume, who in a 5 August 1796 communiqué to his colleagues on the Civil Commission 
had declared that Dominicans “all know that slavery is incompatible with our principles” 
and that one “Proclamation” of amnesty to them was worth more than an army of fifty 
thousand men.
54
 
 Entreaties that French officials directed to the ex-slaves themselves sought to 
assuage their anxieties that the regime of emancipation and the “integral part” principle 
were doomed to fail. In one 3 June 1796 proclamation that he issued in both French and 
Creole and distributed to ex-slaves, Sonthonax attempted to appeal to newly freed 
people‟s vernacular understandings of citizenship rights and social order. This 
proclamation prohibited on pain of imprisonment the mere suggestion that “liberty has 
                                                                                                                                                 
de Bâle qui les détache de la Monarchie espagnole, pour les réunir à la France: Ils invoquent la piété du 
Roi d‟Espagne en faveur de leurs propriétés fondées sur l‟Esclavage.” 
52 “Descriptive Report concerning the Spanish Part of St Domingue as well as [the] French [part],” 
submitted by Jean-Baptiste Formy to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies, an 5 (22 September 1796-21 
September 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. In the original French: “Les habitants propriétaires 
d‟Esclaves de cette partie ne sont pas en général content de devenir Républicains à cause de la Liberté des 
Noirs, ils craignent de Souffrir dans leurs personnes et propriétés dans la prise de possession…Et c‟est ce 
qui les détermine à vendre le plus d‟animaux qu‟ils peuvent…il faudra pour prendre possession des forces 
plus qu‟ordinaires pour empecher des mouvements qui pourraient avoir lieu si on manque de moyens pour 
les prévenir ou les étouffer dès leur naissance.” 
53 Laveaux to “Commander in Gonaïves,” undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/20. In the original: “Les 
espagnols, Les ont fait dans L‟esclavage, Les ont Réuni sous le supplice du fouet, Les ont Rendus encore 
plus malheureux qu‟auparavant.”  
54 Roume to “his colleagues the commissioners delegated by the French government in the [Caribbean] 
islands,” 18 Thermidor an 4 (5 August 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. In the original text: “Je vous 
réponds, sur ma tête, des anciens Espagnols de Santo Domingo et des villes de l‟intérieur, tous ne 
[illegible] que pour la tranquillité du Pays et la [illegible] aux lois de la république, tous savent que 
l‟esclavage est incompatible avec nos principes… Cette Proclamation vous vaut mieux qu‟une armée de 50 
mille hommes puisqu‟elle vous a gagné d‟une manière irrésistible les cœurs de tout le monde.” 
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not been irrevocably granted, [and] that the intention of the French government is to 
place back into irons men who should never have had to bear them.” In its preamble, this 
proclamation reiterated the foundational principles of the emancipationist government; 
the wording of this preamble was much more legalistic in the French version than in the 
Creole. While the French version simply stated that a man “CANNOT SELL HIMSELF 
NOR BE SOLD; HIS PERSON IS NOT AN ALIENABLE PROPERTY” and that “the 
French Colonies are integral parts of the Republic, and are subject to the same 
constitutional law,” the Creole translation included more colorful and descriptive 
presentations of liberty. The French government “says…that it wants all people to be free 
and equal,” the Creole version declared. “[The French government] in this manner also 
says that it wishes people to work for money, but that it absolutely does not wish to see 
nor to hear of people selling themselves, nor of others being able to buy them, because it 
says in this way that one who is able to speak cannot be sold as a horse or a pig as in a 
market.” On the “integral part” doctrine, Sonthonax stated in Creole that the French 
government “wishes that all the French Isles are but one with the great country of France, 
and that all become free as in France.” In his intention to translate the “sacred law” of 
February 1794 into “all of the languages that are spoken” on the island, Sonthonax hoped 
to advance the universalist aims of this decree.
55
 In this endeavor, he engaged with 
indigenous concepts of rights.  
                                                 
55 Proclamation of Sonthonax, 15 Prairial an 4 (3 June 1796), ANOM CMSM F3 200. In the French 
version, the text is as follows: “Citoyens, si la déclaration des droits, qui fait la base de…notre 
constitution, et dont les articles premier et quinze sont conçus en ces termes: Art. 1er. Les droits de 
l‟homme en société, sont la LIBERTÉ, L‟ÉGALITÉ, la SURETÉ, la PROPRIÉTÉ; Art. 15. Tout homme peut 
engager son temps et ses services, MAIS IL NE PEUT SE VENDRE NI ÊTRE VENDU; SA PERSONNE 
N‟EST PAS UNE PROPRIÉTÉ ALIÉNABLE…Si l‟article 6 du titre premier de la constitution, portant que 
les Colonies françaises sont parties intégrantes de la République, et sont soumises à la même loi 
constitutionnelle…Les commissaires seront tenus de proclamer, dans toute l‟étendue de l‟Isle, et dans tous 
les idiomes qu‟on y parle, l‟ABOLITION de l‟ESCLAVAGE, la LIBERTÉ et l‟ÉGALITÉ DES HOMMES 
140 
 
This proclamation‟s translation into Creole was a deeply political phenomenon 
that centered on concepts of freedom and citizenship that had emerged among Creole-
speaking freed people. This process of translation, far from simply working to assimilate 
these individuals into a European model of “civilization” as Sonthonax had hoped, attests 
to the political and intellectual dialogue between French leaders and the colony‟s 
formerly enslaved population as well as the profound importance of local concepts of 
political legitimacy in the transformations of the revolutionary era.
56
 The importance of 
such translation was not lost on a man named Dufay who in a 12 August 1795 tract had 
argued that it was necessary to distribute twenty or thirty thousand copies of the 4 
February 1794 liberty decree in Saint-Domingue, translated into Creole as well as 
English and Spanish, in order to help stabilize this French colony.
57
 
Santo Domingo was also an important arena of conflict over changing 
conceptions of the relationship between economic and political freedom. The dismantling 
of slavery in Saint-Domingue and subsequently in other places beginning in the late 
                                                                                                                                                 
DE TOUTES LES COULEURS, l‟engagement pris par la République française dans l‟acte même de la 
constitution, de maintenir de toute sa puissance cette loi sainte demandée depuis si long-temps par toutes 
les voix de l‟humanité…Tout citoyen qui dira dans les marchés ou ailleurs que la liberté n‟est pas 
irrévocablement rendue, que l‟intention du gouvernement français est de remettre aux fers des hommes qui 
n‟auraient jamais dû en porter, sera saisi sur le champ et conduit chez le juge de paix qui, sur la déposition 
de deux témoins qui attesteront avoir ettendu lesdits propos, les enverra en prison.” In the Creole version, 
the text is: “Li dire comme ça que li voulé que toute monde libre et égaux, li di comme ça encore que li 
voulé ben que monde travail pour l‟argent, mais que li pas voulé voir ni tandé absolument que monde 
vende corps yo, ni que l‟aute monde capable achetté yo, parce que li di comme ça que monde qui conné 
parlé n‟a pas chouval ni cochon pour vende corps yo tant comme dans yon marché…l‟assemblée nationale 
France di comme ça que li voulé que toute les Isles françaises faire rien que yon avec grand pays la 
France, et que toute monde va libre la comme en France.” Emphasis in original. 
56 Sonthonax to National Convention, 30 July 1793, CARAN Comité des Colonies (hereinafter CC) 
D/XXV/5, dossier 52. In the original text: “La précaution que nous avons prise de faire traduire nos 
principales proclamations en créole, et même quelques décrets de la convention, inspire aux africaines du 
respect pour les loix. Je ne doute pas que la civilisation de ce peuple ne soit très rapide.” 
57 “Measures Proposed by Dufay to Come in This moment to the Aid of St Domingue,” 25 Thermidor an 3 
(12 August 1795), ANOM CMSM F3 267. In the original text: “Il faut envoyer le décrêt du 16 Pluviose au 
nombre de vingt ou trante mille Exemplaires, traduit en Creole…il faudrait aussi L‟imprimer En anglais et 
en Espagnol.” Polverel had translated the Declaration of the Rights of Man into Creole and distributed it to 
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eighteenth century coincided with the rise of new concepts of economic freedom that 
vilified the old mercantilist trade restrictions that had underpinned both French and 
Spanish colonialism in favor of more unfettered markets in both goods and labor. In the 
wake of Adam Smith‟s 1776 publication of The Wealth of Nations, the idea that men and 
women were naturally driven to pursue their own self-interest, which could in turn 
benefit society as a whole, was rapidly gaining currency in many parts of the world. In 
the Haitian Revolution, and subsequently in the British Caribbean following the British 
abolition of slavery, the fusion of these ideas with political liberationist discourses 
paradoxically gave sanction to new forms of authoritarian control. At the heart of this 
paradox was the idea—first articulated by Sonthonax and later espoused by Julien 
Raimond, Roume, Toussaint and others—that industriousness and one‟s participation in 
labor markets (especially in the areas of plantation work and military service) were 
essential determinants of one‟s worth as a free citizen and prerequisites for full 
membership in a political community. 
Historian Thomas Holt has persuasively contended that both the end of chattel 
slavery in the British world and Britain‟s later relinquishing of formal domination over 
most of its former colonies were “framed in ways that masked a new coercion even as 
[they] yielded new opportunities for self-determination.”58 Holt‟s The Problem of 
Freedom is in many ways a powerful argument for the notion that coercion lies at the 
heart of modern “liberty”—and that to understand how this concept has acquired such 
intellectual and political resonance in the modern world, one must comprehend the 
violent processes by which political leaders in post-slave societies sought to subordinate 
                                                                                                                                                 
former slaves when he issued his 31 October 1793 emancipation decree. Dubois, Avengers of the New 
World, 164. 
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those whose freedom they claimed to uphold. This often entailed the advancement of 
arguments that couched the continuation of profoundly hierarchical labor relations within 
the guise of free labor. For instance, the municipal administration of Le Cap wrote to 
Sonthonax on 21 August 1797 that “free hands are better suited to cultivate tropical soil 
than enslaved hands.”59 Furthermore, in a 24 December 1795 letter to a “French citizen in 
Santo Domingo” named Francisco Gascue, Roume had declared that the new regime of 
general liberty would in fact stimulate a greater degree of agricultural prosperity than had 
been possible under slavery, as the “joy” of labor and the cultivateurs‟ newfound ability 
to claim a share of its fruits would create powerful new incentives for them to maximize 
their productivity. Yet in the same breath, Roume proposed importing “Unfortunate 
Slaves” from Africa and manumitting them in Hispaniola, arguing that a period of 
temporary indentured servitude was necessary to pay off their debts and habituate them to 
life as free and productive French citizens.
60
 
In their attempts to both meet perceived labor needs and realize the promise of 
universal emancipation in Santo Domingo, various individuals proposed a variety of 
political and military solutions. The anonymous author of one tract that was probably 
written around the time of Santo Domingo‟s cession insisted upon the necessity of 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 Holt, The Problem of Freedom, xviii. 
59 Municipal administration of Le Cap to Sonthonax, 4 Fructidor an 5 (21 August 1797), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/15. In the original text: “Si celui qui, le premier, osa parler de liberté lorsqu‟on combattait encore 
pour l‟esclavage; si celui qui vient de donner la preuve, que des mains libres sont plus propres à fertiliser 
le sol des tropiques que des mains esclaves...” 
60 Roume to don Francisco Gascue, 3 Nivôse an 4 (24 December 1795), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/20. The 
original text reads: “Quant aux colons qui craindraient la perte de leurs revenus, comme une conséquence 
nécessaire à la liberté générale, assurez les que leurs fortunes, loin de Diminuer vont s‟accroître à leur 
Maximum par cette même liberté générale: En effet, n‟est-ce pas à present que nous pourrons, sans être 
des voleurs et des assassins, aller en affrique retirer des Malheureux Esclaves et leur Rendre la liberté en 
les transplantant sur le sol amériquain: ils y arriveront libres comme nous; Mais, fut-il pas juste, En même 
temps, que ces hommes qui nous devront leur Existance Morale soient Engagés pour un temps, Equivalent 
au prix de leur Rançon...les Nègres travailleront, donc, et cela avec d‟autant plus de vigueur et d‟assiduité, 
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informing the “blacks” of Santo Domingo that the “[French] government” intended to 
grant them “Complete Liberty.” This author further suggested that the colonial 
government ensure that ex-slaves were paid a portion of plantation revenues and that it 
issue a Spanish-language proclamation declaring these former slaves “French citizens.” 
Most urgently, Spanish authorities must recognize these “blacks [who were] formerly 
their Slaves” as French citizens and put an immediate halt to their “Kidnap[ping] By 
force.”61 As these freed men and women pursued a meaningful liberty characterized by 
full citizenship rights and economic autonomy, men such as García and Urízar envisaged 
a much more restricted existence for them. In this these Dominican leaders were joined 
by French Republican officials who, while pontificating on the virtues of liberty and the 
injustice of bondage, themselves strove to impose restrictions on the lives of freed people 
in Santo Domingo in much the same vein as the limits placed around “emancipation” in 
Saint-Domingue.   
Numerous examples of this tendency are evident in the primary source record. 
One is Roume‟s handling of the Boca Nigua affair; another is the authoritarian treatment 
of French Dominguan migrants who sought personal and economic freedom in the former 
Spanish colony. On 21 July 1798, the French Directory‟s main agent in Saint-Domingue, 
General Gabriel Marie Theodore Joseph d‟Hédouville, issued an “arrêté” (order) 
targeting what he viewed as a “formal invasion of the territory belonging to the [French] 
                                                                                                                                                 
qu‟ils seront soutenus par le sentiment de l‟Excellence humaine, et qu‟ils seront provoqués par le gout de 
jouissance qu‟ils ignoraient auparavant.”  
61 Anonymous, “Notes” on Hispaniola, undated, CARAN AF/III/63. In the original text: “[I]l est bien 
urgent de faire connaître à tous les noirs de la Partie Espagnole l‟intention du gouvernement à les rendre à 
une Entière Liberté ainsi que la part des productions à laquelle ils doivent Prétendre en continuant à 
[illegible] les habitations sur lesquelles ils Étaient considérés comme Esclaves. Une Proclamation en 
Espagnol, qui les dirait qu‟ils sont citoyens français, dès le moment que le traité de cession [illegible] Été 
signé, suffirait pour les conserver tous dans cette colonie…il faut convenir avec L‟Espagne que les noirs ci 
144 
 
Republic.” The alleged perpetrators of this “invasion” were neither foreign soldiers nor 
malefactors such as pirates. Rather, Hédouville‟s targets were French citizens whose 
“crime” was nothing more than attempting to move within an island that was 
theoretically unified under Republican rule. In their efforts to escape from the repressive 
labor regimes and onerous military duties that characterized post-emancipation society in 
Saint-Domingue, many cultivateurs had tried to relocate to the “open land” of Santo 
Domingo. Hédouville‟s response was to empower the military to forbid any further 
settlement (or “usurpation” of land) in Santo Domingo by Dominguan migrants who did 
not possess a proper land title.
62
 
 These tactics were not unique to white administrators from the metropole, as both 
Toussaint Louverture and his adopted nephew General Moïse pursued similar policies. 
On 19 October 1799, Toussaint in a letter to Roume asserted that “a great number of our 
cultivators take refuge in the Spanish part,” which weakened Saint-Domingue‟s labor 
force and therefore constituted an “abuse” that needed to be suppressed.63 Despite his 
                                                                                                                                                 
devant leurs Esclaves Et qui sont considérés par la république comme citoyens ne Pourront Être Enlevés 
Par force.” 
62 “Order Concerning Establishments formed on the Border that Separates the Former Spanish Part from 
the French Part of St-Domingue, by Citizens Who Have Not Been Authorized There,” 3 Thermidor an 6 
(21 July 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/18. In the original French: “L‟Agence du directoire exécutif, 
Instruit que plusieurs citoyens ont formé, sans y avoir été autorisés, des établissements sur la frontière qui 
séparait la partie ci-devant espagnole de la partie française; Que beaucoup d‟autres cultivateurs 
encouragés par cet exemple se disposent à quitter, avec leurs familles, leurs anciennes habitations, pour 
aller en établir de nouvelles dans cette partie; Considérant que ces établissements sont un envahissement 
formel du territoire appartenant à la République, et qu‟ils enlèvent à la partie française et aux habitations 
déjà en valeur, des bras qui leur sont nécessaires…L‟administration des domaines nationaux se fera rendre 
compte, dans le plus bref délai, des usurpations faites sur les terrains vagues situés à l‟ancienne limite des 
deux parties française et espagnole de Saint-Domingue, principalement dans les arrondissements de Saint-
Michel et Saint-Raphaël…Les commandans militaires sont chargés, sous leur responsabilité, de veiller à ce 
qu‟aucun habitant ou cultivateur de la partie française, ne forme sur la limite de la partie ci-devant 
espagnole, aucun établissement dans les terrains vagues, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, si les habitans 
ou cultivateurs n‟y sont pas autorisés, ou s‟ils n‟ont pas un titre de propriété.” 
63 Toussaint to Roume, 27 Vendémiaire an 8 (19 October 1799), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/26. The original 
French reads: “J‟ai aussi à vous observer, Citoyen agent, qu‟un grand nombre de nos Cultivateurs se 
réfugie dans la partie Espagnole, soit pour se soustraire au travail, que parce qu‟ils ont commis quelques 
fautes, dont ils en craignent le châtiment, il serait urgent de prévenir cet abus, dont il en résulterait par la 
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popularity among freed Dominguans, Moïse shared Toussaint‟s opinion on this matter. In 
a 14 October 1799 missive, Moïse urged Roume to “take measures” to stem the 
“desertion” of many Dominguan migrants to Santo Domingo, since their absence from 
Saint-Domingue was detrimental to both agriculture and the military. Moïse suggested as 
a solution the establishment of a “gendarmerie” that would serve the two functions of 
stopping such unauthorized migration and protecting the cultivateurs from becoming 
victims of slaving to Havana, Caracas and assorted other locales within the Spanish 
empire.
64
 By voting with their feet, these cultivateurs sought to attain their own version 
of “liberty,” which collided with the political and economic agendas of black and white 
French colonial officials. 
 While recurring conflicts between masters and colonial officials concerning the 
precise terms of and oversight over manumission represent a significant aspect of the 
history of eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue, the ambiguous political and legal situation 
in French Santo Domingo made the contours of liberty there even more complicated.
65
 
The French scholar Agnès Renault has closely examined struggles over the limits of 
freedom in Santiago de Cuba, where thousands of French refugees from Saint-Domingue 
                                                                                                                                                 
Suite l‟abandon des cultures.” In his attempts to restrict travel between the two parts of the island, 
Toussaint decreed that travel between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo required a special passport 
which cost more than one that only permitted travel within Saint-Domingue. Regulation of Toussaint 
Louverture, 25 Floréal an 8 (15 May 1800), ANOM CMSM F3 202. 
64 Moïse to Roume, 22 Vendémiaire an 8 (14 October 1799), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/26. In the original 
French: “Il serait bien nécessaire pour le bien de la chose publique que vous preniez des mesures pour 
empêcher l‟émigration qui se fait des français dans la partie espagnole, il vaut de se sauver une grande 
partie des jeunes gens que j‟avais mis en réquisition pour complétter la 5e et [illegible] aussi des 
cultivateurs de différents quartiers qui désertent pour aller dans la dépendance de San Yago. Il faudrait de 
toute nécessité empêcher ces désertions qui ne peuvent que nous être désavantageuses tant pour la culture 
que pour la troupe. Je ne sais qu‟un moyen pour couper court à tout, cela ce serait de prendre possession 
de cette partie, alors on établirait une bonne gendarmerie qui surveillerait aux brigandages qui se 
commettent, car nos cultivateurs qui [illegible] par les espagnols, sont en partie déportés à la Havane, 
Caraque, et différentes isles espagnoles.”  
65 For a discussion of these conflicts over manumission, see Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” chapter 
1.  
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relocated during the Haitian Revolutionary period. Many of these refugees sought to 
circumvent the 1794 French emancipation edict by forcing or persuading fellow French 
citizens to migrate with them from Saint-Domingue and other places to slaveholding 
Cuba. While these purported masters usually “totally ignored” the emancipation decree‟s 
existence, there was at least one instance in which Spanish authorities on that island 
denied a French refugee‟s ownership claim to a child on the grounds that this boy had 
obtained his liberty by the order of general emancipation.
66
 
 Did many French and Spanish authorities and other free persons “totally ignore” 
the French Republican emancipation law in Santo Domingo? The evidence suggests that 
some forms of servile labor persisted in that colony despite the initial fervor of Roume, 
Laveaux and others. Numerous archival documents for instance refer to “slaves” in Santo 
Domingo after 1795. In his comprehensive report on the four Dominican communes 
(local districts) of Axabon (Dajabón), Santiago, Puerto Plata, and Montechristi dated June 
or July 1797, the French Fortifications Director Charles Vincent stated that impoverished 
free Dominicans in Montechristi shared the few possessions they owned with their 
“Slave[s].”67 Moreover, according to another report that was probably written by Vincent 
                                                 
66 Agnès Renault, “Les conditions d‟affranchissements des esclaves appartenant aux immigrés français 
résidant à Santiago de Cuba entre 1791 et 1825,” paper presented at conference entitled Affranchis et 
descendants d‟affranchis dans le monde atlantique (Europe, Afrique et Amériques) du XVe au XIXe siècle: 
Statuts juridiques, insertions sociales et identités culturelles (Musée d‟Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France, 13-16 
May 2009), 4. Publication forthcoming; paper cited with the author‟s written permission. According to Sue 
Peabody, in suits for freedom brought by Dominguan migrants claimed as slaves in Pennsylvania and 
Maryland from 1794-1808, these purported slaves‟ lawyers “apparently ignored the cataclysmic innovation 
of the French and Haitian Revolutions: the emancipation of all slaves” in Saint-Domingue and the French 
empire as a whole in 1793-1794. Sue Peabody, “„Free Upon Higher Ground:‟ Saint-Domingue Slaves‟ 
Suits for Freedom in U.S. Courts, 1792-1830,” in Geggus and Fiering, The World of the Haitian 
Revolution, 268. 
67 “Military Reconnaissance of the Four Districts of Ajabon, Saint Yago, Porto-Plate and Montechrist, as 
well as of the Portion of the Coast that Extends from Fort-Liberté to Porto-Plate Inclusively, Followed by a 
Project [for] a Defensive System for this Extent of the Coast and of the Country,” Messidor an 5 (19 June-
18 July 1797), ANOM Direction de Fortification des Colonies (hereinafter DFC) 5, no. 910. In the original 
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around the same time, the social and economic relations that were embedded in slavery 
caused would-be masters to insist that the extension of the French “decree of general 
liberty” to Santo Domingo would lead to their “inevitable ruin.” This report‟s author 
further argued that “the day of the refusal of the Blacks to obey their master, would be the 
day of their destruction,” as these purported masters—“terrible men”—would not hesitate 
to retaliate.
68
  
 For many Dominicans, the social and racial hierarchies that had become deeply 
woven into the fabric of slave society proved at least as important as economic concerns. 
In a 12 December 1795 letter to don Eugenio de Llaguno y Amirola, the high court 
official Urízar denounced the “printed material” and “verbal exhortations” that Laveaux 
and other partisans of the French Republic had directed at “our Black slaves” and boasted 
that these individuals were impervious to these influences. “Our fortune, and Providence 
have been able to dispel all of their attempts [to sway these „slaves‟],” Urízar proclaimed. 
“The most admirable thing being that our slaves are those who detest them [the French 
entreaties] the most…generally they all excuse themselves to their liberties, and they 
prefer our slavery, singing its praises.”69  
                                                                                                                                                 
French: “L‟habitant de Montechrist, tout autant et plus que celui de Porto de Plata, vit aujourd‟huy des 
faibles ressources qu‟il partage journellement avec L‟Esclave qui les lui crée.” 
68 “Reflections of Political Economy on the Three Spanish Jurisdictions of Montechrist, San Yago and Port 
de Plata, Relative to their Reunion with the [French] Republic,” undated, ANOM DFC 5, no.  914. In the 
original: “La nécessité apparente pour L‟Espagnol d‟être forcé à quelque genre d‟industrie en passant sous 
la dénomination française, n‟est pas le seul mot qu‟il redoute: Le Système Colonial de la France lui paraît 
d‟un danger bien plus menaçant, et il croit sa ruine inévitable dans L‟introduction du décret de la Liberté 
générale…Le jour du refus des Noirs d‟obéir à leur maître, serait le jour de leur destruction chez le très 
grand nombre des hattiers, hommes terribles et inexpugnables.” If this report was indeed composed by 
Vincent, then it would likely have carried some weight in French official circles, as Vincent was an 
important French colonial official with considerable experience in Hispaniola who would later serve as one 
of Napoleon‟s main informants on the situation there. He had served in Saint-Domingue since 1786 and 
became one of Toussaint‟s most trusted allies. Madison Smartt Bell, Toussaint Louverture: A Biography 
(New York: Vintage, 2007), 218. 
69 Urízar to Amirola, 12 December 1795, AGI ASD 1033. In the original text: “...los tres Comisarios que 
havia embiado a este Govierno, y quad terribles se hacían sus impresos, y exhortaciones verbales de que 
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When confronted with challenges from below, slaveholders and those who 
claimed this status in Hispaniola and elsewhere often resorted to two contradictory 
tactics: to deny that slaves could possess the agency to take such initiatives (rendering 
such a possibility “unthinkable” in Michel-Rolph Trouillot‟s well-known terms); and to 
express fear that the perceived contagion of revolt would spread.
70
 Those who claimed 
others as their property in Hispaniola during the Haitian Revolutionary period displayed 
both of these reactions. After 1795, some Spanish officials attempted to either attribute 
unrest among servile laborers to external actors or to simply deny that a problem existed 
at all. Such intransigence provoked arm-twisting from French Republican authorities who 
were themselves often ambivalent about the virtues of emancipation on the island. In a 
tacit admission that his earlier exhortations on the elimination of slavery in Santo 
Domingo had not achieved the intended result, Agent Roume in a letter to the Municipal 
Administration of Montechristi dated 22 March 1800 urged his interlocutors to view 
“your former alleged Slaves” as “friends” who were “interested, as are you, in the 
maintenance of public order and the prosperity of the colony.”71  
Observers gave varying estimates of the number of “slaves” in Santo Domingo. In 
a 26 June 1800 letter to “citizen Perregaux,” the Marquis d‟Iranda claimed that ten to 
twelve thousand “Slaves” lived among Santo Domingo‟s population of approximately 
                                                                                                                                                 
pudiesen causar alguna mosion en nuestros Negros esclavos a quien lisongeaban tanto para atraerlos a 
sus ideas; pero nuestra fortuna, y providencia han podido desvanecer todos sus intentos, siendo lo mas 
admirable que nuestros esclavos son los q[ue] mas los detestan...generalmente todos se excusan a sus 
libertades, y prefieren nuestra esclavitud cantandola por mas dichosa, que aquella.” 
70 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995), chapter 3.  
71 Roume to Municipal Administration of Montechristi, 1 Germinal an 8 (22 March 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/17. In the original French: “Ne voyez plus dans nos nouveaux frères, vos ci-devant 
Esclaves prétendus, que des amis intéressés, comme vous, au maintien de l‟ordre public et à la prospérité 
de la colonie.” 
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one hundred and fifty thousand individuals of “diverse castes.”72 One report on Santo 
Domingo stated that most of the colony‟s “ten thousand slaves” tended to animals and 
worked in the main cities. According to this report, the “free population” of Santo 
Domingo numbered around fifty thousand, the majority of whom were “of color or 
mixed.”73 
 Those who made these seemingly nonchalant mentions of Dominican “slaves” 
naturalized an unstable category, and some of those who sought their freedom found 
themselves in situations that differed little from the circumstances of slaves in the pre-
revolutionary era. In October 1798, Hédouville removed Moïse from his post as 
commander of Republican military forces in Fort-Liberté (formerly Fort-Dauphin) and 
replaced him with an officer named Grandet. Moïse in turn accused Grandet of working 
against emancipation by capturing fugitives from Santo Domingo who had fled across the 
border and returning them to those who claimed to be their masters. (Ironically, this is 
exactly what the French themselves had long pressured the Spanish to do with 
Dominguan slaves, with limited results).
74
 In a 12 September 1798 letter to Moïse, the 
gendarmerie commander Étienne Albert condemned Grandet for fomenting disorder in 
the Fort-Liberté area and told Moïse that a “Spanish army” had begun to “arrest all their 
                                                 
72 Marquis d‟Iranda to Perregaux, 26 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/17. The original text reads: “On 
y compte cependant 150 Mille individus de diverses castes, parmi les quels il y a tout au plus de 10 à 12 
Mille Esclaves.” 
73 “Précis on the Current Position of Saint Domingue and the Provisional Measures to Take,” undated, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/32. In the original text: “Cette partie espagnole est tranquile par sa nullité; il n‟y 
existe pas au total plus de dix mille esclaves répandus dans les hates pour soigner les animaux, ou servir 
dans les principales villes. La population libre s‟élève à plus de cinquante mille âmes, dont La plus part 
sont de couleur ou métis.” Emphasis in original.  
74 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 222.  
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blacks who are in the French part.”75 These Dominican “slaves” found themselves in a 
struggle to eke out an existence across the colonial border in a situation that was similar 
to that of their Dominguan counterparts who were the targets of the anti-migration orders 
of Hédouville, Moïse and Toussaint.  
 As a former slave leading an army composed mostly of fellow freedmen, General 
Moïse had reason to be suspicious of hostility from various quarters towards general 
emancipation. “Since the emancipation of the slaves and the decree of 16 Pluviôse [4 
February 1794], the inhabitants of the former Spanish part keep their cultivators…in the 
most severe servitude and treat them with more cruelty than ever before,” Moïse 
contended in a 9 October 1798 letter to Hédouville. In this correspondence, Moïse 
accused Grandet of complicity in the efforts of many Dominicans to recapture the 
cultivateurs whom they considered to be their “property;” part of Moïse‟s case rested on 
Grandet‟s alleged attempts to arrest “vagabonds” in the area.76  
Though he had won a small victory in deposing Moïse, General Hédouville‟s 
position was weak. On 23 October 1798, partly as a result of his ill-conceived 
provocation of Toussaint‟s ire in the Moïse affair, Hédouville found himself on a ship 
departing Saint-Domingue, having little to show for his brief time there other than 
assorted correspondences containing high-minded rhetoric about liberty, a strengthened 
black army command in a crucial part of the island, and a bruised ego. 
                                                 
75 Étienne Albert to Moïse, 26 Fructidor an 6 (12 September 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the 
original French: “On est venu me dire qu‟une armée Espagnole est venue arrêter tous leurs nègres qui sont 
dans la partie française.” 
76 Moïse to Hédouville, 18 Vendémiaire an 7 (9 October 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. The original 
text reads: “Je ne suis pas Surpris, Citoyen Agent, que [illegible] de votre justice que le chef de Bd. 
Grandet [illegible] visiter le Maribaroux et fort liberté pour faire arrêter les vagabonds …depuis 
l‟affranchissement des esclaves et le décret du 16 Pluviôse les habitants de la partie ci-devant espagnole 
tiennent leurs cultivateurs dans…l‟asservissement le plus dur et les traitent avec plus de cruauté qu‟ils 
n‟ont jamais fait auparavant…Ces habitants espagnols considérant encore les noirs comme une propriété.” 
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 If these Dominican fugitives lived in a liminal space at the interstices of slavery 
and freedom, then the situation of the “maroon” communities near the island‟s colonial 
border was perhaps even more precarious. The very existence of such settlements in a 
land that was theoretically under a regime of emancipation attested to the ambiguities of 
“freedom” in this time and place. These issues proved especially salient in the case of the 
best-known of these communities, which the source record typically refers to as 
“Maniel.” 
 
*  *  * 
 
“The citizens of Maniel, who saw in each Frenchman an enemy of their liberty, 
while the horrible reign of despotism and aristocracy lasted, Can now only see in each of 
us a brother and a defender, since we have decided to give men of all countries, and 
especially the African people, the full enjoyment of the sacred and enduring rights of the 
human race.” So spoke Roume, who hoped that the political transformations in France 
and Saint-Domingue would facilitate the incorporation of those from Maniel into the 
Republican sphere. By presenting France as the sole guarantor of the “sacred and 
enduring rights of the human race,” Roume negated the types of liberty that those from 
the enclave had carved out for themselves, justifying his actions on the premise that “the 
totality of the island ha[s] become an integral Part of the territory of France.”77 Roume 
                                                 
77 “Order of the Provisional Agent in the Spanish Part of St Domingue on the Independent Blacks…of 
Maniel,” 29 Thermidor an 4 (16 August 1796), ANOM CMSM F3 200. In the original French: “…Que la 
totalité de l‟isle étant devenue Partie intégrante du territoire de la France, il est impossible de laisser 
subsister Plus longtemps un ordre de chose incompatible avec limite de la république…Que les citoyens du 
maniel qui voyaient dans chaque français un ennemi de leur liberté, tant que dura le règne horrible du 
despotisme et de l‟aristocratie, ne Peuvent plus voir dans chacun de nous qu‟un frère et un défenseur, 
depuis que nous avons osé replacer l‟homme de tout pays, et particulièrement le peuple africain dans la 
pleine jouissance des droits sacrés et imprescriptible du genre humain.” A copy of this order is preserved 
in CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. 
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and his French successors in Santo Domingo adopted a model that the slaveholding 
Spanish had developed in their dealings with Maniel: the combination of the carrot of 
resettlement and inducements by religious figures to proclaim loyalty to the colonial state 
and the stick of military incursions.  
The cession of Santo Domingo to emancipationist France raised the question of 
the continued viability and status of “maroon” communities after emancipation. In an 
undated letter to the Minister of the Navy, a judicial commissioner named Minuty argued 
that the pre-revolutionary practice of appointing a French agent to Santo Domingo to 
assist in the recapture of “Black maroons” was “illusory” and “useless” in the present 
context given the 1794 general emancipation decree and the subsequent cession of Santo 
Domingo to France.
78
 The archival evidence nonetheless suggests that the basic contours 
of the relationship between colonial authorities and these communities remained much 
the same after 1795.  
While scholars have long debated the role of maroons in enabling the great slave 
uprising that eventually led to the establishment of independent Haiti, my own 
contribution centers on the limitations of French Republican emancipation as revealed in 
the case of Maniel.
79
 The de facto independence of many of these communities, their 
location near the border, and their inclusion of many fugitive slaves from both parts of 
                                                 
78 Minuty to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/21. In the original text: 
“Sous l‟ancien Régime le Gouverneur français de St Domingue nommait auprès du Gouverneur Espagnol 
un Commissaire, dont les fonctions se bornaient aux représentations à faire sur l‟usurpation des Limites, et 
à la réclamation des Déserteurs et Nègres marrons. Le Decret du 16 Pluviose et la Cession de la partie 
Espagnole à la France, ont rendu ces fonctions illusoires, et sous ce point de vue la délégation d‟un 
Commissaire français à Santo Domingo devenait inutile.” 
79 In Les marrons de la liberté (Paris: L‟École, 1972), Jean Fouchard argued that maroons played an 
important role in the 1791 slave uprising. Gabriel Debien in Les esclaves aux Antilles françaises, XVIIe-
XVIII siècles (Basse-Terre: Société d‟Histoire de la Guadeloupe, 1974) by contrast downplayed the 
importance of maroons in this event. For a succinct overview of this argument, see Fick, The Making of 
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the island had provoked numerous disputes between the French and Spanish colonial 
governments before 1789. After 1795, the French employed many of the same policies 
that the Spanish colonial state had utilized with respect to Maniel, even relying upon 
some of the same religious authorities to cajole the “maroons” into submission. In an 
arrêté issued on 16 August 1796, Roume declared that quasi-independent political 
“order[s]” such as Maniel were “incompatible” with an indivisible French Republic. He 
appointed a delegation to communicate his wishes to the members of this community, 
proclaiming the necessity of “instruct[ing]” them on “their rights and duties” as French 
Republican citizens. This was especially pressing given the perceived threat of their co-
optation by either British or royalist French factions. Roume took this measure despite his 
assertion in the same document that these individuals were a “respectable population of 
African citizens who had the courage to conquer their natural liberty” and who “have 
found themselves needing to be constantly on guard against both governments [French 
and Spanish], which has Produced a type of Small independent State, Located at the 
limits of the two colonies.”80 
In his attempts to subdue those who had “had the courage to conquer their natural 
liberty,” Roume employed the same Spanish priest whom Dominican authorities had 
                                                                                                                                                 
Haiti, 5-9. David Geggus in Haitian Revolutionary Studies (p. 46) called Maniel an “important test case” in 
determining the precise “connection between marronage [slave flight] and revolution in Saint Domingue.” 
80 “Order of the Provisional Agent on the Independent Blacks of Maniel,” 16 August 1796, ANOM CMSM 
F3 200. In the original text: “Considérant qu‟il existe dans la Partie des sources et du maniel une 
Population respectable de citoyens affricains qui ont eu le courage de conquérir leur liberté naturelle et de 
forcer le général Bellecombe à la sanctionner lui-même. Que ces citoyens, qui par la nature de leur 
position Politique étaient également en but aux deux Gouvernements français et espagnol de Saint 
Domingue, se sont trouvés dans la nécessité d‟être sans cesse en garde contre l‟un et l‟autre 
Gouvernement, ce qui a Produit une espèce de Petit État indépendant, Placé aux limites des deux colonies. 
Que la totalité de l‟isle étant devenue Partie intégrante du territoire de la France, il est impossible de 
laisser subsister Plus longtemps un ordre de chose incompatible avec limite de la république…Qu‟il est 
urgent de détromper nos frères du maniel en les Éclairant sur la vraie nature de leurs droits et de leurs 
devoirs…instruire nos nouveaux frères sur les objets dont la connaissance leur importe le plus; de leur 
faire connaître leurs droits et leurs devoirs.” 
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entrusted with the spiritual instruction of those from Maniel and their resettlement in 
Catholic poblaciones (settlements).
81
 In a 16 August 1796 letter to this priest, Juan 
Bobadilla, Roume called upon him to “conquer for the French Republic the hearts” of the 
“African population” of Maniel—a task which Roume presumed would be facilitated by 
the “absolute trust” that these individuals supposedly placed in Bobadilla. “His Catholic 
Majesty, in ceding to us the Spanish part of Saint-Domingue, ceded to us the Land that 
this population [of Maniel] inhabits; and we cannot permit them to form a state 
independent of our laws, on a portion of our own territory,” declared Roume.82 By 
enlisting Bobadilla—who had on 25 January 1790 deemed it necessary to “achieve the 
perfect civilization and reduction to Christian life of those [Maniel inhabitants] who for 
so long have groaned under the harsh servitude of heathenism”—Roume allied himself 
with a man who had long worked to undermine the precarious independence that the 
Maniel inhabitants had forged.
83
 Whether the stated ideological justification was the 
achievement of a Christian “perfect civilization” or that of French Republican “liberty,” 
                                                 
81 This Spanish resettlement policy apparently dated back to at least the 1760s. Moreau de St Méry stated 
that the Spanish king issued an order on 21 October 1764 requiring his subjects to “consider [some French 
fugitive] blacks as free, and to attempt to advise them by gentleness to form communities, nonetheless 
taking the necessary precautions to ensure that these communities do not threaten public tranquility.” M. L. 
E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle Saint-
Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 2:177. In the original text: “Mais la cédule 
prescrit au contraire de considérer ces nègres comme libres, et de tâcher de les engager par la douceur à 
former des peuplades, en prenant toutefois les précautions nécessaires pour que ces peuplades ne 
menacent pas la tranquillité publique.” 
82 Roume to Bobadilla, 29 Thermidor an 4 (16 August 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. Emphasis mine. 
In the original French: “Il s‟agit d‟une Peuplade d‟affricains…L‟on m‟a assuré, Mon très Révérend Père, 
que vous jouissiez dans cette peuplade d‟une confiance absolue…c‟est donc à vous, Mon Révérend, que je 
dois m‟adresser, pour vous prier au nom de la France et de l‟Espagne, de vous charger de conquérir à la 
République française les cœurs de ces mêmes hommes. Sa Majesté Catholique en nous cédant la partie 
Espagnole de Saint Domingue, nous a cédé le Terrain qu‟habite cette peuplade; et nous ne pouvons 
permettre qu‟il se forme un état indépendant de nos Lois, sur une portion de notre propre territoire.” 
83 Bobadilla to don Antonio Porlier, 25 January 1790, AGI ASD 1102. In the original text: “...lograr la 
perfecta civilisacion y reduccion a vida christiana de los que por tanto t[iempo] han gemido bajo la dura 
servidumbre del gentilismo.” 
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each colonial state sought to incorporate the residents of this community into a 
centralized state.   
Despite these continuities, the revolutionary upheaval appears in some instances 
to have undermined attempts to assert state authority over these communities. In a report 
written in Santo Domingo on 8 February 1811, a man named Juan Caballero stated that 
Spanish authorities led by a judge, a battalion lieutenant, and the priest Bobadilla had in 
the late 1780s persuaded some maroons to form a town called San Cristóbal del Naranjo 
at the foot of the Baoruco Mountains in southwest Santo Domingo, where Bobadilla 
regularly administered the holy sacraments. Nonetheless, upon Santo Domingo‟s cession 
to France in 1795, the intrusion of many French “negros y mulatos” led to the dissolution 
of San Cristóbal del Naranjo and the dispersion of its residents into the mountains.
84
 
Caballero himself boasted of having resettled over one hundred families in San Cristóbal 
del Naranjo, forming two military companies from these new settlers for the defense of 
the colony.
85
 If Caballero‟s account is to be believed, then the French and Haitian 
Revolutions had complex effects on these “maroons,” driving some of them into the 
mountainous interior and integrating others into the new colonial state as soldiers.
86
  
 Even after the formal dismantling of the “integral part” doctrine in 1799, French 
regimes continued their aggressive efforts to draw Maniel‟s inhabitants into the 
                                                 
84 According to Carlos Esteban Deive, French slaves had constituted much of the population of Maniel 
before the Revolution, and after the August 1791 slave uprising in Saint-Domingue, the migration of 
enslaved Dominguans to this community became even more pronounced. This compelled Governor García 
and other Spanish authorities to attempt to secure San Cristóbal del Naranjo against the numerous French 
slaves who sought refuge in Maniel. Carlos Esteban Deive, Los cimarrones del Maniel de Neiba: Historia y 
etnografía (Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 1985), 68-69. 
85 Report of Juan Caballero, 8 February 1811, AGI ASD 1042. 
86 In a 5 January 1798 letter to the Minister of the Navy, a Saint-Domingue deputy named J. Rey-Delmas 
asserted that “the former insurgents of Maniel” had placed themselves “under the Tricolor [French 
Republican] flag.” J. Rey-Delmas to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 16 Nivôse an 6 (5 January 1798), 
156 
 
Republican fold. French colonial governments in Santo Domingo under Toussaint 
Louverture (1801-1802) and the Napoleonic General François Kerverseau (1802-1803) 
complemented these political and religious efforts at persuasion with a more militaristic 
approach.  
Ultimately, the political, legal and philosophical conflicts that emerged over the 
rights of freed Dominicans after 1795 reflected and helped to shape a story of both great 
hope and bitter disappointment. While Santo Domingo‟s cession to France had elicited 
hopes that the new regime could transform this colony into a land without slavery, this 
possibility became undermined by assorted legal, political, and attitudinal obstacles. 
Although these conflicts attest to the revolutionary potential of emancipation and equal 
citizenship in Santo Domingo, they also revealed some of the problems that led to the 
failure of these ideals to materialize in that colony under French Republican rule.  
                                                                                                                                                 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/19. In the original French: “…les anciens insurgés du Maniel et d‟Oco s‟étaient 
venus ranger d‟eux même sous le drapeau Tricolore.” Emphasis in original. 
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Chapter Three 
  
Santo Domingo in the Rise of Toussaint Louverture, 1795-1801 
 
On 26 January 1801, the forces of Toussaint Louverture, a former slave fighting 
under the banner of liberty, marched into the city of Santo Domingo. Finding relatively 
little armed opposition, they proclaimed their governance over the former Spanish colony 
in the name of the French Republic. At this pivotal moment, the colony‟s inhabitants 
found themselves at the center of the era‟s most contentious conflicts over slavery, the 
existence and legitimacy of racial hierarchies, and the relationship between colony and 
metropole.  
Though Toussaint‟s capture of Santo Domingo city in 1801 altered the island‟s 
political trajectory, in some respects the invasion did not constitute a radical rupture from 
the past, as it was in fact the culmination of a series of military incursions that Toussaint 
had made into the colony since 1795. These in turn reflected in part Toussaint‟s 
knowledge of Santo Domingo gained through his service in Spain‟s armies earlier in the 
1790s. Having risen from the status of Spanish “auxiliary” to that of an indispensable 
leader in the French Republican campaign for the island, Toussaint and the thousands of 
warriors who served under him wrested numerous strategically-crucial Dominican posts 
from British, Spanish, and royalist French enemies in the second half of the 1790s. Their 
efforts served both to bring these areas under French Republican control and to augment 
Toussaint‟s rapidly growing power. In their reshaping of the colonial border, these 
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military episodes also left a lasting legacy for the island‟s political geography. Finally, 
they posed an important if limited challenge to the practice of holding one‟s fellow 
human beings in bondage.  
The military history of Santo Domingo from its cession to France until 
Toussaint‟s coup d‟état five and a half years later suggests the salience of the Dominican 
aspect of the revolutionary conflict in comprehending Toussaint‟s rise to power and 
transformation from a military commander to a political leader. Though its poverty and 
relative strategic insignificance had long relegated it to the status of outlier in the Spanish 
empire, Santo Domingo after 1795 became the object of fierce competition among 
several factions. As he became more powerful, Toussaint came to embrace a goal that 
had eluded all before him since the late seventeenth century: the political and military 
union of the entire island of Hispaniola under a single regime. This brought him into 
conflict with the Minister of the Navy in Paris, who in accordance with the wishes of first 
the Directory and subsequently the Consulate (Napoleon‟s regime) sought to thwart 
Toussaint‟s ambitions in Santo Domingo. In the six years following Santo Domingo‟s 
cession, two opposing visions for Hispaniola‟s political future clashed: that of Toussaint 
of an island united under his rule; and that of Napoleon and the Minister of the Navy who 
saw the status quo of partition as the best way to limit Toussaint‟s authority.1 Though 
Toussaint would triumph in this struggle, the Napoleonic vision of division would in 
many ways characterize the island‟s history in the two centuries following Toussaint‟s 
brief reign in Santo Domingo.  
                                                 
1 I am grateful to John Garrigus (personal communication, 22 October 2010) for suggesting that Toussaint 
may have wished to eliminate the contentious border in his effort to bring the entire island under his 
control.  
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These conflicts transpired against the backdrop of warfare among a multitude of 
factions for control over the island and its resources. Also at stake in these battles was the 
status of thousands of individuals as slaves or citizens. Though the 1795 Treaty of Basel 
had stipulated the end of the Spanish authority over the island‟s eastern part, this did not 
put a stop to frequent armed contests involving partisans of Spain, France and Britain for 
control of important areas on and near the colonial border. Moreover, while the ejection 
of the slaveholding British from the island in 1798 ostensibly stood as a significant 
triumph for the cause of liberty, new threats to emancipation‟s survival would emerge in 
the ensuing years. After the British defeat, Toussaint faced off against his former ally 
André Rigaud, a onetime goldsmith and veteran of the war in the Thirteen Colonies who 
sought to preserve his quasi-independent regime in the southern part of Saint-Domingue. 
Following Toussaint‟s defeat of Rigaud in 1800 and invasion of Santo Domingo city the 
following year, the struggle for Santo Domingo reached its dénouement with Toussaint‟s 
promulgation in 1801 of a constitution which formalized the unification of the island 
under his authority.  
Distinct Dominican and Dominguan racial ideologies converged in this moment 
of “liberation.” In Santo Domingo, Toussaint and many of his followers confronted 
members of a small but vocal elite who clung to their old privileges and vociferously 
objected to the potential racial and political implications of rule by the emancipationist 
French Republic, especially once Toussaint assumed the mantle of supreme leadership. 
His invasion also elicited significant opposition among many partisans of the French 
Republic.  
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Race was closely interwoven with—indeed, inseparable from—the military and 
political conflicts that reshaped the island‟s political landscape in these years. In the 
Haitian Revolution, “a constant and powerful pull between racism and antiracism,” to 
borrow Ada Ferrer‟s phrase, at once created new avenues for the attainment and exercise 
of citizenship rights and gave rise to new forms of discrimination and domination.
2
 Faced 
with an army of thousands of ex-slaves standing at the gates of the oldest capital city in 
the Americas, many French and Spanish commoners and officials betrayed the 
undercurrent of racism that lay beneath the island‟s revolutionary transformations.  
Santo Domingo was at the heart of two interconnected imperial crises that had 
profound implications for the political history of the Caribbean and the hemisphere. 
Toussaint‟s ill-fated attempt to unify the island under his rule ultimately proved to be a 
crucial aspect of an integrated history of geopolitical conflict and factional warfare that 
eventually morphed into an anti-colonial struggle. 
 
Santo Domingo in the Defeat of the British 
 
In a missive to his rival General Gabriel Hédouville dated 5 September 1798, 
Toussaint Louverture dreamed of a hemisphere without slavery. If only France could 
vanquish its foes in the Caribbean, Toussaint declared, then it might realize its supreme 
and urgent goal: “the maintenance and the propagation of universal liberty” in “all of the 
Americas.”3 Nonetheless, before Toussaint or any other Dominguan leader could 
                                                 
2 Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), 198. While Ferrer was referring to the nineteenth-century Cuban wars of 
independence, her argument applies equally to the Haitian Revolution.  
3 Toussaint to Hédouville, 19 Fructidor an 6 (5 September 1798), Centre d‟Accueil et de Recherche des 
Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, Colonies CC/9a/23. In the original text: “...maintien et à 
la propagation de la liberté universelle, vers laquelle l‟amérique entière ne saurait tarder d‟arriver, si elle 
ne cesse de regner à St Domingue sous l‟empire des lois et de la vraie égalité.” 
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properly conceive of the advent of abolition to Chile or Canada, he had to attend to 
matters much closer to home. There was indeed much to attend to, as these years seemed 
to inflict one disappointment after another on defenders of emancipation. Though 
interspersed with fleeting triumphs, successive political setbacks for the causes of 
abolition and revolution in France culminated in the rise of Napoleon in 1799 and his 
dissolution that year of the short-lived French constitution of 1795 that had erased 
distinctions in citizenship rights for all the inhabitants of that nation‟s realms.4  
The cause of “universal liberty” also faced several grave threats in Hispaniola 
itself. Though the defeat of Spain in 1795 represented an apparent triumph for French 
Republican emancipation, Toussaint and other French leaders still had to contend with 
the thousands of British troops who occupied a number of important parts of the island. 
With their domination of the seas, numerous bases in the Caribbean, and strongholds in 
the Dominguan towns of Port-au-Prince, Môle St-Nicholas, Jérémie, and Saint-Marc, the 
redcoats posed a formidable threat to the diverse factions that fought under the tricolor 
flag. French strategists moreover soon came to understand that the spacious and poorly-
                                                 
4 The erosion of “revolution” in France in the latter half of the 1790s was the result of multiple forces. The 
fall of the Jacobins in Paris and the rise to power of first the Directory and then the Consulate (the regime 
that Napoleon instituted in 1799) represented transitions to progressively more conservative regimes that 
sought to reverse what they viewed as the excesses of the “Terror” (1793-1794). Furthermore, according to 
the standard narrative, the so-called “planter lobby” composed of powerful onetime plantation owners and 
sympathetic politicians steadily gained influence in French metropolitan politics during these years. In 
denouncing what they considered to be the excesses of “emancipation,” members of this lobby pointed to 
continuing violence in the colonies as evidence of the alleged inability of ex-slaves to become responsible 
citizens. According to Laurent Dubois, some of the arguments of pre-revolutionary emancipationist 
thinkers and Republican overseers of emancipation in the colonies also helped to pave the way for a return 
to slavery. These arguments included placing plantation and military labor at the heart of citizenship and 
asserting that strict control of labor and mobility was the only viable means of ensuring that the colonies 
would remain lucrative economic enterprises for France. See Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: 
Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004), chapter 14 (esp. 347-353). For an interpretation that downplays the role of the 
“planter lobby” in pushing Napoleon to abandon emancipation and deploy his 1801 expedition to Saint-
Domingue, see Philippe Girard, “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Domingue, 
1799-1803,” French Historical Studies 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 587-618.  
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defended eastern part of the island offered their bitter foe a potential staging ground for 
attacks on Saint-Domingue.  
The confusion surrounding Santo Domingo‟s political status exacerbated these 
problems. Notwithstanding the Treaty of Basel‟s stipulation that “the King of 
Spain...cedes and abandons in all property to the French Republic the entire Spanish part 
of the isle of Saint Domingue, in the Antilles,” much of the old Spanish colonial 
administration including Governor Joaquín García stayed on, struggling for power with 
the few French officials who claimed authority in Santo Domingo.
5
 This situation kept 
Santo Domingo in a political limbo in which its residents could not be certain who their 
true rulers were. It also made the colony susceptible to foreign invasion. As the Spanish 
Ambassador del Campo noted in a 1797 letter to the French Minister of Foreign 
Relations, the “extraordinary and unexpected delay” of Santo Domingo‟s transfer to 
France had rendered it vulnerable to British designs.
6
 
The vagaries of European geopolitics further complicated the political and 
military situation on the island. In 1796, Spain‟s rulers opted to ally with France, thus 
dissolving the tenuous peace that the Iberian power had briefly enjoyed with Britain. Yet 
unlike in 1793, this geopolitical change did not translate into a new war on the island, 
where Spanish authorities and those Dominicans who did not emigrate after 1795 
coexisted with numerous factions including French royalists, the British military forces, 
and assorted French Republican politico-military units. Among the latter, the two most 
                                                 
5 Treaty of Bâle (Basel), 4 Thermidor an 3 (22 July 1795), CARAN AF/III/61. In the original text: “En 
échange de la restitution portée par l‟article IV le Roi d‟Espagne, pour lui et ses successeurs, cède et 
abandonne en toute propriété à la République française toute la partie Espagnole de l‟isle de Saint 
Domingue, aux Antilles.” 
6 Spanish Ambassador del Campo to French Minister of Foreign Relations, 23 May 1797, CARAN 
AF/III/62. In the original text: “...le délai extraordinaire et inattendu de la Reddition de la partie 
Espagnole avait favorisé à l‟infini les intrigues et les progrès du parti anglais.” Emphasis in original.  
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important were the semi-autonomous domain in the southern province of Saint-
Domingue under the general André Rigaud and that led by Toussaint Louverture, who 
during the Franco-Spanish war of 1793-1795 had established a stronghold in the western 
Dominguan provincial town of Gonaïves. Although Paris had delegated the Civil 
Commission that included Philippe-Rose Roume and Julien Raimond as its designated 
authority in Saint-Domingue following this war, most of the real power lay in the hands 
of Toussaint and Rigaud.  
Toussaint‟s military and political success against the British proved integral in his 
rise. Upon the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish war, Toussaint was merely one among 
many competing Republican military leaders; three years later, he personally negotiated 
the departure of British forces from the island. In the intervening period, his military 
victories against this enemy earned him many accolades, of which the most notable was 
his promotion by the Civil Commissioner Léger-Félicité Sonthonax to the post of 
commander-in-chief of all French military forces in Saint-Domingue following a major 
victory over the redcoats in Mirebalais in 1797.
7
 Moreover, Toussaint‟s numerous 
conquests in Santo Domingo during these years helped to cement his authority and that of 
the embattled Republic on the island.    
The 1795 cession of the partie espagnole presented the Republic with both a 
potentially lucrative new possession and unforeseen dangers.
8
 France‟s acquisition of this 
sizeable new territory had formally eliminated a longstanding rival from the island and 
(at least on paper) had delivered to the Republic numerous settlements whose strategic 
                                                 
7 See Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 196. 
8 Partie espagnole refers to the “Spanish part” of the island. This term appears repeatedly in the primary 
source record. 
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and economic importance dated back to the seemingly intractable Franco-Spanish 
conflicts of the eighteenth century. The threat of formidable British encampments 
scattered throughout Saint-Domingue and the presence of many Dominguan settlers in 
Santo Domingo doubtless increased the perceived stakes involved in securing control of 
Santo Domingo, especially since many of these migrants were probably traders who had 
long engaged in prosperous commerce in cattle along the old borderland (particularly in 
the central area near Mirebalais). Further north, vulnerable Dominican towns abutted the 
coveted sugar zones of Saint-Domingue‟s economic heartland.  
Competition for these resources became exacerbated by conflicts over the legal 
condition of those claimed as slaves in Santo Domingo. Several French officials accused 
both the British and the Spanish of exploiting the tumult to illegally enslave hundreds of 
French citizens; their protection constituted an ancillary motive for French incursions into 
Santo Domingo during these years.  
While the British retention of slavery in their zones of occupation on the island 
prevented many of those who ought to have been free by virtue of the 1794 emancipation 
edict from attaining their freedom, the choices available to the approximately seventy 
thousand slaves who lived under British occupation in Saint-Domingue were in some 
respects not so different than those that Dominguan freed people faced.
9
 Those cheated of 
their freedom by the British military occupation for instance could (if male and able-
bodied) take advantage of the same avenue to liberty that had proven instrumental in 
                                                 
9 This figure is from David Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint 
Domingue 1793-1798 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 291. It is Geggus‟s estimate of this 
population just prior to the spring of 1797. Geggus has also argued that slavers imported over 2,500 slaves 
into the areas of British occupation in Saint-Domingue from 1793 to 1798. David Geggus, “The French 
Slave Trade: An Overview,” William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 1 (January 2001), 125. 
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enabling the decrees of general emancipation: military service.
10
 Dependent upon local 
soldiers to fight their battles, the British continued the practice of arming slaves, offering 
eventual liberty and meager provisions in exchange for risking one‟s life for a foreign 
occupier.
11
 Several thousand enslaved men accepted this grim trade-off, gambling on 
gaining their freedom through the wielding of arms rather than as a result of an uncertain 
military triumph of a French Republic that might in any event end up scrapping general 
emancipation. According to Geggus, the Dominguan “black corps” serving the British 
numbered 6,700 men as of late 1796, of whom around five thousand were slaves.
12
  
Toussaint‟s campaigns against the British in Santo Domingo centered on the 
localities of Bánica, Las Caobas (or Lascahobas), San Juan de la Maguana, and Neyba in 
the center-west and southwest of Santo Domingo. This terrain constituted a choke point 
that connected northern Saint-Domingue‟s once-rich sugar zones with the crucial post of 
Mirebalais and the fertile Dominican interior. The British occupied these vital towns in 
successive military advances from late 1796 to the middle of 1797.
13
 By this latter date, 
                                                 
10 Laurent Dubois has highlighted the continuities between colonial militia and military service (especially 
on the part of free men of color) and military policies that developed in the emancipation period. See 
Laurent Dubois, “Citizen Soldiers: Emancipation and Military Service in the Revolutionary French 
Caribbean,” in Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age, ed. Christopher Leslie Brown and 
Philip D. Morgan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 233-254. 
11 In a 7 August 1794 proclamation, the British commander Thomas Brisbane promised “[i]ndulgence and 
pardon” to “those of the insurgent slaves who will at the [illegible] which I shall give them, render 
themselves up to their Masters and recommence their labours.” This offer also included monetary 
recompense to enslaved former enemy combatants who surrendered arms and munitions. Brisbane also 
declared that he “will admit a certain number of [these former enemy soldiers] who shall present 
themselves into an armed corps which I am raising and which will be entirely composed of faithful slaves” 
who were to receive wages and who would “obtain their liberty by [their] service.” “Proclamation of 
Thomas Brisbane commanding for his Majesty...at St Marc, L‟Arcahaye, and their dependencies,” 7 
August 1794, Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, France, Collection 
Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 199. 
12 David Geggus, “The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution,” in Brown and Morgan, Arming Slaves, 
225-226. Geggus estimated that approximately six thousand former slaves served in this “black corps” on 
the eve of the British evacuation from the island in July 1798. Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, 315. 
13 See the long report on military events in these areas which is preserved as: “Procès-Verbal on the Open 
Campaign [on] 13 Pluviôse Year 6 [1 February 1798] Against the Enemies of the French Republic by the 
Army of St Domingue,” 1 February 1798, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/19. Mirebalais in particular held vital 
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John Simcoe, the British Governor appointed to the island, commanded around 14,800 
men who opposed Toussaint‟s armies of fifteen to twenty thousand.14  
For the British, this disadvantage in manpower became compounded by an even 
greater weakness: continued reliance upon slavery. By choosing to maintain slavery 
while relying on the military service of bondsmen, the British in many senses had the 
worst of both worlds. Their refusal to proclaim general abolition translated into an 
inability to claim the moral and political legitimacy that emancipationist France utilized 
so effectively in its military campaigns in Hispaniola and elsewhere. At the same time, 
the use of slave soldiers undermined the slave society that the British were trying to 
preserve, weakening plantation discipline and providing guns and training to men who 
would in many cases end up among Toussaint‟s forces.15 
Following in the footsteps of Sonthonax and Polverel, Toussaint took full 
advantage of the British refusal to relinquish dependence on slave labor. On an island 
where rivals constantly hurled accusations at each other of secretly harboring wishes to 
restore slavery, the politically-savvy Toussaint recognized the potency of such claims 
against an adversary whom he could credibly accuse of employing forced servitude. In 
one detailed recounting of his military exploits dated 9 April 1797, Toussaint proclaimed 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategic and economic importance due to its fertile land and its position as a gateway to the lucrative cattle 
trade with Santo Domingo. Madison Smartt Bell, Toussaint Louverture: A Biography (New York: Vintage, 
2007), 143. 
14 David Geggus concludes that Toussaint had twenty thousand men serving under him around early 1797. 
Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, 221. In a 5 May 1797 letter to the “Captain General of the Province 
of Venezuela,” Agent Roume asserted that Toussaint led a force of fifteen to eighteen thousand “Africans” 
who were “as disciplined and subordinated as the best European troops.” Roume to “Captain General of the 
Province of Venezuela,” 16 Floréal an 5 (5 May 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/20. In the original text: 
“Le Général Toussaint Louverture, à la tête d‟une armée de 15 à 18 mille affricains, aussi bien disciplinés 
et subordonnés que les meilleures troupes Européennes...” 
15 According to Geggus, by March 1798 numerous soldiers from the British black corps had deserted to the 
French side. For instance, in the Arcahaye plain more than three hundred enslaved troops left the British to 
join Toussaint‟s ranks. Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, 375-376. See also Laurent Dubois, Avengers 
of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 215-217. 
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that ousting the British occupiers in Mirebalais would liberate “thousands of 
unfortunates,” whose suffering just happened to occur in a zone that was the “key” that 
linked Saint-Domingue‟s three provinces and the “former Spanish part” to each other.16 
Other highly-placed Republican officials echoed Toussaint‟s concerns. In a 28 June 1796 
letter to Sonthonax, General Donatien Rochambeau (who briefly served as the 
“Commandant in Chief of the Spanish part of Saint-Domingue”) accused the British of 
retaining slavery in Puerto Plata and Samaná (in Santo Domingo‟s north), where they had 
established footholds. According to Rochambeau, the British “have sent Emissaries into 
the interior of the country [Santo Domingo] to permit on their part the maintenance of the 
Catholic religion, [and] the conservation of Slavery and of properties, if [the colony‟s] 
inhabitants wanted to rally to the Side of Great Britain.” In Rochambeau‟s estimation, 
this siren song would prove all the more seductive to these areas‟ inhabitants due to the 
pervasive “prejudices that the Spanish always have about the difference of Colors.”17  
For many inhabitants of Santo Domingo, the British offered two attractions that 
the French Republicans did not: the maintenance of slavery and a coherent royalist 
political order. Many Dominicans thus found common cause with the British despite the 
antagonism between the two European metropoles after 1796 and the exhortations that 
                                                 
16 “Procès-Verbal of the Expedition of the Division General Toussaint Louverture, in Mirebalais and its 
Dependence,” 20 Germinal an 5 (9 April 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. In the original text: “Le 
Mirabalais, par sa situation, peut-être regardé comme la clef qui conduit dans l‟intérieur de Saint-
Domingue, soit dans les parties de l‟Ouest et du Sud, soit dans celle du Nord, et dans la partie ci-devant 
espagnole. Les anglais, possesseurs de cette paroisse, en connaissaient l‟importance, et n‟avaient rien 
négligé pour fortifier de toute part cette dépendance, qui leur était si précieuse...La commission du 
gouvernement, jalouse de conserver à la France cette Colonie, et de rendre à la liberté des milliers de 
malheureux, m‟avait manifesté son désir d‟attaquer le Mirebalais, dont la possession nous procurerait 
infailliblement celle de l‟Escahobe et de Banique, et intercepterait la communication de l‟ennemi avec les 
quartiers de Vallière et de la Grande Rivière, alors en révolte.”  
17 Rochambeau to Sonthonax, 10 Messidor an 4 (28 June 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. In the 
original text: “...ils ont envoyé des Emissaires dans l‟intérieur du pays pour promettre de leur part le 
maintien du culte catholique, la conservation de l‟Esclavage et des propriétés, si les habitants voulaient se 
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Toussaint and other French leaders directed at them to pledge their loyalty to France. As 
the news of Santo Domingo‟s cession became known on the island in late 1795, many 
Dominicans sided with Britain against France, welcoming British ships into their ports, 
making secret agreements with the British that involved pledging allegiance in exchange 
for protection, and enlisting in the military forces of France‟s main remaining foreign 
adversary on the island.
18
 In a 31 July 1796 letter to the Spanish commander in Bánica, 
Toussaint claimed that a “great number” (grand nombre) of Las Caobas residents had 
defected to the British side.
19
 Three days earlier, Toussaint had argued that French forces‟ 
assumption of control over Santo Domingo was necessary in order to thwart both English 
and Spanish designs on the entire island.
20
  
“Almost all of the inhabitants abandoned the country [Santo Domingo], which at 
the time of my departure only offered the tableau of Misery,” lamented the French 
General François Kerverseau in an 1801 report on Santo Domingo.
21
 Those who did not 
emigrate occupied an ambiguous position between the French and British belligerents. 
While persistent suspicions that many Dominicans harbored pro-slavery inclinations and 
were conspiring with France‟s enemies against general emancipation undermined 
relations between them and French authorities, these espagnols (“Spaniards”), as they 
                                                                                                                                                 
rallier sous les Bannières de la grande Bretagne...Vous m‟avez encore paru instruit des préjugés que les 
Espagnols ont toujours sur la différence des Couleurs.” 
18 Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, 183. 
19 Toussaint to the “Commandant for the King of Spain in Banique [Bánica],” 13 Thermidor an 4 (31 July 
1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/12. 
20 Toussaint to [name illegible], 28 July 1796, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/12. In an 11 April 1797 
proclamation to the residents of Bánica, Las Caobas, San Juan and Neyba, Toussaint depicted the English 
as the “common enemies” (nos ennemis communs) of the Spanish and the French. “Proclamation of the 
Division General Toussaint Louverture…” 22 Germinal an 5 (11 April 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/12. 
21 “Report on the Spanish Part of St Domingue from its Cession to the [French] Republic, by the Treaty of 
Basel, to its Invasion by Toussaint Louverture,” submitted by Kerverseau to the Minister of the Navy and 
Colonies, 13 Fructidor an 9 (31 August 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/23. In the original text: “La 
presque totalité des habitants abandonna le pays, qui à l‟époque de mon départ n‟offrait encore que le 
tableau de la Misère...”  
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were typically called in extant records, in fact served on all sides during these border 
skirmishes in the latter half of the 1790s.  In an account of recent military events written 
for Toussaint on 16 October 1798, his trusted general Moïse commented on the mixed 
benefit that armed “Spanish” recruits brought to the French. While acknowledging the 
military asset that a “large Spanish Cavalry” that was “assimilated” to French forces in 
the northern border area represented for the Republic, Moïse warned that many members 
of this cavalry might retain their loyalty to Spain, the “Sworn Enemy nation of the 
Liberty of the Blacks.”22  
Moïse‟s ambivalence towards Dominicans may have also stemmed in part from 
incidents such as the surrender of Bánica to the British in August 1796. In a 17 
September 1796 statement before Agent Philippe-Rose Roume, a French-born settler 
named Pierre-Claude Clément, who had lived in the parish of Bánica for eighteen years, 
provided a vivid description of Bánica‟s surrender to the British by its former Governor 
Domingo Figueré around early August 1796. Though most of Bánica‟s residents 
including Figueré swore an oath of loyalty to the British in a local church, Clément 
refused to do so, which led Figueré to issue an order for his capture “dead or alive” (mort 
ou vif). These Bánica residents‟ “fear of black troops” (more specifically, “black 
republican troops”) represented in Clément‟s reading of the situation a significant 
motivator that drove them into the arms of the British. “If White Republicans came to 
take possession [of Santo Domingo], then we would be able to count on the fidelity of the 
majority of [Santo Domingo‟s] inhabitants,” Clément related through Roume, “but if 
                                                 
22 Moïse to Toussaint, “Report on the Unfortunate Events [that have] Taken Place in Fort-Liberté on the 
23rd, 24th and 25th of Vendémiaire, Year 7 of the French Republic [14, 15, and 16 October 1798],” 14-16 
October 1798, CARAN AF/III/210. In the original text: “...une nombreuse Cavalerie Espagnole (nation 
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blacks come, and above all only blacks,” then the Republic‟s support among Dominicans 
would quickly evaporate.
23
 
Despite such assertions, Dominican officials appear to have made overtures to 
their French counterparts when it suited their interests. On 20 July 1797, the 
Commissioners Raimond and Sonthonax related that Governor García had requested in a 
4 July 1797 letter that they deploy a number of troops to the northern Dominican towns 
of Montechristi and Laxavon (Dajabón) and that they make arrangements to soon take 
possession of these places. According to the commissioners, García was motivated by the 
wish “to oppose an invasion by the English” on the island. In response to this entreaty, 
these French officials sent an officer named Grandet to assume control over these areas. 
In addition to replacing Spanish troops with French ones in accordance with the Treaty of 
Basel, Grandet had orders to oversee an administrative and judicial transformation of 
these posts. This entailed the replacement of Spanish “public functionaries” with French 
administrators, with all official correspondence to be henceforth written in French. 
Nonetheless, “Spanish civil laws” were to remain in force in these areas unless they 
contradicted the French constitution of 1795.
24
 In this moment, the blend of Spanish and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ennemi Jurée de la Liberté des Noirs) aux ordres de Grandet, assimilés aux Troupes de la Garnison et à la 
Garde nationale...” Emphasis in original.  
23 Statement of Roume, 1 jour complémentaire an 4 (17 September 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/12. In 
the original text: “Déclare de plus le Comparant, que lorsque les Républicains virent prendre possession de 
Banica, les habitants eurent peur des troupes noires et s‟enfuirent...Ajoute que la répugnance des habitants 
de cette partie de l‟Isle ci-devant Espagnole, est pour les troupes noires Républicaines est 
presqu‟invincible en ce moment, que s‟il venait des Blancs Républicaines en prendre possession, on 
pourrait compter sur la fidélité de la plus grande partie des habitants, mais que s‟il vient des noirs, et sur 
tout rien que des noirs, les anglais ennemis eternels des Républicains et quelques [illegible], car il s‟en 
trouve d‟ainsi disposés, tourneront au détriment de la République, cette crainte mal fondée qui ne peut 
cependant être dissipée que par une épreuve favorable.” 
24 Commissioners‟ order on Montechristi and Dajabón, 2 Thermidor an 5 (20 July 1797), ANOM CMSM 
F3 201. In the original text: “La commission, considérant que les motifs exprimés dans la lettre du 
président, sont de réunir les troupes employées dans ces deux places à celles qui sont déjà sous ses ordres, 
dans le dessein de s‟opposer à une invasion de la part des anglais dans le Sud-Est de l‟ile, lui font un 
devoir de laisser lesdites troupes à la disposition du président, et de faire occuper par des troupes 
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French authority in Santo Domingo intersected with the imperial war being waged for 
control of Hispaniola.  
As this war progressed, both the British and the French invested a significant 
amount of manpower in Santo Domingo. In January 1798, Toussaint deployed a force of 
eleven thousand men serving under Moïse with orders to march from Fort-Liberté in 
Saint-Domingue‟s north to Las Caobas, where they were to subdue a unit of English and 
Spanish soldiers that included a number of “black troops” in the service of the English.25 
Moïse captured Las Caobas on 6 February 1798.
26
 This triumph helped to break the back 
of the British occupation by closing off a vital interior transit route. Moreover, 
Toussaint‟s incorporation of Hincha and Las Caobas into the French Republican sphere 
altered the island‟s political geography by bringing these areas under French/Haitian 
governance.
27
  
Despite the British deployment of twenty thousand men to Saint-Domingue in the 
five years to 1798, the tide of war had begun to turn decisively against the redcoats by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
françaises les postes évacués par les espagnoles...Aussitôt après la publication de la constitution et sa 
transcription sur les  registres des corps administratifs, tous les fonctionnaires publics desdites communes, 
nommés par le roi d‟Espagne ou ses agens, et même par les assemblées du peuple, cesseront leurs 
fonctions...Provisoirement et jusqu‟à ce que par le corps législatif il en soit autrement ordonné, les lois 
civiles espagnoles continueront à être suivies dans les arrondissemens des communes de Monte-Christ et 
de Laxavon, en tout ce qui ne contrariera pas la constitution française.” In a 24 May 1797 proclamation to 
the residents of Las Caobas, Neyba, Bánica and San Juan de la Maguana, Toussaint ordered the same type 
of reorganization in these areas that he had recently taken from the British. Proclamation of Toussaint, 24 
May 1797, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. 
25 “Attack Plan for the Brigade Generals Moyse and Dessalines,” 9 Pluviôse an 6 (28 January 1798), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/19. In the original text: “Le Général de brigade Moyse partira du Fort Liberté 
avec le 5e régiment, et autres trouppes sous ses ordres qui doivent former onze cent hommes pour se rendre 
à Lescaôbe, où sont plusieurs camps d‟anglais et d‟espagnols et trouppes noires qu‟ils ont seduittes et 
gardés sous leurs ordres.” Emphasis in original.  
26 Report submitted to Toussaint on the military situation in Mirebalais and environs, Germinal an 6 (21 
March-19 April 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/19. 
27 Cartographic evidence suggests that Hincha was an important border area. One map of the island from 
the 1770s placed Hincha within a zone that was in dispute between France and Spain. ANOM Atlas 
Moreau de St-Méry F3 296, no. A5. Another map from Year 11 (September 1802-September 1803) 
included Hincha as part of the “Isle of Saint-Domingue” without a demarcation of the old colonial border. 
ANOM Atlas Moreau de St-Méry F3 289, no. 42.  
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conclusion of the battle in Las Caobas.
28
 This culminated in the negotiated capitulation 
and evacuation of all British forces from the island by the end of 1798. The combination 
of military setbacks, defections to French ranks, disease, and pressing matters elsewhere 
conspired to convince many British leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that Hispaniola 
represented a vast monetary sinkhole whose costs far outstripped the meager benefits that 
Britain had derived from its five-year military presence on the island. Casualties suffered 
by the British in their wars against the French on other Caribbean islands such as 
Martinique and St Vincent bolstered the argument for British military disengagement in 
this region. Indeed, even the most ardent defender of an aggressive British expansionist 
policy in the Caribbean would have found it difficult to defend an enterprise that cost the 
lives of sixty thousand British troops in the region in the 1790s.
29
 Shortly after General 
Thomas Maitland assumed command of British forces in Hispaniola in March 1798, 
discussions between representatives of the two powers commenced on the terms of a 
British withdrawal.  
Developments in both parts of the island accelerated this process. In the month of 
Maitland‟s arrival, Toussaint penetrated a set of British forts that had kept the French out 
of Arcahaye on Saint-Domingue‟s west coast, which severely weakened Britain‟s 
position in the area. He achieved similar successes in Santo Domingo. In a 4 March 1798 
letter to Roume, Toussaint claimed to have retaken Neyba, San Juan and other parts of 
Santo Domingo, condemning in the strongest terms those who had betrayed the French 
Republic by serving the “Freedom-killing project” (projet Liberticide) of the British. 
                                                 
28 This figure is based on the estimates given by Geggus in Slavery, War and Revolution, Appendix F (pp 
403-404).  
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According to Toussaint, these conquests (especially that of Las Caobas) had helped to 
secure Mirebalais for the Republicans and to draw together disparate parts of the island 
under his rule.
30
  
Despite such ominous implied threats of retaliation, the extrication of remaining 
British troops from the island was achieved mostly without further bloodshed. In the 
spring and summer of 1798, Toussaint and Maitland agreed upon terms for the surrender 
of Britain‟s three remaining significant posts in Hispaniola: Port-au-Prince in the west, 
Jérémie in the south, and Môle Saint-Nicolas in the north. In both its results and in the 
means by which it was achieved, this great power‟s exit from the island reflected and 
augmented Toussaint‟s power. The departure of Toussaint‟s last remaining foreign 
nemesis was accomplished without the consultation, much less the approval, of the 
indignant General Hédouville, who theoretically outranked Toussaint. Britain‟s defeat 
signaled Toussaint‟s emergence as an independent statesman and led to a new and 
particularly brutal military phase of the revolution. The war with the British also helped 
to establish an enduring Haitian power base in Santo Domingo whose legacies still 
resonate on the island today.
31
  
 
Santo Domingo and the War of the South 
 
“It is painful for us, after having, by our sensible, laborious and reasonable 
conduct, served the general good, to see ourselves faced with slander, oppression, and as 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 This figure is from Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 224. The figure encompasses British military 
engagements not only in Saint-Domingue but also in Martinique, Guadeloupe, St Lucia, St Vincent, and 
Grenada in the 1790s. 
30 Toussaint to Roume, 14 Ventôse an 6 (4 March 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/18. 
31 For details on the negotiations that transpired between Toussaint and Maitland, see Bell, Toussaint 
Louverture, 157-160; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 215-219. 
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the prey of our old despots.” Fresh from his triumph over the British, Toussaint in this 
address to “all good Frenchmen” (tous les bons Français) of Saint-Domingue expressed 
his unwillingness to rest on his laurels, lest his many enemies succeed in killing or 
deposing him. Years of war and political intrigue had made Toussaint profoundly 
suspicious of those around him, as evidenced in his assertion in this address that a 
number of would-be assassins were preparing to first dispatch him and then “pass as 
saviors of the Colony.”32 Though this discourse served a distinct political purpose, 
Toussaint‟s anxieties were not entirely unfounded. Following the expulsion of the British, 
his onetime ally Rigaud would become his most formidable foe. In their war of attrition, 
both men would claim the mantle of “savior of the Colony,” yet the conflict would leave 
a bitterly divisive legacy for the Haitian nation.  
Hardened by several years of combat against external enemies, the French 
Republican armies in Saint-Domingue turned on each other after the departure of the 
British, coalescing into two principal factions led by Toussaint and Rigaud. As the noted 
Trinidadian scholar C.L.R. James might have observed, internecine warfare among 
victorious liberation forces following the common enemy‟s defeat would later become a 
recognized pattern (indeed, almost a trope) in twentieth-century Third World 
decolonization. As with so many other matters, the Haitian Revolution provided an 
important early example of this phenomenon. Both of these belligerent groups professed 
                                                 
32 Toussaint Louverture, “Continuation of the address of the general in chief, TOUSSAINT 
LOUVERTURE, to all good Frenchmen, to true and sincere friends of liberty, to all its defenders,” in 4 
January 1799 edition of Le Citoyen Véridique: Gazette du Port-Républicain, ANOM CMSM F3 202. In the 
original text: “Mes assassins alors devoient passer pour les sauveurs de la Colonie...Qu‟il est douloureux 
pour nous, après avoir, par notre conduite sage, laborieuse et modérée, fait le bien général, de nous voir 
en butte à la calomnie, à l‟oppression, et en proie à la tyrannie de nos anciens dominateurs.” 
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loyalty to the French Republic and its ideals, trading accusations of treason and of 
concocting malicious plots to re-establish the despised institution of slavery on the island.  
Though the battle against the British had forced Toussaint, Rigaud and the 
Ministry of the Navy into a fragile coexistence, this alliance broke down soon after the 
last British troops left the island. Any hopes of a lasting peace after years of carnage were 
soon thwarted by a confluence of circumstances. These included the bitter rivalry that 
emerged between two ambitious leaders as well as deep-seated animosities between 
Toussaint‟s predominantly nouveau libre following (based primarily in Saint-
Domingue‟s North and West) and the partisans of Rigaud, who had established a 
stronghold in the colony‟s southern province earlier in the 1790s; many officers and 
plantation owners under Rigaud were anciens libres.
33
 Christened by scholars the “War 
of the South,” this conflict involved the commission of atrocities by both sides 
throughout Saint-Domingue and culminated in Rigaud‟s defeat and exile from the island 
in the summer of 1800. While the scholarly literature has usually focused on this 
conflict‟s complex racial and political dynamics as well as the sheer devastation inflicted 
by Toussaint‟s forces (most notably those under the command of his general Jean-
Jacques Dessalines) in the southern province and in Jacmel in particular, this war also 
intersected with the question of Santo Domingo‟s status and Toussaint‟s longstanding 
designs on that colony.  
                                                 
33 The term anciens libres (“formerly free”) generally referred to people of color who had either been born 
free or had acquired their liberty before the revolution, while the term nouveaux libres (“newly free”) 
indicated those who had gained their freedom in the 1793-1794 general emancipations. The most concise 
overview of the political legacies of these divisions for independent Haiti is Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, 
State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990). 
In his treatment of the War of the South, however, Laurent Dubois cautions against interpreting this war as 
simply a conflict between these two groups, as many “[formerly] free-coloreds and whites” fought under 
Louverture, while a number of “ex-slave leaders” were loyal to Rigaud. Dubois, Avengers of the New 
World, 232. 
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Due in part to Saint-Domingue‟s economic importance, many outside parties had 
a stake in the outcome of the “War of the South.” While the North Americans and the 
British lent their support to Toussaint, Spanish authorities and other elite Dominicans 
generally favored his rival. This perhaps owed in part to the aversion that many of them 
had towards Toussaint and to their possible affinities for Rigaud‟s plantation society in 
the south. At the center of these intrigues was Roume‟s chosen agent in Santo Domingo, 
Antoine Chanlatte, who worked both diplomatically and militarily to undermine 
Toussaint. According to an anonymous letter to the Minister of the Navy dated 13 August 
1800, Chanlatte collaborated with Spanish officials in Santo Domingo to send a deputy to 
Paris to discuss the issue of sovereignty over the colony. At the same time, Chanlatte lent 
his support to Rigaud, whose five thousand men could not withstand the onslaught of 
Toussaint‟s ten thousand, though a protracted siege of Rigaud‟s main stronghold of 
Jacmel was necessary to subdue him.
34
 According to Pierre Pluchon, the Spanish in Santo 
Domingo “openly” supported Rigaud over Toussaint, which became apparent in an angry 
August 1800 letter to Roume in which Toussaint accused the Spanish of offering aid in 
men, munitions and arms to his enemy.
35
 
Both the Spanish authorities in Santo Domingo and Rigaud wished to preserve 
their power, while Toussaint felt that the realization of his political ambitions 
necessitated dispatching both. This led to a degree of cooperation between these 
adversaries of Toussaint. This collaboration nonetheless had its limits, as Governor 
                                                 
34 Report to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 25 Thermidor an 8 (13 August 1800), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/18. 
35 Pierre Pluchon, Toussaint Louverture: Un révolutionnaire noir d‟ancien régime (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 
290-291. In a 26 April 1800 report, the military strategist Charles Vincent insisted that the “surest means” 
(Le plus sûr moyen) to end the fratricidal conflict would be the swift deployment of a force of twelve to 
fifteen hundred men on three warships to Jacmel through Santo Domingo city, which was the only port 
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García and other Spanish authorities were astute enough to recognize the imbalance of 
power between the forces of their favorite Rigaud and those of Toussaint. According to a 
19 October 1800 report, if the defeated Rigaud had fled to Santo Domingo, then he would 
have received a cold reception by García due to the latter‟s fear of retribution at the hands 
of Toussaint.
36
 This did not prevent Rigaud from soliciting munitions and other 
assistance from Spanish officials in nearby Cuba, an effort that he hoped would be 
facilitated by these officials‟ anxieties concerning the revolution in Hispaniola. In a 30 
June 1800 request for military aid addressed to Havana‟s Captain General, the Marquis 
de Someruelos, Rigaud waxed melodramatic, insisting that Toussaint was determined to 
not only remove Saint-Domingue from the French orbit but also (with British aid) to 
bring about the loss of all of Spain‟s New World colonies.37  
The Haitian Revolution lent itself to hyperbole, and Rigaud appears to have 
known how to manipulate the fears of white Spanish administrators. Nevertheless, 
Toussaint did lead a formidable military force—perhaps the strongest one in the 
Caribbean at that time. Though he had entered into a secret accord with General Maitland 
in 1798 to desist from supporting any seditious movements in Jamaica, Toussaint‟s 
massive army could threaten neighboring governments—as García was to discover in 
early 1801. Moreover, though he conducted his diplomacy as if he ran an independent 
state, Toussaint was acutely aware of his vulnerability to and dependence on the great 
powers that quite literally surrounded him. Toussaint‟s lucrative commerce with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
suitable for provisioning these men and preparing them for battle. Vincent, “Considerations on the Means 
of Ending the Civil War in St-Domingue,” 6 Floréal an 8 (26 April 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/17. 
36 Anonymous report on military events in Hispaniola, 27 Vendémiaire an 9 (19 October 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/28. 
37 Rigaud to Someruelos, 11 Messidor an 8 (30 June 1800), Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI), 
Seville, Spain, Papeles de Cuba (hereinafter Cuba) 1709.  
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United States for instance was integral to his ability to arm and outfit his thousands of 
troops. According to historian Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos, in September 1800 
Toussaint received in Le Cap twenty thousand rifles, ten thousand pairs of pistols, five 
hundred chairs, and sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder via trade with the US. As they 
nervously observed these exchanges, Santo Domingo‟s leaders presciently feared that 
Toussaint might use these weapons against them.
38
 They had reason to be concerned, as 
Toussaint keenly understood the military foundations of his power and the necessity of 
channeling the martial energies of thousands of slaves-turned-citizens. “The Blacks of 
Saint-Domingue took up arms to obtain their rights of man and liberty,” declared 
Toussaint in a 15 April 1799 letter to a French metropolitan legislator named Rallier. 
“They imitated the French people, the Whites, men of color and free Blacks of this 
colony. It was without doubt a holy insurrection.”39 Toussaint aimed to harness the power 
of this “holy insurrection” for his own ends while at the same time placating other 
powerful rulers who feared a repeat of the uprising in Hispaniola among their own 
enslaved populations.   
Reconciling these sharply opposing interests proved a daunting task even for a 
diplomat and politician as adept as Toussaint, who recognized that Saint-Domingue and 
Santo Domingo were both part of an interconnected series of struggles over political 
sovereignty, the contours of the metropole-colony relationship, and the legitimacy of 
colonialism itself. In a 9 June 1800 report, Chanlatte discussed a fascinating bit of North 
                                                 
38 Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos, Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba: El gobierno del Marqués de Someruelos 
(1799-1812) (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2008), 50. 
39 Toussaint to Rallier, 15 April 1797, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the original text: “Les Noirs de St 
Domingue ont pris les armes pour obtenir leurs droits d‟homme et la liberté. Ils ont imité le peuple 
français, les Blancs, homme de couleur et Nègres libres de cette colonie. C‟était sans doute une sainte 
insurrection.” 
179 
 
American, French, Haitian, and Dominican diplomatic history that illustrates one of the 
ways in which the question of sovereignty over Santo Domingo intersected with these 
geopolitical and diplomatic developments. In 1798, the United States had declared an 
embargo on trade with France in retaliation for repeated attacks by French privateers on 
North American vessels; this was the so-called “Quasi War.” Nonetheless, aware of the 
profits that its traders had long derived from commerce with Saint-Domingue, the United 
States Congress created a special exclusion to this trade interdiction that permitted 
commerce with those parts of the French empire that were judged to have separated 
themselves from direct French control and with which lucrative commercial exchange 
could be conducted. This provision became known as “Toussaint‟s Clause” because it 
chiefly concerned Saint-Domingue.
40
 According to Chanlatte, the US government 
excluded the port of Santo Domingo from Toussaint‟s Clause (thus legally barring its 
citizens from trading there) on the grounds that it had come under French sovereignty per 
the 1795 Treaty of Basel yet had not fallen under Toussaint‟s control.41 Toussaint thus 
benefited from the trade permitted by the relatively sympathetic Adams administration, 
while Dominicans were denied the benefits of legal trade with North Americans. This 
may have served to further weaken Dominican authorities‟ military position by 1801. 
While internal dynamics drove the War of the South, external forces such as trade and 
diplomacy strongly influenced the strength of each belligerent party.
42
  
                                                 
40 For more details on “Toussaint‟s Clause,” see Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 170-171.  
41 Report of General Antoine Chanlatte “to the French government and to all of the Friends of National 
Sovereignty and of order,” 20 Prairial an 8 (9 June 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. 
42 For a discussion of the centrality of diplomacy and foreign policy in the War of the South, see Philippe 
Girard, “Black Talleyrand: Toussaint Louverture‟s Diplomacy, 1798-1802,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 66, no. 1 (January 2009), 102-110. 
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Rigaud‟s defeat made Toussaint the most powerful individual on the entire island. 
“Far from restricting himself to military functions,” Chanlatte lamented in a report dated 
20 June 1800, Toussaint “has extended his authority to all of the branches of social 
organization. It has been a long time since anything has been done outside of his 
influence.”43 On 19 February 1799, General Kerverseau, whom the French metropolitan 
government had appointed to serve as the “Commissioner of the Executive Directory in 
the Former Spanish Part of Saint-Domingue,” composed a frank letter to the Minister of 
the Navy in which he discussed Toussaint‟s growing power.44 By this time, Moïse 
controlled the arrondissements (districts) of Montechristi and Dajabón in the former 
Spanish colony‟s north, and Toussaint‟s ambitions concerning the rest of that colony 
were becoming ever more readily apparent. While Kerverseau dismissed rumors that 
Toussaint was planning an invasion into Santo Domingo as “simple conjecture,” 
Kerverseau vowed to employ all means at his disposal to prevent such an incursion. This 
was in line with his wishes to defer the complete transfer of political and military 
authority there from the Spanish to the French until the “legal taking of Possession” of 
Santo Domingo had transpired.
45
 Such legal niceties stood in marked contrast to the 
                                                 
43 Chanlatte to Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. In the original text: “Loin 
de se tenir dans les bornes des fonctions militaires, il a étendu son autorité sur toutes les branches de 
l‟organisation sociale. Il y a longtemps que rien ne se faisant que par son influence.” 
44 François Kerverseau had several tours of duty in Santo Domingo in the revolutionary period. For an 
overview of Kerverseau‟s career and a transcription of one of his important correspondences regarding 
Toussaint, see Pierre Pluchon, ed., Toussaint Louverture d‟après le général de Kerverseau (Port-au-Prince: 
Éditions le Natal, 1999). Madison Smartt Bell has speculated that Kerverseau‟s antipathy towards 
Toussaint may have resulted partly from jealousy at the high rank that Toussaint held when Kerverseau was 
first sent to Saint-Domingue in 1796. Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 217. 
45 Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 1 Ventôse an 7 (19 February 1799), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/23. In the original text: “À l‟égard du projet que l‟on suppose au Général Toussaint Louverture de 
se mettre en possession de la Partie ci-devant Espagnole, il est probable que ce n‟est qu‟une simple 
conjecture, à laquelle la terreur qu‟il inspire dans les quartiers les plus voisins de la Colonie Française a 
donné quelque consistance...ne doutez pas, Citoyen Ministre, que Je n‟employe tous les moyens qui seront 
en mon pouvoir, pour lui en deffendre l‟entrée, et que Je ne requiere le Gouvernement Espagnol de 
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military situation on the ground. According to a report presented to the “Consuls of the 
Republic” in September or October 1800, Toussaint had possessed nine parishes in Santo 
Domingo as of the previous Germinal (22 March-20 April 1800), and he also had 
imprisoned numerous Dominicans in Port-au-Prince.
46
 
These words of caution and resignation rang true for a succession of French 
administrators (including Sonthonax, Hédouville, and his successor Roume) who 
between 1797 and 1801 found themselves on long, lonely voyages from Saint-Domingue 
back to France, whiling away the days of the passage contemplating how they would 
explain to authorities in Paris their failure to subordinate this ex-slave to the will of this 
global military power. Meanwhile, the multitudes of freed men and women who 
comprised the bulk of Toussaint‟s power base were becoming increasingly apprehensive 
as their once-trusted leader imposed coercive labor regimes that tied them to their old 
plantations and invited back many of the refugee planters who had once held them in 
bondage. This led some of these ex-slaves to engage in periodic armed resistance that 
Toussaint swiftly crushed.
47
  
Toussaint‟s ability to thwart these varied challenges to his authority depended on 
a masterful command of the arts of war and politics; a willingness to employ brute force; 
an indefatigable intensity (Toussaint reportedly slept only a few hours per night); and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
garantir, s‟il le faut, par les armes, des possessions qui demeurent sous sa garde et sa responsabilité 
jusqu‟à la prise légale de Possession.” 
46 Report to “Consuls of the Republic,” Vendémiaire an 9 (23 September-22 October 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. 
47 In a 2 December 1801 letter to the Minister of the Navy, Roume, writing from exile in Philadelphia, 
related that he had predicted an “explosion of discontent” on the part of the “blacks” against the “so-called 
governor Toussaint Louverture.” Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 11 Frimaire an 10 (2 
December 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original French: “La première de mes lettres contient 
un fidèle précis de l‟état des choses à St Domingue au moment de ma déportation: elle annonçait comme 
très prochaine l‟explosion du mécontentement des nègres contre le prétendu gouverneur Toussaint 
Louverture.” In October 1801, Toussaint put down several plantation uprisings in Saint-Domingue‟s north, 
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powerful charisma enhanced by skillful appeals to the ideals of liberty and equal 
citizenship. While Napoleon was storming through parts of Europe and the Middle East 
in a succession of military conquests in the 1790s, Toussaint was gaining prominence 
through his own martial triumphs in Hispaniola. Napoleon‟s ability to translate his 
military victories and professed loyalty to revolutionary ideals into widespread political 
support enabled his coup d‟état of 18 Brumaire year VIII (9 November 1799) which 
overthrew the Directory and replaced it with a regime headed by Napoleon known as the 
Consulate.
48
 Toussaint‟s similar abilities facilitated his assumption of authority over 
France‟s most prized colony around the same time. Aware of their interdependency and 
of the other‟s power, these men maintained a cautious coexistence in the final years of the 
eighteenth century. Nonetheless, a fatal combination of geopolitical shifts and a collision 
of egos unraveled this entente and led Bonaparte to make the catastrophic decision to try 
to oust Toussaint rather than continue their old relationship. Fear of a Napoleonic 
invasion force in turn factored centrally into Toussaint‟s fateful decision to invade the 
capital of the former Spanish part of Hispaniola. In taking each of these actions, both of 
these leaders strove to forcefully transform an unclear political situation into an 
unequivocal imposition of authority. Both episodes in turn proved to be quite costly for 
these men, and both transpired within the larger political context of emancipation‟s 
dismantling in the French world.  
 
Toussaint’s Invasion of Santo Domingo City 
                                                                                                                                                 
which he blamed on Moïse. This led to Toussaint‟s execution of Moïse in November of that year. For 
details on these events, see Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 247-248. 
48 For more information on Napoleon‟s rise and fall, see Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (New 
York: Scribner, 2004). For a reexamination of the political, legal, and social legacies of Napoleon‟s 
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Except perhaps in the most lopsided conflicts, a military intervention is a 
calculated risk. In addition to military and civilian casualties, decision-makers often 
consider the potential economic costs versus gains, the loyalty of the target zone‟s 
population, and the implications of all of these matters for one‟s international political 
standing. As the French would discover in Saint-Domingue/Haiti in the early nineteenth 
century, violent assertions of control over coveted territory can lead to disastrous 
conflagrations. While Napoleon‟s deployment of military force to depose Toussaint in 
late 1801 and early 1802 owed largely to the perceived economic and strategic stakes 
involved, the motivations behind Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo Domingo city a year 
earlier are less immediately apparent. Why did Toussaint divert thousands of his best 
troops to the enterprise of conquering the nerve center of a territory that had long 
languished in poverty and neglect? Why did he add this burden to his already 
overflowing agenda of consolidating his authority over Saint-Domingue, ensuring the 
loyalty of diverse and often antagonistic sectors of the population, rebuilding its 
economy, and navigating the treacherous waters of international diplomacy?  
The answer, quite simply, is that Santo Domingo mattered in all of these areas. 
Toussaint came to view the submission of Santo Domingo as vital to furthering his 
interconnected objectives of increasing plantation production and of ensuring his own 
political survival. Wresting parts of Santo Domingo from the British had given him a 
foothold in this colony; with the dispatching of Rigaud, Toussaint saw the Spanish 
administration in Santo Domingo city as the final obstacle to the realization of his wish to 
unite the entire island under his authority. In invading Santo Domingo city, Toussaint 
                                                                                                                                                 
European conquests, see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford: 
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sought to realize the economic potential of a colony that offered the plantation 
entrepreneur twice as much land as Saint-Domingue; assert his political and military 
authority over the island; augment his army with Dominican recruits;
49
 enhance his 
credibility as a champion of emancipation by stamping out the widespread illegal slaving 
of French citizens that transpired in Santo Domingo; and forestall the anticipated landing 
of a military expedition from mainland France in the former Spanish territory.  
Of these objectives, the final was the most salient. Mounting tensions with 
Napoleon exacerbated Toussaint‟s anxieties concerning a possible French invasion of a 
vast area where several of his prior adversaries had disembarked. In 1796, Moreau de St 
Méry had written that Santo Domingo was “open and defenseless,” exposing neighboring 
Saint-Domingue to “all manner of attacks and abuses.”50 Two years later General 
Hédouville had entered Hispaniola through its eastern part, while in April 1800, a Civil 
Commission with orders from Paris to prevent Toussaint from taking control of Santo 
Domingo arrived in that colony on the frigate L'Africaine.
51
 Both Toussaint and his many 
adversaries thus understood the strategic importance of Santo Domingo and the stakes 
involved in controlling it. Toussaint “wishes to enlist in his army the blacks of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Clarendon Press, 1994), esp. chapter 8. 
49 In a report composed to the Minister of the Navy on the eve of Toussaint‟s conquest of Santo Domingo 
city, one Saint-Domingue official wrote that the attempts of Toussaint and other “black leaders” (chefs 
noirs) to recruit soldiers in Santo Domingo would become frustrated by the fact that the colony contained 
“only three thousand black slaves, including women, the elderly and children.” Saint-Domingue official 
[name illegible] to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 25 Brumaire an 9 (16 November 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “En s‟emparant de la partie espagnole, je sais bien que ces chefs 
comptent y trouver, dans leur Couleur, de quoi augmenter leurs forces et par consequent leurs moyens de 
défense; mais ils ignorent peut-être que cette partie ne renferme que trois mille noirs esclaves, y compris 
les femmes, vieillards et enfans.”  
50 M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle 
Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 2:191. In the original text: “Dans l‟état 
présent des choses, la colonie espagnole, placée au vent de la partie française, étant, en quelque sort, 
ouverte et sans défense, cette dernière se trouve elle-même exposée à toutes les attaques et à toutes les 
insultes.” 
51 Chanlatte to Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. 
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Spanish part and [add] to his coffers the considerable funds that are located there [in 
Santo Domingo],” wrote the anonymous author of a letter to the Minister of the Navy in 
August 1800. “With these forces he believes that he can prevent the French from 
disembarking on the island, and he will stop at nothing to achieve this objective.”52 One 
observer from Baltimore remarked that Toussaint intended to “conquer the Spanish part 
of St Domingue” partly out of determination to “prevent, if he can, the landing of French 
troops, which he presumes should arrive and attack him from that side.”53 
In one telling indication of the primacy of such strategic concerns, the Dominican 
scholar Emilio Cordero Michel, who has written favorably of Toussaint‟s occupation to 
the point of hyperbole, stated that the “real reason” for Toussaint‟s invasion and 
occupation of Santo Domingo in 1801 was his wish to “consolidate his politico-military 
regime.”54 The major secondary works that treat this subject indeed concur that 
Toussaint‟s worries about a possible French invasion strongly motivated his conquest of 
Santo Domingo city. In their histories of the Haitian Revolution, both C. L. R. James and 
Laurent Dubois emphasized the strategic factors impelling Toussaint to take Santo 
Domingo. These included Toussaint‟s desire to consolidate his power and control all of 
                                                 
52 Report to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 25 Thermidor an 8 (13 August 1800), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/18. In the original text: “...il voudrait réunir à son armée les noirs de la partie espagnole et à sa 
bourse les fonds considérables qui s‟y trouvent; avec ces forces il croit pouvoir empecher les français de 
debarquer dans l‟isle, et il ne neglige rien pour parvenir à ce but.” 
53 Anonymous report from Baltimore, 30 September 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: 
“On écrit de Baltimore, que l‟on vient d‟être instruit des préparatifs que fesait Toussaint L‟Ouverture pour 
conquerir la partie Espagnole de St Domingue...en empêchant, s‟il le peut, le débarquement des troupes 
françaises, qu‟il présume bien devoir arriver et l‟attaquer de ce côté là...” 
54 Emilio Cordero Michel, “Toussaint en Saint-Domingue espagnol,” in Saint-Domingue espagnol et la 
révolution nègre d‟Haïti (1790-1822), ed. Alain Yacou (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 252. On p. 255, Cordero 
Michel claimed that Toussaint‟s rule in Santo Domingo created a “democratic fervor” and a “democratic 
period without precedent.” In La Revolución haitiana y Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 
1968), 60-61, Cordero Michel likewise contended that under Toussaint‟s regime “the immense majority of 
the population of Spanish Santo Domingo lived under a democratic climate and a prosperity never known 
in its history.” 
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the island‟s ports in order to thwart the arrival of hostile forces.55 According to Carolyn 
Fick, Toussaint was attuned to the rise of disconcerting reaction in France and the 
imminent possibility of a French invasion of Saint-Domingue, and his actions in Santo 
Domingo amounted to a pre-emptive strike. Toussaint, however, contributed to bringing 
about the very invasion that he had feared, for the capture of Santo Domingo helped 
convince Bonaparte that Toussaint enjoyed too much autonomy and needed to be 
ousted.
56
 Madison Smartt Bell in his biography of Toussaint highlighted the ominous 
political circumstances that appeared to threaten both French Republican emancipation 
and Toussaint‟s political life. These included Napoleon‟s accession to supreme authority 
in France and the promulgation of the 1799 French constitution whose reinstitution of 
“special laws” for the colonies harkened back to slavery and the ancien régime.57  
In articulating his rationale for invading Santo Domingo city, Toussaint also 
pointed to threats to French citizens‟ freedom that had emerged on the island itself. The 
chaos of the Franco-Spanish war had transformed Santo Domingo into a focal point for 
circum-Caribbean human trafficking, and the suppression of such outrages became an 
important concern for Republican leaders including Toussaint. During this war, the 
generals Jean-François and Georges Biassou had sold hundreds if not thousands of other 
human beings into bondage before being unceremoniously relegated to remote corners of 
Spain‟s empire. In a 28 February 1803 letter to Colonial Prefect Hector Daure, a naval 
officer named Vermonnet stated that slavers working under Jean-François had sold 4,742 
slave children (negrillons) through Santo Domingo to assorted Spanish colonies. 
                                                 
55 C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L‟Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. 
(1938; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1963), 237-240; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 236-238.  
56 Fick, The Making of Haiti, 204-206.  
57 Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 186-187. 
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Vermonnet estimated that around one hundred of these captives went to Cuba, two 
hundred to Caracas, two hundred to Campeche (Mexico), three hundred to Trujillo 
(Honduras), and 250 to Grenada.
58
 Toussaint strove to distance himself from his former 
comrades in proclaiming his adamant opposition to the illegal slaving that occurred under 
the noses of Spanish and French officials in the eastern part of the island in the years 
following its formal cession.  
Since emancipation represented the ideological and political linchpin of the 
French Republican presence in the Caribbean after 1794, at stake in the fate of these 
captives was nothing less than the Republic‟s credibility.59 In a 24 January 1796 letter to 
the Minister of the Navy, Roume insisted that the “alleged Slaves of Santo Domingo, 
knowing that they can remain on the island as French citizens, do not wish to permit their 
so-called Owners to transport them with them like vile herds of cattle.”60  
While the scope of such slaving is difficult to determine, the evidence suggests 
that many French citizens in Hispaniola became ensnared by it. On the final day of 1795, 
a resigned Agent Roume informed the Minister of the Navy that a don Joaquín Pueyo, 
who had served as the alcalde (mayor) of the city of Santiago de los Caballeros (northern 
Santo Domingo) for twenty-five years, held such sway among the city‟s population that 
French officials had asked him to intervene to prevent some “men of color” and “free 
blacks” from emigrating to Cuba. In what could be read as a tacit admission of slavery‟s 
continued existence in Santo Domingo, Roume related that Pueyo was “considered as the 
                                                 
58 Vermonnet to Daure, 9 Ventôse an 11 (28 February 1803), Service Historique de l‟Armée de Terre 
(hereinafter SHAT), Vincennes, France, B7 13. 
59 On this slaving, see Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 93; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 237. 
60 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 4 Pluviôse an 4 (24 January 1796), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/20. In the original text: “...les prétendus Esclaves de Sto Domingo, sachant qu‟ils peuvent rester 
dans l‟île en qualité de citoyens français, n‟ont pas voulu permettre que les soi-disant Propriétaires les 
transportent avec eux comme de vils troupeaux.” 
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protector of the free [people] and the slaves of African blood” in Santo Domingo.61 Many 
other captives lacked such a “protector.” In a letter dated 9 July 1796, several French 
captives in Puerto Rico beseeched the “Citizen General of the Island [of] St-Domingue” 
to intercede on their behalf. By their account, more than two thousand “citizens” from 
Martinique and Saint-Domingue had been “sold as slaves” in Puerto Rico.62 “There exists 
in Puerto Rico according to exact information a great number of men of all colors [who 
were] formerly Legally Free,” affirmed General Rochambeau (the above letter‟s 
presumed addressee) in a correspondence to the Directory dated 17 July 1796. Among 
these captives were “those who were part of the First Battalion of Chasseurs of 
Martinique and who had been sold to the English by their loathsome leader who is here 
under your eyes and Resold by them to the Spanish.”63  
Most captives did not possess the power of literacy to aid them in their quests for 
liberation. Those without such tools nonetheless sought other means to escape their 
predicament, such as soliciting the assistance of potentially sympathetic officials. This is 
evident in an April 1797 report that a Spanish royal official named don Bernardino 
Valearze composed for the Directory. In the report, Valearze related that France‟s 
enemies had captured “many French prisoners of war of all colors” from Saint-Domingue 
                                                 
61 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 10 Nivôse an 4 (31 December 1795), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/20. In the original text: “Le second D[on] Joachin Pueyo, est alcalde depuis 25 ans à St Yago de los 
Cavalleros. Il est Riche, c‟est un homme religieux et qui jouit d‟une confiance si entière, que le 
Gouvernement fut obligé de recourir à lui dans un temps où les hommes de Couleur et les Nègres libres de 
cette partie de l‟isle, voulaient aller chercher une existence moins malheureuse à la Havane; le C[itoyen] 
Pueyo parvint à les faire rester; et depuis lors, il est considéré comme le protecteur des libres et des 
esclaves du sang Africain.” 
62 “Prisoners of Puerto Rico” to “Citizen General of the Island [of] St-Domingue,” 21 Messidor an 4 (9 July 
1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. In the original text: “Les Cytoyens de l‟isle de la Martinique et vendu 
en qualité d‟esclave nous sommes plus de deux mille ou de l‟isle de la Martinique et de St Domingue.” 
63 Rochambeau to the “Particular Agents of the Executive Directory,” 29 Messidor an 4 (17 July 1796), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. In the original text: “Il existe à Porto Rico d‟après des renseignements exacts 
un grand nombre d‟hommes de toute couleur anciennement Légalement Libres, ceux qui faisaient partie du 
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and had sent them to Cuba, Caracas, and Puerto Rico, where an “auditor” named François 
Yuguarze separated whites and people of color in order to sell the latter “as Slaves.” 
Estimating the number of French citizens held “in Slavery in these Islands” at more than 
two thousand, Valearze noted that while most “white” prisoners were surrendered to the 
enemy in prisoner exchanges, all of the imprisoned “men of Color” were enslaved. These 
captives “who claim to have not lost their natural Liberty, made a claim to it; but they do 
not have the support of anybody to draft their representations, because they are Slaves of 
the Auditor, the Judges and the men of Distinction.”64 These slavers sought to re-create 
race-based slavery against the determined opposition of French citizens who had been 
violently deprived of their freedom. The perpetrators sought to graft the historically novel 
racial justification for enslavement onto the ancient deprivation of “natural liberty” from 
captives taken in war. These slavers created gradations of unfreedom based in part on 
ascribed racial status.  
What did “liberty” mean for these captives? Who had the power to remove or 
restore it? The issue of illicit enslavement thrust Santo Domingo into the center of a 
contest over the moral and juridical foundations of liberty. For instance, even as he 
denounced these abuses, Valearze argued that the “Laws [of the French Republic] are 
                                                                                                                                                 
premier Bataillon des chausseurs de la Martinique et qui ont été vendus aux anglais par leur infâme chef 
qui est ici sous vos yeux et Revendus par eux aux Espagnols.” 
64 Report of don Bernardino Valearze, noted “for the [French] Directory,” 13 Germinal an 5 (2 April 1797), 
CARAN AF/III/63. In the original text: “À St Domingue, on fit beaucoup de Prisonniers de guerre français 
de toute couleur. On les dispersa dans différentes Isles comme à Cuba et Caracas; ensuite à Porto Rico où 
l‟auditeur faisait séparer les Blancs de ceux de Couleur, afin de vendre les derniers comme Esclaves...On 
compte plus de Deux Mille français en Esclavage dans ces Isles; plusieurs se sont sauvés à la 
Guadeloupe...on a échangé les Blancs, excepté trois...quant aux hommes de Couleur, on n‟en a pas rendu 
un seul et ils sont Esclaves. Ces derniers, qui prétendent n‟avoir pas perdu leur Liberté naturelle, l‟ont 
réclamée; mais ils n‟ont ni appui, ni personne pour rédiger leurs représentations, parce qu‟ils sont 
Esclaves de l‟Auditeur, des Juges et des hommes de Distinction.” 
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worthless, because only Kings can make and abrogate them.”65 Moreover, in his 20 June 
1800 report to the Minister of the Navy, Chanlatte contended that Dominican authorities 
and residents were working to delay the French “taking of possession” of Santo Domingo 
to “buy time to kidnap the blacks who are on the estates or domestics to transport them to 
the lands of slavery.”66  
Such arguments played into the hands of Toussaint, who viewed this slaving as a 
justification for intervention in parts of Santo Domingo. This built on the liberationist 
pronouncements that had characterized his earlier campaigns against the British. In a 29 
October 1799 letter to Roume, Toussaint condemned the “humiliations” perpetrated 
against “French cultivators” in Santo Domingo and urged Roume to put a stop to the 
practice.
67
 For his part, Roume adopted a rather personal approach to the problem. In a 23 
February 1800 letter to Someruelos, Roume claimed that many “black French citizens” 
were being captured from Saint-Domingue and sold “as slaves” in Cuba. Invoking both 
the French emancipation decree of 1794 and the Franco-Spanish alliance, Roume 
demanded that Someruelos immediately liberate all captive French citizens in Cuba and 
intercede more specifically in the case of a man named Jean Le Sol, whose liberty was a 
                                                 
65 Report of Valearze, 2 April 1797, CARAN AF/III/63. In the original text: “...ses Loix ne servant à rien, 
parce qu‟il n‟y avait que les Rois qui puissent en faire et les abroger.” 
66 Chanlatte to Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. In the original text: “On 
ne manquera pas non plus de dire que cette suspension de la prise de possession n‟a eu d‟autre objet que 
d‟obtenir du tems pour enlever les noirs qui sont sur les habitations ou domestiques pour les transporter 
dans les terres de l‟esclavage.” 
67 Toussaint to Roume, 7 Brumaire an 8 (29 October 1799), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the original 
text: “Je vous remercie de la bonté que vous avez eu d‟écrire au général Chanlatte, pour vérifier la 
dénonciation faite contre les vexations commises dans la Partie Espagnole, envers des cultivateurs 
français, et suis d‟avance persuadé que vous les ferez cesser, s‟il est vrai qu‟elles ont eu lieu.” 
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special concern for Roume and for a French official in Santiago de Cuba named 
Pothier.
68
  
When it became clear that Roume could not suppress these violations of 
emancipation law, Toussaint decided to take the matter into his own hands. In an 
impassioned missive to Roume dated 18 January 1800, Toussaint decried the frequent 
sales of “black French Citizens” through Azua (in southern Santo Domingo) to points 
elsewhere and claimed that many “Spaniards” engaged in this “despicable trafficking.” 
Consequently, “it seems to me that to save the French of this part [Santo Domingo] and 
preserve the black Citizens from slavery, it is necessary to take a part” of Santo 
Domingo—specifically Azua and other locations of such enslaving.69 Professions of 
antislavery were closely connected to Toussaint‟s desire to augment his political power. 
While Toussaint‟s sympathies with the plight of these captives may have been genuine, 
one cannot lose sight of the larger context in which “emancipation” had become closely 
linked to imperial warfare and expansion.  
                                                 
68 Roume to Someruelos, 4 Ventôse an 8 (23 February 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1. In the original 
text: “Le citoyen Pothier, Receveur des Droits de la République à Saintiago de Cube, m‟a instruit par sa 
lettre du 4 Pluviose dernier (24 Janvier 1800) que des Particuliers ont l‟audace de transporter de St 
Domingue à l‟isle de Cube, des citoyens noirs français pour les vendre comme esclaves et que des 
habitants de votre isle ignorant sans doute l‟immortelle déclaration des Droits de l‟homme et nos autres 
lois Républicaines, qui garantissent la liberté de tous les français, de quelque Couleur qu‟ils soient, que 
ces habitants, dis-je, achètent ces mêmes citoyens français ainsi transportés pour être vendus.” 
69 Toussaint to Roume, 28 Nivôse an 8 (18 January 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1. In the original text: 
“On y vend les Citoyens noirs français. Ce n‟est point, à dire vrai, à Maguana, Farfan, etc. qu‟on les vend, 
mais on commence par emmener ces malheureux à Azua, pour delà les conduire et les vendre plus loin. 
Des Personnes d‟Azua même sont venues me faire ce rapport. Vous voyez bien, Citoyen Agent, que les 
vendeurs se soutiennent entr‟eux, malgré les renseignemens que vous a donnés le général Chanlatte, qui 
vous mande que ce trafic infâme n‟a pas lieu, néanmoins il est clair que les Espagnols de la partie 
conquise même le font encore, mais bien secrètement. En conséquence, Citoyen agent, il me semble que 
pour sauver les français de cette partie et préserver de l‟esclavage les Citoyens noirs, il faut prendre un 
parti quelconque, puisque nous ne pouvons en ce moment prendre possession de Santo Domingo, je vous 
engage à prendre possession d‟Azua et autres endroits...” Numerous other correspondences by Toussaint to 
Roume and others also attest to his declared intention to halt these atrocities. In one letter to Roume dated 
26 February 1800 for instance, Toussaint denounced the “freedom-killing commerce” (commerce 
liberticide) that existed in Santo Domingo. Toussaint to Roume, 7 Ventôse an 9 (26 February 1800), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1. 
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In both parts of the island, the overseers of emancipation made “liberty” 
contingent upon grateful service to the Republic. The professed goal of rescuing hapless 
victims of enslavement by perfidious enemies fit in well with such political narratives of 
state-centered liberation. It also brought to the fore the degree to which French officials 
felt the need to resort to relics of the slave past in order to root out present outrages. “On 
the nineteenth of the previous month,” wrote Chanlatte, then a Brigade General in Santo 
Domingo, to Roume on 21 January 1800, “a Black Citizen (as we still have the 
humiliating necessity here to distinguish Colors) notified me that the Citizeness Thérèse, 
woman of color had sold to a Spaniard named Miguel Pérez, a black Citizeness named 
Flore, attached to her service.”70 Chanlatte‟s perceived “humiliating necessity” 
constitutes an early example of a dilemma that post-emancipation societies in the French 
world and beyond would confront over the following two centuries: whether to rely upon 
terms associated with inequality and stigmatization in order to eradicate continuing 
vestiges of past injustice.
71
  
Despite the advent of formal emancipation in Santo Domingo, some evidence 
suggests that some Republican authorities also utilized old mechanisms of manumission 
in order to liberate citizens from bondage. In this, they confronted the legacies of the 
unresolved matter of the terms of manumission in colonial Saint-Domingue. According to 
Malick Ghachem, the “persistent absence of any real consensus as to what constituted a 
                                                 
70 Chanlatte to Roume, 1 Pluviôse an 8 (21 January 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1. In the original text: 
“Le dix neuf du mois dernier un Citoyen Noir (car ici nous sommes encore dans l‟humiliante necessité de 
distinguer les Couleurs) vint me prévenir que la Citoyenne Thérèse, femme de couleur avait vendu à un 
Espagnol nommé Miguel Perez, une Citoyenne noire nommée Flore, attachée à son service.” 
71 Scholarship on the histories of race in modern France and the Francophone world is steadily expanding. 
For notable recent contributions, see Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader, eds., Race in France: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); and 
Minayo Nasiali, “Native to the Republic: Negotiating Citizenship and Social Welfare in Marseille 
„Immigrant‟ Neighborhoods since 1945” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2010).  
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valid manumission in colonial [Dominguan] society” had hindered the ability of 
administrators to devise and enforce coherent policies regulating slavery and 
manumission.
72
 After 1795, new ambiguities concerning legal condition arose on the 
island. On 12 January 1800, Miguel Pérez declared that he had sold Flore for two 
hundred gourdes to a man named Lacoste in response to pressures exerted by a “French 
Commissioner” who insisted that Flore was “free.”73 This strategy of bringing about the 
sale of a formally freed woman in order to secure her liberty would recur in Santo 
Domingo under French rule.  
In late 1799 and early 1800, French authorities took more direct measures to 
combat this slaving: establishing a “Provisional Court of Peace” (Tribunal Provisoire de 
Paix) in Santo Domingo city that called several Dominican witnesses to testify on this 
trafficking; and compelling Governor García to pledge to “root out this abominable 
abuse.” In the extant records of testimony before this court, all four individuals 
summoned denied any knowledge of the capture or sale of any French citizens in either 
part of the island. Furthermore, in a 20 January 1800 order, García imposed a fifty-peso 
fine on any notary who validated the sale of another human being. He also declared that 
any “private paper” that documented such a sale would henceforth be “null and void,” 
except as “evidence, for full knowledge of the fraud” that had transpired, with the sale 
price being applied towards the “expenses of justice.”74  
                                                 
72 Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: Haitian Variations on a 
Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002), 90. 
73 Declaration of Miguel Pérez, 12 January 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1. In the original text: “Je 
déclare que Morales, m‟a remis en gage une négresse nommée Flore, âgée de 20 à 25 ans, et qu‟ayant été 
réclamée, comme libre par M. le Commissaire français, je l‟ai remis au C[itoyen] Lacoste qui m‟a fait un 
billet de deux cents gourdes...” 
74 “Extract of Minutes of the Provisional Court of Peace, Established in [Santo] Domingo,” 25 Brumaire an 
8 (16 November 1799), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1; order of Joaquín García, 20 January 1800, CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/26. In the original text from the García order: “Haviendose quejado a este govierno el 
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In his order, García had professed to transform written documentation into a tool 
of liberation, while the tribunal had sought in vain to create a written record of evidence 
of enslavement that might assist in rescuing captives. Toussaint likewise recognized the 
primacy of the law and the written word in pursuing his political objectives. Along with 
his epistolary vilification of this captive-trading, Toussaint advanced the legalistic 
argument that he must take possession of Santo Domingo in order to fulfill the terms of 
the Treaty of Basel.
75
 These claims were two sides of the same coin. By asserting his 
control over Santo Domingo, Toussaint appears to have envisioned himself as fulfilling a 
deferred promise of liberty to thousands of men and women who had been cheated of 
their rights by greedy Dominican “masters” and inept French metropolitan envoys. 
Attempting to judge Toussaint‟s actions within the rubric of cynicism versus sincerity 
misses the point that in the Caribbean in the 1790s, violent conflict, tight control of labor, 
and struggles over “emancipation” were intimately connected.76  
                                                                                                                                                 
Señor Comisario de la Republica francesa de la detestable facilidad con que los franceses, y Españoles, 
ceducen los negros de la Colonia para traerlos a vender a la parte Española y pedido en consequencia me 
sirviese tomar providencia que cortase de raiz este abominable abuso...en manera alguna los compren por 
papel privado que desde luego se tendra por nulo, y solo servira de prueva, para pleno conocimiento del 
dolo con que se ha celebrado, el contrato, y perderá el valor, y precio en que lo hubiere comprado, así 
como el vendedor pudiendo ser havido se condena en la exhivicion real de precio que desde luego se 
aplica a gastos de justicias.” 
75 In a 27 April 1800 letter to General Chanlatte, Toussaint argued that he was deploying his general Pierre 
Agé to Santo Domingo to “make the necessary arrangements for this taking of possession” of Santo 
Domingo in accordance with the “peace treaty drawn up between this power [France] and the King of 
Spain.” Toussaint to Chanlatte, 7 Floréal an 8 (27 April 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original 
text: “D‟après l‟arrêté de l‟agent du directoire à Saint-Domingue en date de ce jour, mon cher général, 
relatif à la prise de possession, au nom de la république, de la partie ci-devant Espagnole, cedée à la 
France par le traité de paix conclu entre cette puissance et le Roi d‟Espagne; j‟envoie, conformément à ce 
qu‟il prescrit, le général de brigade Agé...pour prendre les arrangements nécessaires à cette prise de 
possession.” 
76 I arrive at this conclusion partly due to Philip Girard‟s argument that “[i]n Louverture‟s mind 
international diplomacy and Saint Domingue‟s political and social developments did not operate on 
separate planes but were instead interwoven...Louverture‟s desire for self-preservation might seem crassly 
self-serving, but he saw himself and the future of emancipation as inextricably linked. His continued tenure 
as governor of Saint Domingue was in his eyes not only a matter of personal survival but also a guarantee 
of freedom for the entire black population of the island.” Girard, “Black Talleyrand,” 91. 
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Toussaint‟s concern with legal protocol and the written record strongly informed 
his strategies vis-à-vis Santo Domingo. With over ten thousand men at his command, he 
could have quickly and easily overrun the paltry Spanish defenses guarding Santo 
Domingo‟s capital city long before his eventual invasion. He nonetheless felt obliged to 
secure the formal acquiescence of Roume, the Republic‟s highest-ranking representative 
in the eastern part of the island. Agent Roume repeatedly refused Toussaint‟s demands 
that he issue an arrêté granting the general formal authorization to take political control 
over the colony of Santo Domingo. Roume advanced several legal, economic and 
geopolitical arguments to support his position. In his numerous letters to Toussaint, 
Roume insisted that the metropolitan government had not granted either of them the 
authority to legally assume control over Santo Domingo, whose poverty would in any 
case place heavy burdens on a treasury already severely strained by armed conflicts on 
several continents. Roume furthermore contended that no such transfer of power in Santo 
Domingo ought to occur until the “troubles” that afflicted the island had subsided.77 The 
inhabitants of Santo Domingo “did not refuse to become French,” General Kerverseau 
echoed, “but they did not claim to render themselves subjects of Toussaint; it was not to 
Toussaint but to the [French] Republic that the King of Spain ceded this portion of the 
Isle.”78 
Toussaint was undeterred by such claims. After his efforts to cajole Roume into 
issuing the arrêté through diplomatic means failed, Toussaint adopted a more forceful 
                                                 
77 Roume to Toussaint, 4 Pluviôse an 8 (24 January 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/1; Chanlatte to 
Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. 
78 Kerverseau, “Report on the former Spanish part,” 13 August 1801, Rochambeau Papers, University of 
Florida‟s Special Collections (hereinafter RPUF), no. 77.  In the original text: “Certes, ils ne refuseraient 
pas de devenir français; mais ils ne prétendaient pas se rendre les sujets de Toussaint; ce n‟était pas à 
Toussaint mais à la République que le Roi d‟Espagne avait cédé cette portion de l‟Ile.” 
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approach. According to Chanlatte, Toussaint deployed a force of seven to eight thousand 
“blacks” to Le Cap to compel Roume “on pain of pillage and fire” to grant the 
authorization. “They demanded of him [Roume] with the tone of revolt distribution of 
lands, complete liberty to work how and where they wish and for their benefit, [and] 
finally an order for the taking of possession of the Spanish part.”79 They were only 
successful in winning the last of these demands. In another report, Chanlatte asserted that 
Toussaint had “promised” these eight thousand or so followers the “Spanish part,” and 
when these individuals had cornered Roume, they demanded that he “grant the cultivators 
ownership over half of the land” and the ability to “enjoy completely the benefit of 
liberty...to work for their profit instead of working for that of the landowners.”80 Their 
aspirations would meet with bitter disappointment following Toussaint‟s capture of Santo 
Domingo city and subsequent implementation of pro-planter land-use laws and highly 
restrictive labor policies. 
 Driven at least in part by these hopes for a more genuine liberty, these several 
thousand individuals forced Roume to issue a 27 April 1800 arrêté that authorized the 
                                                 
79 Antoine Chanlatte, “Historical Summary of the Deeds that Preceded the Invasion of the Territory of the 
Former Spanish Part of Saint-Domingue by Toussaint Louverture,” 8 Prairial an 9 (28 May 1801), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Un attroupement d‟environ 7 à 8000 noirs formé par ses ordres 
se réunit à une demie lieue du Cap d‟où il somma la ville de leur envoyer, sous peine de pillage et 
d‟incendie, le citoyen Roume et l‟administration municipale qui s‟y rendirent pour soustraire la ville à 
cette nouvelle calamité. Aussitôt qu‟il fut au milieu de cette horde sanguinaire, il fut assailli d‟injures de 
menaces et même de corps. On lui demanda avec le ton de la révolte le partage de terres, la liberté 
indéfinie de travailler comme et où l‟on voudrait et à leur profit, enfin un arrêté pour la prise de possession 
de la partie Espagnole.” 
80 Chanlatte to the French government, 9 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “...les 
Noirs auxquels on promit la partie Espagnole, pourvu qu‟ils parviennent à obtenir du citoyen Roume, qu‟il 
en ordonna la prise de possession...On dit au Citoyen Roume...qu‟il fallait qu‟il donnât aux cultivateurs la 
propriété de la moitié des terres; qu‟il fallait aussi pour jouir pleinement du bienfait de la liberté que ces 
mêmes cultivateurs eussent la faculté de travailler à leur profit au lieu de travailler à celui des 
propriétaires.” 
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taking of possession of Santo Domingo by Toussaint.
81
 “I will never sign the death order 
of these peaceful inhabitants of the Spanish part,” Roume had supposedly declared. 
“Since I face the alternatives of being sacrificed or of requesting this taking of possession 
[of Santo Domingo], my choice is made, France will avenge me...!”82 Though Roume 
issued a second arrêté on 16 June 1800 that annulled the previous one, Toussaint appears 
to have taken little notice of this. In a letter to García dated 20 December 1800, Toussaint 
invoked Roume‟s 27 April 1800 order—along with the abuses that his envoy General 
Pierre Agé had allegedly suffered at the hands of Spanish authorities—as justifications 
for his impending intervention in Santo Domingo city.
83
 Frustrated by Roume‟s 
continued obstinacy, Toussaint detained his adversary in an undignified residence in 
Dondon (northern Saint-Domingue) in November 1800 and then deported him to 
Philadelphia nine months later.
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 In his efforts to take Santo Domingo, Toussaint also faced opposition from other 
quarters. Neither the Spanish authorities in Santo Domingo city nor many Dominicans 
had ever accepted the legitimacy of French Republican rule, and the prospect of an 
invasion by Toussaint appears to have exacerbated these sentiments. In 1800 and 1801, 
elite Dominicans addressed several petitions to Spanish officials requesting that the 
colony‟s transfer to France be deferred until a more propitious moment. On 22 July 1800, 
a group of Dominicans composed a petition to García in which they denounced the 
French regime as “only a friend and protector of the slaves” and asserted that Republican 
                                                 
81 Secretary-General of the Agency of the French Government in Saint-Domingue to Minister of the Navy 
and Colonies, 15 Thermidor an 9 (3 August 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. 
82 Chanlatte to the French government, 9 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Je ne 
signerai point l‟arrêt de mort de ces paisibles habitans de la partie Espagnole et puisque je suis dans 
l‟alternative d‟être sacrifié ou de demander cette prise de possession, mon choix est fait, la France me 
vengera...!” 
83 Pluchon, Toussaint Louverture: Un révolutionnaire noir d‟ancien régime, 291. 
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officials had armed onetime bondsmen and formed gendarmerie units from them.
85
 
Furthermore, on 2 December 1800, the Spanish Ambassador informed the French 
Foreign Minister that several prominent citizens of Santo Domingo city had addressed a 
petition to the Spanish king requesting deferral of the transfer of power until a “more 
favorable” moment arrived. For these petitioners, several factors made such a delay 
necessary: the “disorder and anarchy that reign in the part of the island under France;” 
Toussaint‟s “quite openly declared intentions” to sever ties with France; his purported 
practice of pressing “whites” into forced labor; and his pillaging of many Dominicans‟ 
houses and other properties.
86
  
Despite the stark racial overtones of these petitions, Santo Domingo had a 
complex history of relative social mobility for those of African descent. A combination of 
legal, social, and economic dynamics had left a “powerful heritage of contradictions” in 
colonial Santo Domingo, which according to Richard Turits “combined racial hierarchy 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Girard, “Black Talleyrand,” 112. 
85 Petition to Joaquín García, 22 July 1800, in Cesión de Santo Domingo a Francia (correspondencia de 
Godoy, García, Roume, Hedouville, Louverture, Rigaud y otros, 1795-1802), ed. Emilio Rodríguez 
Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Impresora Dominicana, 1958), 552-553. In the original text: 
“No es menos, señor, la opresion en que nos hallamos con el Comandante que tenemos y las fatigas que 
nos hace sufrir; lo primero es un general maltratamiento a todo vecino, siendo solo amigo y valedor de los 
esclavos; de ellos no más se fia; de ellos es la dicha [g]armanderia, asi las guardias de la frontera.” 
86 Spanish Ambassador to French Minister of Foreign Relations, 11 Frimaire an 9 (2 December 1800), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “La ville de St Domingue, capitale de l‟isle de ce nom, 
vient d‟adresser une requête au Roi, où elle demande que S.M. ordonne de différer et de remettre à une 
époque plus favorable la tradition de la partie Espagnole de cette isle à la France. Voici les raisons sur 
lesquelles la demande est motivée. Le désordre et l‟anarchie qui règnent dans la partie de l‟isle soumise à 
la France, la férocité de Toussaint Louverture, les cruautés qu‟il exerce envers les blancs, ses intentions 
assez ouvertement prononcées de se rendre indépendant, ses menaces continuelles de venger l‟esclavage 
qui a pesé jusqu‟ici sur les nègres, les pénibles travaux dont il accable tous les blancs, sans distinction de 
sexe, l‟avidité avec laquelle il pille leurs maisons et toutes leurs propriétés...” According to Chanlatte, 
members of assorted Dominican “secular and regular cabildos” (town councils) and other prominent 
residents of the colony sent petitions to colonial authorities demanding the “suspension” of Santo 
Domingo‟s cession to France until new orders from France and Spain had sorted out the confused political 
situation there. Chanlatte, “Historical Summary,” 28 May 1801, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the 
original text: “Dans cette crise terrible les Cabildos séculier et régulier et tous les habitants présentèrent 
des pétitions très humbles, mais très fortes, dans lesquelles on demandait la suspension de cette prise de 
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and a significant degree of racial integration, racist laws with relatively fluid practices, as 
well as racial slavery…with a deracialization of certain forms of liberty.”87 Over the 
course of several centuries, a complicated racial order had emerged in Santo Domingo 
wherein the absence of a strong white elite and the development of a comparatively 
autonomous free black peasantry facilitated relative mobility for persons of African 
descent. These developments did not eliminate racism but rather led to a situation in 
which according to Silvio Torres-Saillant the “social distance between blacks and whites 
shrunk significantly” as substantial numbers of people of African descent became 
“decolorized in the eyes of the ruling class.”88  
This disjuncture between racist law and somewhat more egalitarian reality in 
Santo Domingo had not been lost on Moreau de St Méry, who had misinterpreted relative 
social mobility as evidence of a virtually color-blind society except in law. While 
conceding that a wide variety of laws had been on the books in Spanish Santo Domingo 
that had barred “freed people” from most important positions and stipulated other 
indignities such as a ban on freed women wearing precious metals, Moreau had insisted 
that these laws were “in absolute disuse.” “Color prejudice,” Moreau had argued, “so 
powerful in other nations, where it establishes a barrier between the white and the freed 
person or his descendants, is almost nonexistent in the Spanish part.”89 Furthermore, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
possession jusqu‟à ce que la France et l‟Espagne eussent donné de nouveaux ordres qu‟on demanderait 
sur le champ par les députés qu‟on allait envoyer.” 
87 Richard Turits, “Par-delà les plantations: Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo,” 
Genèses 66 (March 2007), 54. 
88 Silvio Torres-Saillant, “The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity,” Latin 
American Perspectives 25, no. 3 (May 1998), 134-135. For an important work on the historical evolution of 
Dominican ideas and identities concerning race in the United States as well as the Dominican Republic, see 
Ginetta E.B. Candelario, Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).   
89 Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole, 1:58-59. In the 
original text: “Le préjugé de la couleur, si puissant chez les autres nations, où il établit une barrière entre 
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1797, Charles Vincent, the veteran Fortifications Director for French Saint-Domingue 
and close friend of Toussaint, had composed a detailed report entitled “Reflections on 
Political Economy concerning the three Spanish jurisdictions of Montechristi, Santiago 
and Puerto Plata” in which he had also marveled at the perceived degree of racial 
integration within the Dominican elite. In his visit to the northern Dominican city of 
Santiago, Vincent had observed that many of its most prominent citizens had “a little of 
that which one calls mixed blood.” “Considerably wiser than us, the Spanish never 
hesitate to admit in all employment, good and talented men who are not of rigorously 
white origin; they even accord the distinction of Don to men of a very pronounced color 
provided that they possess good manners and wealth.” Vincent cited in particular the 
examples of Manuel Constanza, the “Black Captain of the Company of Blacks of 
Santiago;” Diego Silverio, a marine entrepreneur; and Carlos de Rosas, who may have 
been a signatory to Toussaint Louverture‟s 1801 constitution.90  
Both the image of Santo Domingo as a bastion of racial equality and that of a 
racist Spanish elite appear in numerous tracts and correspondences by French Republican 
officials and others. Both of these tropes, which emerged in part from Santo Domingo‟s 
                                                                                                                                                 
le blanc et l‟affranchi ou sa descendance, n‟existe presque pas dans la partie espagnole. Aussi les loix des 
Indes espagnoles sur les affranchis, y sont-elles absolument en désuétude.” 
90 Vincent, “Reflections on Political Economy concerning the three Spanish Jurisdictions of Montecrist, 
San-Yago and Porto de Plata, relative to their reunion with the [French] Republic,” 1797, ANOM Direction 
de Fortification des Colonies (hereinafter DFC) 5, no. 913.  A copy of this document is preserved in RPUF, 
no. 2269. I discuss the signatories to Toussaint‟s constitution in chapter 4; one of them was named “Carlos 
de Roxas” or “Rojas.”  In the original text: “Je ne saurais point assurer, si parmi les hommes marquans 
que je viens de designer, il en existe, ainsi que je l‟ai beaucoup désiré, quelques uns de Couleur, je le crois 
beaucoup, et l‟on ne peut même se défendre de penser en voyant les gens de bien que l‟on visite à St Yago, 
que la plupart ont un peu de ce que l‟on appelle sang-mêlé; mais bien plus sages que nous, les Espagnols 
n‟hésitent point d‟admettre dans tous les emplois, les hommes de bien et à talent qui n‟ont pas une origine 
rigoureusement blanche; ils ont même l‟attention d‟accorder la distinction de Don à des hommes d‟une 
couleur très prononcée pourvu qu‟ils ayent une bonne conduite et de la fortune...l‟on m‟a néanmoins cité 
avec le plus grand éloge le Capitaine Noir de la Compagnie des Noirs de Sant-Yago, Manuel Constanza. 
J‟ai désiré le voir et le connaître; il doit être un homme bien étonnant pour s‟être autant élevé au dessus 
des préjugés de ses concitoyens oppresseurs de sa caste.” Emphasis in original.  
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“powerful heritage of contradictions,” influenced the racial thinking of many French 
citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. This in turn helped to shape the policies that French 
leaders implemented in Hispaniola, which often undermined the ideal of racial 
egalitarianism.  
Successive struggles for racial equality among the free population had led to the 4 
April 1792 law abolishing institutionalized racism in Saint-Domingue, a principle which 
then became inscribed in the “integral part” doctrine of the 1795 French constitution. 
Vestiges of the old racist order nonetheless persisted in the revolutionary era. This 
reflected in part the fact that some opponents of slavery did not advocate racial equality, 
which to some extent decoupled the two great legislative achievements in the French 
empire that events in Saint-Domingue had enabled. For instance, in a 15 June 1800 report 
to the Minister of the Navy, a former civil administrator and deportee from La Réunion 
named Monnier praised the 1794 emancipation edict as “one of the greatest blessings of 
humanity,” yet insisted that only whites should rule Saint-Domingue because they had 
more of a stake in the colony‟s governance and economic productivity.91 Such logic 
helped to enable the enactment of laws that undermined racial equality on both sides of 
the Atlantic. In 1798, metropolitan legislators passed two such laws: one that effectively 
eliminated the voting rights of most cultivateurs and tied them to their plantations on pain 
of losing the limited citizenship rights that they had previously possessed; and another 
that stipulated the creation of racially-segregated military units in France.
92
 
                                                 
91 “Means without which it is impossible to conserve the French Colonies with the System of general 
Liberty, decreed on 16 Pluviôse, an 2e of the [French] Republic [4 February 1794],” Monnier to Minister of 
the Navy and Colonies, 26 Prairial an 8 (15 June 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/14. In the original text: 
“La loi du 16 Pluviose, an Deuxième de la République française, est un des plus grands bienfaits de 
l‟humanité!” 
92 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 300-304.  
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French authorities in Hispaniola also tried to re-inscribe race into colonial military 
policies, which appears to have been at least partly motivated by attempts to assuage 
Spanish officials in the island‟s eastern part. In his efforts to undermine Toussaint‟s 
power, his rival General Hédouville had shortly after arriving in Saint-Domingue in 1798 
substituted white soldiers for their black counterparts in certain important parts of the 
colony.
93
 Moreover, on 12 August 1796, no less a champion of racial equality than Julien 
Raimond had informed Roume that although his Civil Commission had initially 
possessed the “determination” to refrain from sending any commander who was “black or 
of color” to the colony of Santo Domingo, circumstances might force Raimond and his 
colleagues to send such a commander. Raimond argued that this “determination was 
dictated to us out of consideration for and deference to the Spanish.”94 In an 18 August 
1796 letter to his fellow Civil Commissioners, Roume had likewise contended that while 
circumstances had obliged this commission to deploy a multiracial force of troops to the 
“frontier Posts” bordering Santo Domingo, this body would not dare to send an 
exclusively black force led by a black leader.
95
 Such concerns led Fortifications Director 
Vincent to declare in 1797 that:  
                                                 
93 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 304. In a 31 March 1798 report to the metropolitan government on his 
arrival in Saint-Domingue, General Hédouville had stated that in the name of ensuring “tranquility,” it was 
necessary to use only “European troops” to take Santo Domingo. Hédouville to Paris, 11 Germinal an 6 (31 
March 1798), ANOM CMSM F3 201. In the original text: “...il importe Essentiellement à la tranquillité du 
Pays de n‟en prendre possession qu‟avec des troupes Européennes.” 
94 Julien Raimond to Roume, 25 Thermidor an 4 (12 August 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/12. In the 
original text: “Il est pénible aussi que nous soyons forcés de changer la détermination que nous avions 
prise d‟abord, de n‟envoyer dans la partie Espagnole aucun commandant noir ou de couleur. Si cette 
première détermination nous fut dictée par égard et par déférence pour les espagnols...” 
95 Roume to “his colleagues on the Commission delegated by the French Government in the [Caribbean] 
Islands,” 1 Fructidor an 4 (18 August 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. In the original text: “...je vous 
[illegible] de n‟envoyer pour prendre possession de S[anto] Domingo et des villes intérieures que des 
Blancs seuls, en vous laissant en même temps remarquer mon regret, que vous puissiez vous trouver dans 
la nécessité d‟envoyer d‟autres parmi ceux qui iraient aux Places frontières; Mais que j‟étais loin de 
supposer alors que vous serez dans la nécessité de n‟envoyer que des Nègres, commandés par un Nègre!” 
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A great difficulty that will result from the Entrance of the [French] Republicans in 
the Spanish part [of the island], will come thus, without a doubt, from the changes 
that should be necessarily introduced by the Regime of Blacks…one should say 
frankly that the only way to reassure the inhabitants [of Santo Domingo] on this 
point, would be to prohibit at the moment of the taking of possession, if such a 
thing is possible, and only provisionally, all French Blacks from traversing the 
Spanish part, as all Spanish Blacks are from coming here.
96
 
 
This statement‟s hesitant and ambivalent tone holds as much importance as its 
actual words. In positing a distinction between “French” and “Spanish” “blacks,” and in 
defending strict (albeit purportedly temporary) territorial limitations on their movement, 
Vincent mapped race onto the island‟s contested political geography. The Napoleonic 
regimes that succeeded Toussaint in Santo Domingo would place such constructions at 
the center of their brutal campaigns of re-enslavement. 
 In formulating his strategy to take Santo Domingo city, Toussaint himself may 
have responded to such anxieties. Shortly after forcing Roume to issue his arrêté granting 
him authorization to take control of this city, Toussaint sent the French General Pierre 
Agé on a diplomatic mission to meet with Governor García, with whom he was to 
arrange for the long-delayed transfer of authority in Santo Domingo to the French 
Republic, represented by Toussaint. In a letter to Chanlatte dated 27 April 1800, 
Toussaint elaborated that Agé would be aided by a contingent of “white troops” and the 
“French inhabitants” of Santo Domingo city.97 According to a 28 May 1800 letter from 
                                                 
96 Vincent, “Reflections on Political Economy concerning the three Spanish Jurisdictions,” ANOM DFC 5, 
no. 913.  In the original text: “Une grande difficulté que prouvera l‟Entrée des Républicains dans la partie 
Espagnole, proviendra donc, n‟en doutons pas, des changements que doit nécessairement introduire dans 
le Régime des Noirs, notre système Colonial, et l‟on doit dire franchement que le seul moyen de rassurer 
les habitants sur ce point, serait de défendre au moment de la prise de possession, si la chose est possible, 
et seulement provisoirement, à tout Noir français de passer dans la partie Espagnole, comme à tout Noir 
Espagnol de venir ici...”  
97 Toussaint to Chanlatte, 7 Floréal an 8 (27 April 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: 
“...vous attendre La troupe blanche que [illegible] vous destine le général de brigade Agé, prendrait 
possession de la ville de Santo-Domingo avec les habitants français qui y résident et que vous lui feriez 
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Edward Stevens, the chief US consul in Saint-Domingue, to US Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering, Toussaint had sent an armed schooner from Le Cap with “70 white 
soldiers” under the white General Agé to Santo Domingo (which was later captured near 
Puerto Plata by a British ship) in response to the “Spaniards‟” fears of “the Domination 
of the Blacks.”98  
Following García‟s rejection of Toussaint‟s demands, the black leader began to 
assemble a large military force that would succeed where Agé‟s diplomacy had failed. 
This brought Toussaint into direct conflict with the metropolitan government to which he 
continued to pledge allegiance. In the year following his November 1799 coup, Napoleon 
tried to maintain the status quo in Santo Domingo in part due to distractions in numerous 
other theaters of war and in part because of his intention to limit Toussaint‟s power. In a 
19 October 1800 report to Napoleon, the French Foreign Minister outlined the military, 
strategic and racial concerns that had resulted in the “taking of semi-possession” in Santo 
Domingo instead of the total fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Basel. In this 
official‟s estimation, few French soldiers in either Europe or the Caribbean were 
available due to the “war on the [European] continent, the losses of our navy, and the 
troubles in the western part of St Domingue.” The Republic also hesitated to establish a 
substantial military presence in Santo Domingo because “the inhabitants of the ceded 
territory would have viewed with dread the reunion [of the two parts of the island] by 
troops of color, and it was not possible then to send white troops there.” The Foreign 
Minister advised Napoleon to “leave to the Spanish the task of defending this territory” in 
order to circumvent Roume‟s 27 April 1800 arrêté by which “the General Toussaint-
                                                                                                                                                 
connaître; et [illegible] les autres places.” A copy of this letter exists in CARAN Colonies CC/9a/26. See 
also Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 182.  
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L‟ouverture would be required to take possession of it [Santo Domingo] with a certain 
number of white troops.”99 Accordingly, on 20 November 1800 the Minister of the Navy 
instructed Toussaint to “not undertake anything” in the “former Spanish part” of the 
island.
100
   
Toussaint took little heed of these orders, entering the city of Santo Domingo on 
26 January 1801 at the head of some ten thousand troops.
101
 His forces quickly overran 
the approximately fifteen hundred men that the Spanish in Santo Domingo had deployed 
against him.
102
 Toussaint divided his forces into one division under Moïse which invaded 
the northern part of the colony of Santo Domingo and another sent to the southern part of 
the colony led by the Dominguan general‟s brother Paul Louverture. Toussaint 
maintained the political division of Santo Domingo into the départements of Samaná and 
Inganno, appointing a general named Clairvaux to administer Samaná and Paul 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 Stevens to Pickering, 28 May 1800, CARAN 208 Mi 1. 
99 French Minister of Foreign Relations to Napoleon, 27 Vendémiaire an 9 (19 October 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “...la guerre du continent, les pertes de notre marine, et les troubles 
de la partie occidentale de St Domingue ont constamment rendu impraticables l‟un et l‟autre moyen...Cette 
prise de demi-possession était en effet l‟unique mesure qui fut prudente, et qui put l‟exécuter: Les habitants 
du territoire cédé auraient vu avec effroi opérer la réunion par des troupes de couleur, et il n‟était pas 
possible alors d‟y envoyer des troupes blanches....Quant à son régime militaire, nous y demeurâmes 
étrangers; nous nous reposions sur les Espagnols du soin de défendre ce territoire, lorsque, le 7 floréal an 
8 l‟agent du Gouvernement arrêta que le Général Toussaint-Louverture serait requis d‟en faire prendre 
possession par un certain nombre de troupes blanches.” 
100 Report of Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 30 January 1823, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/54. In the 
original text: “Enfin, dès le 20 Novembre 1800, Le Ministre de la Marine avait écrit à Toussaint 
l‟Ouverture: « n‟entreprenez rien ni l‟un ni l‟autre (lui et l‟agent du Gouvernement Roume) sur la partie 
ci-devant Espagnole; des raisons de Politique et de Convenance vous le commandent ».” 
101 Pamphile de Lacroix, La Révolution d‟Haïti (Paris: 1819; reprint, Paris: Karthala, 1995), 253. Scholars 
have offered a variety of estimates of the total number of troops that Toussaint commanded around this 
time. Emilio Cordero Michel for instance claimed that Toussaint led twenty thousand men into Santo 
Domingo in 1801. Cordero Michel, “Toussaint en Saint-Domingue espagnol,” 252. According to Victor 
Schoelcher, Toussaint commanded fifteen thousand men at the time of his defeat of Rigaud in mid-1800. 
Victor Schoelcher, Vie de Toussaint Louverture (Paris: Karthala, 1982 [1889]), 293. Pierre Pluchon 
moreover asserted that twenty-five thousand men served under Toussaint around late 1801. Pierre Pluchon, 
“Toussaint Louverture défie Bonaparte: l‟adresse inédite du 20 décembre 1801,”  in Toussaint Louverture 
et l‟indépendance d‟Haïti, ed. Jacques de Cauna (Paris: Karthala, 2004), 175. According to Dubois, 
Toussaint had twenty-three to thirty thousand men as of early 1802. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 
262. 
102 Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 190.  
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Louverture to oversee Inganno.
103
 On 5 February 1801, Toussaint declared that elections 
on the island would be organized around municipal administrations that would send 
deputies to departmental assemblies, which would in turn elect representatives to a 
Central Assembly that would sit in Port-Républicain (formerly Port-au-Prince) and that 
would answer to Paris.
104
 
“The invasion of the Spanish part [by Toussaint] has completely changed the 
political situation of France in St. Domingue,” General Kerverseau wrote to the Minister 
of the Navy in September 1801. In capturing Santo Domingo city, Toussaint had 
according to Kerverseau closed off the last port on the island through which French 
administrators or military units could enter; deposed an “allied Government” that had 
maintained a measure of “good order” and “internal and external security;” undermined 
the quiescence of a formerly “peaceful population [that was] accustomed to subordination 
to order and obedience;” and taken over a “vast country” that had once served as an 
“avenue” through which metropolitan French forces could enter all the départements in 
Saint-Domingue.
105
 Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo Domingo city indeed redefined the 
island‟s political trajectory. In putting García and his ruling cadre on boats to Venezuela 
and Europe, Toussaint definitively severed Santo Domingo from the Spanish orbit, which 
                                                 
103 Pluchon, Toussaint Louverture: Un révolutionnaire noir d‟ancien régime, 293. 
104 “Proclamation” of Toussaint to the “municipal administrations of the colony [Santo Domingo] and to his 
co-citizens,” 16 Pluviôse an 9 (5 February 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/9. 
105 “Summary of the Reports on the French Part and the Spanish Part of St-Domingue,” submitted by 
Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 21 or 25 Fructidor an 9 (8 September or 12 September 
1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/23. In the original text: “On voudrait en vain se le dissimuler; l‟invasion 
de la partie Espagnole a changé absolument la situation politique de la France à St Domingue...Elle y 
avait un Gouvernement allié qui maintenait le bon ordre par ses forces, le commerce par l‟or qu‟il y 
[illegible], la sûreté intérieure et extérieure par les troupes qu‟il y [illegible]; Toussaint l‟en a chassé; Elle 
y avait une population paisible accoutumée à la subordination à l‟ordre et à l‟obéissance...Elle avait un 
vaste pays qui lui offrait des places d‟armes pour ses armées, des débouchés pour faire pénétrer ses 
colonnes par le sud, par le Nord, par l‟ouest dans sa partie rebelle; Toussaint s‟en est rendu maître.” 
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helped to pave the way for the short-lived Dominican independence movements twenty 
years later.
106
  
Toussaint‟s intervention in Santo Domingo city also helped to precipitate a crisis 
of empire in the French world. “[T]his taking of possession [of Santo Domingo] was but 
the final act of the tragedy that unfolded in the Colony to lead to independence,” wrote 
Chanlatte in 1801.
107
 This invasion may indeed have constituted a tipping point in 
Napoleon‟s disastrous decision to deploy an expedition of re-conquest whose failure 
would lead to the creation of independent Haiti. Toussaint‟s conquest of Santo Domingo 
city thus at once contributed to the emergence of the first independent emancipationist 
nation in the hemisphere and set an important precedent for the Spanish-American 
independence wars later in the century. Santo Domingo was at the intersection of French 
and Spanish imperial crises that reshaped the geopolitics of the Caribbean and the 
Americas more generally in the first third of the nineteenth century.  
 
Conclusions 
 
“The question is not to know if it is good to abolish slavery, but if it is good to 
abolish liberty in the free part of Saint-Domingue. I am convinced that the island would 
belong to the English, if the blacks were not attached to us by the interest of their 
                                                 
106 In 1821, two Dominican movements arose whose leaders advocated separation from Spain. One group 
comprised largely of non-whites proposed unification with Haiti, which they hoped would lead to the 
abolition of slavery and greater social equality. Another more conservative faction perceived the Spanish 
colonial state to be incapable of maintaining order or creating a prosperous economy, which led them to 
support a break with Spain but to oppose unification with Haiti. Divisions between these two groups helped 
to enable the Haitian regime of Jean-Pierre Boyer to annex Santo Domingo in 1822. Richard Turits, 
Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 44.  
107 Chanlatte, “Historical Summary,” 28 May 1801, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: 
“...cette prise de possession n‟était que le dernier acte de la tragédie qui se jouait dans la Colonie pour 
amener à l‟indépendance.” 
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freedom.” In a riposte to the pro-slavery arguments of the former Saint-Domingue 
intendant François Barbé-Marbois, Napoleon in a speech before the Conseil d‟État 
(Council of State) on 16 August 1800 had advocated a plan that would retain slavery in 
territories such as Martinique (where a British occupation had kept the institution intact 
after 1794) while preserving a formal commitment to emancipation in places such as 
Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe where pro-emancipation regimes had come to power. 
“My policy is to govern men as most want to be governed,” Napoleon continued. “I 
believe that this is the manner of recognizing the sovereignty of the people…thus, I will 
speak of liberty in the free part of Saint-Domingue; I will confirm slavery in Ile-de-
France [an Indian Ocean territory where planters had retained slavery in violation of the 
1794 emancipation law], [and] even in the enslaved part of Saint-Domingue [Santo 
Domingo]; allowing myself to soften and limit slavery, where I will maintain it; [and] 
reestablish order and introduce discipline, where I will maintain liberty.”108  
Napoleon had to manage an array of competing priorities and interests in 
fashioning colonial policy. On the one hand, an influential planter lobby that interpreted 
Saint-Domingue‟s economic devastation and Toussaint‟s increasingly autonomist bent as 
evidence of the failure of emancipation sought to appeal to Napoleon‟s wishes to harness 
the full productive potential of his overseas holdings and to reassert metropolitan control 
over these territories. Nevertheless, Napoleon was also keenly aware that abolishing 
                                                 
108 As quoted in P.-L. Roederer, Journal du Comte P.-L. Roederer (Paris: H. Daragon, 1909), 15-16.  In the 
original text: “La question n‟est pas de savoir s‟il est bon d‟abolir l‟esclavage, mais s‟il est bon d‟abolir la 
liberté dans la partie libre de Saint-Domingue. Je suis convaincu que cette île serait aux Anglais, si les 
nègres ne nous étaient attachés par l‟intérêt de leur liberté…Ma politique est de gouverner les hommes 
comme le grand nombre veut l‟être. C‟est là, je crois, la manière de reconnaître la souveraineté du 
peuple…Ainsi, je parlerai de liberté dans la partie libre de Saint-Domingue; je confirmerai l‟esclavage à 
l‟Ile de France, même dans la partie esclave de Saint-Domingue; me réservant d‟adoucir et de limiter 
l‟esclavage, là où je le maintiendrai; de rétablir l‟ordre et d‟introduire la discipline, là où je maintiendrai 
la liberté.” 
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slavery had enabled the French Republic to remain a viable power in the Caribbean. After 
protracted vacillation, Napoleon (who had by then assumed the title of First Consul of the 
Republic) ended up crafting a delicate compromise that in some ways anticipated the 
disastrous “free state”/“slave state” situation that led to the sectional crisis in the 
antebellum United States. Years later, he would come to bitterly regret abandoning this 
proposal in favor of the attempted restoration of slavery in some of the formerly “free” 
territories.  
Napoleon‟s rivalry with Toussaint proved crucial in the former‟s eventual 
decision to change course. The First Consul‟s efforts to maintain the status quo in the 
“enslaved part” of the island indeed owed largely to his determination to prevent 
Toussaint from unifying the island under his regime. In secret instructions to the Rear 
Admiral Combis, his main envoy to Santo Domingo, dated 14 January 1801, Napoleon 
had outlined a vision for that colony‟s governance that built upon his peculiar concept of 
“recognizing the sovereignty of the people.” While instructing Combis to “remind the 
inhabitants of the Spanish part, as well as the current administrators…that this country 
[Santo Domingo] is henceforth French,” Napoleon declared that “the intention of the 
Government [is] to never reunite the two parts [of the island] under one single 
government.” Paris “will govern the French part with and by the blacks, [and] it will 
govern the Spanish part according to the norms of the country,” Napoleon elaborated. 
The First Consul distilled these principles into two concrete objectives that he ordered 
Combis to pursue: to “oppose, by all means, the encroachment of an army of blacks 
within the boundaries of the Spanish part;” and to “reassure all the white landowners [in 
Santo Domingo] on the views of the French Government, which, aware of the 
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catastrophes in the French part, will not grant unlimited freedom to men even less likely 
to make good use of it.”109  
This freedom would become a pivotal issue in Toussaint‟s yearlong occupation of 
Santo Domingo that commenced twelve days after Napoleon issued these instructions. 
The liminal status that formally freed people occupied in Santo Domingo under Toussaint 
underscores the complexity of the French and Haitian Revolutions. While it may be 
tempting to follow Bonaparte and label Santo Domingo the “enslaved part” of the island 
in this period and Saint-Domingue the “free part,” the primary source record argues for a 
more nuanced interpretation. Toussaint‟s occupation would further bring together the 
interconnected struggles for freedom of onetime slaves in both parts of the island. 
Following Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo Domingo city, these individuals and the island‟s 
other inhabitants would be drawn into a vortex of warfare that would culminate in the 
establishment of the first independent nation in the Caribbean.  
In her efforts to understand the failings of the nationalist movement in the Cuban 
wars of independence, Ada Ferrer concluded that “the seeds of the [nineteenth-century 
Cuban nationalist] revolution‟s undoing were present in the revolution itself.”110 This 
                                                 
109 “Secret Instructions for General Combis,” 24 Nivôse an 9 (14 January 1801), in Correspondance de 
Napoléon Ier, publiée par ordre de l‟Empereur Napoléon III (Paris: Henri Plon and J. Dumaine, 1861), 
6:573 (document no. 5293). In the original text: “Le principal but de la mission du citoyen Combis à Saint-
Domingue est: 1. De faire souvenir, par sa présence, aux habitants de la partie espagnole, ainsi qu‟aux 
administrateurs actuels, que ce pays est désormais français; 2. De rassurer tous les propriétaires blancs 
sur les vues du Gouvernement français, qui, instruit par les malheurs de la partie française, ne donnera 
pas une liberté illimitée à des hommes encore peu susceptibles d‟en faire un bon usage. 3. Il doit continuer 
à maintenir, même augmenter, par tous les moyens possibles, le sentiment de localité et même de 
répugnance qu‟auraient les habitants de la partie espagnole de se réunir à la partie française, l‟intention 
du Gouvernement étant de ne jamais réunir les deux parties sous un même et seul gouvernement. 4. Il doit 
faire connaître aux principaux du pays que le principe du Gouvernement français est de gouverner les 
peuples par leurs habitudes et leurs usages. Ainsi, comme il gouvernera la partie française avec et par les 
nègres, il gouvernera la partie espagnole avec les habitudes du pays. 5. Il est entièrement indépendant de 
Toussaint Louverture et de toute l‟administration de la partie française; il doit s‟opposer, par tous les 
moyens, à ce qu‟une armée de nègres empiète sur les limites de la partie espagnole.” 
110 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 197. 
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powerful argument also applies to the case of French Republican emancipation in the 
Caribbean in the 1790s. As with the Cuban independence wars of nearly a century later, 
French revolutionary emancipation catalyzed far-reaching historical transformations and 
provided foundations for claims-making on the part of those who had long been deprived 
of most rights, yet the scope of citizenship and freedom for freed people became 
circumscribed by a confluence of powerful external forces, racism, leaders‟ limited 
visions, and perceived economic imperatives.  
In 1801, Toussaint would attempt to transform Santo Domingo into a prosperous 
colony that would buttress his power on the island by serving as a sort of economic and 
strategic insurance policy against a French metropolitan invasion. He justified these 
actions as integral to maintaining his position as the self-declared foremost defender of 
freed people‟s rights on the island. While proclaiming all Dominicans to be free French 
citizens, Toussaint nonetheless could not escape from the intellectual straitjacket of the 
ideal of a plantation economy based on a tightly-controlled labor force. The following 
chapter will illustrate how his transformative reign paradoxically became a captive of the 
models of the past.  
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Chapter Four  
 
Toussaint Louverture in Santo Domingo, 1801-1802 
 
 
“In defeating me, they have only cut down the trunk of the tree of liberty in Saint-
Domingue, but it will grow back as the roots are deep and numerous.”1 
-Attributed to Toussaint 
Louverture  
 
This famous pronouncement on the resilience and ultimate triumph of liberty over 
repression, said to have been uttered by the Haitian Revolution‟s central figure upon his 
capture and exile to France in 1802, can be conceptualized as encapsulating in twenty-six 
French words the essence of the struggle for freedom that defined that revolution and its 
largely unfulfilled promise over the following two centuries. Indeed, the invocation of the 
potent French Revolutionary symbol of the liberty tree and the assertion that its “roots” 
were in Saint-Domingue rather than France reinforces much recent scholarship that has 
placed events in Saint-Domingue—and the former slaves such as Toussaint Louverture 
who carried them out—at the center of the emergence of now-hegemonic concepts of 
democracy and equal rights in this period.
2
 At the same time, the powerful imagery of 
thwarted quests for freedom followed by the hope for renewal represented by liberty‟s 
                                                 
1 Quoted from display in Musée d‟Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France, observed on 15 May 2009. The original 
quote reads: “En me renversant, on n‟a abattu à Saint-Domingue que le tronc de l‟arbre de la liberté, mais 
il repoussera car ses racines sont profondes et nombreuses.” 
2 The best-known of such works are Laurent Dubois‟s books Avengers of the New World: The Story of the 
Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004) and A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave 
Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004). For a strong critique of this perspective, see David Geggus, “The Caribbean in the Age of 
Revolution,” in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 83-100.  
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enduring roots strikes a chord with the disappointments and crises that have marked the 
post-independence history of the nation of which Toussaint was in many ways the 
founder, while still resonating with the persistent hope that a better future might yet lie 
ahead.  
Toussaint Louverture‟s commitment to liberty remains at the heart of a 
longstanding debate within scholarly circles and beyond that ultimately centers on the 
roots and persistence of the profoundly unequal economic, political and social 
relationships that have emerged over the centuries in the Caribbean and Atlantic World. 
In his analysis of the “problem of freedom” during the century of Jamaican history 
bounded by the abolition of slavery (1834-1838) and the major labor revolt of 1938, 
historian Thomas Holt reminds us that freedom, like all concepts, is and was “a 
historically particular and socially constructed phenomenon” and that consequently, “the 
struggle to define the content of freedom was at bottom a contest for social power, a 
struggle at once intellectual and political, social and economic.”3 As a former slave who 
became the most powerful individual in the Caribbean by the turn of the nineteenth 
century and who anointed himself the principal defender of universal emancipation, 
Toussaint has attracted both effusive praise and scathing denunciations. While his 
supporters have highlighted his unswerving adherence to formal emancipation after 1794, 
his detractors have pointed to his authoritarian and dictatorial style as well as his 
Machiavellian dealings with other political leaders in Europe and the Americas.  
 Conceptualizing Toussaint‟s reign in both Santo Domingo and Saint-Domingue as 
such a “contest for social power” can help to reconcile these ostensibly contradictory 
                                                 
3 Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xxi-xxii. 
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aspects of Toussaint‟s politics. In a recent article casting Toussaint as a “black 
Talleyrand,” Philippe Girard emphasized Toussaint‟s apparent reluctance to extend his 
policy of emancipation beyond Saint-Domingue. Citing the examples of his complicity in 
thwarting a Jamaican slave conspiracy as well as his questionable commitment to 
emancipation in Santo Domingo, Girard asserted that Toussaint “pursue[d] abolitionism 
in one country only.”4 The documentation surviving in French and Spanish repositories, 
however, suggests a somewhat different interpretation.  
Rather than simply pursuing a policy of emancipation in Saint-Domingue and 
working to undermine liberty in other places, Toussaint decreed essentially the same 
labor codes in Santo Domingo as he did in Saint-Domingue: a highly coercive set of 
restrictions that sought to bind laborers (most of whom were ex-slaves) to certain 
enterprises. In Saint-Domingue this usually translated into the plantation; in Santo 
Domingo, Toussaint aspired to replicate the few productive plantations in existence in an 
effort to finally fulfill the colony‟s economic potential. This chapter argues that 
Toussaint‟s policies in Santo Domingo were driven by a narrow, conservative vision of 
“liberty” and an overriding concern with establishing a profitable plantation economy. 
All of this worked to undermine emancipation in an impoverished land that would have 
to wait until 1822 to experience the permanent end of slavery.   
 Those scholars who have addressed the subject of Toussaint‟s occupation of 
Santo Domingo have often focused on the question of whether he abolished slavery 
there.
5
 The archival evidence suggests that Toussaint‟s reign in Santo Domingo was an 
                                                 
4 Philippe Girard, “Black Talleyrand: Toussaint Louverture‟s Diplomacy, 1798-1802,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 66, no. 1 (January 2009), 92. 
5 For example, as we have seen Girard in “Black Talleyrand” (see esp. pp. 110-112) invoked Toussaint‟s 
treatment of those held in slavery in Santo Domingo as evidence of his reluctance to support emancipation 
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extremely complicated episode that called into question the meaning and limitations of 
“freedom.” The individuals who gave this term the most lived significance in this time 
and place were the formally freed men and women who often defied these labor 
restrictions in pursuit of their own ideals of more autonomous small farming.  
Diverse groups of people—ranging from Haitian politicians and ordinary citizens 
to both Haitian and foreign scholars of that nation—have for the past two hundred years 
intensely dissected, analyzed, interpreted, and “spun” Toussaint Louverture‟s place 
within Haitian history and the precedents that he set as the country‟s first real leader, 
even though he never actually led any formally independent state by that or any other 
name. Neither scholars nor other parties by contrast have devoted comparable attention to 
his place in Dominican history, despite his prominent role during this transformational 
period. Scholars such as Richard Turits have presented as a major theme in Dominican 
history the state‟s vain attempts (until the twentieth century) to impose an export-oriented 
plantation economy upon a reluctant peasantry. Toussaint was one of numerous 
Dominican leaders who pursued such a model, while his political vision of a unified 
Hispaniola envisaged the implementation of a lucrative plantation complex across the 
entire island.  
This political vision emerged against the backdrop of dramatic conceptual and 
legal shifts in imperial power structures in both the French and Spanish worlds. Indeed, 
Laurent Dubois has argued that one of Toussaint‟s major preoccupations as a leader was 
                                                                                                                                                 
outside of Saint-Domingue. Moreover, Dubois in Avengers of the New World (pp. 236-238) asserted that 
Toussaint “envisioned a process of gradual emancipation as the ideal” for Santo Domingo and that for 
Santo Domingo‟s purported slaves, “[Toussaint‟s] occupation of 1801 seems not to have brought 
immediate liberty.” Writing in the early twentieth century, Adolphe Cabon reached a somewhat similar 
conclusion. He contended that “liberty was given [by Toussaint] to all of the slaves [in Santo Domingo 
upon his invasion]; although [the former slaves‟] condition was not by that [measure] notably changed, as 
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the arduous task of “redefining the political terms of empire.”6 As a politically-astute 
master of war and diplomacy, Toussaint moreover understood the imperative of operating 
within a legal framework, which helps to explain not only his refusal to formally break 
with France but also his shrewd efforts to cloak his invasion and occupation of Santo 
Domingo in a veneer of legality. His efforts to impose his own legal order in both of the 
island‟s colonies culminated in his 1801 constitution, which bestowed upon him the title 
of “Governor-for-Life” over the entire island. 
 Toussaint pursued three principal objectives in Santo Domingo. First, as a devout 
Catholic, Toussaint imposed Catholicism as the state religion in Hispaniola, actively 
repressing manifestations of other faiths, especially those associated with the African 
roots of the ex-slave population. Second, he promoted an economic model based on 
large-scale plantation production. Finally, he built this on coercive labor restrictions that 
envisioned the cultivateurs as subordinated units of labor, albeit with certain enumerated 
rights including a modest share of plantation profits. The conflicts that transpired when 
the cultivateurs resisted these measures reflected a recurring phenomenon in Caribbean 
history: the antagonism between authorities‟ pursuit of plantation profits created by a 
substantial docile labor force and peasants‟ strong preferences for smaller-scale 
agricultural production that would afford them much more autonomy than working on 
sizeable plantations.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                 
they continued to depend on their former masters.” Adolphe Cabon, Histoire d‟Haïti: Cours professé au 
Petit-Séminaire-Collège Saint-Martial (Port-au-Prince: Édition de la Petite Revue, 192?-1940), 4:152. 
6 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 173. 
7 Some of the best-known works that discuss this subject include: Holt, The Problem of Freedom; Rebecca 
Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985); and Rebecca Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2005). See also Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, 
State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), 
esp. chapter 1; and Sidney Mintz, Three Ancient Colonies: Caribbean Themes and Variations (Cambridge, 
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Every modern scholar writing on Toussaint and the revolution with which he has 
become synonymous stands on the shoulders of the celebrated Trinidadian scholar C.L.R. 
James, whose Black Jacobins portrayed Toussaint as a tragic hero undone by his own 
inability to effectively respond to the concerns of the masses of ex-slaves whose liberty 
he claimed to hold so dear.
8
 Some subsequent scholars have by contrast presented 
accounts of Toussaint that attack his revolutionary and emancipatory credentials; of these 
authors, perhaps the most strident in his critiques is the conservative historian Pierre 
Pluchon.
9
 Other scholars have attempted more balanced depictions. Madison Smartt 
Bell‟s recent biography of Toussaint for instance highlights both Toussaint‟s 
commitments to liberty and legal racial equality and what Bell characterizes as his 
“absolute treachery, absolute ruthlessness, and absolute hypocrisy.”10 David Geggus has 
concluded that Toussaint was “an enigma,” dedicated to the cause of slave emancipation 
but also calculating and pragmatic in his political and military dealings.
11
 Dubois and 
Carolyn Fick have likewise presented Toussaint in shades of gray as both a product of his 
age and a man who played an integral role in redefining concepts of liberty and equality 
with which he is often associated. For Dubois, Toussaint‟s “ultimate inability to construct 
a multiracial, egalitarian and democratic society in Saint-Domingue” reflected both his 
                                                                                                                                                 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For a pioneering article on the evolution and development of these 
labor dynamics, see Sidney Mintz, “Slavery and the Rise of Peasantries,” Historical Reflections/Reflexions 
Historiques 6, no. 1 (1979): 213-242.  
8 C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L‟Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. 
(1938; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1963). 
9 See Pluchon‟s books Toussaint Louverture: De l'esclavage au pouvoir (Paris: L‟École, 1979); and 
Toussaint Louverture: Un révolutionnaire noir d‟ancien régime (Paris: Fayard, 1989). 
10 Madison Smartt Bell, Toussaint Louverture: A Biography (New York: Vintage, 2007), 106.  
11 David Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 135.  
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own shortcomings and the gargantuan challenges and constraints that he confronted as 
the leader of the first large-scale slave emancipation in the Americas.
12
  
 In his efforts to resolve his perceived dilemmas concerning labor and agricultural 
production, Toussaint operated within a geopolitical context dominated by slaveholding 
empires run by individuals who had no sympathy with a vision of a world without chattel 
slavery. Nonetheless, Toussaint did have some real choices, and the consequences of his 
decisions profoundly influenced the subsequent history of the Dominican Republic as 
well as its neighbor. Though Toussaint‟s commitment to formal emancipation was 
revolutionary for its time, his preference for large-scale plantation agriculture implicated 
him in the perpetuation of repressive labor practices.  
 In seeking to disentangle the apparent contradictions of Toussaint‟s character, it 
may be useful to keep in mind Geggus‟s observation that the Haitian Revolution‟s 
“leaders were antislavery but not liberals.”13 As a former slave who preached general 
emancipation, Toussaint decreed a restrictive labor regime for Santo Domingo in order to 
further two interrelated objectives: the political goal of asserting his authority over the 
entire island and the economic goal of creating virtually ex nihilo a profitable plantation 
economy in this colony that would generate revenue to support the first aim. Yet his 
invasion and occupation of Santo Domingo in fact weakened this first goal by helping to 
precipitate his ouster, while in his pursuit of the second Toussaint would fare little better 
than two centuries of Dominican leaders who had preceded him. 
 
*  *  * 
                                                 
12 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 174. See also Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint 
Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990). 
13 Geggus, “The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution,” 99. 
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 “The [French] Republic does not need your goods; it only demands your heart.” 
In a 4 January 1801 proclamation to all of the inhabitants of the colony of Santo 
Domingo, Toussaint defended his impending conquest of Santo Domingo city and 
promised good governance in an effort to counteract what he knew would be a somewhat 
skeptical reception of his accession. Declaring that he and his emissary to Santo 
Domingo, Pierre Agé, had acted in strict conformity with legal protocol in faithfully 
carrying out the terms of the Treaty of Basel, Toussaint assured his audience that his true 
intentions in that colony were to “assure your [Dominicans‟] happiness, [and] reestablish 
public tranquility and good order.”14 In his bid to gain Dominicans‟ allegiance, Toussaint 
employed rhetoric similar to that used by other French Republican administrators when 
addressing other potentially recalcitrant colonial populations during this era. This rhetoric 
was characterized by a mix of grandiose appeals to liberty and reassurances concerning 
the protection of property and the maintenance of order, which these officials hoped 
would win over diverse groups that had distinct and often competing interests.
15
  
 Toussaint could not, of course, please all of these diverse factions, and when he 
had to make a difficult decision, he often favored the interests of wealthier and better-
connected groups over those of the cultivateurs. This owed to a variety of personal, 
                                                 
14 “Proclamation” of Toussaint to Santo Domingo inhabitants, 14 Nivôse an 9 (4 January 1801), Centre 
d‟Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, Colonies CC/9b/9. In the 
original text: “Si la République a voulu prendre possession de la partie espagnole, c‟est pour assurer votre 
bonheur, rétablir la tranquillité publique et le bon ordre, et son général n‟a agi qu‟en vertu d‟un traité 
existant et qu‟il était chargé d‟exécuter...la République n‟a pas besoin de vos biens, elle ne demande que 
vos cœurs.” 
15 For example, in a 20 December 1801 proclamation to the “inhabitants of the colony” of Saint-Domingue, 
Toussaint promised to “respect persons and properties” (faire respecter les personnes et les propriétés) 
while working for the “triumph of liberty and the prosperity of this island” (le triomphe de la liberté et la 
prospérité de cette isle). Toussaint‟s address to the inhabitants of Saint-Domingue, in Pierre Pluchon, 
“Toussaint Louverture défie Bonaparte: l‟adresse inédite du 20 décembre 1801,” in Toussaint Louverture et 
l‟indépendance d‟Haïti, ed. Jacques de Cauna (Paris: Karthala, 2004), 173-174.  
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international, pragmatic, economic and structural factors. As Carolyn Fick has written, 
Toussaint‟s preference for an economic path centered on the plantation stemmed from 
both his awareness of his status as leader of a relatively small island in a hostile world in 
which slaveholding powers wielded great influence and the emergence of an 
“unbridgeable gap between the state structure [in Saint-Domingue], which was a military 
one, and the rural agrarian base of the nation.”16  
 In his occupation of Santo Domingo, Toussaint appears to have perceived a 
similarly “unbridgeable gap” between his own professed faith of Roman Catholicism and 
the mixed African and Christian beliefs that many of the island‟s inhabitants held. 
Toussaint decreed Catholicism to be the state religion on the island in his 1801 
constitution, which a French Republican official stationed in Caracas denounced as 
antithetical to “French tolerance.”17 Toussaint keenly understood both the institutional 
and social power of religion on an island where multiple African, European and 
indigenous faiths had long interacted under the suspicious eye of a succession of 
slaveholding regimes that had all promoted official state Catholicism. He accordingly 
moved swiftly to assume control of institutional religion in Santo Domingo, appointing 
priests and creating several new parishes in the Santiago de los Caballeros area in the 
                                                 
16 Carolyn Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: From Plantation Labour to Peasant Proprietorship,” Slavery and 
Abolition 21, no. 2 (August 2000), 23. Structural explanations for modern Haiti‟s repressive political 
culture and acute poverty rooted in the longue durée of colonial slavery and authoritarian tendencies within 
the revolution have indeed become fashionable in the last several decades. See for instance Trouillot, Haiti, 
State against Nation; and Robert Fatton, Haiti‟s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to 
Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). These studies have also paid due attention to 
the decades-long ostracism of Haiti by the major Atlantic powers as a significant influence on its trajectory. 
17 Report submitted from Caracas by Pons, “Judge of the Peace and of [Ship] Captures in Santo Domingo,” 
to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 20 or 28 Floréal an 9 (exact date illegible; 10 or 18 May 1801), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “L‟Exercice public du culte catholique y a été 
exclusivement maintenu avec affectation, et comme critique de la tolérance française.” 
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north.
18
 Moreover, in a 4 January 1800 decree, Toussaint outlawed nocturnal dances and 
meetings on pain of corporal punishment based on his allegation that a number of 
malefactors had sought to “divert from his [illegible] labors, the peaceful cultivator, in 
encouraging the violent passion of liberty that he has for dances, principally for that of 
Vaudoux.”19 In seeking to redirect the energies of the “peaceful cultivator” to more 
productive ends, Toussaint relied upon labor codes that undermined the liberty that he 
claimed to promote.   
 
“The Land only Awaits the Aid of Arms to Work its Treasures:” Toussaint’s 
Economic and Labor Policies 
 
“[Toussaint] bragged to me of the wealth that one would find [in Santo Domingo] 
and the great means that this country would provide him so that his authority was finally 
exclusively respected in the entire island,” wrote General Antoine Chanlatte in a 20 June 
1800 report to the Minister of the Navy.
20
 Such a prediction would seem to contradict the 
trope of a colony characterized by poverty and neglect—an image supported by 
Chanlatte‟s assertion in this same report that Santo Domingo represented a significant 
burden on the treasury of New Spain (Mexico), which disbursed three hundred to four 
                                                 
18 In a 10 September 1801 order, Toussaint authorized Santo Domingo city authorities to appoint priests to 
the Santiago area and mandated the creation of four new parishes. Toussaint order on religious organization 
in Santiago de los Caballeros, 23 Fructidor an 9 (10 September 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/9.  
19 Order of Toussaint on nocturnal dances, 14 Nivôse an 8 (4 January 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/9. In 
the original text: “Instruit que plusieurs personnes, mal intentionnées et ennemis de la tranquillité 
publique, cherchent à détourner de ses travaux [illegible], le paisible cultivateur, en flattant la passion 
violente de la liberté qu‟il a pour les danses, principalement pour celle du Vaudoux...” This measure built 
on ancien régime precedents such as a “Police Ordinance” for Saint-Domingue dated 7 September 1774 
that had prohibited “all nocturnal assemblies and dances or Calindas among the people of Color and free 
blacks.” “Police Ordinance concerning dances and assemblies of blacks and other people of color,” 7 
September 1774, Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, France, 
Collection Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 273. In the original text: “…nous défendons à 
l‟avenir toutes assemblées et danses de nuit ou Calindas chez les gens de Couleur et nègres libres.” 
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hundred thousand gourdes annually to the Caribbean colony to subsidize its 
administrative, judicial, military, and religious costs.
21
 Though Toussaint knew Santo 
Domingo‟s impoverishment from firsthand experience, he also understood that it had 
once rendered significant plantation-derived profits to its overlords and that it might do 
so again. Toussaint became determined to exploit Santo Domingo‟s productive potential 
by creating a plantation system supported by coerced labor, capitalistic agrarian policies, 
and reduced customs duties on important cash crops such as sugar and coffee.  
The near-total absence of an infrastructure that might enable substantial 
production of such crops must have been quite a shock to a man born and raised in what 
was in his day the world‟s wealthiest colony. Relatively rich in land yet comparatively 
poor in (enslaved) labor and especially capital, Santo Domingo had long been forced to 
import the main plantation staples. In its first years under French rule, the colony‟s only 
notable export products were tobacco, Acajou wood (or mahogany), and tafia (rum), 
which in addition to the sale of animal products such as meat and hides constituted its 
main sources of revenue.
22
 Toussaint‟s ambitious plans to reverse this state of affairs 
were not quite as far-fetched as they might initially seem. After all, he also faced the 
enormous task of rebuilding the plantation economy of a devastated Saint-Domingue 
upon assuming control of that colony after nearly a decade of war, and he succeeded 
remarkably well in this endeavor.
23
 In pursuing his political and economic goals, 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Chanlatte to Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. In the original text: “...il 
me vanta beaucoup les richesses qu‟on y trouverait et les grands moyens que ce païs lui fournirait pour 
que son autorité fut enfin exclusivement respectée dans toute l‟Isle.” 
21 Chanlatte to Minister of the Navy, 20 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. 
22 See “Descriptive Report concerning the Spanish Part of St Domingue as well as [the] French [part],” 
submitted by Jean-Baptiste Formy to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies, an 5 (22 September 1796-21 
September 1797), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/15. 
23 According to Fick, Toussaint increased Saint-Domingue‟s coffee exports by 1801 to over twenty times 
their nadir in 1795 and boosted sugar exports to over ten times their 1795 level by 1801. Fick, 
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Toussaint consciously or unconsciously modeled many of his efforts upon the 
prescriptions of a relatively obscure Dominican clergyman who, oblivious to the coming 
revolutionary turmoil, had sought to replicate Saint-Domingue‟s successful plantation 
complex across the border in his own destitute land.   
In the 1780s, a priest and chronicler of Spanish Santo Domingo named Antonio 
Sánchez Valverde had provided a blueprint for developing that colony that would 
profoundly influence the economic models pursued by administrators there for decades to 
come. Mindful of the wealth that France had derived from its coveted Caribbean 
possessions, Sánchez Valverde proposed to overhaul his colony‟s economy in the image 
of its neighbor‟s. In a sustained argument to the Spanish crown contained in his tract Idea 
del valor de la isla española (Idea of the Worth of Hispaniola), Sánchez Valverde 
contended that the “key” to exploiting the “most fertile” land of Santo Domingo was the 
massive importation of African slaves; until the Spanish followed the French example 
and undertook this initiative, Santo Domingo‟s wealth would remain but “a treasure 
hidden in the bowels of the earth.”24 Though it is unclear whether Toussaint himself 
actually read or was directly familiar with Sánchez Valverde‟s ideas, they influenced 
many chroniclers and authorities in revolutionary Hispaniola. As an amateur scholar and 
astute observer of Caribbean affairs, Agent Philippe-Rose Roume for instance had read 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Emancipation in Haiti,” 27-28. Furthermore, the British Consul General Charles Mackenzie wrote to 
Secretary George Canning on 9 September 1826 that Toussaint had increased agricultural revenue in Saint-
Domingue from 8,606,720 livres in 1796 to 46,266,300 livres in 1802, which translates into roughly a 
fivefold increase. This latter figure according to Mackenzie represented a quarter of the 1789 revenue. 
Mackenzie to Canning, 9 September 1826, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/54. Bell claims that Toussaint 
managed to almost double the colony‟s coffee exports between 1799 and 1801 and increase cotton and 
brown sugar exports by a notable margin during those same years. Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 203. 
24 Antonio Sánchez Valverde, Idea del valor de la isla española (1785; reprint, Ciudad Trujillo [Santo 
Domingo]: Editora Montalvo, 1947), 168. In the original text: “¿Qué haremos con tener, no digo los dos 
tercios de la Isla, sino más de las tres quartas partes, que el terreno sea más unido, más regado y más 
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the expansive Description of Santo Domingo penned by M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, 
who in turn had drawn significantly upon Sánchez Valverde‟s work.25 Perhaps drawing 
inspiration from this priest‟s arguments, Roume had told several colleagues in late 1797 
that the agricultural production of Santo Domingo could, with the appropriate guidance, 
surpass that of Saint-Domingue within fifty years.
26
 Occupying a precarious if powerful 
position and aware of the necessity to raise funds for his military and state apparatus, 
Toussaint appears to have believed that a much more accelerated timetable was needed. 
Despite—or perhaps in part because of—the revolutionary upheaval, administrators such 
as Toussaint found much to emulate in the Valverdean vision.  
The ideas that shaped Toussaint‟s policies in Santo Domingo were also derived 
from his own experiences in Saint-Domingue and his observations on the relationships 
between economic and political power that had emerged in colonial times. The 
maintenance of political control had a reciprocal and circular relationship to coerced 
labor policies under Toussaint: the cash crops produced under these labor codes 
generated revenues for Toussaint, which he used to fund his army and administration; 
these tangible manifestations of his power then served to further repress ex-slave 
laborers.
27
 In Santo Domingo, Toussaint endeavored not to rejuvenate a once-profitable 
plantation complex but rather to build the rudiments of such a complex from a very low 
                                                                                                                                                 
feraz, si todo este fondo de riquezas es un tesoro escondido en las entrañas de la tierra, que necesita una 
llave para abrirla y aprovecharse de él?” Emphasis in original. 
25 References to Sánchez Valverde appear repeatedly in Moreau‟s work. For instance, Moreau mentioned 
“Don Antonio Valverde” in a discussion of ideas of race in colonial Santo Domingo. M. L. E. Moreau de St 
Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle Saint-Domingue 
(Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 1:59. 
26 Report submitted by Roume to “French Government Commission in the [Caribbean] Islands,” 1 October 
1797, in Cesión de Santo Domingo a Francia (correspondencia de Godoy, García, Roume, Hedouville, 
Louverture, Rigaud y otros, 1795-1802), ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo [Santo 
Domingo]: Impresora Dominicana, 1958), 290. 
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base. This impelled Toussaint to court the support of Santo Domingo‟s equivalent of 
Saint-Domingue‟s grands blancs (“big whites,” or the landed gentry and plantation- and 
urban-based elite class). He thus made conscious efforts to reach out to Santo Domingo‟s 
elite, proclaiming that “their persons and their properties [would] be respected.”28  
As in Saint-Domingue, such overtures to the grand blanc class in Santo Domingo 
became coupled with onerous labor policies designed to produce a pliant labor force. 
Toussaint also implemented economic measures designed to create incentives for the 
cultivation of the same cash crops that had produced such great wealth in Jamaica, 
Barbados and other Caribbean locales. In two orders issued in February 1801, Toussaint 
enumerated the specific details of his plans concerning labor relations and agriculture in 
Santo Domingo. Driven by a philosophy that favored the concentration of wealth in 
relatively few hands, these orders contrasted strikingly with both the letter and the spirit 
of later Latin American land reforms. Emphasizing that agricultural production in Santo 
Domingo was “very different than in other countries,” Toussaint set forth in an arrêté 
decreed in Santo Domingo city on 7 February 1801 a series of steps designed to promote 
his economic vision. In this order, Toussaint forcefully denounced the supposed “abuses” 
committed by “cultivators” in Santo Domingo who bought up small plots of land and 
then cultivated this land for themselves in small groups. Since this practice led these 
laborers to “abandon the plantations,” it accelerated in Toussaint‟s eyes the “ruin” of 
these enterprises. Toussaint thus set a minimum amount of land per concession (fifty 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 For details on this, see: Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti;” Fick, The Making of Haiti, esp. chapter 9; and 
Dubois, Avengers of the New World, chapter 11.  
28 Pamphile de Lacroix, La Révolution d‟Haïti (Paris: 1819; reprint, Paris: Karthala, 1995), 253.  
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carreaux)
29
 and also put in place formidable bureaucratic obstacles to land ownership, 
stipulating that prospective buyers had to present themselves before authorities, who 
would then decide whether to approve the sale based on a number of factors spelled out 
in the order. These included whether the proposed buyer was “attached” to a plantation 
and how many cultivateurs he would employ.
30
  
In a proclamation that Toussaint delivered to all of the residents of the “former 
Spanish part” of the island on 8 February 1801, he explained the economic and 
philosophical rationales behind his restrictive measures. Lamenting that except for some 
modest sugar cultivation, Santo Domingo was “without agriculture,” Toussaint called 
upon Dominicans to “imitate” the French with respect to plantation production and 
accordingly required them to plant major plantation crops including coffee, cotton, sugar, 
and cacao. Judging it necessary to procure a sizeable and acquiescent labor force to 
cultivate these crops, Toussaint ordered Dominican cultivateurs to be “attached” to their 
plantations, declaring: “I have never thought that liberty was a license, that men [who] 
                                                 
29 This translated into between one hundred and fifty and two hundred acres of land. According to Fick, one 
carreau of land equaled about 3.3 acres, so fifty carreaux would be 165 acres. Fick, The Making of Haiti, 
325. Bell wrote that fifty carreaux translated into about two hundred acres of land. Bell, Toussaint 
Louverture, 206. 
30 Order of Toussaint on land acquisition in Santo Domingo, 18 Pluviôse an 9 (7 February 1801), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “La culture de cette Colonie, bien différente de celle des autres 
pays, exige une réunion de moyens considérables en hommes et en argent, sans lesquels il est impossible 
qu‟un planteur puisse obtenir les avantages qu‟il doit naturellement se proposer...Il s‟est introduit dans la 
Partie française des abus qu‟il est urgent d‟arrêter. Un, deux ou trois cultivateurs s‟associent, achètent 
quelques carreaux de terre, et abandonnent des habitations déjà en valeur, pour aller se fixer sur de 
nouveaux terrains incultes. De cette manière les anciens établissements seraient bientôt ruinés, sans utilité 
pour les entrepreneurs des nouveaux défrichemens et sans compensation pour la chose publique, des pertes 
que ces isolemens occasionnent. Il est de la prudence d‟empêcher une semblable 
désorganisation...L‟Administration municipale est tenue d‟examiner si le déclarant est déjà attaché à une 
habitation, quel est le genre de culture qu‟il se propose d‟établir, quel est le nombre de cultivateurs qu‟il 
peut employer et après avoir examiné s‟il a les moyens de former ou de soutenir un établissement, elle 
soumettra sa demande à mon approbation.” Fick stated that Toussaint implemented a similar measure in 
Saint-Domingue. Fick, The Making of Haiti, 207. Furthermore, according to Eric Nabajoth, Toussaint 
decreed on 7 May 1801 that notaries could not register land transactions that included less than sixty-five 
hectares of land. Eric Nabajoth, “Toussaint-Louverture et la Constitution de 1801: une perspective 
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became free could give themselves with impunity to laziness [and] to disorder.” While he 
affirmed that these cultivateurs had a right to basic protection of their persons and their 
safety as well as to their quarter of the plantation revenues, Toussaint insisted that they 
must be “subordinated,” for their own good as well as for that of the colony. “Everywhere 
the land only awaits the aid of arms to work its treasures,” Toussaint proclaimed in a 
statement that had strong echoes of Sánchez Valverde‟s prescriptions of nearly two 
decades earlier.
31
 While various observers over the past two centuries have seen in 
Toussaint the realization of the abbé Raynal‟s famous prediction of the coming of a 
“black Spartacus,” Toussaint‟s labor and economic policies in Santo Domingo suggest 
that, at least in this colony, he may have had more interest in fulfilling the vision of 
Sánchez Valverde than that of the abbé Raynal.
32
 
                                                                                                                                                 
indépendantiste dans le cadre d‟un régime autoritaire?” in Saint-Domingue espagnol et la révolution nègre 
d‟Haïti (1790-1822), ed. Alain Yacou (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 277. 
31 “Proclamation” of Toussaint “to all of the inhabitants of the former Spanish part” of the island, 19 
Pluviôse an 9 (8 February 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “À l‟exception de 
quelques habitations où la canne à sucre était cultivée, et dont le produit suffisait à peine à la 
consommation des habitans, la ci-devant Partie espagnole est sans culture, et par conséquent sans 
commerce...Le secret de leur aisance et de leur bonheur est donc révélé aux habitans de la ci-devant Partie 
espagnole: ils n‟ont qu‟à imiter les Français, pour jouir avec eux les fruits de l‟industrie, et leur pays, plus 
favorisé des dons de la nature, peut par leurs soins et leurs travaux devenir plus florissant encore. En 
conséquence: il est ordonné à tous les habitans de la Partie espagnole qui possèdent des habitations, de 
planter des cannes, du café, du coton, du cacao. Il est de leur intérêt de sortir de l‟indolence à laquelle ils 
étaient livrés: par-tout la terre n‟attend que les secours des bras pour ouvrir ses trésors, pour récompenser 
ceux qui se livreront à la culture de ces riches productions, tandis qu‟elle laisserait dans la misère ceux qui 
cultivent des bananes, des patates, des ignames, productions sans valeur dans cette Colonie...Je n‟ai 
jamais pensé que la liberté fut la licence, que des hommes devenus libres puissent se livrer impunément à 
la paresse, au désordre: mon intention bien formelle est que les Cultivateurs restent attachés à leurs 
habitations respectives; qu‟ils jouissent du quart des revenus; qu‟on ne puisse impunément être injuste à 
leur égard; mais en même temps je veux qu‟ils travaillent plus encore qu‟autrefois, qu‟ils soient 
subordonnés, qu‟ils remplissent avec exactitude tous leurs devoirs, bien résolu à punir sévèrement celui 
que s‟en écartera.” Sánchez Valverde had argued that “[t]he richest Mines do not yield their metal[s] if one 
does not work [in] them, nor does the most fertile land [yield] all of the abundance of its fruits without arms 
and the plow.” Sánchez Valverde, Idea del valor de la isla española, 168-169. In the original text: “Las 
más ricas Minas no dan su metal si no se labran, ni la tierra más fértil toda la abundancia de sus frutos sin 
los brazos y el arado.” 
32 The abbé Raynal was a renowned anti-slavery writer and scholar in eighteenth-century France. In his 
Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes 
(Geneva, 1780), 3:204-205, Raynal predicted a great slave uprising headed by a strong leader. For an 
incisive discussion that contextualizes Raynal‟s writings within the political and intellectual currents of 
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In the ensuing weeks, Toussaint issued other decrees that contained a mixture of 
economic incentives for traders and restrictions on the autonomy of freed people. 
Declaring that “[w]ith arms, intelligence, and activity, laborious men are assured, on such 
fertile land, to be paid a hundredfold for their efforts and their work,” Toussaint on 12 
February 1801 reduced import and export duties in both of Santo Domingo‟s principal 
departments of Samaná and Inganno from twenty to six percent in order to stimulate 
production and trade. In this order, he singled out cash crops including sugar, coffee, 
cacao and tobacco, whose production in his mind served “the state” (la chose publique).33 
This fixation on plantation agriculture led Toussaint to adopt policies that banned or 
marginalized forms of production that he considered inefficient. On 5 March 1801, 
Toussaint prohibited all woodcutting of mahogany except for that which served the 
“internal construction of the Colony” in the name of curbing deforestation.34 Toussaint‟s 
relentless pursuit of his economic vision caused him to brush aside criticisms of his 
policies such as that offered by a French official in Caracas who predicted that this ban 
on woodcutting would hinder Santo Domingo‟s economic development.35  
                                                                                                                                                 
eighteenth-century French antislavery on both sides of the Atlantic, see Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 62-
73 (esp. 64-68).  
33 “Proclamation” of Toussaint on agriculture and commerce in Santo Domingo, 23 Pluviôse an 9 (12 
February 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Avec des bras, de l‟intelligence et de 
l‟activité, les hommes laborieux sont assurés, sur une terre aussi fertile, d‟être payés au centuple de leurs 
avances et de leurs travaux.” A copy of this document is located in CARAN Colonies CC/9b/9. 
34 Order of Toussaint on mahogany woodcutting, 14 Ventôse an 9 (5 March 1801), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/9. In the original text: “À compter de la publication du présent arrêté, il est expressément défendu à 
qu‟elle personne que ce soit, d‟abattre un arbre d‟acajou. Les propriétaires des dits bois ne pourront en 
couper ni en vendre que pour la construction intérieure de la Colonie.” In a letter to the Minister of the 
Navy, the French official Pichon in New York claimed that Toussaint built numerous “box beams” 
(caissons) out of mahogany to protect his arms and munitions from the climate. Pichon to Minister of the 
Navy, 14 Prairial an 9 (3 June 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/28. 
35 Pons to Minister of the Navy, 10 May or 18 May 1801, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. 
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In March of 1801, Toussaint assembled a multiracial delegation comprised of men 
from both parts of the island whom he entrusted with drafting a constitution.
36
 Created 
primarily to institutionalize Toussaint‟s political authority on the island, this document 
named Toussaint governor of the island “for the rest of his glorious life” while at the 
same time refusing to proclaim an outright break with the mother country, asserting that 
“all men [on the island] are born, live and die free and French.”37 This constitution also 
reiterated and expanded upon Toussaint‟s earlier coercive labor measures and by 
implication affirmed the application of these labor codes to Santo Domingo.
38
 Moreover, 
                                                 
36 For the text of Toussaint‟s constitution, see: Claude Moïse, Le projet national de Toussaint Louverture et 
la constitution de 1801 (Montréal: Editions du CIDIHCA, 2001), 72-85; and Thomas Madiou, Histoire 
d‟Haïti (1847-1848; reprint, Port-au-Prince: Deschamps, 1989), 2:542-555. According to Antonio del 
Monte y Tejada, the constitution‟s framers and signatories included not only a coalition of men from Saint-
Domingue but also a contingent of “españoles” (Spaniards) who were presumably from Santo Domingo. 
Monte y Tejada related that these “Spanish” representatives were named Muñoz, Caballero, J. Mancebo, 
Viart, and Carlos de Rojas. The “French” signatories were listed as Borgella, Collet, Raymond, Gaston, 
Latour and Nocerb. Antonio del Monte y Tejada, Historia de Santo Domingo (1890-1892; reprint, Ciudad 
Trujillo [Santo Domingo], 1953), 3: 212. In Moïse‟s text the constitution‟s signatories appear as “Borgella, 
président, Raymond, Collet, Gaston Nogérée, Lacour, Roxas , Munos, Mancebo, E. Viart.” Moïse, Le 
projet national, 85. Madiou lists them as “Borgella, Président, Raymond, Collet, Gaston, Nogérée, Lacour, 
Roxas, Mugnos, Mancebo, E. Viart” in Histoire d‟Haïti, 2:554.  
37 Moïse, Le projet national, 72. In the original text: “Il ne peut exister d‟esclaves sur ce territoire, la 
servitude y est à jamais abolie. Tous les hommes y naissent, vivent et meurent libres et Français...La 
Constitution nomme gouverneur le citoyen Toussaint-Louverture, général en chef de l‟armée de Saint-
Domingue, et, en considération des importants services qu‟il a rendus à la colonie, dans les circonstances 
les plus critiques de la révolution, et sur le vœu des habitants reconnaissants, les rênes lui en sont confiées 
pendant le reste de sa glorieuse vie.” See also Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 242-246 for a recent 
interpretation of Toussaint‟s 1801 constitution.  
38 Title VI of this constitution outlined Toussaint‟s labor policies. Article XVI confirmed the application in 
the entirety of Toussaint‟s domains of his “police regulation” of 20 Vendémiaire an 9 (12 October 1800), 
which had codified his earlier repressive labor decrees. Moreover, article XVII established the conditions 
for the “introduction [to Hispaniola] of cultivators [who are] indispensable for the reestablishment and the 
growth of agriculture.” Moïse, Le projet national, 74. In the original text: “Pour réprimer un vice aussi 
funeste à la colonie que contraire à l‟ordre public, le gouverneur fait tous règlements de police que les 
circonstances nécessitent et conformes aux bases du règlement de police du 20 vendémiaire an IX, et de la 
proclamation du 19 pluviôse suivant du général en chef Toussaint-Louverture. Art. 17-L‟introduction des 
cultivateurs indispensables au rétablissement et à l‟accroissement des cultures aura lieu à Saint-
Domingue; la Constitution charge le gouverneur de prendre les mesures convenables pour encourager et 
favoriser cette augmentation de bras, stipuler et balancer les différents intérêts, assurer et garantir 
l‟exécution des engagements respectifs résultant de cette introduction.” Toussaint‟s acute awareness of the 
sensitivity of the question of slavery is evident in his apparent reticence to make his constitution public 
knowledge in the United States, where the southern slaveholder Thomas Jefferson had recently acceded to 
the presidency. In a letter dated 25 July 1801 in Le Cap, US Commercial Agent Tobias Lear informed 
Secretary of State James Madison that he had managed to procure a copy of Toussaint‟s constitution on the 
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Toussaint inscribed into this document his preference for the export of plantation-based 
cash crops by banning their importation into the island.
39
  
In the labor codes that he had promulgated in 1798 and 1800, Toussaint had 
adopted the core components of the labor regulations that the Civil Commissioners 
Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel had devised in 1793-1794: workers were 
to be bound by force and law to their plantations; they would collectively earn one 
quarter of plantation revenues; and military and domestic service constituted the only 
legal means by which able-bodied individuals could escape plantation work.
40
 
Toussaint‟s two main innovations on these earlier decrees were the intensification of this 
“militarization of agriculture” and the formal extension of these labor rules to Santo 
Domingo.
41
 
Though Santo Domingo‟s dramatically different economic situation might have 
suggested the wisdom of employing a labor system distinct from that which prevailed in 
Saint-Domingue, Toussaint appears to have sought to impose very similar labor regimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
condition that this document “would not be made public in the United States at present.” Lear to Madison, 
25 July 1801, CARAN 208 Mi 2. 
39 Article XVIII reads: “As the commerce of the colony consists only of the exchange of commodities and 
products of its territory, in consequence the introduction of those of the same nature as its own [products] is 
and remains prohibited.” Moïse, Le projet national, 74. In the original text: “Le commerce de la colonie ne 
consistant uniquement que dans l‟échange des denrées et productions de son territoire, en conséquence, 
l‟introduction de celles de même nature que les siennes est et demeure prohibée.” 
40 In a “Provisional Regulation” issued in Port-Républicain (Port-au-Prince) on 18 May 1798, Toussaint 
had ordered that all “citizens” who were “attached” to agriculture but who were not presently engaged in 
either military or domestic service be arrested by the Gendarmerie and “subjected to labor.” “Provisional 
Regulation of General Toussaint Louverture,” 29 Floréal an 6 (18 May 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. 
In the original text: “Tous cytoyens et citoyennes qui étaient attachés à la culture et qui se trouvent 
maintenant vagabonds dans les villes et dans les campagnes, qui n‟étant attachés ni à l‟État militaire ni à 
celui de domesticité y [illegible] une vie oisive et par conséquent pernicieuse à la société seront arrêtés par 
la Gendarmerie et conduits au commandant en chef du lieu où ils auront été arrêtés, lequel les fera 
conduire sur leurs habitations respectives pour y être assujettis au travail.” Toussaint extended this decree 
to all of Saint-Domingue in October 1800, when he formally entrusted the military with the enforcement of 
his labor regime. Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 203. A copy of Toussaint‟s 12 October 1800 “Règlement de 
Culture” is preserved in CARAN Colonies CC/9b/9. For more details on the nature of Toussaint‟s 
agricultural labor policies, see a report sent to the French Minister of the Navy and Colonies dated 16 
November 1800 in CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18.  
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in both places. Unfortunately, much of the extant evidence on the effects of Toussaint‟s 
labor policies in Santo Domingo is contained in quite tendentious tracts which were 
sometimes written by those who opposed him. In a May 1801 report, Toussaint‟s 
adversary Chanlatte accused him of employing the “most severe violence” to “[call] all 
blacks, without distinction” to agricultural labor in both parts of the island.42 Moreover, 
two British correspondences from the 1820s offer lurid portraits of the state of 
agricultural labor under Toussaint in both colonies. In a letter to Secretary George 
Canning written in Port-au-Prince on 9 September 1826, British Consul General Charles 
Mackenzie detailed the “decidedly coercive” clauses of Toussaint‟s constitution 
concerning agricultural labor and contended that although the “cultivators” were 
supposed to receive a quarter of plantation revenues, they were given “in reality much 
less” than this share.43 In one report submitted to the Earl of Dudley a year and a half 
later, Mackenzie claimed that atrocities evocative of the days of slavery such as caning 
and live burials had survived under Toussaint.
44
 Those claiming to have been subjected to 
these labor practices were perhaps even more polemical. In an account of his experiences 
as a French colonist in the northern Samaná peninsula, Armand Hardouin compared 
Toussaint to the Roman emperor Nero and accused him of forcing “the Spanish of all 
classes and colors” to perform “public labor.”45 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 26. 
42 Antoine Chanlatte, “Historical Summary of the Deeds that Preceded the Invasion of the Territory of the 
Former Spanish Part of Saint-Domingue by Toussaint Louverture,” 8 Prairial an 9 (28 May 1801), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Pour mieux endormir les habitants de la partie Espagnole, 
Toussaint rendait des arrêtés pour rappeler sans distinction tous les noirs à la culture; on prétendait même 
qu‟il employait la violence la plus sévère pour faire exécuter ces dispositions qui paraissaient si favorables 
à l‟ordre public.” 
43 Mackenzie to Canning, 9 September 1826, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/54. 
44 Mackenzie to the Earl of Dudley, 10 March 1828, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/54. 
45 Report of Armand Hardouin, undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/53. In the original text: “Les Espagnols 
de toutes les classes et couleurs, furent envoyés aux travaux publics, et aux plus humiliants.” 
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Many years ago, C. L. R. James labeled Toussaint‟s imposition of harsh labor 
polices in Saint-Domingue a “change from the old to the new despotism.”46 In seeking to 
appeal to thousands of ex-slaves in both parts of the island while pursuing his economic 
agenda, Toussaint actively encouraged these ex-slaves‟ aspirations for economic and 
personal autonomy only to then repress what ensued. In his determination to transform a 
long-neglected outpost of empire into a prosperous export colony, Toussaint attempted to 
target ex-slaves‟ practices of cultivating small-scale landholdings that have deep roots in 
both Haitian and Dominican history. While the radically different stages of plantation 
development that characterized Santo Domingo and Saint-Domingue by 1789 translated 
into distinct patterns of peasant and slave settlement and cultivation, the peasantries of 
both nations grew out of enslaved populations who had found in subsistence agriculture 
an escape from the brutalities and dehumanization of the slave regime.  
As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has convincingly demonstrated, slaves‟ cultivation 
grounds in colonial Saint-Domingue had acquired a profound and enduring “ideological 
significance” for their symbolic as well as economic value, since they represented a rare 
area in which the slaves exerted a certain degree of control and autonomy.
47
 Richard 
Turits has argued that a similar phenomenon occurred in Santo Domingo/Dominican 
Republic. “Deeply rooted in peasants‟ moral economy,” Turits contends, “was a right to 
the land. Especially in the historical context of slavery, an independent means of 
subsistence became associated with freedom—autonomy from economic subordination to 
and control by others as well as from the vagaries of market and central state forces.”48 
                                                 
46 James, The Black Jacobins, 242.  
47 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 39. See also Mintz, “Slavery and the Rise of Peasantries.” 
48 Richard Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican 
History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 27.  
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During Toussaint‟s reign in Santo Domingo, these historical developments converged as 
both Dominican and Dominguan freed peasants determinedly sought this “autonomy 
from economic subordination.” Indeed, the “abuse” that Toussaint so vehemently decried 
that involved the small-scale cultivation in Santo Domingo may have had its roots in 
these same practices and inclinations.  
The advent of revolutionary conflict to Hispaniola in the 1790s led formally free 
men and women to adapt old tendencies to new circumstances. After 1795, numerous 
freed people from Saint-Domingue had migrated across the old colonial boundary and in 
so doing built on centuries-old patterns in which ex-slaves and their descendants had 
carved out spaces of autonomy and economic independence as poor but free ranchers and 
farmers. “What is surprising but nonetheless true,” declared Chanlatte in a report dated 9 
June 1800, “is that the slaves even in the Spanish part have preferred their state [of 
bondage] to the facility that they had to go to the French part where liberty awaited 
them.”49 What Chanlatte interpreted as a rejection of freedom nonetheless appears to 
have been an illustration of these individuals‟ quests to attain “liberty” on their own terms 
by following the example of Dominican peasants who for centuries had created and 
preserved spaces of freedom in el monte.
50
 Chanlatte indeed admitted that many French 
                                                 
49 “Description of the French and Spanish Parts of the Island of St-Domingue by Antoine Chanlatte Brigade 
General [and] Commissioner of the French Government in the Former Spanish Part of Saint-Domingue,” 
20 Prairial an 8 (9 June 1800), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Ce qui est surprenant 
mais pourtant vrai, c‟est que les esclaves même de la partie espagnole ont préféré leur état à la facilité 
qu‟ils avaient de passer dans la partie française où la liberté les attendait.” 
50 “El monte” refers to the sparsely-populated countryside in Santo Domingo, where from the sixteenth 
century former slaves and their descendants had often managed to largely elude the reach of the state and 
the plantation. See Turits, Foundations of Despotism, chapter 1.  
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citizens “of all colors” often “frequented” Santo Domingo in order to “seek asylum” from 
various “persecutions” that they experienced in Saint-Domingue.51 
While Haiti‟s foundation by onetime slaves has been commemorated by 
everything from the large statue of the “unknown maroon” in Port-au-Prince to 
contentious debates over the role of Vodou in the 1791 slave revolt, no comparable 
official or mass awareness of the Dominican slave past has emerged.
52
 Nonetheless, in its 
own way the Dominican peasantry—and by extension, the nation as a whole—was also 
the “offspring of slavery,” in the words of the Dominican intellectual Pedro Francisco 
Bonó.
53
 Indeed, as in the Haitian case, genuine “liberty” for freed Dominicans came to 
encompass much more than a simple escape from the juridical status of slave. Equally 
crucial was the ability to cultivate a plot of land, however small, and to benefit from its 
fruits in proportion to the amount of labor invested. In the words of Trouillot, such a 
fundamental right to land and its products became in Haiti “the terms under which 
freedom was first formulated in the history of the [Haitian] nation.”54  
Perhaps partly due to his status as a relatively privileged horseman during his time 
in bondage, Toussaint appears not to have shared such sentiments with the masses of ex-
slaves in Hispaniola; if he did he did not act upon them. For their part the freed 
individuals who lived in Toussaint‟s Santo Domingo were part of what Turits has termed 
                                                 
51 “Description of the French and Spanish Parts of the Island of St-Domingue,” 9 June 1800, CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Beaucoup de français de toute les couleurs, de tous les principes, 
de toutes les opinions ont successivement fréquenté la partie espagnole...pour y chercher un asile contre 
les persécutions, les assassinats, qui étaient devenus les élémens du gouvernement colonial.” 
52 Nonetheless, several scholars have explored this aspect of Dominican history in depth. See for example 
Carlos Esteban Deive, La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492-1844) (Santo Domingo: Museo del 
Hombre Dominicano, 1980); and Ruben Silié, Economía, esclavitud y población: Ensayos de 
interpretación histórica del Santo Domingo español en el siglo dieciocho (Santo Domingo: Editora de la 
Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1976).  
53 Quoted in Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 25. 
54 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 39-40.  
235 
 
an “exceptional and enduring Caribbean peasantry” that successive Spanish, French, 
Dominican and Haitian regimes attempted to subordinate to their economic and political 
agendas; these efforts consistently failed until the long twentieth-century dictatorship of 
Rafael Trujillo.
55
 Thus, for all of his successes in rising from slavery to the pinnacle of 
power in Saint-Domingue and in outfoxing and overpowering the armies of the world‟s 
most powerful empires as well as numerous internal foes, in the context of Dominican 
history Toussaint was but another leader who failed to create a plantation economy. 
While the short duration of his reign accounts for part of this failure, other factors include 
the resistance of the cultivateurs and many Dominicans‟ unwillingness to work with or 
especially for this onetime slave. 
As the starting point of the European colonial enterprise in the Americas, 
Hispaniola had been the first territory to experience the range of labor systems that the 
Europeans implemented in their conquered lands. This inheritance framed Toussaint‟s 
seemingly contradictory choices. As Philippe Girard and others have noted, since the 
time of Columbus a wide range of “semifree” labor arrangements had developed 
throughout the Caribbean, which offered some precedents for French Republican 
authorities‟ attempts to fashion labor codes that maintained a subordinated labor force 
without reducing the workers to chattel.
56
 In his own efforts to devise such a system, 
Toussaint‟s predispositions led him to confuse the cultivateurs‟ preference for smaller-
scale agricultural production on their own terms with indolence, as he equated productive 
labor exclusively with the types of plantation and military work that had proven so vital 
to the success of French Saint-Domingue under the ancien régime. The struggles between 
                                                 
55 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 26. 
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Toussaint and these ex-slaves in Santo Domingo challenged the political, economic and 
intellectual boundaries of “emancipation.”  
 
An Aborted Abolition? The Question of Slavery under Toussaint in Santo Domingo 
 
“When I was a slave,” Toussaint had related to General Hédouville a 22 
September 1798 missive, “I became free, by [the French constitution of 1795], when I 
was excluded from society, it made me enter it with my brothers.”57 While Toussaint 
clearly disregarded the fact that he had gained his freedom long before the advent of the 
French and Haitian Revolutions, the political implications of presenting his own personal 
emancipation as inextricably linked to French Republican universal emancipation were 
clear: just as he had played an integral role in bringing about abolition in Hispaniola, so 
too was he indispensible in ensuring its survival.   
By 1801 emancipation on the island was in serious jeopardy, yet Toussaint often 
acted to undermine it even as he strove to protect those whom many Dominican 
emigrants claimed as their slaves. Confronted in Santo Domingo with multiple 
manifestations of freed people‟s wishes for a meaningful liberty, Toussaint responded 
with a mixture of restrictive labor rules, orders seeking to reduce the migration of French 
citizens across the island‟s old colonial boundary, and diplomatic and military measures 
designed to protect Santo Domingo‟s few plantations from “maroon” communities. 
While Emilio Cordero Michel has argued that Toussaint won the support of the “popular 
masses” in Santo Domingo with his liberty declaration and his appointments of non-
                                                                                                                                                 
56 Philippe Girard, “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Domingue, 1799-1803,” 
French Historical Studies 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 589. 
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whites to high offices, the evidence for this is lacking.
58
 At the same time, Toussaint did 
not simply institute a “new type of Slavery,” as the exiled Agent Roume asserted in a 
September 1801 letter.
59
  
 Toussaint nonetheless confronted numerous accusations that he wished to impose 
slavery in new guises. “Is there on the entire island,” General François Kerverseau had 
asked rhetorically on 15 December 1800, “a single black person who, however beaten 
down he may be...to please Toussaint, would want to accept new irons?”60 Though he 
refused to re-impose slavery, Toussaint understood the importance of asserting his 
control over the existing plantation infrastructure in Santo Domingo. In his 15 April 1801 
recounting of Toussaint‟s takeover of the Boca Nigua plantation, Saint-Domingue‟s 
“Receiver General of Contributions” asserted that after declaring Dominican refugees to 
be “émigrés” and distributing their possessions among his chieftains, Toussaint “seized 
the superb plantation of M. Oyarzaval” and stole all the “most Precious” items there. 
Moreover, according to this report this transfer of authority did not lead to an 
amelioration of plantation laborers‟ conditions. “The system of equality and liberty that 
had made the French the first nation in the world,” the Receiver General declared, “is not 
at all appropriate for this country. I repeat again that this System has not destroyed 
slavery there, it has only changed the color [of the plantations‟ managers], the black 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Toussaint to Hédouville, 1 Vendémiaire an 7 (22 September 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the 
original text: “Certes, lorsque d‟esclave, je suis devenu libre par elle, lorsqu‟exclu de la société, elle m‟y a 
fait entrer avec mes frères.” 
58 Emilio Cordero Michel, “Toussaint en Saint-Domingue espagnol,” in Yacou, Saint-Domingue espagnol, 
254-255. 
59 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 3 Vendémiaire an 10 (25 September 1801), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “...sa prétendue constitution qui fixe une ligne de démarcation entre 
les créoles et les affricains et qui annonce visiblement une nouvelle sorte d‟Esclavage, par l‟introduction 
de nouveaux nègres.” 
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brigands, who have been installed there, alone reign there as tyrants.” Despairing that this 
new arrangement retained the brutality of slavery while eliminating the strict labor 
discipline that had made pre-1789 Saint-Domingue “so flourishing and so superb,” this 
official concluded that “the lack of arms, laziness, libertinage, and all the crimes that 
follow from this precipitate [Saint-Domingue‟s] destruction, and upon seizing the 
Spanish part, one has just dealt [Saint-Domingue] the final blow.”61  
Since Santo Domingo‟s plantation infrastructure was so meager and Toussaint‟s 
reign was so brief, these takeovers did not produce the same degree of economic and 
social transformation that they did in Saint-Domingue. Toussaint nonetheless strove to 
protect Santo Domingo‟s few productive enterprises from so-called maroons whom he 
deemed to threaten economic and social order on the island. In a 22 September 1798 
letter to Hédouville, Toussaint had written favorably of the Commandant of Neyba, held 
in high esteem by many Dominican landowners due to his “influence” over the “blacks” 
of the community of Maniel. Many of these landowners had complained to Toussaint of 
“incursions” and “pillages” of their “plantations” committed by individuals from 
Maniel.
62
 Yet Toussaint‟s tough labor policies may in fact have augmented these 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 24 Frimaire an 9 (15 December 1800), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/23. In the original text: “Et est-il dans toute l‟île, un nègre, quelque abruti qu‟on suppose, 
qui, pour plaire à Toussaint, voulût accepter de nouveaux fers?” 
61 Receiver General of Contributions of Saint-Domingue to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 25 
Germinal an 9 (15 April 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Toussaint s‟est emparé 
de la superbe habitation de M. Oyarzaval...malgré cela il en a fait enlever tout ce qu‟il y avait de plus 
Précieux...J‟ai l‟honneur de vous dire dans mes lettres Citoyen Ministre, que le système d‟égalité et de 
liberté qui avait fait des français la première nation du monde, ne convenait pas du tout dans ce pays ci. Je 
le repette encore ce Système n‟y a pas détruit l‟esclavage, il n‟a fait que changer de couleur, des brigands 
noirs, qu‟on a mis en place, y regnent seuls en tyrans...Tant que ce système, je ne crains pas de le dire, 
existera, la France n‟a rien à attendre de cette Antille autrefois si florissante et si superbe; le manque de 
bras, la paresse, le libertinage et tous les crimes qui en sont la suite la précipitent vers sa destruction, et en 
s‟emparant de la partie espagnole, on vient de lui porter le dernier coup.” 
62 Toussaint to Hédouville, 22 September 1798, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the original text: “Il ne 
pourra d‟ailleurs que leur être fort agréable puisque par son influence sur les noirs du Maniel et du 
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communities‟ numbers, for according to Adolphe Cabon these labor practices 
exacerbated “marronnage,” which Toussaint reframed as “vagabondage.”63  
Toussaint could not accept a viable independent polity in Hispaniola that existed 
outside of either the political sphere of the French Republic or the social and economic 
world of the plantation. This led him to adopt much the same authoritarian approach 
towards Maniel as Roume had before him. Due to the “powerful considerations of the 
restoration of agriculture” that alone could return Saint-Domingue to its “former 
splendor,” Toussaint demobilized several hundred of his soldiers and reassigned them to 
agricultural labor while redeploying about one hundred other troops to Neyba to serve 
under “Chef de Brigade” Mamzelle, who supposedly had the “trust of the blacks of 
Maniel.” Toussaint made these decisions in order to bring these “blacks,” who had 
become “independent” during the ancien régime, into the Republican fold so that they 
would obey the Republic‟s “beneficent laws.”64  
Maniel presented a direct challenge to Toussaint‟s claims to be the foremost 
defender of liberty on the island as well as his projects of political centralization and 
economic overhaul. His credibility in the eyes of the island‟s freed population may have 
been further undermined by his inability to protect many individuals in Santo Domingo 
from enslavement. In a report to the Minister of the Navy dated 17 May 1801, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Duncan, il empêchera leurs incursions dans leur territoire et le pillage de leurs habitations dont ils m‟ont 
portés des plaintes.” 
63 Adolphe Cabon, Histoire d‟Haïti: Cours professé au Petit-Séminaire-Collège Saint-Martial (Port-au-
Prince: Édition de la Petite Revue, 192?-1940), 4:190. 
64 Toussaint to Hédouville, 30 Fructidor an 6 (16 September 1798), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/23. In the 
original text: “J‟ai l‟honneur de vous prévenir que les considérations puissantes de la restauration des 
cultures qui seules peut rendre à St Domingue son ancienne splendeur...m‟ont porté à licencier une partie 
des soldats enrégimentés dans la 8, 10 et 12 régiments...Mamzelle, Chef de Brigade que je viens de revêtir 
le commandement comme connaissant les localités et ayant la confiance des noirs du Maniel et du Duncan 
qui s‟étaient rendus indépendants de l‟ancien gouvernement et qui m‟ont fait promettre par le chef de 
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Toussaint‟s close friend Charles Vincent (the Fortifications Director) stated that while 
“the black man, enjoy[ed] all his rights in the French part,” if he found himself in the 
“Spanish part” he could “be sold and embarked to be transported to another Colony.”65 
The most convincing evidence of Toussaint‟s mixed record on slavery in Santo Domingo 
nonetheless comes not from those with whom he had close contact but rather from those 
who departed from the island seeking to take their “slaves” with them.    
 
Exiles and Refugees: Bondage and Flight from Santo Domingo 
 
Like any proper revolution, the upheaval in Hispaniola produced its share of 
exiles (both forced and self-imposed), whose economic losses, psychological and social 
displacement, and real as well as perceived political persecution run throughout the pages 
of seemingly innumerable correspondences and mémoires. Though scholars of the 
Haitian Revolution have mostly focused on the waves of Dominguan refugees who fled 
after events such as the 1791 slave revolt, the destruction of Le Cap in June 1793, and the 
collapse of French rule in Saint-Domingue in late 1803, the transfer of Santo Domingo to 
France produced its own cohort of exiles who often relocated to parts of the Spanish 
empire such as Cuba and Puerto Rico.
66
 Toussaint‟s capture of Santo Domingo city in 
                                                                                                                                                 
brigade Mamzelle que j‟envoyai plusieurs fois auprès d‟eux, de se réunir aux républicains et d‟obéir aux 
lois bienfaisantes de la république française.” 
65 Report of Charles Vincent to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 27 Floréal an 9 (17 May 1801), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/28. In the original text: “...si l‟homme noir, jouissant de tous ses droits dans la 
partie française, se trouvait jetté, par un événement quelconque dans la partie espagnole; il devait y être 
vendu et embarqué pour être transporté dans une autre Colonie.” 
66 In what is probably an exaggerated estimate, Roberto Cassá wrote that more than two-thirds of Santo 
Domingo‟s population emigrated after 1789. Roberto Cassá, “Les effets du Traité du Bâle,” in Yacou, 
Saint-Domingue espagnol, 209. According to David Geggus, by the summer of 1796 several thousand 
residents of Santo Domingo including almost eight hundred “black auxiliaries” had emigrated. David 
Geggus, “Slave Resistance in the Spanish Caribbean in the mid-1790s,” in A Turbulent Time: The French 
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, ed. David Geggus and David Gaspar (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 140. 
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1801 appears to have accelerated this exodus, notwithstanding his imposition in February 
1801 of a ban on most emigration from the former Spanish colony.
67
 
On 20 May 1802, one such refugee, don Pedro Abadia, composed a detailed letter 
to a Monsieur Thermite, the commander of the frigate La Poursuivante. Writing from 
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, Abadia described himself as “the unfortunate attorney of the 
most beautiful plantation in the Spanish part of St-Domingue” who had been “chased 
from this country by the bloodthirsty and hypocritical Toussaint Louverture.” Professing 
his loyalty to the Napoleonic forces that were engaged in a war to re-conquer Hispaniola, 
Abadia insisted that he would without hesitation provide useful information to this 
expedition‟s leader, General Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc, in order to prove his 
“devotion to our new mother country.” Abadia nonetheless acted less out of any 
newfound sense of patriotism than out of concrete material and familial motivations. As a 
relative of this plantation‟s director Juan Baptista Oyarzával and as an official charged 
with overseeing the production of aguardiente (sugar cane brandy) who had experience 
punishing slaves who had attempted to steal this product, he eagerly awaited the end of 
                                                 
67 On 8 February 1801, Toussaint decreed a ban on all emigration from Santo Domingo except for that of 
Governor Joaquín García and the Regiment of Cantabria. “Proclamation…to all of the Inhabitants of the 
Former Spanish Part [of Hispaniola],” 19 Pluviôse an 9 (8 February 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. 
According to Frank Moya Pons, in 1795 emigration from Santo Domingo commenced on a fairly modest 
scale, but it became much more pronounced in the wake of Toussaint‟s invasion in early 1801. Moya 
asserted that virtually all Spanish authorities as well as “French functionaries” departed Santo Domingo 
after Toussaint‟s invasion, and at least 1,988 individuals from Santo Domingo arrived in Venezuela in the 
first two months of 1801. Frank Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 9th ed. (Santo Domingo: 
Caribbean Publishers, 1992), 191-192. See also Carlos Esteban Deive, Las emigraciones dominicanas a 
Cuba, 1795-1808 (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1989), 91-102. Sigfrido Vázquez 
Cienfuegos has written that as of 30 November 1803, 1,679 “French emigrants” had arrived in Santiago de 
Cuba from “Santo Domingo.” Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos, Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba: El gobierno 
del Marqués de Someruelos (1799-1812) (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2008), 289. 
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the “reign of the black despot” so that he could return to the Oyarzával plantation with his 
“200 blacks.”68   
Were these “blacks” claimed by Abadia enslaved or free? As had his Republican 
predecessors, Toussaint confronted the matter of whether the purported property rights in 
human beings of Dominican emigrants trying to depart with their “slaves” superseded the 
rights of these individuals as French citizens. High-ranking Spanish officials generally 
sided with the purported slaveholders, as is evident in a letter dated 16 September 1801 
by a Pedro Ceballos, who praised the “prudent” measures that Governor Joaquín García 
had adopted “in favor of the Owners of Slaves” that permitted them to emigrate with 
these “Slaves” in accordance with the “liberty” that the Treaty of Basel had given them to 
do this.
69
   
An intriguing series of petitions addressed to various Spanish officials that are 
preserved in the Audiencia de Santo Domingo collection in the Archivo General de Indias 
(Seville) provides further insight into these complication questions. Comprising 
significant portions of several legajos (bundles of documents) in this archive, these 
petitions were sent to representatives of the Spanish Crown in the colonies or in Europe 
by supposedly dispossessed refugees from Santo Domingo. They often followed a 
                                                 
68 Don Pedro Abadia to M. Thermite, 20 May 1802, Service Historique de l‟Armée de Terre (hereinafter 
SHAT), Vincennes, France, B7 13. In the original text: “Espagnol et malheureux procureur de la plus belle 
habitation de la partie Espagnole de St Domingue...chassé de ce pays par le sanguinaire et hippocrite 
Toussaint Louverture, je me croirais trop heureux, si je pouvais fournir au Général Leclerc quelques 
Renseignements qui l‟assureraient de mon devoument pour notre nouvelle mère patrie...Je me trouve ici 
avec plus de 200 noirs...lorsque le regne du despote noir est aboli, serait-il condamné à une condition plus 
dure que le reste de ses compatriotes?” For an account of Abadia‟s punishment in 1796 of the “slave” 
Benito, who was accused of stealing aguardiente, see Manuel Bravo y Bermudez to Joaquín García, 14 
December 1796, Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI), Seville, Spain, Audiencia de Santo Domingo 
(hereinafter ASD) 1033. 
69 Pedro Ceballos to Joaquín García, 16 September 1801, AGI Papeles de Cuba (hereinafter Cuba) 1705. In 
the original text: “El Rey enterado por la Carta de VS no. 175 y copias que le son adjuntas, de los 
prudentes pasos y acertadas disposiciones tomadas por VS después de hecha la entrega a la República 
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formula wherein the petitioner affirmed his or her record of loyal service to the Crown 
and to the colony of Santo Domingo; described his or her present dire situation; and 
presented a request for material assistance such as a stipend, a pension, or land. Many 
such refugees who composed these petitions during Toussaint‟s reign in Santo Domingo 
made claims to “slaves” who had lived in the colony for several months under Toussaint, 
which implies the perpetuation of servitude under his rule.  
As the Treaty of Basel became known in Santo Domingo, many anxious 
inhabitants began to create these petitions that ignored French Republican emancipation 
law in favor of Spanish imperial laws that sanctioned slavery. Illustrative of this is an 8 
February 1796 petition brought by a doña Josefa de Coco y Landeche to Spanish 
authorities in that colony. This indigent widow and owner of a sugar plantation wished to 
immigrate to Cuba with her family along with several “Blacks” whom she had in her 
“service.”70  
 Those claimed as slaves appear to have constituted a significant segment of the 
Dominican emigrant population. According to Carlos Esteban Deive, Toussaint estimated 
that three thousand such individuals had departed Santo Domingo by 1801; this figure 
represents a fifth of the fifteen thousand slaves who had lived in the colony in 1789.
71
 
Emigration on such a scale would seem to have jeopardized Toussaint‟s hopes of 
building a plantation economy there, which led him to try to stop this emigration. A letter 
by Cuba‟s Marquis de Someruelos dated 2 November 1801 for instance details the case 
of a widow named doña Ana Baptista, who had attempted to emigrate from Santo 
                                                                                                                                                 
Francesa de la Parte Española de la Isla de Santo Domingo, en favor de los Dueños de Esclavos que se 
retiraban en uso de la libertad que les daban los Tratados...” 
70 Petition of doña Josefa de Coco y Landeche, 8 February 1796, AGI ASD 1033. In the original text: 
“...algunos Negros (que los destina para su servicio).” 
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Domingo to Cuba with nine children and eight “slaves.” She was forced to “abandon” 
these “slaves” because authorities in Santo Domingo did not permit her to “embark” 
them.
72
 In a similar case, Toussaint‟s government prohibited the Dominican refugee José 
de Labastida from taking his six “slaves” (esclavos) with him when he departed Santo 
Domingo for Maracaybo (in modern Venezuela).
73
  
 Did Toussaint simply want to preserve scarce labor in a colony that he wished to 
transform into a prosperous plantation society, or did this interdiction also reflect genuine 
sentiment in favor of protecting these would-be slaves? While the evidence presented in 
the preceding chapter concerning Toussaint‟s opposition to slaving in Santo Domingo 
lends some support to the latter, Toussaint clearly recognized the need for “arms for the 
cultivation of the land,” in Deive‟s words.74 Whatever humanitarian sentiments he may 
have held, Toussaint understood the economic stakes involved in the question of this 
emigration. An 1804 cadastral survey carried out in Santo Domingo by the Napoleonic 
regime that governed there from 1804 to 1809 noted that the “capital representing the 
tributes” fell by “twelve hundred thousand francs” upon Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo 
Domingo city. The reason for this loss, according to the survey, was the departure of 
many cultivateurs whom numerous emigrants had taken to Cuba and Puerto Rico. In a 
blunt assessment of the impact of such migration, the survey‟s authors concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 Deive, Las emigraciones dominicanas a Cuba, 94. 
72 Marquis de Someruelos to Spanish Minister of State, 2 November 1801, AGI ASD 1037. In the original 
text: “Dirige una Instancia de Da. Ana Baptista emigrada de Santo Domingo, y viuda de Don Nicolás 
Arias Admor. que fue de Neyba en aquella Isla en donde falleció dejándola con nueve hijos, y ocho 
esclavos que abandonó por no habérselos dejado embarcar.” 
73 Petition of José de Labastida, 14 December 1802, AGI ASD 1037. 
74 Deive, Las emigraciones dominicanas a Cuba, 93.  
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loss of this labor had turned Santo Domingo into a “wasteland,” devoid of the revenues 
that otherwise would have accrued.
75
  
Toussaint had mixed success in halting this emigration with “slaves.” According 
to one account, a Militia Lieutenant named Alexandro Ynfante tried to leave Santo 
Domingo with his purported slaves after having spent ten months there during 
Toussaint‟s reign but was thwarted by Toussaint‟s prohibition of taking these “slaves” on 
pain of “severe penalties.”76 These “severe penalties” nonetheless did not prevent him 
from holding these people in servitude for ten months on Toussaint‟s watch. Moreover, 
on 8 July 1804 another refugee named Domingo Díaz Paez composed a petition from 
Santiago de Cuba relating that he had owned an estancia and other possessions in Santo 
Domingo and had fled Toussaint‟s occupation of that colony with several captives.77 In a 
petition for land and slaves to facilitate his resettlement in Cuba, Tiburcio Josef Esterlín, 
who had served on the high appeals court in Santo Domingo city, wrote that he had left 
behind assorted coffee and cacao plantations along with about eighty men and women 
claimed as slaves when he departed from the colony.
78
 
                                                 
75 “General Cadastral Register of all the National Goods recognized until this Day in the Eastern Part of 
Saint Domingue,” 30 Nivôse an 12 (21 January 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Il 
est essentiel d‟observer que les capitaux représentant les tributs ont diminué de près de douze cent mille 
francs, au moment de la prise de possession de la Partie ci-devant Espagnole, par Toussaint Louverture. 
Cette perte a été occasionnée par l‟exportation d‟une grande quantité de cultivateurs, faisant partie des 
Biens hypothéqués, que divers Tributaires emmenèrent à la Havane et a Porto-Rico. Les Terreins ainsi 
démunis de Bras, ont resté en friche et consequemment les redevances en sont devenues nulles.” 
76 Account of military service record of Alexandro Ynfante, 7 April 1804, AGI Cuba 1742. In the original 
text: “Abandonó igualmente sus esclabos que no pudo sacar, a causa de la prohivicion estrecha, y general 
entredicho puesto por el citado negro Louverture, baxo penas gravicimas contra los que intentavan 
executarlo.” 
77 Petition of Domingo Díaz Paez, 8 July 1804, AGI Cuba 1742.  
78 Petition of Tiburcio Josef Esterlín, 11 May 1804, AGI ASD 1038. Due in large part to the association of 
blacks from Hispaniola with revolutionary violence, those Dominican refugees who succeeded in resettling 
elsewhere with their captives sometimes faced difficulties incorporating them into local slave societies. For 
example, according to the Intendant of Caracas, many Dominicans were unable to sell or rent out their 
“slaves” due to these captives‟ associations with the “past uprising [in Hispaniola].” Correspondence of 
Andrés Talavera, “General Intendant of the Army and and Royal Treasury of these Provinces [of] Caracas,” 
26 March 1801, AGI ASD 1037. In the original text: “...aun que han traído algunos esclavos aquí no hay 
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Deive has argued that Toussaint‟s 1801 invasion had two contradictory effects on 
Santo Domingo‟s “slaves:” while it emboldened many of them to flee or to simply refuse 
to accompany their would-be masters on ships departing from Santo Domingo, it also 
enabled numerous individuals to emigrate from the island with their purported human 
property.
79
 Some of these petitioners indeed provided evidence of the exploitation of 
these disruptions by these “slaves.” According to one such petition, composed by the 
refugee Francisco de Arredondo, the “black government” had provoked his “slaves” to 
flee from his control.
80
 Furthermore, a report composed by the members of Cuba‟s 
highest appeals court discussed the situation of the lawyer José Antonio Ilinojosa, who in 
his flight from Santo Domingo to Cuba lost the equivalent of nine hundred pesos when 
his two “blacks” (negros) refused to join him.81 Nonetheless, Toussaint‟s measures 
against enslavement in Santo Domingo appear to have not significantly altered the 
quotidian situation of most people claimed as slaves in that colony.  
Toussaint proved rather more successful in the arena of high politics. His 1801 
invasion decapitated the Spanish political apparatus in Santo Domingo, bringing a 
dramatic and sudden end to a process that had proceeded very slowly since the cession of 
1795.
82
 Governor García arrived in Maracaybo on 22 February 1801 as part of a party of 
1,803 political leaders, administrators, military officers, soldiers, family members, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
quien se los compre ni conviene el que los arrienden a los dueños de Hacienda por las Luces que daran a 
los de aquí de la entrega de Santo Domingo a Tusen quando en los de esta serranía no falta el fermento de 
la sublevacion pasada.” 
79 Deive, Las emigraciones dominicanas a Cuba, 93. 
80 Petition of Francisco de Arredondo, 29 November 1805, AGI ASD 1038. In the original text: “...sus 
propios esclavos, q[ue] hasta allí se havian mostrado fieles...parece estavan ya corrompidos, con el 
auxilio, y protección del govierno negro, en la primera jornada profugaron...” 
81 Report of several members of the Real Audiencia in Cuba addressed to don José Antonio Caballero, 4 
February 1804, AGI ASD 1038. 
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servants. The official record of the expedition that included García (who sailed on the 
Danish ship Eliza), created in Maracaybo on 21 March 1801, noted that its members had 
fled the regime of the “black General of the French Colony Tousaint Louverture” 
(General negro de la Colonia Francesa Tousaint Louverture). Among these 1,803 people 
were 360 “Slaves” (Esclavos) who thus comprised twenty percent of the total.83 The 
situation of these “Slaves” evinces the success of many Spanish colonial officials and 
would-be slaveholders in circumventing French Republican emancipation and preserving 
ties of servitude and bondage. Though they had lived through a transformational slave 
revolution, slavery was business as usual for these transplanted colonists and authorities.  
Ultimately, while Toussaint did not impose slavery in Santo Domingo, neither did 
he fulfill his and the French Republic‟s promises of genuine emancipation and equal 
citizenship in that colony. His adherence to formal emancipation went beyond the more 
limited visions of his onetime rivals Jean-François and Georges Biassou. Moreover, his 
attempts to eliminate slaving in Santo Domingo—even if limited in efficacy and partly 
qualified as a justification for his invasion and as a means by which to retain labor 
power—do serve as evidence of his commitment to legal emancipation. Although he 
could be fairly described as an authoritarian and Machiavellian political figure, he also 
stood for the premise that nobody should be enslaved and that the old order built on 
institutionalized racism could no longer endure. In this, Toussaint was truly ahead of his 
time. Nonetheless, in his efforts to replicate the Dominguan plantation complex in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
82 One significant political change that did transpire in Santo Domingo between 1795 and 1801 was the 
transfer of the Real Audiencia of Santo Domingo to Puerto Príncipe, Cuba. Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos 
details this protracted process in Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba, 279-283.  
83 “State that shows the number of Emigrants who have entered this Port [Maracaybo]...” 21 March 1801, 
AGI ASD 1037. Both Chanlatte and Kerverseau also fled Santo Domingo for Venezuela shortly after 
Toussaint‟s takeover in early 1801. Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 190. 
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neighboring colony, Toussaint looked backwards to at least two sources for guidance and 
inspiration: the repressive policies of his predecessors and the world of the plantation that 
had shaped his outlook. His failure to depart from the plantation model in Santo Domingo 
undermined the possibilities of “emancipation” there and widened the divide between 
Toussaint and the island‟s freed population. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Writing from Philadelphia on 2 December 1801, Roume informed the Minister of 
the Navy that travelers from Bordeaux were spreading rumors that the “Consuls of the 
Republic” had ordered Toussaint to oversee a reestablishment of “colonial slavery” in 
Hispaniola, naming him “Captain General” and investing him with a full range of 
“military and civilian” powers.84 In truth, Roume and these voyagers got it half right: 
while the First Consul was indeed apparently preparing to re-impose slavery in Saint-
Domingue, he had in fact become opposed to Toussaint‟s accumulation of power and had 
consequently outfitted a huge military expedition to overthrow him and restore direct 
metropolitan French rule to the island.
85
 
 By the middle of 1801, Toussaint appeared to possess virtually unquestioned 
authority over the island of Hispaniola, yet his grip on power was less secure than it 
                                                 
84 Roume to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 11 Frimaire an 10 (2 December 1801), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Je n‟ai jusqu‟à présent rien fait de semblable, j‟en ai été empêché d‟abord 
par la nouvelle que [illegible] des passagers venant de Bordeaux. Ces arrivants parlaient du rétablissement 
de l‟esclavage colonial comme d‟une chose voulue par les Consuls de la République, et par eux ordonné au 
général Toussaint; ils [illegible] de plus que Toussaint avait été nommé Capitaine général et muni de tous 
les pouvoirs militaires et civils.” 
85 The jury is still out concerning the thorny question of the precise moment in which Napoleon decided to 
reinstitute slavery in Saint-Domingue. According to Dubois, Napoleon had likely made his final decision 
on the matter before dispatching the Leclerc expedition in late 1801, but he did not publicly commit to the 
elimination of general emancipation until a year after this. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 259-260. 
For more details on Napoleon‟s lengthy vacillations on this issue, see Girard, “Napoleon Bonaparte,” 600-
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seemed. On the one hand, his military power had assured a relatively easy conquest of 
Santo Domingo, and he disregarded repeated metropolitan instructions to first not 
undertake and then to renounce the capture of Santo Domingo. His subordination of three 
officials sent by Paris to check his power in 1801 repeated the well-established pattern 
that had played out in his earlier expulsions of Sonthonax, Hédouville, Roume, and 
others.
86
 Nevertheless, winning the peace would prove rather different. Toussaint‟s 
vulnerabilities became painfully evident when the feared French military expedition 
finally arrived. 
 Though Toussaint continued to profess loyalty to France, many inside and outside 
Napoleon‟s government increasingly came to perceive his actions as motivated by the 
secret wish to win independence. In an 11 February 1799 letter to the Directory, the 
“Particular Agent” Desforneaux had warned that Toussaint‟s “insatiable ambition” fueled 
his determined pursuit of a “system of personal independence” that necessitated a swift 
and forceful response from Paris.
87
 Toussaint‟s intervention in Santo Domingo had 
already raised questions in metropolitan circles regarding his loyalty and legitimacy; his 
                                                                                                                                                 
615. Girard contends that Napoleon initially wished to maintain emancipation in Saint-Domingue upon 
deploying the expedition.  
86 In a letter to Toussaint dated 17 March 1801, the French government insisted that he recognize the 
authority of General Combis, the newly-appointed “Commissioner of the French government in the former 
Spanish part of Saint-Domingue.” This letter instructed Toussaint to cooperate with Combis in the “most 
faithful execution of the order of 1 Frimaire, year 9 [22 November 1800], which postpones until general 
peace the taking of possession of this part of the island, ceded to France by the treaty of 4 Thermidor year 3 
[the Treaty of Basel].” Paris to Toussaint, 26 Ventôse an 9 (17 March 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. 
In the original text: “Enfin, le Général Combis, officier supérieur de la marine, est établi commissaire du 
gouvernement français à la partie de S. Domingue, dite ci-devant Espagnole, par un arrêté du 14 du 
courant Vous rapellerez, en conséquence, l‟agent qui y serait établi présentement, et vous concourrez avec 
le général Combis, à la plus fidèle exécution de l‟arrêté du 1er Frimaire, an 9, qui ajourne jusqu‟à la paix 
générale la prise de possession de cette partie de l‟isle, cédée à la France par le traité du 4 Thermidor de 
l‟an 3.” On these three officials, see Mongiraud, Combis, and Desperoux to Minister of the Navy and 
Colonies, 15 Messidor an 9 (4 July 1801), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. 
87 Desforneaux to “Citizen Merlin, Director,” 23 Pluviôse an 7 (11 February 1799), CARAN AF/III/209. In 
the original text: “Par quels moyens ramener à se soumettre à l‟autorité nationale le General Toussaint 
que tous paraît désigner comme dévoré d‟ambition insatiable, comme déterminé à suivre un sistème 
d‟indépendance personnelle et de suprématie sur toutes les autorités civiles et militaires.” 
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new constitution now represented all the proof that many needed that he amounted to 
nothing more than a “usurper” (usurpateur) with a thinly-disguised “opposition to the 
current system of the metropole [France],” as one exiled Saint-Domingue colonist living 
in Philadelphia put it.
88
 “The taking of possession of Santo Domingo,” echoed the French 
official Pichon in a letter from New York, “is but the prelude to the resistance that 
[Toussaint] proposes to make to the forces of the Metropole.”89 
Across the Atlantic in Paris, those who controlled the reins of power had reached 
the same conclusions. In late 1801 Napoleon, who had risen to the most prominent 
position among these leaders, organized military expeditions to Hispaniola as well as 
several other overseas territories with the aim of restoring metropolitan rule and reversing 
the turmoil of the last decade. While he targeted other leaders whom he deemed to 
threaten his authority, Napoleon appears to have reserved a special ire for Toussaint, 
whose sins in the Corsican‟s eyes were numerous. In addition to several major perceived 
affronts to Napoleon‟s authority (of which Toussaint‟s self-appointment as governor-for-
life of Hispaniola was perhaps the most egregious), many lesser demonstrations of the 
Dominguan general‟s power—including a curious order that Dominicans construct an 
“Arc de Triomphe” in Toussaint‟s honor—seemed to directly challenge the claims to 
supremacy of Bonaparte, for whom the outward manifestations and accoutrements of 
power mattered a great deal.
90
 Nonetheless, such slights were only part of a distinct 
confluence of circumstances that contributed to Napoleon‟s decision to deploy the 
                                                 
88 Gerbier to Saint-Domingue, 3 August 1801, Rochambeau Papers, University of Florida‟s Special 
Collections (hereinafter RPUF), no. 75. In the original text: “Car tous les membres ont été de son choix, et 
sont remarquables par leur opposition au système actuel de la métropole.” 
89 Pichon to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 3 June 1801, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/28. In the original 
text: “...la prise de possession de Sto Domingo n‟est que le prélude de la résistance qu‟il se propose de 
faire aux forces de la Métropole.” 
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expedition to Hispaniola. These included the mounting tensions between the two leaders 
and geopolitical realignments marked most significantly by the ephemeral Franco-British 
peace that temporarily removed the military threat of France‟s main rival in the 
Caribbean.
91
 For Napoleon, this created a seemingly propitious environment in which he 
could crush these perceived challengers to his authority. In an often-cited letter that 
Napoleon appears to have taken to heart, General Kerverseau wrote to the First Consul in 
September 1801 that no nation as great as France should “receive laws from a rebel negro 
in one of its own colonies.”92 Bonaparte‟s fatal miscalculation that eliminating Toussaint 
was a superior alternative to collaborating with him precipitated the bitter war of Haitian 
independence, which lasted from early 1802 until November 1803.  
Once the die had been cast, Napoleon acted swiftly. As part of a lengthy series of 
instructions to his brother-in-law General Charles Leclerc, whom he had appointed to 
lead the expedition to Hispaniola, Napoleon on 31 October 1801 declared: “If the 
political goal [of the expedition] in the French part of Saint-Domingue should be to 
disarm the blacks and make them cultivators, but free, we should in the Spanish part 
disarm them as well, but place them back into slavery.”93 This followed a decree that 
Napoleon had issued two days earlier in which he had declared Toussaint‟s occupation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 Kerverseau to Colonial Prefect François Lequoy-Mongiraud, 18 Brumaire an 11 (9 November 1802), 
CARAN 135 Archives Privées (hereinafter AP) 2, dossier 18. 
91 In the spring of 1801, Britain and France began to negotiate a peace treaty. These negotiations 
culminated in the March 1802 Treaty of Amiens that ended hostilities between the two nations until the 
renewal of war in the spring of 1803. For an extensive discussion of the geopolitical circumstances 
concerning this peace and their influence on Napoleon‟s decision-making, see Girard, “Napoleon 
Bonaparte,” esp. 600-603. 
92 Quoted in Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 253.  
93 Napoleon, “Notes pour servir aux instructions à donner au Capitaine Général Leclerc,” 31 October 1801, 
in Lettres du général Leclerc, Commandant en Chef de l‟armée de Saint-Domingue, ed. Paul Roussier 
(Paris: Société d‟Histoire des Colonies Françaises et Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1937), 272. In the original 
text: “Si le but politique de la partie française de Saint-Domingue doit être de désarmer les noirs et de les 
rendre cultivateurs, mais libres, on doit dans la partie espagnole les désarmer également, mais les remettre 
en esclavage.” See also Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 259. 
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Santo Domingo to be “null and void” and ordered all “Ecclesiastic, civil and military 
divisions” to remain under “Spanish authority” until the metropolitan French government 
came up with a clear plan for administrative and judicial reorganization in the colony.
94
  
“I am a soldier. I have no fear of men, I only fear God. If it is necessary to die, 
[then] I will die as an honorable soldier who does not have anything to regret.” Toussaint 
uttered these words in a 20 December 1801 speech to the residents of Saint-Domingue 
that Pierre Pluchon cites as a turning point that marked the moment when Toussaint 
publicly abandoned his adherence to France and declared his intention to militarily 
oppose Napoleon‟s forces.95 By the time of this pronouncement, both Toussaint and 
Napoleon had crossed the Rubicon, drawing their respective lines in the sand over the 
questions of Toussaint‟s power and the viability of slavery on the island. While Toussaint 
organized this resistance in large part as a defense of the regime that he had instituted on 
the island, he and many other freed individuals were also motivated by a perceived need 
to mount a defense of general liberty due to widespread suspicions of Napoleon‟s pro-
slavery intentions.  
In late January 1802, the Leclerc expedition entered the island through its eastern 
part, just as Toussaint had feared.
96
 Toussaint‟s soldiers fought hard to retain every inch 
                                                 
94 Napoleon‟s instructions on Santo Domingo, 7 Brumaire an 10 (29 October 1801), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/28. In the original text: “La prise de possession de la partie Espagnole faite par Toussaint 
L‟ouverture est nulle et non avenue. Lorsque le général en chef le jugera Convenable, il fera dresser le 
procès verbal de prise de possession, dans lequel il aura tous les égards dus à la puissance alliée qui a 
cédé ce territoire à la République. Art. 4. Tous les actes faits dans la partie Espagnole par Toussaint 
L‟ouverture sont, de leur nature, nuls et non avenus. Art. 5. Jusqu‟à ce que le gouvernement ait arrêté une 
organisation définitive pour la partie espagnole de St Domingue, l‟organisation et les divisions 
Ecclésiastiques, civiles et militaires resteront dans l‟État où elles étaient sous l‟autorité Espagnole.” The 
ANOM contains at least two copies of this decree: in 8 Supplément Saint-Domingue (hereinafter 
SUPSDOM) 390 and in CMSM F3 202. 
95 Pluchon, “Toussaint Louverture défie Bonaparte,” 174-177. The original French reads: “Je suis soldat, je 
n‟ai pas peur des hommes, je ne crains que Dieu. S‟il faut mourir, je mourrai comme un soldat d‟honneur 
qui n‟a rien à se reprocher.” 
96 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 262. 
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of ground from the moment he learned of the expedition‟s arrival, yet they were hindered 
by defections (such as that of General Pierre Agé, who had been Toussaint‟s envoy to 
Santo Domingo in 1800), conflicts within their own ranks, and the early loss of vital 
posts such as Le Cap, which burned to the ground in February 1801. This same month the 
enemy targeted Santo Domingo city. Napoleon had appointed General Kerverseau to lead 
the division assigned to wrest this city from the hands of Toussaint‟s brother Paul 
Louverture, and Kerverseau‟s forces succeeded on 21 February 1802 following a three-
week siege of the city.
97
 At the time of Leclerc‟s initial invasion Toussaint had three 
thousand troops in the colony of Santo Domingo out of a total of sixteen to eighteen 
thousand.
98
 One thousand six-hundred of these men defended Santo Domingo city, more 
than a match for Kerverseau‟s four hundred men and two frigates.99 Indeed, the Leclerc 
expedition‟s overall troop commitment to the colony of Santo Domingo appears to have 
been disproportionately slight, as evidenced in a 17 February 1802 letter to Bonaparte in 
which Leclerc stated that he had only one thousand men stationed in the “Spanish part” 
(Partie espagnole) out of a total of over fourteen thousand soldiers.
100
 This, in addition to 
Paul Louverture‟s resistance and the rebel forces‟ determination to defend the liberty that 
they had “conquered through much blood and fire,” may explain why Leclerc‟s men only 
                                                 
97 Claude B. Auguste and Marcel  B. Auguste, L‟expédition Leclerc, 1801-1803 (Port-au-Prince: 
Deschamps, 1988), 111.  
98 Antoine Marie Thérèse Métral, Histoire de l‟expédition des français à Saint-Domingue, sous le consulat 
de Napoleon Bonaparte (Paris: Fanjat Ainé, 1825), 33; and Leclerc to Napoleon, 15 February 1802, in 
Roussier, Lettres du général Leclerc, 88. 
99 Napoleon, “Notes pour servir aux instructions,” in Roussier, Lettres du général Leclerc, 265; and 
Auguste and Auguste, L‟expédition Leclerc, 111-112.  
100 Leclerc to Napoleon, 17 February 1802, in Roussier, Lettres du général Leclerc, 94-95. 
254 
 
seized the city of Santo Domingo when Paul Louverture was duped into surrendering 
after receiving a false letter ordering him to yield to the invaders.
101
  
After the fall of Santo Domingo city, the military tide turned even more against 
Toussaint. A series of defections by his major chieftains decimated his ranks and placed 
him in an increasingly vulnerable position; most notably, the surrender in April 1802 of 
one of his most important generals, Henri Christophe, broke the back of his military 
campaign and impelled him to approach General Leclerc to discuss terms of surrender. At 
a meeting in Le Cap later that spring, Toussaint and his second-in-command Jean-
Jacques Dessalines met with Leclerc and Christophe and signed an accord that sent 
Toussaint back to his old plantation as a retired general and incorporated his former 
troops into Leclerc‟s forces.102 In a letter to Toussaint dated 3 May 1802, Leclerc 
acknowledged his former adversary‟s submission to the “arms of the republic” and 
entreated Toussaint to trust him and to distance himself from those who had “sought to 
mislead [Toussaint] about the true intentions of the French government.”103 In truth, it 
was Leclerc himself who proved to be duplicitous. In June 1802, he tricked and captured 
Toussaint and then proceeded to send the Dominguan leader and his family to France, 
where the Haitian Revolution‟s greatest figure would die in an isolated prison cell in the 
Jura Mountains in April 1803.  
Napoleon is famously held to have bitterly regretted his choice to combat 
Toussaint instead of continuing to collaborate with him; this mistake perhaps cost him at 
                                                 
101 Métral, Histoire de l‟expédition des français, 33. For details on Paul Louverture‟s surrender, see Dubois, 
Avengers of the New World, 267. 
102 For more information on these events, see Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 275.  
103 Leclerc to Toussaint, 13 Floréal an 10 (3 May 1802), ANOM CMSM F3 283. In the original text: “Je 
vois avec plaisir, citoyen général, le parti que vous prenez de vous soumettre aux armes de la république; 
ceux qui ont cherché à vous tromper sur les véritables intentions du gouvernement français, sont bien 
coupables.” 
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least as much geopolitically as his better-known debacle in Russia. “What might [I] not 
undertake,” Napoleon ruefully reflected at the end of his life, “with an army of the 
twenty-five to thirty thousand blacks [that Napoleon might have enlisted had he 
reconciled with Toussaint], in Jamaica, the Antilles, Canada, the United States even, and 
the Spanish colonies?”104 Some less famous exiled Dominican leader or planter might 
well have expressed similar sentiments. Toussaint‟s opinions on economic development 
(and, to a lesser extent, political organization) converged to a remarkable degree with 
those of his numerous enemies in French and Spanish elite circles, and if more of these 
individuals had taken his outstretched hand instead of spitting on it, then the historical 
trajectories of both parts of the island might have been very different. As a firm adherent 
of a Valverdean plantation-oriented economic model based on a coerced labor force who 
at the same time managed to retain the allegiance of thousands of armed ex-slave 
followers despite their sporadic resistance to his authoritarianism, Toussaint could have 
been a very useful partner for these elites.  
Toussaint‟s reign in Santo Domingo had significant implications for a number of 
matters: the fate of the French Republican emancipationist endeavor in the Caribbean; the 
labor systems that would emerge in the Dominican Republic; and circum-Caribbean and 
Atlantic geopolitics. This yearlong occupation of Santo Domingo was also a seminal 
moment in the longue durée of Dominican history in which several centuries of slavery 
forged an enduring ethos that held access to land to be an essential component of 
autonomy and liberty. These mentalités persisted long after slavery‟s final abolition in 
                                                 
104 Quoted in Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 220. Philippe Girard also cites this passage in “Napoleon 
Bonaparte,” 601. 
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1822, such that they strongly influenced the ability of the dictator Rafael Trujillo to gain 
a measure of peasant support and consolidate his rule more than a century later.
105
  
In his assessment of Toussaint‟s life and legacy, Pluchon claimed that by virtue of 
two deeds—his formal defense of emancipation and his defiance of the might of 
Napoleonic France and its armies—this famed leader “transcends the petty borders of 
political maneuvering, to enter the universe of myths and symbols.”106 Notwithstanding 
two centuries of myth-making, the weight of historical evidence concerning Toussaint‟s 
rule in Santo Domingo does not accord with the image of the martyred hero that he 
wished to create for both contemporaries and posterity. Yet Toussaint certainly 
understood the power of “myths and symbols”—especially that of the tree of liberty, 
which became a popular symbol of renewal and the promise of a new beginning in the 
French and Haitian Revolutions. Like all symbols, it could nonetheless acquire quite 
distinct meanings in specific situations. Surveying the human and material devastation 
wrought by Dessalines‟s armies in Saint-Domingue‟s southern province in the civil war 
of 1800, Toussaint is alleged to have remarked: “I said to trim the tree, not uproot it.”107 
In Santo Domingo, Toussaint in some senses uprooted the tree of liberty, yet in other 
respects he put down the roots for the 1822 Dominican abolition of slavery. His rule thus 
left a paradoxical and contested legacy for subsequent Dominican history.  
                                                 
105 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 27. 
106 Pluchon, “Toussaint Louverture défie Bonaparte,” 177. 
107 Quoted in Bell, Toussaint Louverture, 185. 
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Chapter Five  
 
“The Shame of the Nation:” The Force of Re-Enslavement and the Law of 
“Slavery” under the Regime of Ferrand, 1804-1809 
 
On 10 October 1802, the French General François Kerverseau composed a frantic 
“proclamation” that detailed the plight of “several black and colored children” from the 
French ship Le Berceau who “had been disembarked” in Santo Domingo. According to 
the “alarms” and “foolish speculations” of various rumor-mongers in that colony, these 
children had been sold into slavery with the complicity of Kerverseau. As Napoleon‟s 
chief representative in Santo Domingo, Kerverseau strove to dispel the “sinister noises” 
and “Vain fears” that had implicated him in such atrocities, insisting that “no sale [of 
these people] has been authorized” and that any future sale of this nature would result in 
the swift replacement of any “public officer” who authorized it. Kerverseau concluded by 
imploring his fellow “Citizens” to “distrust those who incessantly spread” these rumors 
and to instead “trust those who are charged with your safety; who guard over you while 
you sleep, and who attach to the prosperity of this country, and to Yours, their happiness 
and their Glory.”1    
                                                 
1 Proclamation of François Kerverseau, 18 Vendémiaire an 11 (10 October 1802), Centre d‟Accueil et de 
Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, 135 Archives Privées (hereinafter AP) 2, 
dossier 18. In the original French: “Quelques enfants noirs et de couleur ont été débarqués avec ma 
permission écrite de la Corvette Le Berceau. La malveillance a cherché à inspirer des allarmes, et la 
Cupidité à faire des spéculations insensées. Les Citoyens sont prévenus qu‟aucune vente n‟a été autorisée, 
qu‟aucune ne sera permise…Toute vente qui en serait, ou qui en aurait été faite est déclarée nulle. Tout 
officier public qui se serait permis, ou se permettrait d‟en passer l‟acte, sera destitué…Citoyens, Défiez 
vous de ceux qui vous répandant sans cesse des bruits sinistres et de Vaines terreurs…ayez confiance dans 
ceux qui sont chargés de votre sureté; qui veillent tandis que vous dormez, et qui attachent à la prospérité 
de ce païs, et à la Vôtre, leur bonheur et leur Gloire.” 
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Would Kerverseau clear his name? Would these children be fated for a life of 
bondage, or would they be able to enjoy the right to grow into free men and women? In 
late 1801 and early 1802, Napoleon had deployed a military expedition to Hispaniola 
with the aim of asserting unquestioned metropolitan control over the island. By the fall of 
1802, this expedition had also become committed to the hidden goal of the restoration of 
slavery.
2
 Keenly aware of the ferocious opposition that French forces would encounter 
should the island‟s freed population get wind of the second of these motivations, the 
expedition‟s leaders did their utmost to discredit rumors suggesting an impending return 
to slavery. This lent a special urgency to the Berceau incident, impelling Kerverseau to 
shore up the French Republic‟s emancipationist credentials by denying all wrongdoing 
and promising harsh punishments for all would-be enslavers.  
Ultimately, these determined efforts proved futile, as the “common wind” of 
information spreading from diverse locales brought word not only of episodes such as the 
landing of the Berceau but also of France‟s successful restoration of slavery in 
                                                 
2 On 24 July 1802, the expedition‟s leader General Leclerc wrote to the Minister of the Navy Decrès: “Do 
not think of restoring slavery for some time. I think I can arrange everything so that my successor has no 
more to do than to put the government‟s decree into effect, but after the endless proclamations that I have 
issued here to ensure the blacks their freedom, I do not want to contradict myself, but assure the First 
Consul that my successor will find everything ready.” Jean-Marcel Champion, “30 Floréal Year X: The 
Restoration of Slavery by Bonaparte,” in The Abolitions of Slavery: From Léger Félicité Sonthonax to 
Victor Schoelcher, 1793, 1794, 1848, ed. Marcel Dorigny (Paris: Éditions UNESCO/Presses Universitaires 
de Vincennes, 1995; New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 233. Citation is to the Berghahn Books edition. 
Nonetheless, likely due in part to the wish to conceal the objective of restoring slavery from the island‟s 
freed population, the earliest documentary evidence that I have uncovered in which a high official in this 
Napoleonic expedition openly and directly advocated the reestablishment of slavery in Hispaniola is from 
several months later. In a 15 January 1803 letter to the Minister of the Navy, General Donatien 
Rochambeau (who had assumed command of the expedition in late 1802) argued that “it is necessary to put 
the blacks back into Slavery” in order to rescue French Saint-Domingue from its “deplorable state” and to 
make it once again a “flourishing and productive Colony.” Rochambeau to Minister of the Navy and 
Colonies, 25 Nivôse an 11 (15 January 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/19. In the original French: “Après 
avoir très murement réfléchi, Général, sur la position dans laquelle se trouve St Domingue et sur ce qu‟il 
serait nécessaire de faire pour la tirer de l‟état déplorable où elle est plongée, je suis fondé à vous dire 
qu‟il faut remettre les noirs sous l‟Esclavage; c‟est au point où en sont les Choses, le seul remède au mal, 
et le seul je pense que la triste et cruelle expérience de Douze années de Crimes monstrueux de tous les 
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Guadeloupe and the preservation of the institution in Martinique, which had spent most 
of the emancipation era under slaveholding British rule.
3
 The Berceau incident attests to 
the intense concern that French officials, including Kerverseau, had for their own 
credibility and that of an expedition that effectively sought to re-enslave hundreds of 
thousands of individuals. It also illustrates Santo Domingo‟s involvement in networks of 
captivity and coerced migration that became especially pronounced during a decade that 
witnessed fundamental challenges to both the transcontinental slave trade and slavery 
itself.  
The French words Le Berceau translate to “The Cradle;” in practice Hispaniola in 
late 1802 was fast becoming a graveyard of both French Republican emancipation and 
Napoleon‟s grand designs to reassert French imperial power in the Americas using Saint-
Domingue as a base. For his part, Kerverseau felt his own position gravely jeopardized 
by the Berceau affair, forwarding to his superiors seven documents detailing the facts of 
the case. While these papers suggest that the embattled general had entrusted the children 
in question to a citoyen Cornet who would care for them as free people, they also hint at 
the existence of an enterprise of illicit slaving that involved Santo Domingo.
4
  
 Unsurprisingly for a clandestine slaving operation, the ship‟s exact itinerary is 
unknown, but the evidence from Kerverseau‟s dossier indicates that the ship transported 
several dozen captives, most of them from Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guyana, 
                                                                                                                                                 
genres nous indique, je dirai plus nous Prescrit. La France veut une Colonie florissante et productive pour 
elle, et non pas un vaste champ de meurtres et d‟incendies.” 
3 Julius Scott, “The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of the Haitian 
Revolution” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1986). For details on the restoration of slavery in Guadeloupe, 
see Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), Part III. On the situation in Martinique, 
see Rebecca Schloss, Sweet Liberty: The Final Days of Slavery in Martinique (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009), chapter 1.  
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and that it may have passed through Aruba, Saint Croix, and Puerto Rico before arriving 
in Santo Domingo.
5
 Extant hospital records from Santo Domingo list eighteen people 
from the crew of the Berceau, including five from Cayenne (French Guyana), two from 
Saint-Domingue, six from Martinique, four from Guadeloupe, and one from Africa.
6
 On 
30 October 1802, the governor of Puerto Rico, Ramón del Cano, had advised the French 
expedition‟s leader Charles Leclerc that he had learned via a “subject interested in 
tranquility” residing in Santo Domingo that a commander named Broit had tried to sell 
“eighty-five to ninety-five blacks” from Guadeloupe in Santo Domingo, dumping several 
there “due to illness and other reasons” and taking the remainder with him in order to try 
his luck at various other ports. Governor del Cano assured General Leclerc of his 
willingness to help to “contain this political Epidemic, avoid its spread and havoc, [and] 
apprehend and punish vigorously the guilty parties and their accomplices.”7 
 Leclerc and Kerverseau confronted two related problems: quarantining this 
“political epidemic” that threatened to blow what cover remained on the poorly-
concealed enterprise of re-enslavement; and relocating the seventeen or so black 
“prisoners of War” from this ship who found themselves in Santo Domingo. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 L. Delpech to Kerverseau, Vendémiaire an 11 (23 September-22 October 1802), CARAN 135 AP 2, 
dossier 18.  
5 See Kerverseau to Leclerc, 19 Vendémiaire an 11 (11 October 1802); Kerverseau to Leclerc, 22 
Vendémiaire an 11 (14 October 1802); and Kerverseau to Leclerc, 13 Brumaire an 11 (4 November 1802), 
all contained in CARAN 135 AP 2, dossier 18. 
6 Hospital records for Berceau sailors, Vendémiaire-Brumaire an 11 (23 September-21 November 1802), 
CARAN 135 AP 2, dossier 18. 
7 Governor Ramón del Cano to Leclerc, 30 October 1802, Rochambeau Papers, University of Florida‟s 
Special Collections (hereinafter RPUF), no. 1265. In the original text: “Un sugeto interesado en la 
tranquilidad me escribe desde Sto Domingo con f[echa] de 14 del corriente mes q[ue] el dia 2 del mismo 
fondeó en su Puerto la corbeta de Guerra Francesa Berceau, su Comandante el Capn. de Fragata Mr. 
Broit con ochenta y sinco o noventa y sinco negros…vendiñ en d[icho] Puerto algunos de d[ichos] negros 
y dexó otros por enfermos y otras razones, habiendo comprado el resto Mr. Couret con el designio de 
introducirlos en las Costas de la Ysla…Tanto por esto quanto por atajar en tiempo las consequencias 
sucesivas q[ue] pueden recelarse estoy entendiendo con reserva y seriedad en dictar las mas activas 
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Kerverseau‟s judgment, these captives could not stay indefinitely in Santo Domingo upon 
release from its hospital where they currently resided. “Foreign Governments do not even 
want to admit them as slaves,” lamented Kerverseau in a letter to Leclerc dated 4 
November 1802. Kerverseau thus proposed employing them as sailors on French ships, 
“where they could serve usefully,” or sending them to Aruba or Buenos Aires.8 Though 
he strove to dispose of these captives as expeditiously as possible, Kerverseau called 
others as witnesses to testify on the circumstances of their captivity and forced transit. 
The remarkable series of “declarations” that survive in the archival record serve as 
evidence of a striking irony: that an official in the service of a campaign of re-
enslavement invited captives to offer eyewitness accounts to assist an investigation into 
slaving. One such witness, a “nègre créole de la Martinique” (black creole from 
Martinique) named Jean-Charles, claimed to have been captured from a Danish ship by 
the British off the coast of St Thomas and sent to Martinique, where he was placed on the 
Berceau and sent to Santo Domingo.
9
  
 Jean-Charles and his fellow captives found themselves in the middle of the 
reversal of the hemisphere‟s first large-scale experience with general emancipation. The 
reestablishment of slavery in France‟s overseas colonies imbued longstanding quandaries 
with urgent new significance. Could one capture a juridically free individual in one 
jurisdiction and then proceed to claim him or her as a slave in another? On what legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
providencias para contener esta Epidemia política, evitar su extencion y extragos, aprehender y castigar 
vigorosam[ente] los culpados y complices.” 
8 Kerverseau to Leclerc, 13 Brumaire an 11 (4 November 1802), CARAN 135 AP 2, dossier 18. In the 
original French: “Les dix sept noirs qui sont ici à l‟hôpital, provenant de la même Corvette…Ce sont des 
prisonniers de Guerre. On ne veut pas les renvoyer dans leur païs. Les Gouvernements étrangers ne 
veulent pas même les admettre chez eux comme esclaves et nous ne pouvons les Garder ici. Je vous 
propose, mon Général, ou de les employer comme matelots sur les Bâtiments de l‟État, où ils pourraient 
servir utilement, ou de les déporter tous aux isles de Roube et de Buenos Ayres.” 
262 
 
basis could a person held as a slave sue for his or her freedom? Long before 1794, legal 
struggles over the boundaries of freedom had emerged from the dense webs of extralegal 
commerce in both human beings and material goods, the physical proximity of many 
islands claimed by competing colonial powers, and divergences in colonial slave law 
across colonies (including those in the same empire). Then, after 1802, the successful 
struggle against slavery in Saint-Domingue/Haiti transformed the scope of claims-making 
for those held as slaves and gave rise to powerful new liberation discourses. 
Following the Napoleonic expedition‟s defeat in late 1803 and the formation of 
independent Haiti on 1 January 1804, one of the expedition‟s generals named Jean-Louis 
Ferrand established a regime in the eastern part of the island in 1804 that was driven by 
the overriding objective of erasing the emancipationist past and placing thousands of 
freed people on the island back into bondage. While Ferrand strove to make slavery a 
juridical and social reality in Santo Domingo, those targeted by these efforts fought back. 
This chapter explores the conflicts that emerged when men and women in Santo 
Domingo challenged the fact and terms of their subjugation. It argues that, while Ferrand 
undertook a massive project of attempted re-enslavement, those claimed as slaves or 
vulnerable to enslavement devised a multitude of ways to carve out their own versions of 
“freedom.” 
The Ferrand regime‟s brutality could not conceal the fact that it had a very 
dubious legal mandate to carry out such an endeavor. As Leclerc and his successor 
General Donatien Rochambeau had tried to subdue various rebel armies in Hispaniola, 
they had become frustrated in their attempts to institute a coherent legal framework for 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Testimony of Berceau captives, Brumaire an 11 (23 October-21 November 1802), CARAN 135 AP 2, 
dossier 18.  
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the island. According to one report to Paris composed on 25 February 1803, upon 
disembarking on the island, “the General in Chief [Leclerc] had…the double task of 
reestablishing [in Saint-Domingue] legitimate authority by the force of arms and by that 
of Laws. The Second [task] was perhaps still more difficult than the first, since it was 
necessary to complete it in the tumult of the Camps.”10 Leclerc and Rochambeau in the 
end failed to impose either on those determined to preserve their liberty. The Ferrand 
regime‟s attempts to do so would elicit multiple forms of resistance that played out on 
both the juridical and military planes.  
In societies predicated upon the forced servitude of some of their members, 
conflicts often emerged between these two pillars of “force of arms” and “laws,” as 
“existing relations of force,” in Rebecca Scott‟s words, ultimately undergirded master-
slave relations.
11
 The incoherence of laws built on the premise of transforming human 
beings into pieces of property enabled some slaves in many parts of the Americas to 
exploit certain statutes or provisions to improve their condition or to win their freedom. 
Some slaves even managed to influence the evolution of slave law in some places by 
asserting claims such as the right to purchase oneself from bondage.
12
  
                                                 
10 Anonymous report to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 6 Ventôse an 11 (25 February 1803), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/22. In the original text: “Le Général en Chef avait donc la double tâche d‟y rétablir 
l‟autorité légitime par la force des armes et par celle des Loix. La Seconde était peut-être plus difficile 
encore que la première puisqu‟il fallait la remplir dans le tumulte des Camps.” 
11 Rebecca Scott, “„She…Refuses to Deliver Up Herself as the Slave of Your Petitioner:‟ Émigrés, 
Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 
no. 24 (2009), 134.  
12 For analyses of some of the contradictions that emerged in attempts to codify slavery, see Scott, 
“She…Refuses to Deliver Up Herself,” and Keila Grinberg, “Slavery, Liberalism and Civil Law: 
Definitions of Status and Citizenship in the Elaboration of the Brazilian Civil Code (1855-1916),” in 
Honor, Status and Law in Modern Latin America, ed. Sueann Caulfield, Sarah Chambers, and Lara Putnam 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 109-127. In colonial Cuba, litigation and other actions by slaves 
led to the creation of two legal rights for slaves: coartación (self-purchase in installments) and pedir papel 
(to “request paper” to change masters). Alejandro de la Fuente situates this phenomenon within the 
contexts of Spanish-American slave law and Cuban slave society in “Slaves and the Creation of Legal 
Rights in Cuba: Coartación and Papel,” Hispanic American Historical Review 87, no. 4 (2007): 659-692. 
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 It is not clear whether slavery was ever explicitly reestablished in law by the 
French under Napoleon in Santo Domingo. As discussed in chapter 4, Napoleon on 31 
October 1801 had instructed General Leclerc to place Dominican blacks “back into 
slavery,” but no known legal mechanism backed up this order. The French scholars Jean-
François Niort and Jérémy Richard have argued that any measure restoring slavery at this 
time would have been illegal by virtue of being in contravention of the 1799 French 
constitution, while only an act passed by a legislature would have the “same juridical 
force” as the 1794 emancipation act.13 On 20 May 1802, Bonaparte‟s legislature passed a 
law composed of four short articles that did little more than formally ratify Napoleon‟s 
“free part/enslaved part” compromise discussed in chapter 3 that confirmed slavery only 
in those areas where it had been maintained de facto. The law‟s four articles are worth 
quoting in their entirety:  
First Article: In the colonies returned to France in execution of the Treaty of 
Amiens of 6 Germinal Year Ten [27 March 1802], slavery will be maintained in 
accordance with the laws and regulations prior to 1789.  
Article 2: This will also be the case in the other French colonies beyond the Cape 
of Good Hope.  
Article 3: The trade in Blacks and their importation in the said colonies will take 
place in accordance with the laws and regulations in force before the said date of 
1789.  
Article 4: Notwithstanding all of the preceding laws, the colonial regime is 
subject for ten years to the regulations that will be made by the government.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                 
See also Alejandro de la Fuente, “Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: The Tannenbaum Debate 
Revisited,” Law and History Review 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 339-369. 
13 Jean-François Niort and Jérémy Richard, “À propos de la découverte de l‟arrêté consulaire du 16 juillet 
1802 et du rétablissement de l‟ancien ordre colonial (spécialement de l‟esclavage) à la Guadeloupe,” 
Bulletin de la Société d‟Histoire de la Guadeloupe no. 152 (January-April 2009), 40-42. 
14 Pierre Branda and Thierry Lentz, Napoléon, l‟esclavage et les colonies (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 121-122. 
The original text is as follows: “Article premier: Dans les colonies restituées à la France en exécution du 
traité d‟Amiens du 6 germinal an X, l‟esclavage sera maintenu conformément aux lois et règlements 
antérieurs à 1789. Article 2: Il en sera de même dans les autres colonies françaises au-delà du cap de 
Bonne-Espérance. Article 3: La traite des Noirs et leur importation dans lesdites colonies auront lieu 
conformément aux lois et règlements existant avant ladite époque de 1789. Article 4: Nonobstant toutes les 
lois antérieures, le régime des colonies est soumis pendant dix ans aux règlements qui seront faits par le 
gouvernement.” A copy of this 20 May 1802 law is preserved in Collection générale des lois, décrets, 
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 In simply stating that “slavery will be maintained” in those colonies that Britain 
had “returned” to France by the Treaty of Amiens (Saint-Lucia and Martinique), this 
measure thus did not legalize the reestablishment of slavery in Saint-Domingue, 
Guadeloupe, or Guyana, which had come under emancipationist governments after 1793. 
It was also silent on Santo Domingo. Thus, the murderous campaign conducted by 
Napoleon‟s General Antoine Richepanse had questionable legal sanction for re-enslaving 
thousands of freed people in Guadeloupe, as did Ferrand for his restoration of slavery in 
Santo Domingo.
15
  
Niort and Richard have moreover unearthed surviving copies of a “consular 
order” (arrêté consulaire) that Bonaparte issued on 16 July 1802 which stipulated that 
“[t]he colony of Guadeloupe and dependences will be governed in the manner of 
Martinique, Saint Lucia, Tobago, [and the] eastern colonies, by the same laws that were 
in place in 1789.” Scrupulously avoiding the usage of the word “slave,” this order made 
no mention of either Saint-Domingue or Santo Domingo. Moreover, Niort and Richard 
have argued that the order may not have carried legal weight even in Guadeloupe. They 
contended that “the reestablishment of slavery, and more generally of the old 
segregationist and discriminatory order in Guadeloupe [after 1802] rested, for 46 years, 
on a legality that was more questionable than that of the law of 30 floréal an X (20 May 
1802).”16 One can advance a similar argument concerning Ferrand‟s attempt to restore 
slavery in Santo Domingo. Except for Napoleon‟s “enslaved part” speech to the Conseil 
                                                                                                                                                 
arrêtés, sénatus-consultes, avis du conseil d‟état et règlements d‟administration, publiés depuis 1789 
jusqu‟au 1er avril 1814 (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1818), 924. 
15 For details on Richepanse‟s expedition to Guadeloupe, see Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, chapters 15-16.  
16 Niort and Richard, “À propos de la découverte de l‟arrêté consulaire du 16 juillet 1802,” 36 and 58. In 
the original text: “La colonie de la Guadeloupe et dépendances sera régie à l‟instar de la Martinique, de 
St-Lucie, de Tabago, [et des] colonies orientales, par les mêmes lois que y étaient en vigueur en 1789.” 
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d‟État discussed in chapter 3 and his 31 October 1801 order to Leclerc, I have not 
uncovered an executive order, law, or even correspondence from Napoleon‟s government 
that authorized or explicitly endorsed the reestablishment of slavery in Santo Domingo. 
The Ferrand regime grew out of an island-wide war against French forces of re-
conquest, and Ferrand‟s incessant conflicts with the young Haitian nation underscore the 
interconnected histories of both sides of the island during these years. Conceptualizing 
this period through an island-wide lens offers several new perspectives on Haitian and 
Dominican history. First, it enables one to contextualize the militarism of early Haitian 
leaders as in part a response to a brutal campaign of re-enslavement rather than simply an 
overreaction on the part of fundamentally authoritarian leaders.
17
 Second, it encourages 
comparisons between the repressive policies of each of the island‟s regimes, while 
highlighting the intertwined struggles of the citizens of each place for a more genuine 
liberty. Finally, it reflects the centrality of the larger geographical and geopolitical 
contexts within which these regimes operated. 
In 1802, Kerverseau and Leclerc had desperately tried to silence rumors of a 
return to slavery, which did not allay the island‟s inhabitants‟ well-founded suspicions 
regarding the expedition‟s true goals. After 1804, Ferrand attempted a different type of 
silencing: the erasure of “emancipation” by re-creating slavery in law, on the ground, and 
in the written record. Yves Bénot has shown that the abandonment of emancipation by 
Napoleon‟s Consular government provoked considerable opposition in metropolitan 
France among those who condemned slavery, racism and colonialism (though not always 
all three together).
18
 In Santo Domingo, a different form of opposition emerged: that of 
                                                 
17 I thank Laurent Dubois (personal communication, 24 September 2010) for suggesting this to me.  
18 Yves Bénot, La démence coloniale sous Napoléon, 2nd ed. (Paris: Découverte, 2006), esp. 93-99. 
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freed people who sought to preserve their liberty. Thomas Holt noted years ago that “it is 
from ex-slaves that we may well learn much of what it means to be free.”19 This 
statement can be expanded to add that formally freed people who lived under the threat of 
re-enslavement also can convey political lessons on “freedom” that have purchase in our 
own time. The very uncertainty of their condition, as much as the abject deprivation that 
they so feared, gave them a visceral appreciation for “liberty.” It is their actions—often in 
vain, occasionally with success—that animate this chapter.  
 
The Establishment of Ferrand in Santo Domingo 
 
  
“The three strong Expeditions [sent to re-conquer Saint-Domingue] 
combined…are indispensable,” General Donatien Rochambeau wrote to the Minister of 
the Navy and Colonies on 28 April 1803, “since we now have to endure the war of the 
White Color against the two others.”20 After 1802, the French Republic under Napoleon 
undertook to dismantle the principal legal bulwarks of egalitarianism that had been 
achieved across a decade and a half of fierce political and military struggle. 
Rochambeau‟s depiction of the final year of the Haitian war for independence as a race 
war converged with this reactionary vision. In 1796, accusations of racism had 
contributed to the ouster of Rochambeau from the position of “Commandant in Chief of 
the Spanish part of Saint-Domingue” that he had briefly held that year.21 In the changed 
                                                 
19 Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 9. 
20 Rochambeau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 8 Floréal an 11 (28 April 1803), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/34. In the original French: “Les trois forts Expéditions combinées à des époques rapprochées sont 
indispensables, puisque nous avons maintenant à soutenir la guerre de la Couleur Blanche contre les deux 
autres.” 
21 On 27 July 1796, a disgraced General Rochambeau had sailed back to France on the Berceau following 
his removal from this position six days earlier on charges of sympathizing with the Dominican clergy and 
nobility and encouraging royalist émigrés to return to Hispaniola. In a letter to the Directory composed in 
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political context of 1803, by contrast, this man‟s prejudices and ruthlessness fit in well 
with the mission of reinstituting metropolitan rule at any cost.    
The most significant such cost was the lives of thousands of men, women and 
children who perished from violence, disease or privation. Napoleon‟s determination to 
re-conquer this once-lucrative land led him to deploy to Hispaniola a massive invasion 
force in which he staked the future of French imperialism in the Americas. According to 
one estimate, France sent 47,286 men to the island between 4 February 1802 and 21 May 
1803.
22
 By comparison, this was over twice the population of Le Cap at its height in the 
late 1780s, and sixteen thousand more than the entire white population of Saint-
Domingue on the eve of the revolution.
23
 It was also only slightly less than the entire 
population of the colony of Santo Domingo in 1808, according to one census.
24
 Though 
Saint-Domingue was the main prize, its neighbor also merited the belligerents‟ attention. 
This owed in part to the strategic imperatives that had impelled Toussaint Louverture in 
January 1801 to capture the former Spanish colony‟s nerve center in an unsuccessful 
                                                                                                                                                 
July or August 1796, the Bureau des Colonies cited a letter that Rochambeau had supposedly written to the 
Minister of the Navy in which he had labeled “men of Color” (hommes de Couleur) a “rebel Caste, proud 
and bastard” (Caste rebelle, orgueilleuse et bâtarde) and had recommended their expulsion from the island. 
Bureau des Colonies to the Directory, Thermidor an 4 (19 July-17 August 1796), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/11. In a report composed on 18 July 1796, the Civil Commission on the island accused Rochambeau 
of being a partisan of the nobility and clergy in Santo Domingo. According to this report, his arrival there 
had been “the object of the wishes and the hope of the noble émigrés, and rich colonists, [who were] all 
royalists.” “Extract of the Registry of the Deliberations of the Commission Delegated by the French 
government in the [Caribbean] islands,” 30 Messidor an 4 (18 July 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11. In 
the original text: “…son arrivée à Santo Domingo est l‟objet des voeux et de l‟espoir des émigrés nobles, et 
grands colons, tous royalistes.” Emphasis in original. See also: report to the Directory, 12 September 1796, 
CARAN AF/III/62; and “Extract of the Registry of the Deliberations of the Commission Delegated by the 
French government in the [Caribbean] islands,” 3 Thermidor an 4 (21 July 1796), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/11. For Rochambeau‟s attempted refutation of the charges against him, see Rochambeau to Roume, 
3 Thermidor an 4 (21 July 1796), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/11.  
22 “State of troops [that have] Arrived in Saint Domingue from 15 Pluviôse year ten to 1 Prairial year 
eleven,” 1 Messidor an 11 (20 June 1803), Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-
Provence, France, Troupes et Personnel Civil (hereinafter TPC) D2C 371. 
23 Population figures are from Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 22 and 30. 
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effort to prevent the Napoleonic expedition from landing there. As he formulated plans to 
use a re-conquered Saint-Domingue as a beachhead for French imperial expansion in the 
western hemisphere, Napoleon grasped the necessity of holding onto Santo Domingo and 
subduing potential and actual enemies there.
25
   
“The possession of this part [Santo Domingo] is essentially necessary for the 
execution of the orders of the Government,” wrote General Antoine Chanlatte in an 
undated report advising the French government on military strategies for the island‟s re-
conquest. “The locality offers great means to maintain oneself without much force and to 
oppose the bands of Toussaint in case he fights against national authority; and when the 
Republic will make itself known there, each Spaniard interested in defending his life, his 
possessions and his family will become a soldier who will be worthy of the name of 
French republican.”26 Asserting control over Santo Domingo initially required deposing 
the Louverture regime, which General Kerverseau had accomplished in February 1802. 
The more difficult mission would nonetheless come later: the subjugation of thousands of 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 “General State of the Population of the Eastern Part of Saint-Domingue, as of the First of January 1808,” 
1 January 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. This census put the population at 50,089. 
25 On Napoleon‟s strategic designs in the Americas and Saint-Domingue‟s role in this, see Philippe Girard, 
“Napoleon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Domingue, 1799-1803,” French Historical 
Studies 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 587-618; Robert Paquette, “Revolutionary Saint Domingue in the Making of 
Territorial Louisiana,” in A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, ed. David 
Geggus and David Gaspar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 204-225; and Dubois, Avengers 
of the New World, 304.  
26 Chanlatte, “Proposed Means to Establish French Authority in Saint-Domingue that Would Create 
Respect for the Laws of the Republic in the French Colony and Would Work towards its Reduction…” 
undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/18. In the original text: “La possession de cette partie est 
essentiellement nécessaire pour l‟exécution des ordres du Gouvernement. La localité offre de grands 
moyens de s‟y maintenir sans beaucoup de forces et de s‟opposer aux bandes de Toussaint en cas qu‟il 
voudrait combattre l‟autorité nationale; et lorsque la République s‟y sera fait connaître, chaque Espagnol 
intéressé à deffendre sa vie, ses biens et sa famille y deviendra un soldat qui voudra mériter le nom de 
républicain français.” Furthermore, in the words of Dubois, Napoleon had ordered Leclerc to “rally support 
in Spanish Santo Domingo.” Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 254. 
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what were characterized as “Maroons” in Santo Domingo whose destruction Napoleon 
had mandated in his instructions to Leclerc.
27
  
Despite these perceived threats, Napoleon may have also been aware of various 
opinions circulating at the time that recognized the economic benefits that Santo 
Domingo could potentially render to France. In one tract dated 5 March 1802, a petitioner 
named Lavassor had advocated splitting Saint-Domingue and other French colonies into 
two areas: a “white” zone in the mountains, and a “black” zone on and near the plains and 
lowlands. Lavassor supported this proposal by citing the maroon activity that mountains 
supposedly facilitated and asserting that Santo Domingo‟s “immense and uncultivated 
plains” could be worked by millions of “blacks,” until such time as the whole of “Africa 
is exhausted.”28 
While such grand schemes no doubt motivated some of Napoleon‟s partisans, 
events on the island ultimately dictated the war‟s outcome. In 1802 and early 1803, forces 
under General Kerverseau conducted expeditions against the “maroons” of the 
community of Maniel, located near the Dominican town of Neyba close to the old 
colonial border. Despite his frustration at an initial lack of manpower, Kerverseau utilized 
the same carrot-and-stick policies that his predecessors had, with rather more emphasis 
on the stick.
29
 On 24 April 1802, the French General Boudet informed Rochambeau (who 
                                                 
27 Napoleon, “Notes pour servir aux instructions à donner au Capitaine Général Leclerc,” 31 October 1801, 
in Lettres du général Leclerc, Commandant en Chef de l‟armée de Saint-Domingue, ed. Paul Roussier 
(Paris: Société d‟Histoire des Colonies Françaises et Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1937), 268-269.  
28 “Report by M. Lavassor on agriculture in the Colonies,” 14 Ventôse an 10 (5 March 1802), ANOM 
Collection Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 266. In the original text: “Les Nègres, Comme il a 
été dit, peut Seul Cultiver les plaines; or il existe dans l‟ancienne partie Espagnole de St Domingue, des 
plaines immenses et incultes qui pourraient employer des millions de nègres; et l‟afrique est épuisée.” 
29 As of 30 May 1802, only around ten percent of the Leclerc expedition‟s forces (2,556 out of 24,220 men) 
were assigned to the eastern two-thirds of the island, which was nominally under Kerverseau. 
Comprehensive listing of divisions in Leclerc expedition, 30 May 1802, ANOM TPC D2C 371. On 16 
September 1802, Kerverseau informed Pamphile de Lacroix, the commandant of Cibao, that he did not 
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had just succeeded Boudet as commander of all French forces in Saint-Domingue‟s West 
and South) of the potential links between the Maniel residents and the rebels. Warning 
Rochambeau that the “insurgents” could seek refuge in Maniel and augment this group‟s 
numbers (which he estimated at around 1,200), Boudet communicated his intention to 
send a “deputation” that would “open relations” with these settlers, which he hoped 
would bring them to the French side and stop their alleged killings of whites.
30
 Three 
months later, a commander in Neyba named Joseph Ruiz wrote to Rochambeau that “a 
great quantity of Blacks from the Army of Toussaint took refuge there [in Maniel] with 
their arms; [and] that seven or eight [fugitives] arrive there each day, and that they 
organize companies.” What is more, according to Ruiz a ship had recently disembarked 
near Petit-Trou (Saint-Domingue) to trade powder and munitions with the inhabitants of 
Maniel in exchange for mahogany. Most urgently, Ruiz reported that several “Blacks” 
from Rochambeau‟s own division had attempted to travel to Maniel with false passports, 
and that despite Ruiz‟s order that all “French cultivators” in the area return to their 
plantations, many had gone to Maniel.
31
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have the troops or funds to attack those in Maniel. Kerverseau to Pamphile de Lacroix, 29 Fructidor an 10 
(16 September 1802), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/23. 
30 Boudet to Rochambeau, 4 Floréal an 10 (24 April 1802), CARAN 135 AP 1, dossier 4. In the original 
text: “Le Maniel, partie de la Colonie où se trouvent réunis environ 1200 Noirs sous le commandement du 
nommé Lafortune est au point où les insurgés pourraient aller chercher retraite et grossir le nombre de 
cette bande…Je cherchai à ouvrir des relations avec cette partie…j‟ai renvoyé au Maniel les hommes qui 
en étaient venus en députation satisfait de l‟accueil qu‟ils avaient reçu…” Emphasis in original.  
31 Ruiz to Rochambeau, 23 Messidor an 10 (12 July 1802), CARAN 135 AP 1, dossier 11. In the original 
text: “…je viens d‟apprendre qu‟une grand quantité des Noirs de l‟Armée de Toussaint s‟y sont réfugiés 
avec leurs armes, qu‟il y arrivent sept ou huit par jour, et qu‟ils organisent des compagnies…J‟ai 
également l‟honneur de vous informer que depuis quelque jours viennent de votre division plusieurs Noirs 
avec des faux passe-Ports pour passer à la Source, qui est un Bourg moitié dependant de cette Commune, 
et moitié dependant du Maniel…Il y a quinze jours que j‟avais intimé aux cultivateurs français existents 
dans cette commune de rentrer dans leurs Habitations.” On 10 July 1802, Ruiz had related an order 
mandating the arrest of these cultivateurs and their relocation to Port-Républicain after officials ascertained 
to which plantation they had belonged. Order on cultivateurs in Maniel, 21 Messidor an 10 (10 July 1802), 
CARAN 135 AP 1, dossier 11. Ruiz‟s “distinguished conduct” (conduite distinguée) in the “Maniel 
expedition” (l‟expédition du Maniel) earned him promotion on 23 December 1803 by Ferrand to the rank of 
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These alleged connections with the enemy made the Maniel enclave an important 
target for the Napoleonic mission to the island. The Maniel residents‟ defiance of French 
and Spanish armies and envoys over the preceding century had earned them a special 
notoriety, while their skillful adaptation to the island‟s conditions had enabled them to 
create a tenuous space of freedom for themselves.
32
 They nonetheless appear to have had 
less success defending this freedom against the Leclerc expedition than they had had 
against Toussaint and earlier leaders. According to an “Order of the Day” dated 26 March 
1803, Kerverseau had “taken the important position of Maniel,” “killing and dispersing” 
its residents.
33
 Recounting these events in a lengthy report that he composed in 
Mayagüez, Puerto Rico in February 1804, Kerverseau related that he had attacked Maniel 
with a force of six hundred “Spaniards” and two hundred “French blacks or mulattos.” 
After a pitched battle in which those from the enclave were “vanquished by fear more 
than by our arms,” all of their encampments were “reduced to Ashes” and a garrison was 
stationed there to prevent new “maroon” communities from forming. “Such was the end 
of this republic of Brigands who for about a century lived by Hunting, pillage and 
piracy,” declared Kerverseau.34 
                                                                                                                                                 
First Class Cavalry Captain. “Nominations” by Ferrand for promotion, 1 Nivôse an 12 (23 December 
1803), ANOM TPC D2C 371. 
32 Aside from the munitions-for-mahogany trade, the settlers in Maniel appear to have acquired goods 
through cultivation and trade with Dominicans. One military report from 26 March 1803 stated that the 
French invaders had noticed an “immense quantity of provisions” (l‟immense quantité de vivres) that had 
been planted in Maniel. “Order of the Day,” 6 Germinal an 11 (26 March 1803), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/22. Kerverseau moreover accused those in Maniel of engaging in trade in meat and arms with the 
Spanish in Santo Domingo. Kerverseau to Rochambeau, 6 Germinal an 11 (27 March 1803), CARAN 135 
AP 2, dossier 18. 
33 “Order of the Day,” 6 Germinal an 11 (26 March 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/22. In the original 
text: “Le 14 ventose, le général Kerverseau, après une marche pénible et périlleuse, s‟est emparé de la 
position importante du Maniel, en tuant et dispersant, devant lui, les hordes de bandits qui habitaient ces 
repaires.” 
34 Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 20 Pluviôse an 12 (10 February 1804), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/37. In the original French: “…je partis le même jour pour Le maniel avec six Cents 
Espagnols et deux Cents nègres ou mulâtres français…surpris sur tous les points et vaincus par la peur 
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This victory was short-lived. The defeat of Maniel could not offset the effect of 
successive setbacks at the hands of forces under Toussaint and his trusted general Jean-
Jacques Dessalines. Leclerc‟s death in October 1802 led to Rochambeau‟s assumption of 
command of the expedition. By 23 September 1802, Kerverseau, though holding the rank 
of general, was listed as commanding a mere 651 troops who formed part of an 
expeditionary force of 24,519 men. This precipitous decline in troop strength in part 
owed to the effects of disease, which had supposedly destroyed half of Santo Domingo‟s 
“garrison” (garnison) in six weeks.35 The survivors faced a bleak struggle for self-
preservation. By late June 1803, Kerverseau commanded 479 men, out of 17,055 for the 
entire expedition.
36
 According to an official report, a mere seven thousand men remained 
in French service on the island as of 21 August 1803, with two to three thousand dying 
per month. In this dire assessment, without external assistance, the French fighting force 
would be reduced to zero in three months.
37
 
In their attempts to ameliorate their position, the French expeditionary leaders 
forcibly recruited among both urban and rural residents of Santo Domingo in the hope 
that more acclimated troops might bolster their strength. While “Spanish” troops served 
various French Republican regimes throughout the period of French rule over the island‟s 
eastern part, in 1803 the recruitment of such troops apparently became more heavy-
                                                                                                                                                 
bien plus encore que par nos armes. Tous leurs établissements furent réduits en Cendres…Telle fut la fin 
de cette république de Brigands qui depuis près d‟un siècle vivait de Chasse, de pillage et de piraterie.” 
Emphasis in original. 
35 “General Chart of the Armed Forces in St Domingue,” 1 Vendémiaire an 11 (23 September 1802), 
ANOM TPC D2C 371. 
36 “General Chart of the Armed Forces in St Domingue,” 1 Messidor an 11 (20 June 1803), ANOM TPC 
D2C 371. 
37 “Extract of the Correspondence of the Leaders of Saint Domingue remitted by the Squadron leader,” 3 
Fructidor an 11 (21 August 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/22. 
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handed.
38
 On 9 October 1803, Dr. Pedro Francisco de Prado warned his fellow citizens 
that a new threat had replaced that of the “ominous cloud of blacks” who had sought to 
take the city of Santo Domingo. They were now threatened by the “oppressive yoke” of 
metropolitan French military presence. Kerverseau‟s enlistment of troops whom he then 
stationed in various border areas drew particular ire. According to Prado, Kerverseau 
later issued two declarations to Dominicans in an effort to stop the resulting desertions.
39
 
A 7 June 1803 letter by Kerverseau to several military commanders and “notables” in 
Santo Domingo decried the “disastrous effects of the desertion that has reduced an army 
of more than two thousand men to less than four hundred, and delivered the border to the 
Enemy.”40 
In the countryside, impressment met with similar results. French General Pierre 
Quantin wrote a series of letters to his superiors that revealed what happened to 
Dominican peasants ensnared by the invasion force. Quantin commanded the crucial 
border post of Fort-Dauphin
41
 which had been wrested from those fighting against the 
                                                 
38 In a letter on the strategic and economic importance of parts of the island‟s borderland, Kerverseau 
claimed to have deployed “three thousand Spaniards assembled on the Border of the two [Dominican] 
departments for the defense of the country.” Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 10 February 
1804, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/37. In the original text: “…trois mille Espagnols rassemblés sur la 
Frontière des deux départements pour la défense du paÿs.” 
39 Pedro Francisco de Prado, account of French occupation in Santo Domingo, 9 October 1803, in Las 
invasiones haitianas de 1801, 1805 y 1822, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo [Santo 
Domingo]: Editora del Caribe, 1955), 85-92. The original wording is: “Las tropas españolas que dicho 
General tenía acantonadas en la raya o frontera para impedir a los negros, desertó la mayor parte de ella 
por la miseria y maltrato que recibìan…Resentido el General…por la mucha deserciñn, soltñ dos 
proclamas las más denigrantes y ofensivas a la España y a los pueblos dominicanos, mandando se 
pregonasen y fijasen en las partes públicas.” 
40 Kerverseau to “the military Commanders, [and] to the notables and municipal Administrators of the 
Eastern Division,” 18 Prairial an 11 (7 June 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/23. In the original text: “Vous 
connaissez tous les funestes effets de la désertion qui a réduit une armée de plus de deux mille hommes à 
moins de quatre cents, et livré la frontière à l‟Ennemi.” 
41 According to military records from this period, the invaders had restored the old name of Fort-Dauphin to 
Fort-Liberté. 
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expedition on 1 December 1802.
42
 In January 1803, Quantin—who was listed as 
commanding 844 troops as of 20 February 1803—reported to Rochambeau that two or 
three “Spaniards” (espagnols) were dying every day.43 On 4 March 1803, Quantin 
informed Rochambeau that sixteen deserters had probably gone back to their ranches 
(hattes).
44
 In sharp contrast to his superior‟s starkly racialist language, Quantin candidly 
noted that soldiers “of all colors” (de toutes couleurs) were dying under his command.45 
These developments may have helped lead to Quantin‟s replacement by General 
Jean-Louis Ferrand by 20 June 1803.
46
 Born in Besançon, France, Ferrand had served in 
the revolution in the Thirteen Colonies and other armed conflicts before joining 
Napoleon‟s ill-fated expedition of re-conquest.47 A list of military officers dated 22 
December 1802 referred to him as a Brigade General who had “Disembarked” 
(Débarqué) on 24 November 1802.
48
 At the time of the fall of Fort-Dauphin to the enemy 
on 12 September 1803, many of the expedition‟s survivors had already begun to 
contemplate returning to France, and a chaotic evacuation was already underway in the 
Dominguan town of Jérémie.
49
 Ferrand, however, refused an opportunity to escape the 
                                                 
42 Rochambeau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 16 Frimaire an 11 (7 December 1802), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/19. 
43 Quantin to Rochambeau, 24 January 1803, RPUF, no. 1567; “General Chart of the Armed Forces in St 
Domingue,” 1 Ventôse an 11 (20 February 1803), ANOM TPC D2C 371. 
44 Quantin to Rochambeau, 4 March 1803, RPUF, no. 1682. “Hatte” is the French rendering of the Spanish 
word “hato,” which referred to cattle ranches in the Dominican context. For more on the hato, see Richard 
Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 29. 
45 Quantin to Rochambeau, 21 February 1803, RPUF, no. 1640. 
46 “General Chart of the Armed Forces in St Domingue,” 1 Messidor an 11 (20 June 1803), ANOM TPC 
D2C 371. 
47 For information on Ferrand‟s prior military service, see Pamphile de Lacroix, La Révolution d‟Haïti 
(Paris: 1819; reprint, Paris: Karthala, 1995), 474-475. 
48 “Review” of military officers and their salaries, 1 Nivôse an 11 (22 December 1802), ANOM TPC D2C 
371. 
49 The main inventory of the Rochambeau Papers at the University of Florida contains intriguing hints of 
such an evacuation. For instance, the entry for document number 2084 (a 16 September 1803 letter from a 
minor official named Henri Perroud to the “Prefect of the Isle of St Domingue”) describes the document as 
a “Report on the expenses of the evacuation of Jérémie and on the difficulty of providing for the care of 
276 
 
island on a British ship, deciding instead to retreat to the Cibao area (northern Santo 
Domingo). He settled in Santo Domingo city on 16 December 1803.
50
 
On 1 January 1804, the former Toussaint partisan Jean-Jacques Dessalines 
proclaimed the independence of Haiti, memorably claiming to have “avenged 
America.”51 As Ferrand and his crew of just a few hundred men strove to establish a 
government in Santo Domingo city, they embarked upon a different sort of vengeance: 
violence against those who in Ferrand‟s mind had overthrown Saint-Domingue‟s 
legitimate French masters and replaced them with a barbaric regime.
52
 At its core, the 
underlying logic behind the policies of the Ferrand regime was the desire to crush the 
new Haitian state and reestablish a rejuvenated French plantation colony on its ruins. In 
pursuing this enterprise, the regime would be met with the determined opposition of those 
who refused to allow the emancipationist past to be completely erased.  
 
A Demographic and Economic Portrait of Santo Domingo under Ferrand 
In a 3 August 1813 report to the Spanish Secretary of State and the Office of 
Overseas Governance (Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación de 
                                                                                                                                                 
evacuees with 250 ill persons in St. Yago [Santiago], Cuba.” Laura V. Monti, A Calendar of Rochambeau 
Papers at the University of Florida Libraries (Gainesville: University of Florida Libraries, 1972), 279-280. 
50 “Extract of the Correspondence of the Leaders of Saint Domingue remitted by the Squadron leader,” 25 
Fructidor an 11 (12 September 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/22; Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy 
and Colonies, 20 Pluviôse an 12 (10 February 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/37. 
51 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, unpaginated epigraph at beginning of book. In a “Proclamation” to 
his fellow Haitians dated 28 April 1804, Dessalines exclaimed: “Yes, we have rendered to these true 
cannibals war for war, crime for crime, courage for courage; Yes, I have saved my country—I have 
avenged America.” English translation of Dessalines proclamation of 28 April 1804, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/18. 
52 General Kerverseau, writing on 10 February 1804, claimed that Ferrand had only 157 men under his 
command upon traveling to Santiago (northern Santo Domingo) in early December 1803. Kerverseau to 
Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 10 February 1804, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/37. By 20 July 1804, 
Ferrand had a total of 854 men in his army, including 224 troops from the “Légion du Cap” and nineteen 
“Spanish artillerymen” (Artilleurs Nx [Nouveaux?] Espagnols). “State of the Situation” of troops under 
Ferrand in Santo Domingo, 1Thermidor an 12 (20 July 1804), ANOM TPC D2C 371. 
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Ultramar, the approximate Spanish equivalent of France‟s Minister of the Navy and 
Colonies), Carlos de Urrutia called upon the “liberal hand” of an “enlightened 
Government” to finally realize the economic potential of a colony that had languished in 
poverty for centuries. Despite the presence of a relatively prosperous tobacco industry 
based in the north, as well as an overabundance of pigs, cattle and other animals whose 
meat and hides could bring in revenue, he believed that Santo Domingo still lacked the 
resources and the far-sighted policies to cultivate the real money-makers of the day such 
as sugar, coffee, and cacao. He suggested reforms to economic governance there that 
would place Spain‟s oldest colony on track to claim a more exalted place in the vast 
colonial empire.
53
  
 Urrutia‟s prescription echoed that of Sánchez Valverde of nearly thirty years 
earlier, and its very issuance implies repeated past failures to implement a profitable 
plantation system in this colony. The governance of Ferrand indeed proved 
inconsequential in improving the colony‟s economy. Far from exercising a “liberal hand” 
over Santo Domingo, Ferrand based its fortunes on a formula that combined economic 
incentives for plantation production with repressive labor policies, which bore a 
resemblance to Toussaint‟s policies there. He nonetheless differed from the Dominguan 
general in one crucial respect: as an unabashed slave-owner, Ferrand harbored no qualms 
about once again making the institution explicitly legal in the land that had pioneered 
American plantation slavery.
54
 
                                                 
53 Carlos de Urrutia to “Secretary of State and the Office of Overseas Governance,” 3 August 1813, 
Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI), Seville, Spain, Audiencia de Santo Domingo (hereinafter 
ASD) 1042. In the original Spanish: “Pero así como todas estas riquezas han estado hasta ahora perdidas, 
es mui de temer que continúen en el mismo abandono, si la mano liberal de un Gobierno ilustrado no se 
aplica a recogerlas.” 
54 I have located two “slave” sales among extant notarial records from Santo Domingo in which Ferrand 
was a buyer or a seller. In the first sale, Ferrand sold a woman named Pomette to a Captain Philipe Filoche 
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 In 1795 most of the colony‟s few relatively lucrative plantation and ranching 
enterprises had been under the control of the Spanish colonial administration by virtue of 
either their owners‟ inability to meet financial obligations or the forced transfer of 
religiously-held properties occasioned by the Jesuits‟ expulsion from Spain‟s American 
domains in 1767. Their status from 1795 until Toussaint‟s invasion of Santo Domingo 
city in 1801 appears to have remained largely unchanged. In 1802 Kerverseau had made 
claims to these properties based on France‟s assumption of Spain‟s assets and 
prerogatives in this land as stipulated in the Treaty of Basel.
55
 Kerverseau had also 
attempted to direct the energies of several Dominican plantations towards the production 
of tafia (rum) for his troops. For instance, he ordered on 12 October 1803 that thirty-four 
cultivateurs were to be “taken” (pris) from their current plantations and reassigned to 
labor on the tafia-producing San Nicolás plantation.
56
 
                                                                                                                                                 
on 18 October 1807. Furthermore, on 30 May 1808, Ferrand purchased a “négresse” (black woman) named 
Agathe from Captain François Antoine Lavalette. Both sales were for three hundred gourdes. Furthermore, 
a 3 April 1809 roster of a “Corps Franc” listed Ferrand as the owner of five “Blacks” (Nègres) who served 
in it. See sale of Pomette, 18 October 1807, ANOM Dépôt des Papiers Publics des Colonies, Notariat de 
Saint-Domingue (hereinafter DPPC NOT SDOM) 1699; sale of Agathe, 30 May 1808, ANOM DPPC NOT 
SDOM 1700; and “Nominative state of men comprising the free Corps, drawn up according to the Extract 
of the review of Commissioners and Serving as payment for the Blacks acquired by the Government to 
form the Corps,” 3 April 1809, Service Historique de l‟Armée de Terre (hereinafter SHAT), Vincennes, 
France, B7 12. 
55 Kerverseau‟s confiscation of these properties built on the revolutionary precedent of state seizure of the 
assets of refugees who were deemed disloyal to the Republic or who had simply abandoned their properties 
in their flight from the island. In a decree dated 14 May 1800, Toussaint had ordered that revenue from 
plantations with “absent Owners” (Propriétaires absens) go to state coffers, with deductions made for the 
wages of the cultivateurs. “Regulation” of Toussaint on plantation revenue, 24 Floréal an 8 (14 May 1800), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/24. In an order dated 23 November 1802, Kerverseau had established the 
organizational structure of a new “Administration of national domains.” A colonial prefect was to oversee 
the confiscation of properties that had belonged to religious brotherhoods, cabildos (town councils), and 
other entities as well as the proceeds of intestate successions. This national domain administration would be 
based in Santo Domingo city, but administrators would also be stationed in Santiago, Seybo, Azua, Bánica, 
and La Vega. Order of Kerverseau on national domains, 2 Frimaire an 11 (23 November 1802), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9b/2. 
56 Kerverseau order on national domains, 19 Vendémiaire an 12 (12 October 1803), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/4.  
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Ferrand would considerably expand upon these efforts. Two comprehensive 
listings of property that came under the French “national domain” were produced by the 
state to document their transfers. These records confirm the portrait of a colony with few 
productive enterprises and a small labor force, yet they also hint at continual conflicts 
over the conditions and fact of servitude.  
 As Urrutia‟s letter suggests, Santo Domingo underwent little substantial economic 
change during the Ferrand period, as it continued to rely upon ranching, livestock raising, 
tobacco production, and the limited cultivation of plantation crops such as sugar and 
coffee. Ferrand instituted a policy of granting money to the owners of productive 
enterprises in proportion to their coffee and sugar output; in at least one case, such 
financial incentives reflected the size of the subordinated labor force.
57
 Despite such 
measures, the scope of cultivation in Santo Domingo remained small. According to one 
estimate, as of 1 January 1808, only 8,506 carreaux (about twenty-eight thousand acres) 
of Santo Domingo‟s land was planted in sugar, and just 2,231 carreaux (7,362 acres) of 
land were devoted to tobacco.
58
  
 The scale of individual enterprises mirrored this larger picture. A national 
domains survey dated 21 January 1804 listed four plantations and three cattle ranches; 
two of the plantations were planted in sugar, one in cacao, and one in “vivres” 
(provisions). Two of these plantations were listed as having labor forces of around fifty 
                                                 
57 Order of Sub-Prefect A. P. Tirol on plantation production, 23 Frimaire an 12 (15 December 1803), 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/37. In a 29 November 1809 letter to Napoleon, a former subordinate of Ferrand, 
writing to convince Napoleon to grant a generous pension to Ferrand‟s widow and children, insisted that 
Ferrand had devoted all of his fortune of around two hundred thousand francs to the acquisition of 
plantations and houses. E. Paillier, report to Napoleon on the service of Ferrand, 29 November 1809, 
CARAN AF/IV/968. 
58 “State of Agriculture and of Animals of all Types in the Eastern Part of Saint Domingue,” 1 January 
1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. 
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cultivateurs, while another had twenty-one laborers and the fourth had none listed.
59
 An 
1806 cadastral survey contained much the same data, with the notable exception of a 
substantially smaller number of laborers; the survey‟s creators attributed the decrease to 
Dessalines‟s 1805 invasion of Santo Domingo. Upon this incursion, two of the three 
“blacks” on the L‟Espérance ranch “followed the rebels [Haitians] in their flight.”60 
 While these laborers had apparently rejected servitude in French Santo Domingo 
and sought a different life in independent Haiti, others became the subject of claims that 
implicitly elided the French emancipation edict of 1794. According to a set of 
“Observations on the nature of national Domains of the eastern part of St Domingue,” a 
plantation manager named Gabriela Sánchez had violated French authorities‟ claims to 
all property associated with her plantation by “embarking” for Havana twenty 
“cultivators” who had been “attached” to the estate in the year 1800.61 Were these 
“cultivators” property? In advancing a claim to these laborers, the Ferrand government 
                                                 
59 “General Cadastral Register of all the National Goods recognized until this Day in the Eastern Part of 
Saint Domingue,” 30 Nivôse an 12 (21 January 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. 
60 “Summary of the Cadastral Register of the Domains of the French Empire,” 1806, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/42. This survey listed five plantations and four cattle ranches. In the original text: “Cette hatte avait, 
avant le siège de Sto Domingo, environ 800 Bêtes à corne, neuf cavalines et trois nègres. Deux de ces 
derniers ont suivi les révoltés dans leur fuite.” 
61 “Observations on the nature of national Domains of the eastern part of St Domingue,” undated, CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/42. In the original text: “Il est à observer au sujet de l‟habitation située De l‟autre Bord de 
la rivière, ci-devant au trésorier Esparza ensuite appartenant au Roi, que Da. Gabriela Sanchez V[euve] 
De Dn. Andres de Licanda, qui se trouvait chargée de sa régie, a embarqué pour la havane dans L‟année 
1800 vingt cultivateurs Les plus forts qui se trouvaient attachés avec L‟autorisation, et passeport du 
président Dn. Joachim Garcia.” A “Gabriela Sánchez” is listed as owning a plantation near Santiago that 
was to be auctioned off in June 1807. Announcement on auction of assorted properties, 29 May 1807, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/44. According to the 1806 national domains survey, “the widow of André 
Lecanda, who was entrusted with the management of the Esparza plantation in 1800, exported from it 20 
blacks whom she took to Cuba, upon the taking of possession of the Spanish Part by Toussaint Louverture, 
and that the French Government has the right to demand the restitution of these blacks who belong to it, as 
dependents of the Esparza succession, that has fallen to it by the substitution of the rights of the King of 
Spain in St Domingue.” “Summary of the Cadastral Register of the Domains of the French Empire,” 1806, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. In the original text: “Il est essentiel d‟observer que la veuve d‟André 
Lecanda, qui était chargée de la régie de l‟hab[itation] Esparza en 1800, en a exporté 20 nègres qu‟elle a 
emmenés à Cuba, lors de la prise de possession de la Partie Espagnole par Toussaint Louverture, et que le 
Gouvernement français est en droit de réclamer la restitution de ces nègres qui lui appartiennent, comme 
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implicitly tried to re-create “slave” as a coherent category by taking as a given the 
justness of demanding the “restitution” of human beings as property. Even as 
representatives of this regime condemned Sánchez for absconding with these 
“cultivators,” they implicitly upheld her right to force captives to travel and resettle with 
her in circumstances in which no such competing property claim existed, in spite of the 
existence of the French emancipation law. 
Some of those who could not escape the re-imposition of servitude by legal or 
extralegal means found that certain aspects of associational life enabled them to 
ameliorate their condition. As in many other parts of Latin America, Catholic 
brotherhoods had become part of the social fabric in colonial Santo Domingo, and they 
offered members of various statuses and conditions numerous forms of social, material 
and spiritual support.
62
 Under Ferrand, some “slaves” appear to have continued to find 
that these groups enabled them to attain a degree of autonomy. The 1806 cadastral survey 
listed “61 blacks” among the “rural Properties” (Propriétés rurales) of the department of 
Cibao who were part of the “Brotherhood of St Antoine” (Confrérie de St Antoine) 
located in the city of Santiago. “These blacks have always lived in a state of 
independence,” this survey noted, “which has never permitted [officials] to collect any 
goods from them.”63  
                                                                                                                                                 
dépendants de la succession Esparza, qui lui est échue par sa substitution aux droits du Roi d‟Espagne à St 
Domingue.” 
62 For a discussion of the workings of such an organization in Brazil, see “A Black Irmandade in Bahia, 
Brazil (1699),” in Colonial Latin America: A Documentary History, ed. Kenneth Mills, William Taylor, 
and Sandra Lauderdale Graham (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 2004), 280-296. See also Richard Gray, “The 
Papacy and the Atlantic Slave Trade: Lourenço da Silva, the Capuchins and the Decisions of the Holy 
Office,” Past and Present no. 115 (May 1987): 52-68 (esp. 54-58). 
63 “Summary of the Cadastral Register of the Domains of the French Empire,” 1806, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/42. In the original text: “Ces nègres ont toujours vécu dans un état d‟indépendance, qui n‟a jamais 
permis d‟en retirer aucun produit.” According to the 1804 cadastral survey, upon Toussaint‟s invasion of 
Santo Domingo city the “great number” of brotherhoods in that colony had become sharply reduced, as the 
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 According to a census of the colony‟s population published in 1808, urban 
“slaves,” who could presumably more easily avail themselves of the opportunities offered 
by these brotherhoods, constituted a significant proportion of the unfree population. 
Among the 7,052 souls that this census designated as “Slaves” (Esclaves), thirty-five 
percent were listed as residing in Santo Domingo city and Santiago, the colony‟s two 
main urban areas, though this figure likely reflects an urban bias in the collection of data. 
This census divided the colony‟s population into four distinct categories based on race 
and condition: “European Whites” (Blancs Européens); “Whites of the Country” (Blancs 
du Païs); “Creoles of color” (Créols de couleur); and “Slaves.” While both classes of 
“whites” together accounted for just over a quarter of the population, the free-colored 
group encompassed around sixty percent of the total. The “Slaves” represented fifteen 
percent of the entire population—strikingly, the same proportion as in 1789, though the 
population of the colony had halved in these two decades, from around one hundred 
thousand to just over fifty thousand.
64
  
 French refugees constituted a substantial portion of this population, at least in 
Santo Domingo city. In an 18 November 1808 census for the city of Santo Domingo, 
3,875 inhabitants were listed as “French” (Français), while the remaining 3,891 were 
labeled “Spanish” (Espagnols). The census takers listed a quarter (24.7%) of the city‟s 
“French” population as “black” (nègre or négresse) while applying this label to only 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Titles” to these brotherhoods were taken out of the colony. “General Cadastral Register of all the National 
Goods,” 21 January 1804, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/2. In the original text: “Il existait sous la domination 
Espagnole, un grand nombre de confrairies, qui possédaient quelques Tributs fondés en leur faveur: mais à 
l‟époque de la prise de possession par Toussaint Louverture, les Titres ont été enlevés et embarqués: ils ne 
formèrent d‟ailleurs qu‟une somme très modique.” 
64 “General State of the Population of the Eastern Part of Saint-Domingue,” 1 January 1808, CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/45. 
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thirteen percent of the “Spanish” population.65 While such perceptions of fused color and 
national identities perhaps served to heighten the regime‟s concern with “French” blacks 
whom its leaders associated closely with Haiti, the Dominican historical context also 
shaped the colony‟s demography and the ideas of race that prevailed in the Ferrand 
period.  
 The abrupt end of colonial Santo Domingo‟s early plantation boom had led to a 
relative lack of plantation infrastructure in this colony; this, combined with the weakness 
of the colonial state and the comparatively small number of white settlers, had enabled 
those held in bondage to succeed in escaping from servitude in large numbers. From the 
end of the seventeenth century, these ex-slaves and their descendants came to constitute 
the majority of the population. Some of these individuals became part of a relatively 
autonomous peasantry, while their urban counterparts sometimes succeeded in 
surmounting legal and social barriers to attain high positions in the Church, the army, the 
government, and top educational institutions. According to Richard Turits, the term 
“blancos de la tierra” (whites of the land) emerged in Santo Domingo to describe 
“people of African origin who were better off [than others] and who lived with privileges 
[that were] in principle reserved for whites.”66 This term bears a striking resemblance to 
the phrase “Blancs du Païs” utilized in the 1 January 1808 census.  
                                                 
65 “General State of the population of the City of Santo Domingo on 18 November 1808,” SHAT B7 13.  
66 Richard Turits, “Par-delà les plantations: Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo,” 
Genèses 66 (March 2007), 53-58. In a 23 March 1804 letter to the Minister of the Navy, Kerverseau stated 
that “[a]ll of the great landowners of the Colony [Santo Domingo] are absent, the majority of those who 
remain there are a [illegible] of free blacks, mulattos, and men of color of all nuances, known by the name 
of Whites of the land.” Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 1 Germinal an 12 (23 March 
1804), ANOM CMSM F3 283. In the original French: “Tous les grands propriétaires de la Colonie sont 
absents, la plupart de ceux qui y restent sont un [illegible] de nègres libres, de mulâtres et d‟hommes de 
couleur de toutes les nuances, connus sous le nom de Blancs de la terre.” 
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Given that the colony‟s ruling cadre were veterans of the Leclerc/Rochambeau 
expedition, and consciously modeled many of their policies on the restrictions on free-
colored rights promulgated in late colonial Saint-Domingue, one can presume that this 
perception of such a large free “colored” population very likely alarmed them. After all, 
even at the height of the legal onslaught on the rights of the gens de couleur libres in 
Saint-Domingue, that population was never more than ten percent of the total.
67
 “If I were 
to disarm all who are not white,” Kerverseau had stated in late 1802, “I would disarm 
nine tenths of the Spanish Part.”68 Having been a leading officer in the service of an 
expedition that had fought under explicit orders to “not allow any blacks having held a 
rank above that of captain to remain on the island,” Kerverseau now confronted in Santo 
Domingo a long tradition of relative non-white mobility.
69
 In a 22 October 1802 letter, 
Kerverseau had instructed the Commandant of the Department of Cibao to exercise 
“great surveillance” over the cultivateurs of Santiago and to “purge” the countryside of 
the “most seditious” and send some of them to Puerto Plata.70 Though he would depend 
on black and colored soldiers in his military campaigns as had his predecessors, Ferrand 
sought to disenfranchise and subordinate non-whites. In this, he conformed to the official 
                                                 
67 According to Dubois, in 1789 the free-colored population in Saint-Domingue stood at twenty-eight 
thousand, or about five percent of the entire population. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 30. John 
Garrigus has observed that “Saint-Domingue in 1789 was a society whose 30,831 French colonists, already 
outnumbered fourteen to one by their slaves, lived alongside at least 24,848 free people of African 
descent.” John Garrigus, Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2.  
68 Kerverseau to Daure, 18 November 1802, CARAN 135 AP 2, dossier 18. In the original text: “Mais une 
Grande Partie de la Population Libre se Compose de noirs, et si je désarmais tout ce qui n‟est pas blanc, je 
désarmerais les neuf dixièmes de la Partie Espagnole.” 
69 Quoted in Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 255. 
70 Kerverseau to Merck, Commandant of the Department of Cibao, 30 Vendémiaire an 11 (22 October 
1802), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/23. In the original French: “Tenez vous en Grande Surveillance de la part 
des cultivateurs de St Yago. Ils sont nombreux, ils ne sont pas tous les mieux intentionnés. Vous avez bien 
fait d‟envoyer à Puerto Plata ceux dont vous avez le plus à vous défier. Tâchez de purger le pais des plus 
séditieux.” 
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racism emanating from the metropole, enhanced by his hatred of the emancipationist 
republic next door.  
 
Legal and Political Conflicts over Enslavement and Citizenship Rights 
 
 
“What afflicts us the most today, Sire,” wrote a group of Dominguan refugees in 
Santiago de Cuba to Napoleon on 5 February 1805, “is that our enemies are equally 
yours: thus the cowardice with which they have betrayed, evacuated, and delivered Saint-
Domingue to a miserable handful of freed people and rebel slaves, who only have the 
energy and courage of a blind and cowardly ferocity, has only the impure result of their 
hatred for Reigning authority.”71 The vitriol of these exiles attests to the degree to which 
the Haitian victory of the previous year had transformed the political landscape in the 
French empire and beyond.
72
 The fact of slave revolution in nearby Haiti shaped the 
decisions that the leaders of the French occupation of Santo Domingo made in their 
efforts to fashion a slaveholding society modeled to a considerable extent on colonial 
                                                 
71 “Representatives of the refugee Colonists of Saint Domingue, in Santiago de Cuba” to Napoleon, 5 
February 1805, CARAN AF/IV/941. In the original French: “Mais ce qui nous afflige le plus aujourd‟hui, 
Sire, c‟est que nos ennemies sont également les vôtres: car la lâcheté avec laquelle ils ont trahi, évacué et 
livré Saint-Domingue à une misérable poignée d‟affranchis et d‟esclaves révoltés, qui n‟ont d‟autre 
énergie et d‟autre courage qu‟une aveugle et lâche férocité, n‟a été autre chose que le résultat impur de 
leur haine pour l‟autorité Régnante.” 
72 In recent decades, scholars such as Ada Ferrer and Matt Childs have explored many of the reverberations 
of the Haitian Revolution in Cuba and the rest of the Caribbean, drawing scholars‟ attention to the complex 
interpretations that individuals in these places attached to these events. Another corpus of scholarship has 
sought to better integrate the intertwined histories of revolutionary conflict in France and in its overseas 
colonies, investigating the circulation of pro-slavery and abolitionist discourses, as well as those espousing 
racism and egalitarianism, and their role in reshaping the French imperial world. The experience of Santo 
Domingo from 1804 to 1809 draws together these two avenues of research. On the Haitian Revolution and 
Cuba, see María Dolores González-Ripoll, Consuelo Naranjo, Ada Ferrer, Gloria García, and Josef 
Opatrny, El rumor de Haití en Cuba: Temor, raza y rebeldía, 1789-1844 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 2004); and Matt Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle 
Against Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Among other works on 
revolutionary conflict in the French world, see Yves Bénot, La Révolution Française et la fin des colonies 
(Paris: Découverte, 1988); Bénot, La démence coloniale sous Napoléon; Laurent Dubois, “An Enslaved 
Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,” Social History 31, no. 1 
(February 2006): 1-14; and Schloss, Sweet Liberty.   
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Saint-Domingue. In this respect, the close proximity of Haiti reinforced the resurgence of 
racism in French law and colonial policy.  
In the writings of many eighteenth-century French abolitionists and in the 
discourses of numerous figures in the revolutionary era, antislavery and antiracism often 
diverged, as support for one did not necessarily imply acceptance of the other.
73
 
Nonetheless, the years 1790-1802 in the French world can be conceptualized as an arc 
across which struggles against legalized racism and slavery yielded landmark legislative 
triumphs, peaking in 1795, only to reverse direction after 1799. In the erosion of the gains 
of the French and Haitian revolutions, racism and slavery became closely intertwined. 
The “integral part” doctrine as embodied in the 1795 French constitution had 
institutionalized the two great victories that slaves, free people of color, and their 
advocates had won in the first half of the 1790s: the overturning of racially-
discriminatory laws and the formal elimination of slavery. The fears of many abolitionists 
that Napoleon‟s revocation of this doctrine in his 1799 constitution represented a grave 
threat to the regime of emancipation became realized in 1802, when Napoleon coupled 
his (partial) repeal of the 1794 emancipation decree with an array of racist laws that left 
the hard-won gains of 1791-1795 in tatters. These included a reinstatement of the 
infamous pre-revolutionary Police des Noirs regulations which had aimed to closely 
monitor the activities of persons of African extraction in France; the reinstitution of the 
requirement that blacks carry identity cards while in the metropole; prohibitions on 
mixed-race persons‟ entry into France; and a ban on interracial marriage.74  
                                                 
73 For a discussion of these abolitionist writings, see Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, chapter 2.  
74 For details on these laws, see Schloss, Sweet Liberty, 24. In a recent article, Jennifer Heuer placed an 
1803 French ministerial ban on marriage between whites and blacks within the context of developments in 
both continental France and in the colonies, comparing the ideologies and categories of race that had 
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After 1802, authorities in various French territories passed laws that targeted the 
rights of those seen as having African ancestry and that sought to limit the means by 
which “slaves” could gain their freedom.75 On 21 December 1802, a Spanish priest in 
Santo Domingo named Manuel de Mena had urged Rochambeau to suspend a 
proscription on Dominican refugees‟ taking their “slaves” with them from that colony, 
contending that those “blacks” who remained in Santo Domingo after their purported 
owners had emigrated became “vagabonds” who threatened “tranquility” and public 
order. “It suits us to minimize the number of our enemies,” Mena had told Rochambeau, 
“and one cannot trust our blacks, although they are Spanish. They are of the same origin, 
                                                                                                                                                 
emerged in different parts of the French world. See Jennifer Heuer, “The One-Drop Rule in Reverse? 
Interracial Marriages in Napoleonic and Restoration France,” Law and History Review 27, no. 3 (Fall 
2009): 515-548. Two cases meticulously documented by French officials attest to the high degree of 
scrutiny that they sought to exercise on non-whites‟ lives. On 29 April 1807, a French authority informed 
the Police Minister that in contravention of a 2 July 1802 order that had banned the “introduction of that 
caste into the continental [French] territory,” a man named Dupons had brought to France a twenty-two-
year-old “mulâtre” (mulatto) named Hyacinthe Coco. M. Coco had allegedly been “perverted by the 
frequent orgies and nocturnal meetings of the men of color who live in Paris.” The writer of this note 
prescribed two remedies for the situation: more stringent enforcement of this 2 July 1802 decree on some 
non-whites‟ travel and the enlistment of some of these “men of color” into the army, where they could 
perform “useful services” (services utiles). Letter to the Minister of General Police, 29 April 1807, ANOM 
Correspondance au départ (hereinafter CD) B 267. In the original French: “Je suis informé, Monsieur, par 
une lettre du Sieur Dupons, ci-devant agent commissionné du feu Général en chef Le Clerc, qu‟il a amené 
en France un mulâtre âgé de 22 ans…nommé Hyacinthe Coco, et que dans l‟ignorance où il était, ajoute-t-
il, de l‟arrêté consulaire du 13 messidor an 10 qui défend l‟introduction de cette caste sur le territoire 
continental, il n‟avait point jugé nécessaire de prendre à cet égard mon autorisation, mais que le Mulâtre 
dont il s‟agit, perverti par les orgies fréquentes et les réunions nocturnes des hommes de couleur qui se 
trouvent à Paris, avait fini par quitter son service pour s‟engager à celui du S[ieur] Jurien.” On 24 June 
1807, an “Adjunct Chief” had informed the president of the civil tribunal of Pont Audemer that before 
authorities could address the petition of a Guadeloupean “black” (noir) named Jean-Pierre Gerard for 
certain official “civil acts and certificates” (les actes civils et les certificats), it was necessary to ascertain 
whether his fiancée was “white” (blanche) due to an order issued in Nivôse an 11 (22 December 1802-20 
January 1803) that forbade any tribunal from recognizing a marriage between whites and blacks. “Adjunct 
Chief” to M. Bourard, President of the Civil Tribunal of Pont Audemer, 24 June 1807, ANOM CD B 267. 
75 For instance, Rebecca Schloss has shown that Martinican authorities issued several decrees during these 
years that aimed to strengthen official control over manumission. These included a ruling that no 
manumission decree issued in any other colony was valid in Martinique until public officials there ratified 
it as well as a decree that recognized an individual‟s freedom only if he or she had secured a “title of 
liberty” after the French reoccupation of Martinique in 1802, secured official confirmation of such a pre-
existing title after 1803, or gained the provisional assent of the colonial prefect for manumission. Schloss, 
Sweet Liberty, 39.  
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and of the same condition as the [Haitian] rebels: and although we treat them gently, it 
remains to be seen, whether they serve us with love.”76   
Ferrand built upon this logic, enforcing a distinction between “French” blacks, 
whom he associated with Haiti and considered especially subversive, and “Spanish” 
blacks, deemed somewhat less dangerous.
77
 The line separating “French” and “Spanish” 
blacks ran through the ancien régime to the revolutionary era and into the post-1804 
period.
78
 Ferrand‟s actions in this respect mirrored those of his counterparts in other parts 
of the Americas, as Cuban officials generally sought to bar the settlement on that island 
of free and freed men of color from Saint-Domingue, while North American authorities 
passed laws designed to halt or greatly reduce the entrance of so-called “French Negroes” 
into the United States.
79
  
                                                 
76 Manuel de Mena to Rochambeau, 21 December 1802, SHAT B7 12. In the original text: “Mi pequeñez 
pide licencia a V.E. para suplicarle, que se digne suspender, y derogar la prohibición de sacar sus 
esclavos los que emigran, por que así es importante para el publico reposo, y tranquilidad deseada de esta 
Ysla. Los negros, que no siguen a sus amos, quando emigran, quedan sin la sugecion vagabundos, 
insolentes, y atrevidos. Conviene minorar los enemigos; y no hay que fiar de nuestros negros, aunque sean 
españoles. Ellos son del mismo origen, y de la misma condición de los rebeldes: y aunque nosotros los 
tratamos con dulzura, resta saber, si ellos nos sirven con amor.” 
77 For instance, on 22 May 1804, Ferrand declared that while “Spanish” (espagnols) inhabitants of the 
department of Cibao could enter the department of Ozama, most “French blacks and men of color” (nègres 
et…hommes de couleur français) were prohibited entry. Ferrand to Sandoval, 2 Prairial an 12 (22 May 
1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. 
78 According to Moreau de St Méry, as early as 1697, M. Ducasse,  the Governor of French Saint-
Domingue, had signed an accord with his Spanish counterpart in Santo Domingo which had stipulated that 
“French blacks” (nègres français) who had fled to Santo Domingo were to be returned to their former 
masters. Both bilateral treaties and unilateral declarations throughout the eighteenth century continued to 
posit a distinction between “French” and “Spanish” blacks. For instance, the 1777 Treaty of Aranjuez had 
apparently included a provision that exempted “Spanish blacks” (nègres espagnols) from a French rule 
requiring recaptured fugitive slaves to be sold following a set detention period if no would-be master 
presented himself or herself.  M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la 
partie espagnole de l‟isle Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 2:172, 179. 
79 On the situation in Cuba, see Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard, “Servitude, liberté et citoyenneté dans le 
monde atlantique des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles: Rosalie de nation Poulard…” Revue de la Société Haïtienne 
d‟Histoire et de Géographie no. 83 (July-September 2008), 33. On the United States and “French 
Negroes,” see Sue Peabody, “„Free Upon Higher Ground:‟ Saint-Domingue Slaves‟ Suits for Freedom in 
U.S. Courts, 1792-1830,” in The World of the Haitian Revolution, ed. David Geggus and Norman Fiering 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 261-283; and Ashli White, Encountering Revolution: Haiti 
and the Making of the Early Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
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Ferrand issued an assortment of other racially discriminatory orders, some 
implicitly in response to claims-making by both those claimed as slaves and those 
deemed to be of African descent who were able to prove their freedom. These laws 
included curfews, racially-based exclusion from emigration and immigration programs, 
anti-vagabondage measures, and even discrimination in treatment for illnesses.
80
 Such 
measures were closely linked to fears of a Haitian invasion. In early 1804, Ferrand related 
in a note to his subordinate Vives his anxieties concerning a “quantity of blacks and 
people of color of both sexes, refugees from the French part [Haiti], who are continually 
in idleness and who will surely become dangerous especially if the Brigands [Haitians] 
invade the land.” Ferrand then ordered Vives to gather information on and put to work 
those among these people who did not have any “means to subsist” or who were “slaves 
who find themselves here without their masters.”81 These efforts culminated in a 15 
September 1804 order by Ferrand to create a comprehensive registry that recorded the 
following information for all “French blacks and people of color” over twelve years old: 
their names, ages, legal status (“free or slave”), and “from which neighborhood and 
                                                 
80 One such curfew prohibited most “Blacks and Mulattos” (Nègres et Mulâtres) from being outside after 
seven in the evening. Ferrand to Colonel Pichot, 7 January 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. During the 
1805 siege of Santo Domingo city by Haitian forces, Ferrand instructed the “Notables of Santo Domingo” 
(Notables de Sto Domingo) to compose a detailed listing of families that would be eligible for evacuation, 
which was to only include “whites, and others considered as such” (blancs, et autres considérés comme 
tels). Ferrand to “Notables of Santo Domingo,” 13 Ventôse an 13 (4 March 1805), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/40. Furthermore, in one order from 26 February 1804, Ferrand invited only white Saint-Domingue 
refugees to settle in Santo Domingo. Ferrand order on refugees, 25 February 1804, AGI Papeles de Cuba 
(hereinafter Cuba) 1705. When undergoing treatment in Santo Domingo‟s hospitals, “black and mulatto” 
(nègres ou mulâtres) nurses could not claim any part of their salary, while their “white” (blancs) 
counterparts would receive half of their salary in the same situation. Lt. Col. Vives to “Colonial Inspector,” 
18 March 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/3. 
81 Ferrand to Vives, 4 Pluviôse an 12 (25 January 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original text: 
“Il y a ici une quantité de noirs et gens de couleur des deux sexes, réfugiés de la partie française, qui sont 
continuellement dans l‟oisiveté et ne peuvent qu‟être ou devenir dangereux surtout si les Brigands 
pénétraient dans le pays. Il faut, mon cher commandant vous entendre avec le commandant de la place 
pour avoir des renseignements sur ces individus, et occuper à des travaux utiles ceux qui n‟ont pas de 
moyens pour subsister, comme aussi ceux esclaves qui se trouvent ici sans leurs maîtres.” 
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plantation they come,” in addition to their present place of domicile. Ferrand also 
proposed either employing “French black and colored slaves” (nègres et gens de couleur 
français esclaves)—especially those whose purported masters were not present—in 
“useful jobs” (travaux utiles) or loaning them out.82 
Intertwined in all these measures was the question of the rights that people of 
color could claim in this society. Though they could draw upon an inheritance of 
protracted struggles for equality that had culminated in the 4 April 1792 law abolishing 
legalized racial discrimination in Saint-Domingue, gens de couleur were confronted with 
severe challenges in asserting their rights in the face of Ferrand‟s racist laws. In the spirit 
of a “Police Ordinance” (Ordonnance de Police) from 19 November 1773 that had 
ordered the arrest and imprisonment of all “Black slaves who try to pass for free” in Port-
au-Prince, the Ferrand government imposed all manner of restrictions on the mobility of 
                                                 
82 Ferrand to Vives, 28 Fructidor an 12 (15 September 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original 
text: “Il y a dans la ville et dans l‟arrondissement un [illegible] de gens de couleur et de nègres français 
dont la police veut que nous connaissions l‟existence, afin d‟empêcher le vagabondage. Il faut, pour 
parvenir à ce but, que vous vous entendiez avec le Com[mandant] d‟Armes, afin que dans le courant de la 
Semaine prochaine il sera dressé au bureau de la place un tableau, qui indiquera les noms et prénoms de 
tous les nègres et gens de couleur français de tout sexe au dessus de douze ans, leur âge s‟ils sont libres ou 
esclaves, de quel quartier et de quelle habitation ils proviennent, à quelle époque ils se sont retirés ici, le 
quartier de la ville ou de l‟arrondissement où ils font leurs résidences, en y ajoutant les observations qui 
seront jugées nécessaires.” Emphasis in original. In a 12 April 1803 letter to local officials in Montechristi 
and Santiago (Santo Domingo), a presumed authority (probably General Kerverseau) had written that “the 
number of French refugees, [who are] black and of Color, of the different sexes, has considerably 
increased.” Fearful of the alleged “bad intentions” of these individuals, the letter‟s author indicated that he 
would soon order all such migrants to appear before authorities so that the latter could record their names, 
ages, legal condition, marital and family situation, and their ownership of any property. Letter to officials in 
Montechrist and Santiago, 22 Germinal an 11 (12 April 1803), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/35. In the original 
text: “D‟après les rapports qui m‟ont été fait, il paraît, que depuis quelque tems, le nombre des réfugiés 
français, nègres et de Couleur, des différents sexes, a considérablement augmenté. Je viens d‟ordonner à 
Monte Christe des mesures pour déjouer ceux de ces réfugiés qui pourraient avoir des mauvaises 
intentions.” I have not located either registry in my research. 
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non-whites, seeking to enslave those who could not prove their freedom and to 
disenfranchise those who could.
83
  
On 31 December 1807, Ferrand decreed that those wishing to create État Civil 
records in their names must present a “title of liberty.”84 In other respects as well, Ferrand 
sought to impose a rigid line between “slave” and free. On 26 December 1807, Ferrand 
declared that henceforth no “Slave” (Esclave) could sell “dry goods” (marchandises 
sèches) in the streets. This order required all “People of color” (Gens de couleur) who 
wished to sell such goods to provide written proof of their liberty and pay a deposit. 
Though he based this order on the claim that unfree dry goods sellers frequently engaged 
in theft, it may have represented an attempt to reduce these alleged slaves‟ opportunities 
to accumulate the funds for self-purchase.
85
 
Two other measures served to further circumscribe the rights of those of African 
descent. On 21 December 1804, Ferrand requested that a subordinate conduct a 
“contrôle” (inspection) on a number of men belonging to two military companies that 
would require information on their legal condition, domicile, purported master (if deemed 
                                                 
83 “Police Ordinance concerning So-called Free Blacks,” 19 November 1773, ANOM CMSM F3 273. In 
the original text: “Il est ordonné et enjoint à la maréchaussée du ressort du dit siège, d‟arrêter tous les 
Nègres esclaves qui se feront passer pour libres dans ce Quarter, pour les conduire en prison.” 
84 Ferrand order on Napoleonic Civil Code, 31 December 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/44. In the 
original text: “Le Commissaire de l‟État civil sera tenu de se faire représenter et de mentionner les titres de 
liberté, avant de donner la qualification de libre, aux parties qui comparaitront dans les actes.” The État 
Civil was the main legal repository of birth, marriage and death records in both metropolitan France and in 
the colonies. 
85 Order of Ferrand on dry goods sales, 26 December 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. The Code Noir‟s 
Article XIX forbade slaves from “sell[ing] any type of foodstuffs” in the “market” or in “private houses” 
“without the express permission of their masters by a note or by known marks, on pain of confiscation of 
the items thus sold.” In the original text: “Leur défendons aussi d‟exposer en vente au marché, ni de porter 
dans les maisons particulières pour vendre aucune sorte de denrées, même des fruits, légumes, bois à 
brûler, herbes pour la nourriture des bestiaux et leurs manufactures, sans permission expresse de leurs 
maîtres par un billet ou par des marques connues, à peine de revendication des choses ainsi vendues, sans 
restitution du prix par leurs maîtres, et de six livres tournois d‟amende à leur profit contre les acheteurs.” 
Louis Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, ou le calvaire de Canaan (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), 
128. Ferrand may have sought to close this loophole in this 1807 order. 
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to be a slave), the date of their arrival in Santo Domingo, and their comportment during 
Toussaint‟s reign there as well as upon the arrival of the Leclerc expedition in 1802.86 
While this measure appears to have responded in part to bitter memories of Toussaint‟s 
power, another decree stemmed from a phenomenon with much deeper roots on the 
island. No doubt well aware that access to inheritance had represented a key means by 
which Saint-Domingue‟s free-colored population had accrued wealth over the course of 
the eighteenth century, Ferrand sought to sharply restrict the practice among non-whites 
in Santo Domingo.
87
 In a 27 February 1806 order, Ferrand banned the bestowal on any 
person of color of inheritance exceeding the value of one hundred gourdes that was 
against the interests of “absent rightful heirs.”88  
As in the late eighteenth century, a fearful colonial state responded to the 
perceived threat of non-white demographic preponderance, accumulation of resources, 
and accession to political power with a legislative assault on not only the civil and 
political rights of gens de couleur but also their dignity and ability to both escape from 
enslavement and preserve their liberty once freed. The intended parallels to the pre-
revolutionary order became explicit in one letter that Ferrand composed to the “Notables 
of Santo Domingo” on 15 September 1804. In his discussion of a work program aimed at 
“French blacks and people of color,” Ferrand stated that the program “is a means to 
                                                 
86 Ferrand to Peralta, 30 Frimaire an 13 (21 December 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. 
87 According to Sue Peabody, though a royal decree issued in 1726 forbade slaves and free people of color 
in the French Caribbean from receiving inheritances from whites, this was not frequently enforced in Saint-
Domingue. Sue Peabody, “Négresse, Mulâtresse, Citoyenne: Gender and Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1650-1848,” in Gender and Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World, ed. Pamela Scully and 
Diana Paton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 58. 
88 Ferrand order on inheritances, 27 February 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. In the original text: 
“…aucune donation ou Legs faits en faveur des gens de couleur, au préjudice d‟héritiers de droit absens, 
en excédant la Somme de Cent gourdes, ne pourront être exécutés.” For details on the importance of 
inheritances in eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue, see Garrigus, Before Haiti, chapter 1 (esp. 64-72); and 
Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 60-65. 
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occupy the Vagabonds, and to persuade those, who believe themselves [to be] 
independent, that we consider them in the State in which they were before the revolution, 
and from which they have been removed to the detriment of the Colony.”89 
The legal scholar Vernon Palmer has written that “history tends to show that the 
stronger the fear of insurrection, the more likely restrictive laws will be passed targeting 
free people of color.”90 While the Ferrand regime‟s legislative record amply supports this 
assertion, a look back at the notarial archive hints that the law also represented a terrain 
for contestation over rights. The language of the several dozen notarized acts of liberty 
that were created in French Santo Domingo often displayed an ambiguity concerning the 
scope of citizenship there. A discernible tension existed between two statements that one 
encounters repeatedly in these acts: that the person thus freed would live like “other freed 
people;” or that the freed subject would have “all of the rights” of “anciens libres” (the 
formerly free; i.e. those who had never been slaves).
91
 This tension was rooted in the 
bitter political and legal history of colonial Saint-Domingue. The 1685 Code Noir had 
granted ex-slaves “the same rights, privileges, and liberties that persons born free enjoy,” 
                                                 
89 Ferrand to “Notables of Santo Domingo,” 28 Fructidor an 12 (15 September 1804), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/40. In the original text: “C‟est un moyen d‟occuper les Vagabonds, et de persuader à ceux, qui se 
croyent indépendants, que nous les considérons dans l‟État où ils étaient avant la révolution, et dont on les 
avait tiré pour le malheur de la Colonie.” 
90 Vernon Palmer, “The Strange Science of Codifying Slavery—Moreau Lislet and the Louisiana Digest of 
1808,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum no. 24 (2009), 97.  
91 According to one notarial act, Louise Félicité dite Agard was to be “freed from the yoke of slavery, and 
Free, as all the other freed people of the colony, to enjoy, and make use of her Free state…and as the 
former regulations and Laws [illegible] in the colony of Saint Domingue prescribe, concerning the 
manumission of slaves.” Freeing of Louise Félicité dite Agard, 30 April 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 
699. In the original text: “…affranchie du joug de L‟esclavage, et Libre, comme tout les autres affranchis 
de la colonie, pour elle jouir, et disposer de son état de Libre, ainsi, et comme La prescrivent les anciens 
règlements et Loix [illegible] dans la colonie de Saint Domingue, concernant l‟affranchissement des 
esclaves.” In the manumission act of Étiennette Eloize, the terms of freedom were as follows: “Étiennette 
Eloize, [is to] be, and remain from this moment Free, and freed from the bonds of servitude…[and] fully 
enjoy her Liberty, and dispose of her person as all the other formerly Free people, and freed people of the 
colony.” Freedom act of Étiennette Eloize, 28 July 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 699. The original text 
reads: “Étiennette Eloize, soit et demeure dès ce moment Libre, et affranchie des liens de La servitude pour 
294 
 
yet by the 1780s, living like “other freed people” often meant enduring political 
disenfranchisement and innumerable quotidian humiliations.
92
 By contrast, the ability to 
claim the status of “formerly free” could enable one to avoid these curtailments of rights. 
In their long struggle against these racist laws, free-colored activists from Saint-
Domingue had devoted scrupulous attention to law and to the skillful manipulation of 
language. John Garrigus observes that “[t]he first free colored spokesmen in 
revolutionary Paris—a merchant and a planter—were so skilled at legalistic argument 
that historians have mistakenly described them as „lawyers.‟”93 Two notarial acts from 
French Santo Domingo hint at the continued salience of language in struggles over rights 
there. On 17 October 1806 in Santo Domingo city, the Saint-Domingue refugee Rozine 
dite (called) Alzire came before a notary with a 19 August 1803 act of sale (created in Le 
Cap) which confirmed that her mother Rosalie dite Dufay had purchased her in order to 
free her. This 1803 act had labeled Rosalie a “mulâtresse libre affranchie” (free freed 
mulatto), but the word “affranchie” (freed) had been crossed out. The 1803 document 
then declared that Rozine would enjoy “all of the rights…attached to The Class Of Free 
men.”94 Moreover, the 12 December 1805 Santo Domingo city manumission act of the 
adolescents Zénon and Solon noted that they would “enjoy liberty from this day forth, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
elle jouir, pleinement de sa Liberté, et disposer de sa personne comme tous les autres anciens Libres, et 
affranchis de la colonie.” 
92 Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 200. The original French reads: “Octroyons aux affranchis les mêmes droits, 
privilèges et immunités dont jouissent les personnes nées libres.”  
93 Garrigus, Before Haiti, 95. There exists a sizeable literature on the centrality of language in the unfolding 
of revolution in metropolitan France. For a useful overview, see Jay M. Smith, “No More Language 
Games: Words, Beliefs, and the Political Culture of Early Modern France,” American Historical Review 
102, no. 5 (December 1997): 1413-1440. 
94 Dépôt of Rozine dite Alzire, 17 October 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 705. The phrase in French 
reads: “…demeurer libre et affranchie de toute servitude et Esclavage, Jouir et user de tous les droits et 
[illegible] attachés à La Classe D‟hommes Libres.” 
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the other freed people enjoy it in this Colony, by virtue of the edict of the month of 
March 1685 [the Code Noir].”95 
Of course, the mere invocation of the Code Noir in this and other acts in no way 
implied its wholesale and faithful application, any more than was the case in colonial 
Saint-Domingue. Nonetheless, the Code‟s provisions of equality and the history of free-
colored activism associated with them may have represented grounds for the 
advancement of claims by those targeted by the regime‟s racist laws. Furthermore, 
correspondence and reports concerning disputes over the ownership of several “slaves” 
suggest the ability of the purportedly enslaved to exploit legal and documentary 
mechanisms to improve their condition. 
While the Code had represented for free-colored leaders a latent royal 
commitment to a legal regime of racial equality, it had distinctly different meanings for 
those still held in bondage. Though the Code contained certain avenues for escape from 
servitude (such as being named the executor of the master‟s will and marriage to the 
master) along with provisions requiring masters to provide for slaves‟ basic subsistence 
and to refrain from “barbarous and inhumane treatments...of their slaves,” its stance on 
matters such as slaves‟ serving as witnesses was much less liberal than its position on the 
rights of manumitted persons.
96
 Nonetheless, some of those held in bondage in Santo 
Domingo in the Ferrand period stretched the boundaries of the law, forcing authorities to 
                                                 
95 Freedom of Zénon and Solon, 12 December 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 735. In the original text: 
“…jouir de la liberté à compter de ce jour, ainsi qu‟en jouissent les autres affranchis de cette Colonie, en 
vertu de l‟édit du mois de mars 1685.” 
96 Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 142; Laurent Dubois and John Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 
1789-1804: A Brief History with Documents (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 51-53. The text of Article XXVI 
reads: “Les esclaves que ne seront point nourris, vêtus et entretenus par leurs maîtres selon que nous 
l‟avons ordonné par ces présentes pourront en donner l‟avis à notre procureur général et mettre les 
mémoires entre ses mains, sur lesquels et même d‟office, si les avis lui en viennent d‟ailleurs, les maîtres 
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address their claims to switch masters, to reunite with an allegedly enslaved relative who 
had been transferred to another location, or to escape from servitude altogether. 
Some “slaves” struck against their predicament by provoking or exploiting 
disputes over their purported ownership. In a 28 July 1808 letter to a don Juan Castillos, 
Ferrand described a conflict concerning the ownership of a “nègre créole” (black creole) 
named Manuel Aldaña, who was detained in a prison in Seybo. While Feliciana Cabrera, 
a native of Hincha who had emigrated to Seybo, claimed to have “lost” (perdu) this 
would-be slave in Hincha, a man named Jean Lemdez also asserted his rights over him. 
Lemdez meticulously assembled a dossier of evidence to prove his case, including a 
notarial act of his purchase of Manuel from Thomas Figueredo, a native of Bánica, 
created by the notary Antonio Pérez. Other documentation traced the purported 
ownership of Manuel back to a Dionicio Hernández, whose succession had transferred 
Manuel to his brother Santiago. Ferrand requested that Santiago Hernández appear before 
Castillos in order to show one or more “titles of property” (titres de propriété) over 
Manuel so that the matter might be resolved.
97
 Buried in this voluminous paper trail is 
Manuel‟s own agency: the pivotal word “lost” implies that he may have become a 
fugitive, creating this dispute over his ownership by his attempts to escape from bondage.  
More direct evidence of flight appears in a 3 September 1807 letter that a woman 
named Ana Victoria Lasapelo wrote to the Commandant in Chief of the Western 
Subdivision in Santo Domingo. In it, she implored her interlocutor to apprehend a 
                                                                                                                                                 
seront poursuivis à sa requête et sans frais, ce que nous voulons être observé pour les crimes et traitements 
barbares et inhumains des maîtres envers leurs esclaves.” Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 142. 
97 Ferrand to don Juan Castillos, 28 July 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. On 20 July 1808, Ferrand had 
asked Lemdez in a letter to come before him with the “black” (nègre) Manuel and with the proper “titles” 
(titres) that would prove ownership over Manuel. Ferrand to Lemdez, 20 July 1808, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/45. 
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“Slave” (Esclave) named Mauricio who had departed with the “Brigands” (Haitians), 
offering to provide proof of ownership if requested.
98
 On what legal basis did this 
unspecified written proof of Mauricio‟s status rest if, as is likely, he had been freed by the 
1793-1794 emancipation edicts? Would his settlement in Haiti invalidate his purported 
master‟s claims on his person? Implicit in the assertion that this document superseded his 
actions was the attempted re-creation of slavery in the documentary record. This 
document serves as a reminder that the re-imposition of slavery in Santo Domingo 
entailed quasi-legal as well as military force.  
In some instances, those claimed as slaves subverted legal restrictions and obliged 
authorities to call them to testify in contentions over proper ownership. According to the 
notes of a session of a government commission from 9 February 1805, an unnamed 
woman had made a claim to recover her daughter Anastasie, who had been taken from 
the Cambariva plantation by a Nicolás González and sent to Puerto Rico in exchange for 
the “petit nègre” Juannico. Anastasie‟s mother insisted to the “Captain General” 
(presumably Ferrand) that her daughter and Juannico be returned to their original 
residences. Ferrand requested that both Juannico and Anastasie‟s mother appear as 
declarants (comparaître) before a government commission in order to resolve the 
problem.
99
  
On 4 June 1808 Ferrand wrote to Castet, a military commander in Samaná, 
concerning the alleged slave Nicolás, currently held in prison in Samaná, who had 
advanced a claim to belong to the family of a M. Sosa against the opposition of a Julián 
                                                 
98 Ana Victoria Lasapelo to Monsieur P. C. Desile, Commandant in Chief of the Western Subdivision, 3 
September 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/44. 
99 “Commission charged with the examination of the Management of the ex-administrator Nicolás 
González,” Session of 20 Pluviôse an 13 (9 February 1805), CARAN Colonies CC/9b/15. 
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Vallejos. Ferrand ordered Nicolás to appear in Santo Domingo city so that authorities 
could determine his “legitimate owner” (propriétaire légitime).100  
While the original 1685 redaction of the Code Noir had severely limited slaves‟ 
ability to provide testimony by denying their word any legal weight, the 1724 revisions to 
the Code stipulated that slaves could be witnesses in civil or criminal cases only if their 
testimony was necessary, no white witnesses were available, and they were not testifying 
for or against their master.
101
 According to Malick Ghachem, though these small 
“loopholes” existed in French colonial slave law in order to “prosecute slave „crimes‟ for 
which the only available evidence was the eyewitness report of another slave,” such 
provisions became invoked in ways unintended by their framers. For instance, in a 1775 
investigation into a complaint brought by a slave named Thomas against his master 
concerning alleged abusive treatment, the sénéchal (magistrate) of Le Cap heard 
Thomas‟s testimony.102 In compelling colonial officials to call them as witnesses, Nicolás 
and Anastasie‟s mother likewise took advantage of these “loopholes” in a way that 
contravened the spirit of the legal regime that Ferrand sought to put in place.
103
 
                                                 
100 Ferrand to Castet, 4 June 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. 
101 Alan Watson, Slave Law in the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 88. 
102 Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: Haitian Variations on a 
Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002), 136-140. France, unlike Spain, had no 
explicit legal mechanism by which slaves could claim redress against owners who treated them especially 
cruelly, except as concerns the deprivation of nourishment and clothing and the practice of forcing slaves to 
work on Sundays and holidays. Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, 86; Sala-Molins, Le Code Noir, 102, 
134-142 (Articles VI and XXII-XXVI of the Code Noir). 
103 The interplay between possible “slave” flight, document-based claims on individuals as “property,” and 
presumed appearances of “slaves” as witnesses is evident in an 1806 dispute between two purported 
masters of a man named Andrés. According to a letter from Ramón Cabral, the alcalde (mayor) of Santo 
Domingo city, to the imperial high appeals court president Minuty dated 1 February 1806, Remigio 
Acebedo had made a claim to the “negro Andrés” as his “property” (propiedad) based on a written 
document obtained in Azua, and was seeking to recover him after he had spent the past six years “in flight” 
(de fuga) in Los Ingenios. Ramón Cabral to Minuty, 1 February 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. In a 31 
January 1806 letter to Ferrand, the other disputant, María Lebrón, contended that the only possession that 
she had retained upon her flight from San Juan to Los Ingenios to escape the “brigands” was Andrés, who 
according to Lebrón came into her possession upon her mother‟s death around six years ago. Though an 
auction to pay off her brother‟s debts had included the sale of Andrés in Azua, Lebrón had ignored this and 
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Ferrand employed his own legal tools in his most draconian policy: the capture 
and enslavement of Haitians. In an arrêté issued on 6 January 1805, Ferrand authorized 
those living near the border with Haiti to enter Haiti and “make prisoners” of Haitians 
who were under fourteen years of age, who would become the “property” of their captors. 
Females under twelve years old and males under ten could not be returned to Haiti but 
could be either “attached” to a plantation or sold. Ferrand entrusted his Commandant 
Joseph Ruiz and other trusted subordinates with the task of issuing official certificates 
affirming these captives‟ ownership and their capture in the “territory occupied by the 
rebels.”104 Furthermore, Ferrand stated in a letter to Ruiz that Haitian males in Santo 
Domingo over fourteen years of age should be shot.
105
  
Extant notarial records provide further evidence of such slaving. On 3 February 
1808, sieur Pierre Senabrier sold a woman named Marie-Catherine to the dame 
Chadefand for 144 gourdes. Marie-Catherine had initially been “captured among the 
Brigands [Haitians]” (prise sur les Brigands) before being sold twice. A 26 December 
                                                                                                                                                 
continued to keep him “in her power” (en son pouvoir) in Azua on the grounds that the auction (and thus 
Andrés‟s sale) had been illegitimate. Authorities in Santo Domingo called both María Lebrón and Andrés 
to appear before a tribunal in order to decide the matter. María Lebrón to Ferrand, 31 January 1806, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. 
104 Order of Ferrand on capture of Haitians, 16 Nivôse an 13 (6 January 1805), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/40. In the original text: “Les habitants des frontières des Départements de l‟Ozama et du Cibao, 
ainsi que les troupes employées au Cordon, sont et demeurent autorisés, à se répandre sur le territoire 
occupé par les révoltés, à leur [illegible], et à faire prisonniers tous ceux des deux sexes que ne passeront 
pas l‟âge de quatorze ans. Art. 2e. Les prisonniers provenant de…ces expéditions, seront la propriété des 
capteurs. Art 3e. Les enfants mâles capturés ayant moins de Dix ans et les Négresses, mulâtresses…au 
dessous de Douze, devront expressément rester dans la Colonie et n‟en pourront être exportés sous aucun 
prétexte. Les capteurs pourront à leur gré, ou les attacher à leurs plantations, ou les vendre à des 
habitants, résidents dans les Dép[artements] de l‟Ozama et du Cibao. Art. 4e. Les noirs et gens de Couleur, 
dont il est fait mention dans l‟article précédent, et que ne devront pas être exportés, ne seront considéré 
comme propriété des Capteurs, et ne pourront être vandus par eux, qu‟autant qu‟ils se seront munis, pour 
chaque individu, dans le Département de l‟Ozama, d‟un Certificat des Notables d‟Azua, visé par le 
Commandant Ruiz, et dans le Département du Cibao, d‟un pareil certificat…qui constate que ces noirs ont 
été effectivement pris, sur le territoire occupé par les révoltés.” Emphasis in original.  
105 Ferrand to Joseph Ruiz, 16 Nivôse an 13 (6 January 1805), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original 
text: “Je ne dis rien dans mon Arrêté, au sujet des noirs et gens de couleur, au dessus de quatorze ans. Il 
300 
 
1807 certificate created by her first owner Anastacio Váldez (appended to this notarial 
act) elaborated that Marie-Catherine had been “captured in the enemy part [Haiti]” 
(apresada en la parte enemiga) before coming into Váldez‟s possession.106 On 11 
September 1808, a sieur Espaillat sold four children to Ferrand‟s second-in-command, 
General Joseph Barquier. Three of them had been “captured among the rebels” (pris sur 
les révoltés) according to certificates mentioned in the notarial act.
107
 As with the 
certificates issued by Ruiz, these notarial records sought to re-inscribe slavery into the 
documentary record.   
Slaving in Santo Domingo under Ferrand rested on a mix of opportunism and 
resolute anti-Haitianism. This in turn entailed a wholesale rejection of both the 
revolutionary emancipation decrees and of emancipations granted by onetime slaves-
turned-generals. In one 8 November 1804 letter to his subordinate Peralta, Ferrand 
rejected even the limited manumissions that the royalists Jean-François and Georges 
Biassou had offered in the early 1790s. Insisting that these men had never had the “right” 
to liberate anybody, Ferrand declared that all “French black and colored slaves” who had 
been given their “liberty” by either of these men did not have a valid claim to freedom 
and thus must be “considered as Slaves.” By contrast, Ferrand argued that the former 
“Spanish Slaves” who had received their liberty from the “King of Spain” due to service 
in colonial armies ought to remain free.
108
 In this letter, Ferrand implicitly responded to 
                                                                                                                                                 
est bien entendu, que les mâles doivent être fusillés: Quant aux femmes, il est avantageux, je pense, de les 
conserver.” Emphasis in original.  
106 Sale of the “négresse” Marie-Catherine, 3 February 1808, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1700. 
107 Sale of four children, 11 September 1808, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1701. 
108 Ferrand to Peralta, 17 Brumaire an 13 (8 November 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original 
French: “…les esclaves noirs et de couleur français, à qui Jean François et Biassou, qui n‟avaient aucun 
droit à cet effet, ont donné la liberté, doivent toujours être considérés comme Esclaves: qu‟ils doivent être 
arrêtés et envoyés à la disposition de ce commandant…quant aux Esclaves Espagnols, qui ont servi 
en…sous les ordres du G[énéral] Cabrera, et qui ont eu leur liberté au nom du Roy d‟Espagne, leurs titres 
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would-be slaves‟ potential efforts to attain liberty, accepting only a narrow range of 
claims to free status. On other occasions, Ferrand tapped into the legal and social history 
of the Code Noir, which had proclaimed the French king to be the ultimate arbiter of 
legal condition even as it recognized certain forms of claims-making by slaves and freed 
people. In giving legal justification to this captive-taking, however, Ferrand disregarded 
royal authority and instead recalled that most ancient of bases for enslavement: capture in 
war. In a 2 October 1808 letter to several of his subordinates, Ferrand explicitly stated 
that captives taken from Haiti in battle would legally belong to their captors.
109
 
Partly in response to these policies and to the fear of a French invasion, Haiti‟s 
first leaders ordered the construction of a series of forts in their territory. They also 
conducted a military incursion into Santo Domingo in 1805, which met with defeat 
despite Dessalines‟s tenfold manpower advantage over Ferrand due to the fortuitously-
timed arrival of a French naval force under Admiral Missiessy.
110
 In a 12 April 1805 
address to his citizens, Dessalines justified his invasion of the “former Spanish part” of 
the island partly on the basis of the “decree issued by Ferrand, on the date of 16 Nivose, 
year III (6 January 1805).” He further accused the “Spanish indigenes” of collaborating 
with the “freedom-killing endeavors” of the French and called upon his fellow Haitians to 
“live or die as free men,” distributing among them numerous copies of the 6 January 
1805 enslaving order in an effort to rally them around the flag.
111
 Emilio Cordero Michel 
                                                                                                                                                 
doivent être respectés; et ils ne doivent pas faire partie de ceux que réclame le Command[ant] de la place.” 
Emphasis in original. 
109 Ferrand to “Commandants” and “Notables” in Santo Domingo, 2 October 1808, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/45. 
110 Bénot, La démence coloniale, 117-128. 
111 Proclamation of Dessalines to fellow Haitians, 12 April 1805, in Rodríguez Demorizi, Invasiones 
haitianas, 105-108. In the Spanish translation: “…persuadido de que mientras un solo enemigo respire 
todavía en este territorio, siempre me quedaría algo que hacer para llenar dignamente el puesto adonde 
me habeis elevado; provocado por un decreto expedido por Ferrand, en fecha de 16 Nivoso, año III (6 
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has argued that Ferrand‟s 6 January 1805 order was a major reason why Dessalines led 
the 1805 invasion into Santo Domingo, as the decree represented ample evidence that 
“[t]he project of Ferrand…included not only the re-conquest of Haiti but also the 
reestablishment of slavery as he had already done in Spanish Saint-Domingue [Santo 
Domingo].”112  
Though the Ferrand regime built on precedents from both the ancien régime and 
the revolutionary era, the overthrow of slavery and colonialism in Haiti had transformed 
the geopolitical terrain. The rulers of Napoleonic Santo Domingo felt compelled to react 
to the presence of Haiti, fusing the alleged external threat of “rebel” armies with internal 
concerns in a way that bears more than a passing resemblance to early Haitian leaders‟ 
resort to forced labor on the grounds of the threat of a French invasion. As Rebecca 
Schloss has observed, the transformation of French Saint-Domingue into independent 
Haiti exacerbated the tendencies of French authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to 
associate non-whites with criminality and subversion, which they manifested in acute 
fears that “a network of gens de couleur roaming the Atlantic would incite rebellion and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Enero 1805)…el cual ordené que os fuera comunicado por vìa de publicidad, resolvì ir a apoderarme de 
una porción integrante de mis Estados y borrar allí hasta los últimos vestigios del ídolo europeo. En 
consecuencia, una fuerza armada fué desplegada contra la parte antes española. Nuestra marcha fué 
rápida, y nuestros pasos fueron señalados por otros tantos éxitos felices. Era natural presumir que los 
indìgenas espaðoles…aprovecharían con avidez la preciosa ocasión de sacrificar a los manes de sus 
antepasados; pero esta especie de hombres envilecidos y degradados, prefiriendo a las dulzuras de una 
vida libre e independiente…hizo causa común con los franceses. Era compartir los crímenes de los últimos, 
asociándose a sus trabajos liberticidas…En cualquier punto que el destino de este paìs haga un llamado a 
mi firmeza, recibiréis de mí el ejemplo de vivir o de morir como hombres libres.” The rhetoric of top 
French officials may have added fuel to Dessalines‟s fire. In a 7 March 1805 letter instructing Ruiz and two 
other subordinates to win as much support as possible among the “Spanish,” Ferrand declared that 
Dessalines had “sworn an implacable hatred for all those who were not born in slavery and to exterminate 
all those who are free.” Ferrand to Peralta, Baron and Ruiz, 7 March 1805 (16 Ventôse an 13), CARAN 
Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original text: “Dessalines…a juré une haine implacable à tout ce qui n‟est pas 
né dans l‟esclavage et d‟exterminer tout ce qui est libre.” Emphasis in original.  
112 Emilio Cordero Michel, “Dessalines en Saint-Domingue espagnol,” in Saint-Domingue espagnol et la 
révolution nègre d‟Haïti (1790-1822), ed. Alain Yacou (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 416-418.  
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bring the downfall of France‟s remaining West Indian colonies.”113 These developments 
transpired during a decade that was marked by both dramatic challenges to enslavement 
and human trafficking in some areas and the retrenchment of these practices in others. As 
the location of Ferrand‟s enterprise of re-enslavement and as a hub of captive trading, 
Santo Domingo became an important arena of conflict over enslavement and freedom in 
the Ferrand period.  
 
Santo Domingo in Circum-Caribbean Circuits of Captivity 
 
 When a group of ex-slaves declared Haitian independence in 1804, they offered a 
new vision of a New World society without slavery. Three years later, the British 
prohibition of its Atlantic slave trade gave new impetus to a powerful moral crusade 
against slavery in the Atlantic World. Nonetheless, in this same period a confluence of 
technological breakthroughs, policy shifts, the collapse of Saint-Domingue‟s plantation 
complex, and other factors gave rise to the resurgence of plantation slavery in Cuba, 
Louisiana and Brazil, a phenomenon that Dale Tomich has termed the “second 
slavery.”114  
                                                 
113 Schloss, Sweet Liberty, 35. Emphasis in original. Alleged connections between Haiti‟s civil strife and 
non-whites in neighboring slaveholding colonies provoked anxiety among many authorities. According to 
one report to the Minister of the Navy composed in January 1806, many “people of color” in Santiago de 
Cuba (the site of a large French refugee community) had collected five to six thousand gourdes that were to 
be given to the faction that opposed Dessalines in Haiti‟s internal conflict. This caused the report‟s author 
to suspect the existence of a “secret mission, on the part of the Mulattos” in France and to urge a 
“redoubling of surveillance and of precautions” against them even as he admitted that “no proof” existed to 
substantiate his allegations. Letter to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, January 1806, CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/42. In the original text: “Il assure qu‟une collecte de 5 à 6000 gourdes a été faite entre les gens de 
couleur réfugiés à St. Yago, en faveur des deux Rigaud, et qu‟une Mulâtresse, nommée Chaune, est chargée 
de leur remettre ce Secours, et en même temps de remplir, en France, une mission sècrette, de la part des 
Mulâtres. Quoique ces faits ne soient soutenus d‟aucunes preuves, la prudence semble pourtant indiquer 
un redoublement de surveillance et de précautions.” Emphasis in original. 
114 Dale Tomich, Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital and the World Economy (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 56. 
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 Though Santo Domingo was never as integral in the transatlantic slave trade as 
Charleston, Havana, or pre-revolutionary Le Cap, it was a central battleground in 
struggles over the terms of bondage and liberty—and the viability of slave status across 
imperial and colonial boundaries—in the decade to 1810. Santo Domingo‟s longstanding 
political links to Cuba and Puerto Rico had facilitated illegal slaving between these 
places during the emancipation period, and following the Berceau incident in the fall of 
1802, Santo Domingo became even more implicated in far-reaching circuits of captivity 
that blurred the line between slavery and freedom.
115
 In his trading of Haitian captives to 
places with long-established slave-based economies such as rice-producing South 
Carolina and in his sales of captives from slaving vessels that shipwrecked on Santo 
Domingo‟s coasts, Ferrand participated in networks of captive trading that operated on 
the margins of the law.  
Ferrand‟s shocking order to Ruiz, commanding him to execute male Haitians over 
fourteen, attests to a dilemma that he shared with many other authorities in the Americas: 
the wish to accrue profit by maximizing the size of the servile labor force, 
counterbalanced against the fear of an uprising. Largely cut off from sources of servile 
labor outside of the island, Ferrand resorted to trafficking in Haitians—while trying to 
eliminate those whose knowledge of freedom and warfare might pose a threat. Hence the 
chilling focus on the seizing of children.  
  Ferrand also sought to export some of these captives to South Carolina in 
exchange for slave-produced rice, as a means by which to pass on some of his risk to his 
                                                 
115 Some inhabitants of Santo Domingo in the Ferrand period advanced claims to property rights in 
individuals who resided in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other places. For instance, in a 5 October 1807 letter, 
Ferrand instructed his subordinate Pedro Ruiz to send him several “slaves” (esclaves) living in Puerto Rico 
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North American counterparts while tapping into one of the most important plantation 
economies in the antebellum United States.
116
 In a 4 December 1804 letter to the Superior 
Council of Santiago, Ferrand related that a ship that he had deployed to Charleston, South 
Carolina containing a number of “black Brigands” had recently returned to Santo 
Domingo with a quantity of rice obtained in exchange for the captives. Ferrand estimated 
his revenue at one thousand to 1,200 gourdes.
117
  
 Despite this trade, the cash-strapped Ferrand government lacked adequate sources 
of revenue, and it relied to a considerable degree on the proceeds of ship captures to 
finance its administrative and military costs, justifying many interceptions on the high 
seas as retaliation for foreigners‟ alleged trading with Haiti.118 If these ships contained 
captives who could be sold for the profit of the state, then so much the better. The records 
of the board that Ferrand entrusted with adjudicating ship capture cases, known as the 
“Commission des Prises de Santo Domingo” (Santo Domingo [Ship] Captures 
                                                                                                                                                 
who were claimed by would-be masters based in Santo Domingo. Ferrand to Pedro Ruiz, 5 October 1807, 
CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43. 
116 For details on the rice economy in antebellum South Carolina and Georgia, see Judith Carney, 
“Landscapes of Technology Transfer: Rice Cultivation and African Continuities,” Technology and Culture 
37, no. 1 (January 1996): 5-35. Carney‟s scholarship has demonstrated that South Carolina and Georgia 
were key nodes in the Atlantic rice economy, with African captives and their descendants providing 
invaluable knowledge and technology in addition to labor. See Judith Carney, Black Rice: The African 
Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
117 Ferrand to Members of the Superior Council of Santiago (Santo Domingo), 13 Frimaire an 13 (4 
December 1804), CARAN Colonies CC/9a/40. In the original text: “Après beaucoup de traverses et 
d‟événements malheureux, Le Cap[itain] de navire, qui avait conduit à Charlestown les nègres Brigands, 
qui m‟avaient été envoyés de St Yago, est arrivé avec une partie de Riz qu‟il avait eu en échange. Je 
calcule qu‟il reviendra mille ou douze Cent gourdes au Dep. du Cibao.” Emphasis in original.  
118 According to General Kerverseau in a 23 March 1804 letter to the Minister of the Navy, “[t]he financial 
resources of that part [Santo Domingo] are reduced today to captures made by the Corsairs; for in the 
absolute stagnation of commerce, the products of customs are almost nothing, and in this part‟s current 
State of depopulation, it is necessary to count as almost nothing that of the national domains.” In this same 
letter, Kerverseau stated that North American, British and Danish “agents of Commerce” (agents du 
Commerce) had established themselves in Les Cayes and Jacmel, Haiti. Kerverseau to Minister of the Navy 
and Colonies, 23 March 1804, ANOM CMSM F3 283. In the original text: “Les ressources financières de 
cette partie se réduisent aujourd‟hui aux prises faites par les Corsaires; car dans la stagnation absolue du 
commerce, les produits de la douane sont presque nuls, et dans l‟État de dépopulation actuelle de cette 
partie, il faut compter presque pour rien celui des domaines nationaux.” 
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Commission), contain details on the sale of “slaves” procured from the seizures of vessels 
that straddled the thin line between legal and illegal trafficking. On 9 February 1804, the 
ironically-named Good Hope, a slave-trading vessel with a largely British crew and 
British captain sailing under the Danish flag, shipwrecked near the Dominican town of 
Higüey. According to the Commission‟s records, the ship stopped at St Croix, where the 
captain claimed to have lived for six years, and then proceeded to sail first to Havana and 
subsequently to Santo Domingo. This captain‟s luck finally ran out in the latter locale, as 
the 18 March 1804 judgment of the Commission des Prises mandated the confiscation of 
all of the ship‟s purported cargo—including its 185 “Blacks” (Nègres)—and these 
captives‟ sale for a total of 81,400 francs.119    
 Following the abolition of the British Atlantic slave trade by a 25 March 1807 Act 
of Parliament, attempts to ferret out secretive slaving vessels sailing under foreign flags 
gave rise to a complex military and juridical infrastructure. For instance, the British and 
the signatories to their anti-slaving treaties such as Brazil set up “mixed commissions” 
that adjudicated cases involving the capture of suspected slavers.
120
 While the raison 
d‟être of the Commission des Prises may at first appear to have been quite distinct from 
that of these “mixed commissions,” telling similarities existed between the two bodies. 
The decisions of both could accrue revenue for state authorities by exploiting the labor of 
captives, whether labeled “slaves,” “liberated Africans,” or something else.121  
                                                 
119 “State of Affairs in which the articles came from Santo Domingo, that are subject to observation,” 
undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/48. 
120 For a recent article on the political situation between Britain and Brazil with respect to these matters, see 
Beatriz Mamigonian, “In the Name of Freedom: Slave Trade Abolition, the Law and the Brazilian Branch 
of the African Emigration Scheme (Brazil-British West Indies, 1830s-1850s),” Slavery and Abolition 30, 
no. 1 (March 2009): 41-66. 
121 Beatriz Mamigonian argues that a principal objective of the British Colonial Office was to transport 
“liberated Africans” from captured slave ships (and from the British colony of Sierra Leone) to serve as 
indentured laborers in British West Indian colonies. Mamigonian, “In the Name of Freedom,” 42. On 
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 Those who sought to eliminate slaving in the Napoleonic-era Caribbean faced 
several formidable challenges, including the difficulties of policing the seemingly 
innumerable ships that plied circum-Caribbean and Atlantic routes and the willingness of 
governments such as that of post-1807 Britain to condone and even perpetrate captive 
trading under new guises. Whatever their legal status may have previously been, these 
Good Hope captives found themselves sold into something closely resembling slavery in 
processes that combined the use of force with legal and bureaucratic procedures that re-
created slavery in the written record as well as on the slave ship. On 8 December 1806, a 
négociant (businessman) from St Thomas named H. Abendanon sold to another 
négociant resident in Santo Domingo city named Payra Ferry 187 “new blacks” (nègres 
nouveaux) who had been sold in a public auction of captives from the Good Hope, which 
was listed as having been shipwrecked in Higüey and captained by a “Biscoe.”122 
Furthermore, on 4 September 1808, the merchant Mauger sold a seventeen-year-old 
African-born boy named L‟Éveillé to another merchant named René Pichaud. L‟Éveillé 
was noted as having come into the seller‟s possession by purchase in a “public sale” 
(vente publique) in Samaná of items that had come from the capture of the Danish ship 
Only Son.
123
 
 While Kerverseau had grappled with the question of how best to dispose of the 
Berceau captives, Ferrand had no qualms about selling off captives who had found 
themselves shipwrecked on the colony‟s shores. In a 27 February 1804 letter to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
indentured labor and comparisons to slavery, see David Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of 
Imperialism, 1834-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Roseanne Marion Adderly, 
“„New Negroes from Africa:‟ Culture and Community among Liberated Africans in the Bahamas and 
Trinidad, 1810 to 1900” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1996).  
122  Sale of “blacks” from H Abendanon to Payra Ferry, 8 December 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 
705. 
123 Sale of L‟Éveillé, 4 September 1808, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1302. 
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Commandant of Higüey, Ferrand requested that his subordinate send to Santo Domingo 
city those individuals remaining in Higüey who had been among the 103 “blacks” (noirs) 
who had been aboard a ship from Puerto Rico that had wrecked near Higüey. Ferrand 
promised to pay fifteen gourdes for each “head” (tête) that residents of the Higüey area 
sent to Santo Domingo city.
124
 In instructions that he gave to another subordinate named 
Villavicencio dated 20 July 1807, Ferrand clarified that his earlier statement on the 
Higüey “blacks” had been an order, not a suggestion, demanding an inquiry as to whether 
any of the “Blacks coming from the Vessel shipwrecked, about four years ago, on the 
coasts of your district” had been hidden from the central government by residents of 
Higüey.
125
 Ferrand‟s distinctly personalistic approach to resolving such matters is evident 
in a letter that he wrote to the “Chief of Administration” on 17 August 1807 in which he 
ordered that a “nègre Bossal” (African-born black) living in Seybo who may have “come 
from some ship [that had] perished on the Coast” be sold the following day in a “public 
sale, for the account of the Government.”126 
 Officials charged with resolving these slaving cases often responded to 
geopolitical concerns in their decision-making, as the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars 
had made colonial rivalries even more salient. In the year before the British and North 
American abolitions of their respective slave trades, an incident involving a slave-trading 
ship called the Joseph illustrated how shifting geopolitical winds could affect the lives of 
                                                 
124 Ferrand to “Commandant of Higüey,” 7 Ventôse an 12 (27 February 1804), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9a/40. 
125 Ferrand to Villavicencio, 20 July 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43. In the original text: “Dites moi 
bien sincèrement, Mon cher Commandant, ce qui m‟a été caché avec soin par votre prédécesseur, 
concernant les Nègres provenant du Navire naufragé, il y a près de quatre ans, sur les côtes de votre 
arrondissement. Je suppose qu‟il s‟en trouve encore plusieurs entre les mains de quelques habitants, et 
c‟est à vous à m‟informer si mes doutes sont fondés.” 
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those held in servitude. In an 8 April 1806 letter to the Minister of the Navy, Ferrand 
recounted the story of the Joseph, a vessel that was “evidently English” (évidemment 
Anglais) but sailed under the Swedish flag. After loading its human cargo in Africa, this 
ship had made a stopover in St Barthélemy, where it had switched flags. It then traveled 
towards Havana with its “thus disguised cargo” after having “boarded around a Hundred 
Blacks on another Swedish Vessel;” a French corsair called La Fortune captured it en 
route. Though the captain of the Joseph requested the “intervention” of Spanish 
authorities by virtue of being arrested in the territorial waters of Cuba, the Governor of 
Baracoa (Cuba) turned the case over to a French tribunal in Santo Domingo that he 
deemed to be the sole authority competent to judge the legality of the Joseph‟s capture. 
After deliberating on the matter, the “Administrative Commission of Santo Domingo” 
judged this capture to be legal, basing its decision on a 1778 law stipulating that any ship 
with an “enemy owner” could not be considered neutral.127 
The application of this ancien régime statute elided the emancipation period, 
asserting a property right in human beings that was assumed to exist despite the uncertain 
legality of slavery in French Santo Domingo. While Kerverseau‟s preoccupation with 
saving his own skin in the Berceau episode had stemmed from a concern to not present 
its captives as slaves, in the case of the Joseph different colonial authorities took as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
126 Ferrand to “Chief of Administration,” 17 August 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/44. In the original text: 
“…il paraît qu‟il provient de quelque bâtiment péri sur la Côte; Et dans ce cas il convient qu‟il soit vendu 
demain à la vente publique pour le compte du Gouvernement.” 
127 Ferrand to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 8 April 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. In the original 
text: “Le Capitaine capturé a prétendu à son débarquement avoir été arrêté dans les limites de la mer 
territoriale de l‟Isle de Cuba, et a reclamé l‟intervention des autorités Espagnoles...a Soutenu un Combat 
contre un Corsaire français, avant d‟arriver au port de St Barthélemy, que c‟est dans ce port qu‟il a arboré 
le pavillon Suédois dans les Vingt quatre heures de son arrivée, et qu‟il en est reparti de suite, pour porter 
à la Havane sa cargaison ainsi déguisée, après avoir transbordé une Centaine de Nègres sur une autre 
Goëlette Suédoise…Sa décision est basée sur les Articles 7 et 8 du Règlement de 1778, qui éxigent „que les 
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given the right to hold people as property, even as they disputed specific means of 
exercising this supposed right. Nonetheless, the illicit itineraries of these slavers serve as 
an apt reminder that enslavement required the exertion of force regardless of any legal 
sanction. Both Ferrand and these contrabandists devised their own solutions to navigate 
the tensions between the force of enslavement and the law of “slavery”—a tension that 
had existed in the French world since at least the promulgation of the Code Noir.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In a report to the Minister of the Navy dated 6 March 1801, a Saint-Domingue 
official had condemned Toussaint Louverture‟s rule as the “shame of the nation,” yet this 
label more aptly applies to the Napoleonic campaigns of re-enslavement.
128
 Ferrand‟s 
five-year enterprise of seeking to place thousands of people into bondage encountered the 
determined opposition of “slaves” who devised novel ways of manipulating the law of 
“slavery” in their efforts to evade the force of re-enslavement. While some of these 
individuals managed to carve out relatively autonomous existences as members of 
religious brotherhoods or to compel authorities to enable them to change masters, reunite 
with relatives, or testify as witnesses, others escaped from servitude by flight or self-
purchase. Those claimed as slaves or targeted by the Ferrand regime‟s racist laws fought 
back in ways that undermined the regime‟s attempts to reinvent a slaveholding order in 
the first site of plantation slavery in the Americas. These individuals drew upon a 
                                                                                                                                                 
bâtiments qui auront eu un propriétaire ennemi ne pourront être reputés neutres ou alliés.‟” Emphasis in 
original. 
128 “Précis sent by the Government to fill in Saint Domingue the functions of Receiver General of 
Contributions,” to Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 15 Ventôse an 9 (6 March 1801), CARAN Colonies 
CC/9b/18. In the original text: “Car il en est d‟autres qui, à la honte de la nation, vils et rampants et 
réellement tarés dans l‟opinion publique cherchent à force de flagornerie à occuper les places et à se 
vendre à l‟iniquité.” 
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heritage of resistance to enslavement and racial repression forged over several centuries 
by slaves and freed people from both parts of the island. 
Though Ferrand tried to re-create slavery as a legal construction, in the written 
record, and as a lived reality, many “slaves” in Santo Domingo manipulated the legal 
tools of the Napoleonic state and built on the successful struggle for freedom in 
independent Haiti. Santo Domingo under Ferrand ultimately represents a crucial case in 
the legal history of race and slavery in the Americas, as those who fought against 
enslavement and disenfranchisement there challenged the project of re-enslavement and 
left traces of an alternative history in the archival record. 
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Chapter Six 
 
“They Always Knew Her to be Free:” Archiving Liberty in French Santo Domingo, 
1804-1809 
 
 
On 30 July 1803 the citoyenne (citizen) Adelaïde Faury presented herself before 
the notary Derieux in the Dominican city of Santiago. A merchant from the Dominguan 
city of Fort-Dauphin, Faury had traveled to the notary‟s office in order to deposit what 
was perhaps the most important document in her life. Created by citoyenne Faury‟s 
former master Magdeleine Garçon Magagues and a French consular official in Norfolk, 
Virginia (USA), this act declared that: “From this day forward, September 1st, seventeen-
hundred and ninety-four, I grant liberty to my aforementioned servant [slave] Adelaïde 
Faury of Fort-Dauphin.”1 
Citoyenne Faury‟s story spans the arc of emancipation and the subsequent re-
emergence of slavery that defined the two decades after 1789 in France‟s Caribbean 
colonies. As is evident above, Faury gained her legal freedom in 1794, in the same year 
that the French Republic abolished slavery throughout its empire. Mme Garçon, who was 
probably one of the hundreds of slaveholding refugees from Saint-Domingue who 
brought their purported human property with them to numerous circum-Caribbean and 
mid-Atlantic ports such as Norfolk, thus removed Faury from the scene of the 
revolutionary turmoil to which she would subsequently return.  
                                                 
1 Dépôt of Adelaïde Faury, 30 July 1803, Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-en-
Provence, France, Dépôt des Papiers Publics des Colonies, Notariat de Saint-Domingue (hereinafter DPPC 
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Uprooted from the site of the first large-scale general slave emancipation in the 
Americas before she could benefit from the institution‟s dismantling there, citoyenne 
Faury won her liberty in slaveholding Norfolk, only to then feel obliged to document her 
status as a free woman after her return to Hispaniola and her establishment as a 
successful merchant there.
2
 Her odyssey provides further evidence that the first French 
Republican emancipation in many ways represented an ambivalent rupture with much 
continuity with the past.
3
 Nonetheless, confronted with a Napoleonic regime determined 
to re-enslave thousands of people who had been formally freed in Hispaniola in 1793-
1795, men and women like citoyenne Faury infused “liberty” with new meanings. As the 
several dozen surviving acts created by French notaries that recognize or grant the 
freedom of at least one individual in Santo Domingo between 1804 and 1809 suggest, 
purported slaves and freed people skillfully exploited small openings in the repressive 
social and legal order.
4
 
The strategies employed by men and women who came before French notaries in 
an effort to secure their freedom in Santo Domingo between 1804 and the collapse of the 
slaveholding regime of General Jean-Louis Ferrand in 1809 can be grouped into three 
principal types. Those fortunate enough to possess tangible proof of their juridical 
freedom (manumission act, baptismal record, etc) deposited these records with notaries in 
order to prove their prior attainment of free status. Others with the means to do so 
purchased themselves from their masters, while some freed individuals with the right 
                                                                                                                                                 
NOT SDOM) 485. In the original text: “À compter de ce jour premier septembre mil sept cent quatre vingt 
quatorze je donne la liberté à ma ditte servante Adelaïde Faury du Fort Dauphin.” 
2 For Adelaïde Faury‟s activities as a merchant, see: sale of a hut from Jean-Pierre Cayret to Adelaïde 
Faury, 28 July 1803, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 485. 
3 The second and final declaration of the emancipation of slaves in all French territories took place in 1848.   
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connections called upon witnesses to vouch for their freedom. These strategies often 
worked together. Those who sought this documentation were responding to the real and 
grave menace of re-enslavement at the hands of a regime born out of the failure of the 
Napoleonic expedition of re-conquest, which itself had attempted to brutally re-enslave 
many men, women and children.  
This uncertainty became compounded by the unstable political situation. Would 
the Ferrand regime collapse? Would the French again abolish slavery as they had in 
1794, or would Napoleon‟s troops retake Haiti, thereby crushing the one abolitionist 
nation in the hemisphere? Nobody knew for sure. Nor was it immediately evident 
whether French or Spanish law (or some combination of the two) might prevail in a given 
dispute. While the principal laws governing matters such as enslavement, manumission, 
and the rights of freed people in the Spanish-American world largely derived from the 
Siete Partidas (Seven Divisions), a wide-ranging compilation of laws promulgated in 
thirteenth-century Castile, France by contrast lacked a coherent legal framework 
concerning slavery in its overseas possessions until 1685, when legal scholars working 
for Louis XIV devised the Code Noir.
5
 This comprehensive reorganization of French 
colonial slave law attempted to strike a delicate balance between maintaining discipline 
among slaves in that nation‟s overseas colonies and ensuring certain minimal standards 
concerning humane treatment and the rights of manumitted persons that were more often 
honored in the breach. France‟s failure to fully assert control over Santo Domingo after 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 These records represent the totality of all such documents that survive in the books of French notaries 
who served in Santo Domingo during the years 1795-1809. Eighty-nine of these 103 acts were created 
under the slaveholding Ferrand regime. 
5 For a recent translation of the Siete Partidas, see Robert J. Burns, ed., and Samuel Parsons Scott, trans., 
Las Siete Partidas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 5 vols.  
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its cession in 1795 contributed to the emergence of a complicated hybrid legal situation 
there wherein officials and other parties drew upon both French and Spanish law.
6
  
The itinerant notaries who redacted these records strove to navigate this confused 
legal terrain. Following Santo Domingo‟s cession to France, several French Republican 
notaries left their posts in Saint-Domingue to serve the Dominguan migrant community 
across the border in Santo Domingo. One of their number intriguingly drafted his acts in 
French on the letterhead of the Spanish king and was referred to in these documents as 
the “Écrivain du Roy et Seigneur Don Carlos IV de la ville de Bayajá” (“Writer of the 
King and Sire Don Carlos IV in the City of Bajayá”).7  
                                                 
6 Proposals and ordinances on French judicial reorganization in Santo Domingo starting in 1802 called for a 
degree of power-sharing between “French” and “Spanish” authorities. One proposed judicial reform 
concerning Santo Domingo dated 10 October 1802 envisioned the establishment of three “Courts of 
Justice” (Tribunaux de Justice) including two of the first instance (one in Santo Domingo city and the other 
in Santiago) and an appeals court to be located in Santo Domingo city. Each of these three courts was to 
have three judges, of which one on each tribunal had to be “Spanish” (Espagnol). Proposal for judicial 
organization in Santo Domingo, 18 Vendémiaire an 11 (10 October 1802), Centre d‟Accueil et de 
Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, Colonies CC/9a/32. Furthermore, on 22 
September 1805, General Ferrand issued a decree that called for a comprehensive restructuring of Santo 
Domingo‟s judicial infrastructure. This included the creation of a high appeals court that would be 
composed of half “French” and half “Spanish” judges. The decree also ordered the establishment of courts 
of the first instance that would have the same proportion of French and Spanish justices. This order invoked 
Spanish legal precedent and maintained certain Spanish officials such as alcaldes (mayors) in their posts 
while also stipulating the appointment of French judges and other authorities. Ferrand, “Regulation on 
Judicial Organization of the Eastern Department, Formerly [the] Spanish Part,” 22 September 1805, 
ANOM 8 Supplément Saint-Domingue (hereinafter SUPSDOM) 390. For an incisive discussion on the 
complex interplay of French, Spanish and United States slave law in the drafting and implementation of the 
Louisiana Digest of 1808, see Vernon Palmer, “The Strange Science of Codifying Slavery—Moreau Lislet 
and the Louisiana Digest of 1808,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum no. 24 (2009): 83-113. 
7 See ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1301, book of notary Noël Nicholas Leprestre, 1795-1796. In fact, at 
least two “Spanish” notaries, Manuel Regalado and Antonio Pérez, appear in the extant documentary 
record as having served in Santo Domingo during at least part of the fourteen years of French rule. A 23 
September 1805 decree concerning judicial reorganization in French Santo Domingo stipulated that two 
“former Spanish Notaries” (anciens Escribanos Espagnols) named Antonio Pérez and Manuel González 
Regalado were to serve as notaries in Santo Domingo city alongside their “French” counterparts Jean-Paul 
Gaernier, Pierre-Joseph Funel, and Barthélemy Vallenet. Ferrand decree on judicial reorganization, 23 
September 1805, CARAN Colonies CC/9c/11. A detailed biographical listing of public officials in Santo 
Domingo city contains an entry for a notary named Antonio Pérez, born in that city on 26 June 1737, who 
had served in this function there since 1762. “Nominative Listing of Officers Comprising the Judicial Order 
in Santo Domingo,” 1 March 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9c/11. A death record for the “notary public” 
(notaire public) Manuel Regalado dated 5 September 1807 exists in the État Civil, Santo Domingo 
collection in the ANOM (see the microfilm 85 Miom 95). Kathryn Burns has noted that after the 
promulgation of the Siete Partidas, rivalries between monarchical authority and cities in Castile led to the 
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Both the Francophone and Spanish-speaking worlds had long employed notaries 
as guarantors of the legal validity of agreements contracted between citizens.
8
 According 
to Julie Hardwick, early-modern French subjects “found the acts that notaries wrote to be 
crucial safeguards” of transactions ranging from marriage contracts to loans and sales to 
wills.
9
 The omnipresence of slavery in France‟s overseas colonies dramatically enhanced 
the importance of these “crucial safeguards” for the numerous men and women whose 
formal separation from perpetual servitude often rested on a piece of paper procured in 
precarious circumstances.
10
 Moreover, in a legal context that privileged “written 
                                                                                                                                                 
creation of different types of notarial posts, one of which was “escribano[] del rey” (one Spanish 
translation of écrivain du roy). The French notary Leprestre‟s designation thus appears to reflect this 
Spanish medieval precedent. Kathryn Burns, “Notaries, Truth, and Consequences,” The American 
Historical Review 110, no. 2 (April 2005), 358. 
8 The Siete Partidas enumerated certain requirements for becoming a notary. These included being a free 
man (not a slave); being a Christian of “good reputation;” possessing skill in writing; maintaining residency 
in one‟s place of employment; and being a layman. Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, 3:759-760 (Partida 
III, Title XIX, Law II). Numerous laws and decrees moreover affirmed the centrality of notaries and their 
services in Saint-Domingue and other French colonies. For instance, one 21 July 1802 regulation issued by 
the “General in Chief [and] Captain General” (Le Général en Chef, Capitaine Général) in Saint-Domingue 
declared that the “Notariat” was “the Civil institution upon which the security of families and the fortune of 
Citizens especially rests.” The order also set three requirements for entry into the notarial profession: 
attainment of at least twenty-five years of age; proof of “irreproachable morality” by way of certificates “in 
due form” signed by “Notable Citizens” in the prospective notary‟s place of domicile; and evidence of 
sufficient knowledge of both old and new laws, the “functions and duties of notaries,” and the drafting of 
notarial acts. Intriguingly, this regulation also required notaries to not violate the “law of 16 pluviôse year 
2,” which may refer to the 4 February 1794 act of general emancipation. “Regulation [on the] Organization 
of the Notariat in the French Part of the Isle of St Domingue,” 2 Thermidor an 10 (21 July 1802), ANOM 8 
SUPSDOM 390. In the original text: “Considérant que le Notariat et l‟institution Civil sur laquelle 
reposent spécialement la sécurité des familles et la fortune des Citoyens...Art. 5. À dater de la publication 
du présent, les prétendans aux Places de notaires, autres que ceux qui seront confirmés devront remplir les 
trois Conditions suivantes: 1. Être âgés de vingt cinq ans accomplis; 2. justifier d‟une moralité 
irréprochable par des certificats en due forme des Citoyens Notables du Lieu de leur domicile; 3. faire 
preuve de connaissances suffisantes des lois anciennes et nouvelles relatives à la Carrière qu‟ils veulent 
parcourir, des fonctions et devoirs des Notaires et de la rédaction des actes...ils se conformeront aux 
anciennes ordonnances et Règlements concernant les Notaires, dans la Colonie, dans tout ce qui n‟est pas 
contraire à la loi du 16 Pluviôse an 2.” 
9 Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early 
Modern France (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 5.  
10 In my emphasis upon the centrality of written documentation in the highly unequal conflicts that 
transpired in Hispaniola between would-be slaveholders and those who sought to escape enslavement, I 
owe much to the pioneering work of Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard on multigenerational struggles for 
liberty in multiple parts of the Atlantic World. See their “Servitude, liberté et citoyenneté dans le monde 
atlantique des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles: Rosalie de nation Poulard…” Revue de la Société Haïtienne 
d‟Histoire et de Géographie no. 83 (July-September 2008): 1-52.  
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evidence” over the “sworn oral testimony” of Anglo legal systems, notaries represented 
indispensable “mediators of oral and literate cultures” who were the main gatekeepers to 
the world of literate power both in mainland France and in the colonies.
11
 Securing a 
notarized act attesting to one‟s legal condition of freedom provided a degree of insurance 
against enslavement in French Santo Domingo. I build on the scholarship of Kathryn 
Burns, Natalie Zemon Davis, and others in emphasizing the performative element of 
notarial acts‟ production, demonstrating that some freed people could secure a coveted 
notarized liberty act by skillfully acting out the part of “free person” in the absence of 
written proof of free status. 
The individuals who sought these freedom acts constituted part of a 
heterogeneous populace comprised of Saint-Domingue refugees, Spanish speakers whose 
roots in the colony long antedated the cession, and a small number of North American 
traders and Dutch and Danish smugglers.
12
 Intriguingly, few freed people or freedom 
granters appear in these records as having lived in Santo Domingo, while a relatively 
high proportion of the freed subjects had an ascribed African provenance (twenty-eight 
percent of subjects with a prior residence listed were so designated). “Congo” was the 
most common geographical label in this subset (five of sixteen cases), reflecting the 
                                                 
11 Hardwick, Practice of Patriarchy, 5 and 43. John Garrigus has likewise argued that the notarial system in 
colonial French Saint-Domingue provided a “public voice” for poor free-colored people and that it 
constituted a nascent “public space” for Dominguans regardless of social status. John Garrigus, Before 
Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 94-95. 
12 Fifty-seven liberty acts out of the 103 listed a place of birth or former residence for the freed subject, 
while fifty-three contained this information for the freedom granter (former master or individual entrusted 
to act in his or her name). Out of such records, over fifty-nine percent of the subjects and eighty-one 
percent of the freedom granters had lived in Saint-Domingue. Within this subset of cases, Saint-
Domingue‟s three provinces (the North, West and South) had roughly equal representation. 
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demographic predominance of Congos/Kongos in Saint-Domingue in the late eighteenth 
century.
13
 
Many of the Saint-Domingue refugees anticipated an imminent French re-
conquest of Haiti and the resumption of business as usual within a plantation society. 
They often appear to have perceived their condition of exile to be temporary and the 
long-term survival of the revolutionary state in the Caribbean to be inconceivable.
14
 
Dominguan refugees in Santo Domingo frequently attempted to preserve social and 
familial networks that had developed in Saint-Domingue, while the freed people among 
them drew upon these networks in their quests for a permanent and enduring liberty. 
Claims such as the one filed by a Dominican colonist to an African-born purported slave-
turned-maroon who was captured in Cuba, and that made to a captive who was sold in St 
                                                 
13 Laurent Dubois has stated that “Kongos” constituted forty percent of total slave imports to Saint-
Domingue in the eighteenth century, and that by the 1780s they comprised half of the slave population on 
the coffee plantations in the colony‟s North and West provinces and forty percent of the total slave 
population on Northern sugar plantations. Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the 
Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 40-43. According to David Geggus, “West 
Central Africa” (the region associated with the terms “Congo” and “Kongo”) supplied virtually half 
(49.2%) of African slaves sold to Saint-Domingue on French ships. In this colony‟s North, the figure was 
even higher (56.6%). David Geggus, “The French Slave Trade: An Overview,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 58, no. 1 (January 2001), 137-138. See also Geggus‟s informative earlier article “Sex Ratio, Age 
and Ethnicity in the Atlantic Slave Trade: Data from French Shipping and Plantation Records,” Journal of 
African History 30, no. 1 (1989): 23-44. On the political and military impact of the Kongos in Saint-
Domingue in the eighteenth century, see John Thornton, “„I Am the Subject of the King of Kongo:‟ African 
Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution,” Journal of World History 4, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 181-214.  
14 Major French repositories (in particular the “Colonies CC/9a-CC/9c” collections in the CARAN and 
ANOM) are replete with post-1804 tracts (often written by former Saint-Domingue colonists or military 
leaders) outlining strategies for a French re-conquest of Haiti. See for instance a tract by a Louis Drouin 
that advocated the reestablishment of slavery in a recaptured Haiti, which in this vision would entail strict 
conditions for manumission and minimal material requirements for slaves‟ upkeep. Louis Drouin, “Ideas on 
the Means to Employ in order to bring the Isle of Saint-Domingue [to France] in all its value,” 1 February 
1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/44. Moreover, some individuals residing in Santo Domingo appear to have 
carried out their personal affairs on the assumption that France would retake its lost territory. In his 1805 
will, Jean-Baptiste Junca, a former military officer from Dondon (northern Haiti) who currently lived in 
Santo Domingo city, bequeathed a plantation in Dondon, including several “cultivateurs” who were listed 
as being attached to it, to his natural son Adrien. Will of Jean-Baptiste Junca, 15 August 1805, ANOM 
DPPC NOT SDOM 702. In the original text: “Je donne, et Lègue à Adrien celle du quartier du Dondon, 
avec touts les nègres, et négresses cultivateurs qui en dépendent...” Furthermore, on 17 July 1804, a man 
named Louis Henry Constance freed the “négresse de nation Congo” (black woman of the Congo nation) 
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Thomas, Curaçao, and Santo Domingo between 1805 and 1807, hint at Santo Domingo‟s 
role in broader Caribbean and Atlantic histories of migration, emancipation and re-
enslavement.
15
 Nominally part of a French empire that had repudiated much of its 
commitment to emancipation, Santo Domingo in the Ferrand era was nonetheless shaped 
by the eight-year emancipationist period. Thus slavery, whose legality was very much in 
doubt, was subject to multiple challenges as “slaves” and freed people drew upon this 
emancipationist past in asserting their own claims to freedom. 
Though the line separating servitude from freedom had always been somewhat 
blurred on the island in the era of general emancipation, notarial acts created after early 
1803, when the Napoleonic expedition‟s intention to restore slavery had become widely 
known, contain traces of an attempted transition back to chattel slavery. Many notarial 
acts from this time contain lists of “cultivators” who were often described as being 
“attached” to plantations; these lists sometimes also included imputations of these 
individuals‟ provenance such as the name of an African “nation” or the designation 
“creole” (locally-born). One act from Santiago dated 13 January 1803 includes a huge 
inventory of animals, clothing and assorted other property, as well as a numbered list of 
“cultivateurs” with Augustin, the “conducteur” (overseer), at the top.16 Like many of 
their counterparts in numerous other American slave societies, most of these individuals 
were listed by a single prénom (first name) without any surname or other name. Yet in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Esther and gave her twenty carreaux (about sixty-six acres) of land on his plantation in Jacmel, Haiti. Will 
of Louis Henry Constance, 17 July 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 699.  
15 For details on the “maroon” Marthone‟s capture in Cuba and the dispute that ensued concerning 
ownership of her, see notarial act of 28 March 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 704; and act of 21 August 
1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 705. For the sale of the captive from Curaçao, see sale of Lucie, 14 
December 1807, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1699.  
16 The term conducteur was a holdover from slavery that had referred to the overseer (often a slave himself) 
of slave laborers on part of a plantation.  
320 
 
contrast to many listings of slaves, none of these cultivateurs had any prices, nor did any 
of them have racial labels, with two conspicuous exceptions.
17
  
Despite this relative paucity of racial marking, the dismantling of emancipation 
translated into the widespread application of racial labels in the notary‟s office.18 The 
tumult of the revolutionary era had challenged but not destroyed ideologies of racial 
inferiority that had become deeply entrenched in the two colonies that shared Hispaniola, 
and race-based discrimination became a core component of Ferrand‟s project of re-
enslavement. In the emancipation era, notarial records had generally eschewed racial 
terms in favor of the designation “citoyen/ne” (citizen). In late 1803 and 1804, this trend 
dramatically reversed within notarial records created in French Santo Domingo. The 
usage of citoyen all but ceased by November 1804, as freed subjects were increasingly 
accorded racial labels and the freedom granters were often listed as sieur or dame 
(roughly “Sir” and “Madam”); the latter terms as well as the former had acquired distinct 
connotations of racial inequality in the French Caribbean.
19
 The proportion of all 
                                                 
17 Inventory of Jeanne Roxas, 13 January 1803, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 485. The two people marked 
racially were each labeled “négresse;” both were listed as being “in the service of” (au service de) Jeanne 
Roxas. Jean Hébrard found correlations between legal condition (and other indicators of social standing) 
and the presence of one or more surnames in nineteenth-century Bahia, Brazil. He contended that having 
“conquered [one‟s] liberty” became associated with the acquisition of additional prénoms as well as 
surnames. Jean Hébrard, “Esclavage et dénomination: imposition et appropriation d‟un nom chez les 
esclaves de la Bahia au XIXe siècle,” Cahiers du Brésil contemporain 53/54 (2003), 87.  
18 Fully seventy-eight percent of all the notarial records studied for this chapter included at least one racial 
marker for the subject; the freedom granter was racialized in just under a tenth of all cases. Of the racial 
terms used, “nègre” and “négresse” were by far the most common, with half of all records that include 
racialized subjects employing these words. By contrast, the freedom granters who were racialized 
predominantly bore the labels “mulâtre” and “mulâtresse” (this was the case in six out of ten such records). 
The word “nègre” in French Saint-Domingue became closely associated with slavery, and during the 
revolutionary period it continued to carry a certain amount of stigma.  
19 The singular exception to the elimination of “citoyen” in these records by the end of 1804 is the 18 April 
1807 self-purchase of Marie-Claire dite Coco from her former purported master citoyen Pierre-Nicholas 
Pitre contained in ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 735. According to John Garrigus, by 1782 the law in Saint-
Domingue forbade the according of the title “sieur” to a man of color. Garrigus, Before Haiti, 186. 
Furthermore, Laurent Dubois has written that the État Civil (records of events such as births, marriages, 
and deaths) in Guadeloupe before 1789 had attempted to distinguish between whites and non-whites by 
applying the terms “sieur” and “madame” to the former and “le nommé” (“named”) to the latter. Laurent 
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notarized freedom acts per year that applied racial labels to the freed individual spiked 
from 1803 to 1804, as only twenty percent of all acts in the former year used racial terms 
to designate these individuals while eighty-one percent employed these terms in the latter 
year.  This suggests a chronological correlation between the phase-out of revolutionary-
era terms of equality and the return of markers of stigma and inequality at the time of the 
end of French rule in Haiti and the consolidation of the Ferrand regime in Santo 
Domingo.
20
  
As Laurent Dubois has illustrated in a study of similar acts created in Guadeloupe 
in the late 1790s, questions revolving around whether or not the cultivateurs were truly 
no longer “property”—and thus, the extent of their control over their own labor, time, and 
even bodies—were never resolved during the revolutionary era.21 Subtle traces of these 
conflicts emerge in a record created in Santo Domingo city on 30 April 1804. In this act, 
the notary Pierre-Joseph-Jean-Baptiste Antoine Funel de Seranon initially marked the 
citoyenne Louise Félicité dite (called) Agard as a “slave,” but then struck this word and 
replaced it with the phrase “Legally-acquired property.”22 The freed subjects of these 
notarial acts tried to take advantage of small loopholes that afforded them opportunities 
to evade perpetual servitude. In the first decade of the new century, the efforts of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 256.   
20 My findings appear to accord with those of Frédéric Régent for Guadeloupe. In his extensive political 
and social history of that colony in the Haitian Revolutionary era, Régent argued that in the wake of the 
crushing defeat of emancipationist rebels under Louis Delgrès by the proslavery French forces of Antoine 
Richepanse in 1802, a pronounced shift transpired in the marking of race in the colony‟s État Civil records. 
According to Régent, “the disappearance of the mention of citizen [in these records] mark[ed] the debut of 
the reestablishment of the color barrier [barrière de la couleur].” Frédéric Régent, Esclavage, métissage, 
liberté: La Révolution française en Guadeloupe 1789-1802 (Paris: Grasset, 2004), 425. 
21 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 220-221.  
22 Freeing of Louise Félicité dite Agard, 30 April 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 699. In the original 
text: “Lequel nous a dit, et déclare, que satisfait des soins [illegible], et du bon service continuel qu‟il a 
reçu de la citoyenne Félicité surnommée Agard, depuis environ quatorze ans, qu‟elle est son esclave, et sa 
propriété Légalement acquise...” 
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individuals in Santo Domingo who attempted to secure their freedom despite often long 
odds provide ample evidence that the Napoleonic program of re-enslavement was every 
bit as contentious and unrealized as the enterprise of “emancipation” that had preceded it. 
 
The Presentation of Documentation of Free Status 
 
 
“All creatures in the world naturally love and desire liberty, and much more do 
men, who have intelligence superior to that of the others, and especially such as are of 
noble minds, desire it.”23 This statement comes not from an Enlightenment-era tract on 
abolitionism but rather from the Siete Partidas. Though it sanctioned human bondage, 
this code held slavery to be “contrary to natural reason,” from which it followed that the 
law ought to favor liberty.
24
 In contrast, colonial legislation in late eighteenth-century 
French Saint-Domingue had sought to impose a stringent burden of proof on those of 
African descent to document their free status.
25
 After the collapse of emancipation, 
French authorities in Santo Domingo reverted to this underlying presumption of slavery, 
which impelled the subjects of these notarial acts to marshal documentation that would 
reduce the risk of enslavement at the hands of an opportunistic or vengeful would-be 
master.  
On 3 September 1804, almost eight months to the day after Dessalines declared 
Haitian independence, another former slave called Marie-Jeanne came before a notary in 
the last real bastion of French power in Hispaniola, the city of Santo Domingo, in order to 
                                                 
23 Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, 4:981 (Partida IV, Title XXII).  
24 Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, 4:977 (Partida IV, Title XXI, Law I).  
25 Beginning in the 1760s in Saint-Domingue, a confluence of repressive legislation and periodic 
crackdowns by zealous authorities had led free people of color to scrupulously document their free status 
using every means at their disposal. This hostile climate also compelled many of them to notarize even the 
smallest sales in order to thwart possible accusations of theft that would not have been so readily made 
against whites. Garrigus, Before Haiti, 84, 167, and 178-179.  
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register and deposit a manumission act. Created in Mirebalais (Saint-Domingue) on 2 
December 1794 by the citoyen Girard, this document stated that in recognition of the 
“good and loyal services” (bon et fidel service) that Marie-Jeanne had rendered to Girard 
as a gouvernante (governess) and as a wet nurse to three of his children, she would no 
longer have to live in slavery.
26
 This woman must have been quite familiar with the 
disconnect between metropolitan law and on-the-ground reality, since in December 1794, 
the theoretically free soil of Saint-Domingue had been besieged by military forces of the 
slaveholding British and Spanish empires, which circumscribed the application of the 4 
February 1794 French emancipation decree.
27
  
Given that they had to interact with officials who were in the employ of a 
slaveholding state that sought to turn back the clock on emancipation, many freed people 
in Santo Domingo sensed that the mere invocation of this law of general emancipation 
might not constitute sufficient proof of their own free status. After all, authorities‟ 
acceptance of this claim would “upset the entire applecart,” to use Rebecca Scott‟s 
words, since it would imply that most of Santo Domingo‟s captives had a valid legal 
claim to their liberty.
28
 Freed people thus scrambled to assemble all documentary 
evidence of their own attainment of freedom.
29
 The records that these people zealously 
guarded included sacramental documents, such as baptismal and marriage acts, as well as 
                                                 
26 Dépôt of Marie-Jeanne, 3 September 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 699. 
27 For a succinct overview of “The Great Powers and the Haitian Revolution,” see David Geggus, Haitian 
Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), chapter 11.  
28 Rebecca Scott, “„She…Refuses to Deliver Up Herself as the Slave of Your Petitioner:‟ Émigrés, 
Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 
no. 24 (2009), 128. 
29 Many former Saint-Domingue residents who brought freedom suits to United States courts against those 
who claimed them as slaves based their cases at least partly on the 1794 French emancipation law. For a 
discussion of the extremely complicated legal disputes that ensued over this law‟s legitimacy and 
applicability, see Sue Peabody, “„Free Upon Higher Ground:‟ Saint-Domingue Slaves‟ Suits for Freedom 
324 
 
civil records such as manumission acts. Within a single notarial act from French Santo 
Domingo, one or more such documents might be appended, each duly certified by both 
its creator and the Santo Domingo notary who redacted the final notarial act.  
Beginning in 1802, freed people in Hispaniola had responded to the presumed 
repeal of the emancipation law by seeking to exploit the legal channels of manumission. 
According to Philippe Girard, “[i]n Saint-Domingue [after 1802] panic-stricken nouveaux 
libres [people freed by the 1794 edict] begged their former masters to let them buy their 
freedom, while anciens libres [those freed before this edict‟s promulgation] lined up in 
the courts to get their old emancipation papers notarized.”30 The Napoleonic regime that 
followed did little to assuage such anxieties.
31
 As discussed in the previous chapter, on 31 
December 1807, Ferrand issued an order that required the subjects of all État Civil 
records created henceforth in the colony to show a “title of liberty” in order to prove their 
legal condition of freedom. This order was part of the reassertion within French law of 
the twin pillars of American slave societies: the subjugation (in this case, re-subjugation) 
                                                                                                                                                 
in U.S. Courts, 1792-1830,” in The World of the Haitian Revolution, ed. David Geggus and Norman 
Fiering (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 261-283 (esp. 268-271). 
30 Philippe Girard, “Napoleon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Domingue, 1799-1803,” 
French Historical Studies 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 614. Emphasis in original. Régent has found that fear of the 
impending reestablishment of slavery provoked the same responses among many freed people in 
Guadeloupe starting in the spring of 1802. Régent, Esclavage, métissage, liberté, 425. The threat of 
enslavement also impelled some individuals to go to the lengths of creating manumission records for those 
who had been living as free people as a documentary safeguard against the loss of liberty. On 10 May 1803, 
the Dominguan colonist Michel Vincent created an act of manumission for his companion Rosalie and her 
four children, despite their having attained their freedom some time before. Scott and Hébrard attribute this 
seemingly odd act to the uncertain political and legal context and to “the symbolic and juridical powers of 
contractual written documents.” Scott and Hébrard, “Servitude, liberté et citoyenneté,” 30. 
31 Bitter memories of the dismantling of the French emancipationist regime cast a long shadow over 
subsequent contests over the terms of freedom in the Caribbean. In the 1830s, as the British imposed a 
system of “apprenticeship” in their slaveholding territories that its architects envisioned as a path to gradual 
emancipation, many of the formally freed “apprentices” tried to purchase their freedom shortly before the 
term of apprenticeship was slated to end. David Gaspar attributes this to these freed individuals‟ suspicions 
that British abolition might not endure, and they based this judgment partly on their knowledge of the 
brutal overturning of French revolutionary emancipation several decades before. David Gaspar, “La Guerre 
des Bois: Revolution, War and Slavery in Saint Lucia, 1793-1838,” in A Turbulent Time: The French 
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of men, women and children to a state of perpetual servitude; and an ideology of racist 
stigmatization that administrators and masters held to justify this enslavement.  
Those who came before these notaries seeking these freedom acts may also have 
been aware of the fate of those who had fallen foul of the Ferrand regime‟s presumption 
of slavery. In a letter to the Commandant of Seybo dated 12 September 1807, Ferrand 
rejected the claim of a M. Jacques (surname illegible) to have granted liberty to an 
unnamed woman. Ferrand declared that in the absence of a proper “rectification” of her 
freedom, this woman was to remain a “slave” (esclave). He then proceeded to ask the 
Seybo commander to send her to him so that she could be sold.
32
 
According to Kathryn Burns, notarial records are “always in implicit dialogue 
with an imagined litigious future.”33 For the freed woman Henriette dite Pommeau and 
many others, such a future entailed avoiding the fate of the unfortunate woman who had 
lacked a written “rectification” of her manumission. On 28 June 1805, Henriette 
deposited in Funel de Seranon‟s Santo Domingo city notarial office a document created 
and signed in 1803 by Michel, a notary from Le Cap who had attested to Henriette‟s 
having produced several witnesses affirming that her former master had freed her in 
approximately 1787. Claiming to have lost her original manumission papers during the 
destruction of her hometown by the “rebels” (révoltés), Henriette drew upon her social 
contacts and access to notarial services to produce these two written testaments to her 
legal freedom.
34
 Faced with the prospect of a possible return to servitude, Henriette 
                                                                                                                                                 
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, ed. David Geggus and David Gaspar (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 123-124. 
32 Ferrand to Commandant of Seybo, 12 September 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43. 
33 Burns, “Notaries, Truth, and Consequences,” 372. See also Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and 
Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
34 Dépôt of Henriette dite Pommeau, 28 June 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 702. 
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determinedly sought to transform the “messy specifics” of her manumission and life as a 
freed woman in the tumult of revolutionary Saint-Domingue into a “legally valid form” 
that would help to protect her against re-enslavement.
35
 
Another woman who acted with foresight was Margueritte Bonne. On 24 
December 1801, Bonne had procured from the notary Michel in Le Cap a document 
stating that her former master citoyen Morel had drawn up with this same notary a 
manumission act in her name dated 6 April 1790. Consultation of this notary‟s registry 
had revealed the existence of this 1790 manumission act despite its destruction in the 
great June 1793 fire in Le Cap. By the summer of 1803, Bonne had migrated to Santo 
Domingo as part of the wave of French refugees who fled the collapse of French Saint-
Domingue. Upon arriving she prudently appeared before the notary Derieux in Santiago 
on 8 August 1803, depositing Michel‟s 1801 attestation of her manumission.36 
During the dying days of the French regime in Saint-Domingue, one woman had 
bought her own daughter out of bondage, taking care to create a verifiable record of the 
act so that the daughter might preserve her precarious liberty. Three years later, the 
“mulâtresse affranchie” (freed mulatto) Rozine dite Alzire deposited with a Santo 
Domingo city notary a document dated 19 August 1803, drawn up before another notary 
in Le Cap, which recognized Rozine‟s mother Rosalie dite Dufay‟s purchase of her 
daughter for the sum of 2,500 livres coloniales (colonial pounds) “on the Express 
                                                 
35 The quotes are from Burns, “Notaries, Truth and Consequences,” 366. 
36 Liberty act of citoyenne Margueritte Bonne, 8 August 1803, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 485. The Siete 
Partidas contained certain provisions that encouraged scrupulous attention to recordkeeping. Partida III, 
Title XIX, Law X for instance required a notary to produce a copy (as close to the original as possible) of a 
document that a client claimed to have lost and to record this in his register. Burns and Scott, Las Siete 
Partidas, 3:763-764. Such practices were evidently also important in the French world, as comprehensive 
registries for every notarial book produced in French Santo Domingo exist in the ANOM (section “DPPC 
SDOM REP”).  
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condition” that Rosalie free Rozine.37 This 1803 act was then ratified multiple times, 
including in Le Cap and in Santo Domingo city.  
For those fortunate enough to bear such evidence of their freedom, no piece of 
paper was too old or too tattered to submit in their own defense. On 18 August 1807, 
Louise dite Letort deposited in a Santo Domingo city notary‟s office an “extremely 
damaged” (extrêmement endommagée) manumission act from the year 1739 that had 
freed her and her mother Rose.
38
 In the summer of 1806, the “mulâtresse libre” (free 
mulatto) Marie-Magdeleine, whose mother was listed as coming from the “côte de 
Guinée” (African coast), similarly presented to the notary Funel de Seranon a 
manumission act in her name from 1728.
39
 This act hinted at a multigenerational story of 
enslavement and liberation in which those subjected to bondage sought to use to their 
advantage the systems of law and written documentation that had once aided their 
oppressors. Having lived through most of Saint-Domingue‟s history under French rule, 
Marie-Magdeleine knew all too well the power of written documents in establishing 
one‟s legal personhood.  
In manipulating the legal levers of this slaveholding society, the subjects of these 
notarial acts employed every resource at their disposal. While some utilized the artifacts 
of freedom that they possessed, others who had managed to accumulate the funds sought 
recourse in the age-old practice of self-purchase.  
 
Self-Purchase 
  
                                                 
37 Dépôt of Rozine dite Alzire, 17 October 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 705. In the original text: 
“...sous la condition Expresse faite à la dite comparante d‟affranchir la dite Rozine... ” 
38 Dépôt of Louise dite Letort, 18 August 1807, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 735.  
39 Dépôt of Marie-Magdeleine, 8 August 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 705. 
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Since at least the time of the Romans, laws in slave societies had often included 
certain means by which those in bondage could purchase their freedom. Perhaps no 
aspect of slave law better encapsulated the absurdities of transforming a human being 
into a “person with a price.”40 In tacitly acknowledging slaves‟ volition, capability for 
rational decision-making, and desire for their freedom, the practice belied the presumed 
lack of full personhood upon which many legal justifications of enslavement rested. At 
the same time, it did not challenge (indeed, it depended on) the premise that one could 
assign a monetary value to a fellow person. In plantation societies such as eighteenth-
century Saint-Domingue, masters and colonial authorities grew to fear the implications of 
such a route to freedom. As these anxious authorities had implicitly recognized in their 
laws seeking to restrict this type of manumission, self-purchase involved much more than 
a simple exchange of money for a change in formal legal status. Behind each formulaic 
act of self-purchase lay multiple hidden conflicts and negotiations; behind each sale price 
lay one human being‟s assessment of another‟s purported economic worth.  
Illustrative of this is the self-purchase of Marie-Elizabeth dite Justine. On 8 June 
1807, the notary Funel de Seranon redacted an act that formally recognized Marie-
Elizabeth‟s purchase of her own freedom. According to this document, this woman‟s 
“good conduct” and the constant “affection” and “attachment” that she had shown her 
former master Bernard Leglise Dupoux had convinced the latter to reduce her purchase 
price to three hundred gourdes despite her higher “value.”41 While would-be masters 
                                                 
40 Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 1. 
41 Self-purchase of Marie-Elizabeth dite Justine, 8 June 1807, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 706. In the 
original text: “...déclarant que la bonne conduite que la dite Marie Elizabeth Justine a constamment tenu à 
son Égard, depuis qu‟elle est son esclave et les services ainsi que les marques d‟affection, et d‟attachement 
qu‟il a reçu d‟elle, l‟ont porté à fixer le prix de sa personne à trois cents gourdes seulement, Malgré qu‟elle 
soit de plus haute valeur...” 
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employed the language of “good conduct” in order to inscribe in these records the fiction 
of the manumitted person‟s grateful acceptance of the purported master‟s voluntary and 
benevolent exercise of his or her power to liberate, this elided a much more complicated 
reality.
42
  
In accumulating her purchase price and buying her freedom, Marie-Elizabeth 
situated herself within a deep island-wide history of resistance to enslavement. The 
sedimentation of legal systems in French Santo Domingo entailed a complex interplay 
between two quite distinct legal and extralegal traditions of self-purchase that had 
evolved in both parts of the island during the centuries of colonial slavery. Though some 
slaves in both parts of Hispaniola had managed to procure the funds for their self-
purchase through a variety of sources including hiring out their labor, selling the products 
of their cultivation grounds, and even prostitution, the legal and political context in each 
colony differed significantly. As with so much else, one central factor behind this 
divergence was the two colonies‟ markedly different trajectories of plantation 
development; another was pronounced variations in local laws and their interpretation. 
For a variety of economic, social and political reasons, administrators in colonial Saint-
Domingue had from the early eighteenth century imposed much legislation that aimed to 
significantly impede access to manumission through self-purchase and other means. By 
contrast, the relative lack of such laws (and their often infrequent enforcement) in Santo 
Domingo had facilitated the development of certain practices by which slaves could buy 
                                                 
42 Just over half (fifty-one percent) of these 103 notarial records included a phrase such as “good services” 
or “good will” (bon gré), making this the most frequently-cited reason for manumission among these 
freedom acts. The underlying logic of the “good services” manumission was an assertion of the would-be 
master‟s sovereignty over those whom he claimed as his slaves, and this logic was evident at higher levels 
of authority as well. Malick Ghachem has argued that the very presence of provisions for manumission and 
the naturalization of freed people in the Code Noir and subsequent legislation implied the king‟s power to 
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their own freedom for an agreed-upon price; some of these customs appear to have 
acquired legal backing over time.
43
  
While the frequency of self-purchase in colonial Santo Domingo remains 
unknown, evidence suggests that it was a recourse chosen by some slaves in their escape 
from bondage.
44
 Intriguing clues further hint that practices of self-purchase that had 
evolved there during the colonial period continued into the era of “emancipation.” In a 26 
June 1800 correspondence to a citoyen Perregaux, the Marquis d‟Iranda (the absentee 
owner of Santo Domingo‟s largest plantation) had defended a state of affairs in which ten 
to twelve thousand of the colony‟s inhabitants still occupied the status of “Slave.” “The 
Slaves there [in Santo Domingo] are under the protection of a magistrate,” Iranda 
asserted. “They cite before him [the magistrate] their master when they have just 
motivations to bring a complaint, and they can also buy themselves, reimbursing him [the 
master] the price of their acquisition.”45 These developments reflected a Spanish-
American political and legal context in which certain legal and customary barriers to the 
master‟s absolute control over a slave had emerged, including the presence of local 
                                                                                                                                                 
arbitrarily revoke these privileges. Malick Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery in the Age of Revolution: 
Haitian Variations on a Metropolitan Theme” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002), 59-60. 
43 For details on these developments in colonial Santo Domingo, see Richard Turits, “Par-delà les 
plantations: Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo,” Genèses 66 (March 2007): 51-68 
(esp. 54-55).   
44 In a study currently in progress of manumission deeds from the Dominican towns of Higüey and 
Bayaguana, Richard Turits has identified so far thirty-eight created between 1702 and 1821. About these 
cases, he writes: “Twenty five were paid for, mostly but not all by self-purchase. Eleven were gracioso [not 
paid for]. And two are unclear.” E-mail correspondence (from 12 July 2010) cited with written permission 
of author.  
45 Marquis d‟Iranda to Perregaux, 26 June 1800, CARAN Colonies CC/9b/17. In the original text: “...les 
Esclaves y sont sous la protection d‟un magistrat, citent devant lui leur maître quand ils ont des justes 
motifs de s‟en plaindre, et peuvent aussi se rachetter, en lui remboursant le prix de leur acquisition.” 
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officials entrusted with defending slaves in legal disputes and forms of self-purchase that 
involved gradual self-ownership through payment in installments.
46
 
The situation in Saint-Domingue was rather different. While authorities in that 
colony in the late eighteenth century passed a spate of laws seeking to sharply reduce 
both the numbers and the political rights of its free-colored inhabitants, officials there in 
fact had adopted measures against self-purchase much earlier. According to Malick 
Ghachem, colonial administrators‟ concerns about the ease of self-purchase in Saint-
Domingue—which they considered especially threatening to social order due to slaves‟ 
allegedly frequent resort to prostitution to raise the necessary funds—resulted in a 1711 
law that required authorities‟ written permission for all future manumissions. 
Manumissions based solely on a master-slave agreement, in other words, would 
henceforth be illegal. As early as 1711, then, Dominguan administrators (followed two 
years later by the king) rejected the absolute inviolability of the master‟s property rights 
over his or her slave.
47
  
In his tract on the history of the Spanish part of the island, Moreau de St Méry had 
similarly presented manumission in Spanish Santo Domingo as a gendered and 
                                                 
46 For details on this local official, known as the síndico in Cuba, see Rebecca Scott, Slave Emancipation in 
Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 74-75. For 
information on the practice of self-purchase in installments that emerged in Cuba known as coartación, 
which according to Scott “[in] theory…created an intermediate status between slave and free,” see Scott, 
Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 13; and Alejandro de la Fuente, “Slaves and the Creation of Legal Rights in 
Cuba: Coartación and Papel,” Hispanic American Historical Review 87, no. 4 (2007): 659-692. In her 
study of the French refugee community in Santiago de Cuba, Agnès Renault characterized self-purchase 
(rachat) as an “exceptional phenomenon” whose rarity owed to the combination of a high purchase price 
and purported masters‟ unwillingness to relinquish valuable servile labor. Moreover, not a single case of 
self-purchase that she uncovered there before 1809 involved a coartado (individual who purchased himself 
or herself through coartación). Agnès Renault, “Les conditions d‟affranchissements des esclaves 
appartenant aux immigrés français résidant à Santiago de Cuba entre 1791 et 1825,” paper presented at 
conference entitled Affranchis et descendants d‟affranchis dans le monde atlantique (Europe, Afrique et 
Amériques) du XVe au XIXe siècle: Statuts juridiques, insertions sociales et identités culturelles (Musée 
d‟Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France, 13-16 May 2009), 12. Publication forthcoming; paper cited with the 
author‟s written permission. 
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destabilizing phenomenon. He insisted that the alleged ease of manumission there (in 
which self-purchase had factored prominently) had long served to undermine social order 
in much the same way that it supposedly had in Saint-Domingue, for it produced a 
sizeable group of “vagabonds” and women whose only means of subsistence was 
“shameful commerce.”48 Self-purchase nonetheless appears with only modest frequency 
in my data: among all extant notarial freedom acts from French Santo Domingo, only 
seven percent featured a self-purchase. Confusion over the exact terms of self-purchase 
(both legal and customary), along with the difficulties involved in raising the funds, may 
help to explain its relative infrequency, though the relatively small sample size imposes 
certain limitations on what can be generalized or extrapolated.
49
 The terms of the 
exchange as laid out in most of these notarial acts were typically fairly straightforward: 
the “slave” paid off his or her price to the purported master in one lump sum, upon which 
the latter formally relinquished all rights over the newly freed person.
50
  
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 60-61.  
48 M. L. E. Moreau de St Méry, Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l‟isle 
Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia: Self-published by author, 1796), 1:57-58. In the original text: “Si l‟on en 
croit Don Antonio de Valverde, cette facilité des affranchissements (à la ratification desquels le 
gouvernement n‟attache aucune rétribution) ne produit le plus communément que des vagabonds et des 
femmes qui se rappellant toujours comment elles sont devenues libres, et qui n‟ayant aucunes ressources 
pour subsister, se livrent à un commerce honteux et affligeant pour les mœurs.” On these same pages, 
Moreau asserted that “a slave” (using the feminine form of the noun) could purchase her liberty by 
“present[ing] to her master 250 piastres gourdes (1,375 liv. tournois)” after which “she is assured of her 
freedom.” She could also buy a child‟s freedom for an additional sum. In the original text: “Enfin, dès 
qu‟une esclave présente à son maître 250 piastres gourdes (1,375 liv. tournois), elle est assurée de sa 
liberté.”  
49 In a recent article, Alejandro de la Fuente wrote that “the significance of coartación goes beyond the 
number or percentage of slaves who successfully availed themselves of it. As with marronage or revolts—
which always involved a small proportion of total slaves—the impact of coartación cannot be reduced to 
mere statistics.” De la Fuente, “Slaves and the Creation of Legal Rights,” 669. This also applies to the 
relatively small number of people who sought to secure their liberty in the notary‟s office in French Santo 
Domingo.   
50 For example, on 18 April 1807, Marie-Claire dite Coco (who had been living in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico) 
purchased herself from Pierre-Nicholas Pitre for the sum of 280 gourdes. Self-purchase of Marie-Claire 
dite Coco, 18 April 1807, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 735. 
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One exceptional case nonetheless suggests the existence of more complex forms 
of self-purchase. Towards the end of 1805, a woman named Catherine bought her 
freedom from the merchant Mathurin Chinon for the sum of 1,760 francs, which were 
listed as “coming from her peculium.”51 The Roman legal framework upon which both 
the Siete Partidas and Code Noir were largely based contained stipulations for such a 
path to freedom. According to Peter Temin, in ancient Rome the peculium was “money 
„owned‟ by slaves, with which to purchase freedom.” In other words, slaves could 
accumulate funds (to which the master could not lay claim, even though the law 
technically forbade slaves from owning property), which they could devote towards their 
self-purchase.
52
  
While such possession and manipulation of resources by slaves stretched the 
juridical limits of enslavement, some individual cases pushed the boundaries of slavery 
(and freedom) still further. Over the course of twelve days, the citoyenne Louise Félicité 
dite Agard won her freedom, lost it, and then regained it in a saga that illustrated that 
freed individuals sometimes could not rest assured that they were safe from re-
enslavement even after they had gained that precious scrap of paper stating that they were 
not human property in the eyes of the law. On 5 May 1804 Louise Félicité deposited 
before a notary in Santo Domingo city a document dated 30 April 1804 declaring that she 
had paid her former master Dominique Cerice Vigneron five hundred gourdes for her 
                                                 
51 Self-purchase of Catherine, 9 October 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1698. The original wording in 
French is: “provenant de son pécule.”   
52 Peter Temin, “The Economy of the Early Roman Empire,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 
1 (Winter 2006), 141. According to Alan Watson, a version of the Code Noir redacted in 1724 allowed 
slaves to have a peculium; the rules governing this drew substantially from Roman legal precepts 
concerning fathers‟ and masters‟ responsibilities for the liabilities and other obligations of sons and slaves. 
Alan Watson, Slave Law in the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 89. 
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liberty.
53
 Nonetheless, just a few days later, Vigneron revoked the 30 April 1804 freedom 
act, only to then create a second document that same day that re-emancipated his former 
“slave.” Whence this dramatic about-face? Perhaps the financial aspect of their 
relationship entered into this matter, as the second act in favor of Louise Félicité 
mentioned the five-hundred gourde payment whereas the revocation did not.
54
 What is 
evident is that Louise Félicité‟s self-purchase was no simple monetary exchange. As 
Dubois has shown in his study of ex-slaves in 1790s Guadeloupe, people such as Louise 
Félicité  “actively used and reshaped documentation” in order to assert their political and 
social identities as “citizens rather than as objects.”55 
In responding to such initiative, the Ferrand government sought to regulate the 
terms of manumission in order to bolster its own grip on the colony and its servile 
population. In a 5 December 1807 letter to his subordinate Agustín Franco de Medina, 
General Ferrand addressed the difficult situation of an unnamed “nègre” in Puerto Plata 
(northern Santo Domingo) who claimed that he had gained his liberty seven years before 
by paying fifty gourdes to his former master. On unspecified grounds (possibly penury), 
this presumptive freed man had petitioned for an exemption from having to pay the 
comparable sum required for the “ratification” of his liberty. Ferrand rejected this man‟s 
argument that held Franco to be the responsible party in the granting of this ratification, 
insisting instead that only he (Ferrand) held such authority.
56
 Following the 1711 
precedent, Ferrand asserted his authority to determine this man‟s legal condition. In so 
                                                 
53 Self-purchase of citoyenne Louise Félicité dite Agard, 5 May 1804, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 699. 
54 Revocation and reinstatement of liberty for citoyenne Louise Félicité dite Agard, 11 May 1804, ANOM 
DPPC NOT SDOM 699.  
55 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 257.  
56 Ferrand to Medina, 5 December 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43.  
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doing, he applied this century-old legal principle to the profoundly uncertain context of 
French Santo Domingo.  
Notwithstanding Ferrand‟s attempts to assert his authority over the determination 
of individuals‟ legal condition, demands advanced by “slaves” for a path to liberty via the 
purchase of one‟s own person pushed him to address their concerns by proposing a 
carefully-regulated mechanism for this. In the letter to Franco quoted above, Ferrand 
informed his underling that “a quantity of Slaves” who belonged to the “former convents 
of the country [Santo Domingo]” had put forth demands to be able to purchase their 
freedom. Moreover, according to Ferrand other “Slaves” in the Cibao area (in the 
colony‟s north) shared with those of the convents the “same desire” for liberty. In search 
of a means by which to grant some of these demands that would accrue profit for the state 
and not undermine the slave system or his own authority, Ferrand granted Franco 
permission to establish a system of self-purchase if the latter “believe[d] it convenient to 
free them [these purported slaves].” Such self-purchases had to conform to the following 
prices: 150 gourdes for each “head” (tête) who was sixteen to forty years of age; one 
hundred gourdes per “slave” aged twelve to sixteen and over forty; seventy-five gourdes 
for “slaves” aged eight to twelve; and fifty gourdes for children under eight years old. 
Ferrand claimed final authority over the ratification of all manumissions that might 
ensue.
57
 
Though Ferrand tried to impose a system that treated human beings like cattle, he 
acknowledged that the “desire” of these “slaves” for freedom had impelled him to 
                                                 
57 Ferrand to Medina, 5 December 1807, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43. In the original text: “Je me rappèle, 
mon cher Franco, qu‟il y avait une quantité d‟Esclaves appartenant aux anciens couvents du pays où vous 
commandez qui demandaient à acheter leur libertés; si parmi ceux de ces Esclaves qui sont dans le Cibao, 
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propose such an arrangement. As Dominguan authorities had done in the early eighteenth 
century, Ferrand at once sought to set the financial and legal terms of formal escape from 
slavery while at the same time tacitly recognizing the will of these captives. In calling 
witnesses to attest to their freedom, some freed people in French Santo Domingo 
exploited another fissure in the edifice of repression.  
 
Calling Witnesses 
 
On 21 June 1805, a woman from Le Cap called Marseille dite Migniac appeared 
before a Santo Domingo city notary, claiming to have lost her original freedom papers in 
a fire (probably one of the burnings of her hometown during the revolutionary years). In 
the absence of such a record, she called four witnesses, including a pharmacist and a 
bureaucrat, who supported her claims to be a free woman. One witness declared that he 
had known Marseille since 1788, and that he had observed her “enjoying her State of 
Freedom” and that she was “considered as [other] formerly Free, and Freed [people] 
were” by others whom both Marseille and this witness knew. Moreover, this same 
witness had “never heard” that this woman was “in the Bonds of slavery.” Another 
witness stated that Marseille had once owned a coffee plantation and slaves in Mornet, 
Saint-Domingue, before she fled to the colony of Santo Domingo during the 
revolutionary upheaval.
58
  
                                                                                                                                                 
il n‟est qui ayent encore le même désir, et que vous croyez convenable de les affranchir, arrangez vous de 
manière à obtenir...” 
58 Witnesses‟ testimony in favor of Marseille dite Migniac, 21 June 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 702. 
In the original text: “...connaître Marseille Migniac depuis L‟année 1788...et de l‟avoir vue au Fort 
Dauphin à différentes Époques, jouissant de son état de Liberté, considérée comme L‟étaient les anciens 
Libres, et Affranchis jouir de touts les droits, et prérogatives attachés à cet État...et n‟ayant jamais entendu 
dire, qu‟elle fut dans les Liens de L‟esclavage.” 
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Therefore, by virtue of her prior ownership of this plantation and servile laborers, 
her connections with influential colonists, and perhaps most crucially, these witnesses‟ 
concurrence that they “always knew her to be free,” Marseille was able to translate her 
lived experiences on both sides of the island into an official recognition of her legal 
freedom.
59
 In French Santo Domingo, “free person” and “slave” constituted statuses that 
were constructed and interpreted in part through others‟ observations of an individual‟s 
social and economic roles and behavior. Such perceptions of an individual‟s proper or 
assumed legal condition were historically and contextually contingent, reflecting not only 
the legal categories themselves but also the socially-embedded expectations and 
experiences that constituted the somewhat malleable yet powerful scripts for who and 
what an enslaved or free man or woman should be.
60
 
 Scholars who work with legal documents have long understood the power of the 
skillfully-constructed narrative to influence the outcome of many legal proceedings. 
These phenomena in turn reveal much about the society within which these proceedings 
transpire. In her well-known study of such matters in sixteenth-century France, Natalie 
Zemon Davis explored the “possible story lines determined by the constraints of the law 
and approaches to narrative learned in past listening to and telling of stories or derived 
                                                 
59 Witnesses‟ testimony in favor of Marseille dite Migniac, 21 June 1805, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 702. 
In the original text: “...qu‟elle L‟ont toujours connue pour Libre, jouissant de sa Liberté plusieurs années 
avant la Révolution.” 
60 In a study of marriage contracts and testaments drawn up by notaries in Le Cap and Port-au-Prince in the 
late eighteenth century, Dominique Rogers found that while Port-au-Prince notaries usually demanded from 
free-colored clients proof of free status such as a manumission act or birth certificate, their counterparts in 
Le Cap often “ascertained that a person was free simply by reference to his or her reputation, specifically 
their possession d‟état de libre (the fact that a person was considered by others to be free).” Dominique 
Rogers, “On the Road to Citizenship: The Complex Route to Integration of the Free People of Color in the 
Two Capitals of Saint-Domingue,” in Geggus and Fiering, The World of the Haitian Revolution, 72. 
Emphasis in original. The stringency of these Port-au-Prince notaries‟ practices may have reflected official 
crackdowns on these notaries‟ perceived laxity concerning the matter of determining colored clients‟ status. 
In one 1784 episode, the Conseil (Council) of Port-au-Prince suspended a notary for one month for the 
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from other cultural constructions.” Davis argued that some “possible story lines” were 
more likely than others to shape narratives recounted in the legal record due to the 
confluence of social convention, legal codes (both as written and as popularly 
understood), and a host of other factors.
61
 In French Santo Domingo, freed men and 
women and their witnesses consciously constructed tales that emphasized the salient 
characteristics of life as a free person: ownership of property including slaves, 
participation in a social network that included prominent individuals, and enjoyment of a 
quotidian experience free from submission to a master. In the production of these notarial 
acts, freedom was created as a social reality via the reaffirmation of these purported 
aspects of it.  
People like Marseille could thus inscribe their own liberty into these legal 
documents through mobilizing witnesses to confirm their long experience of living as 
“free” individuals. This required the exploitation of one‟s social networks, which often 
were rooted in his or her former area of residence. It was indeed no accident that one of 
Marseille‟s witnesses was from her former home of Le Cap, while two others hailed from 
nearby Fort-Dauphin. This pattern obtained for numerous other freed subjects, such as a 
refugee from Léogane (southern Saint-Domingue) named Chonne Martin.  
On 26 February 1806, Martin appeared before the notary Funel de Seranon in 
Santo Domingo city. Having lost the original “title of liberty” that her father and former 
master sieur Martin had granted her during the “troubles, pillages and fires” of revolution 
                                                                                                                                                 
offense of labeling several people of color as “free” without specifying the documentation that proved that 
they occupied this status. Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 102.  
61 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century 
France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 4. For an examination of legal testimonies concerning 
a series of riots in Paris in 1750, see Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, The Vanishing Children of Paris: 
Rumor and Politics before the French Revolution, trans. Claudia Miéville (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991 [1988]), esp. chapter 4.   
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in Saint-Domingue, Chonne “finds herself today obliged to justify her state as [a] Free 
person.” In pursuit of this objective, Chonne called four witnesses (all of whom were 
from the Léogane area) who swore that they had “full and certain knowledge” that sieur 
Martin had bought Chonne and then proceeded to free her. These witnesses also stated 
that they had seen Chonne “enjoy [her liberty], in Léogane, before the Revolution.”62 
These narratives of her purchase and liberation by her own father, the original 
manumission act‟s destruction in revolutionary violence, and her longstanding experience 
as a free woman could substitute for documentary proof of prior manumission in 
Chonne‟s successful bid for the recognition of her freedom. In skillfully presenting 
themselves as exhibiting the principal behaviors of a respectable free person, these 
women crafted their own reality of freedom. 
Spanish law had in fact for centuries prescribed certain means by which one could 
move from juridical slavery to freedom by an extended period of living as a free person.  
Moreover, the more recent development of assorted customary practices in the French 
world created liminal situations that further stretched the categories of “slave” and “free 
person.” According to a provision in the Siete Partidas, a slave who “goes about 
unmolested for the space of ten years, in good faith and thinking that he is free, in the 
country where the master resides” would gain his liberty after this duration of time; he 
                                                 
62 Freedom act of Chonne Martin, 26 February 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 704. In the original text: 
“Laqu‟elle nous a dit, et déclaré que privée de son titre de liberté, que lui avait été donné par feu sieur 
Martin son père, qu‟elle a perdu par l‟effet des troubles, des pillages, et des incendies qui ont eu lieu dans 
la partie française de St Domingue, et dans les diverses insurrections qui ont lieu, elle se trouve 
aujourd‟hui obligée pour justifier de son état de personne Libre...ils ont chacun individuellement prêté 
devant nous, la main levée, avoir eu, pleine, entière, et certaine connaissance, que feu Sieur Martin ...avait 
acheté de cette dernière, la dite Chonne Martin sa fille naturelle, à l‟effet de lui donner la Liberté...étant 
devenu le maître de sa fille naturelle, il lui avait donné la Liberté, dont les susdits comparants, déclarent, 
et affirment l‟avoir vue jouir, à Léogane, avant la Révolution.” See also an act concerning a woman named 
Marie-Claire whose late ex-master‟s widow testified that she was free. Freedom act of Marie-Claire, 29 
August 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 705.  
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could also earn his freedom after living in such a state for twenty years “in some other 
country” or for thirty as a “fugitive.”63 In French Saint-Domingue, efforts to evade taxes 
and legal restrictions on manumission gave rise to a peculiar form of semi-freedom 
christened “liberté de savane” (savannah freedom) wherein many slave-owners 
circumvented official manumission by granting unofficial freedom to slaves who often 
subsequently continued to labor on their old plantations.
64
  
In the unstable political and legal context of French Santo Domingo, efforts to 
define the boundaries of enslavement led to conflicts that sometimes drew in the colony‟s 
highest authorities. In one particularly compelling episode, a woman named Marie Emilie 
from Mirebalais came before the notary Barthélemy Vallenet in Santo Domingo city on 
18 March 1808 and stated that the “négresse” Marie Melie, who had been sold into 
slavery on 23 February 1808, was in fact “Free by birth” (Libre de naissance) by virtue 
of being the daughter of a Marianne, who was herself born free. Marie Emilie then 
proceeded to affirm that Marie Melie had received a proper baptism and that a “great 
number” (un grand nombre) of former Mirebalais residents presently living in Santo 
Domingo city could swear to the veracity of this woman‟s legal freedom.65 Her plight 
appears to have garnered the attention of General Ferrand himself. In a 4 March 1808 
letter to a military subordinate in Azua, Ferrand related that a “Marie Emelie” (who was 
very likely the captive woman from the 18 March 1808 notarial act, notwithstanding the 
                                                 
63 Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, 4:983 (Partida IV, Title XXII, Law VII).  
64 Ghachem, “Sovereignty and Slavery,” 66-67. 
65 Act in favor of Marie Melie, 18 March 1808, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1700. Roman law had 
established the basic principle (which subsequently became enshrined in both French and Spanish law) that 
slave status passed through one‟s mother. The Siete Partidas specified three ways in which a person could 
be enslaved: birth to an enslaved mother, capture in war, and voluntary sale of oneself into slavery. Burns 
and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, 4:977 (Partida IV, Title XXI, Law I). The Code Noir also stipulated that a 
child‟s legal status followed that of his or her mother. See Laurent Dubois and John Garrigus, Slave 
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confusion between her name and that of her benefactor) had been sold to a Francisco de 
Castro by Joseph Dias, a resident of Azua, despite the fact that she “seems to be free by 
birth, according to certificates that state this and [that] have been submitted to me.” In the 
ensuing dispute over this woman‟s status and thus the validity of the sale, Ferrand called 
upon Dias to present himself to him with the “titles” (titres) that could prove his 
legitimate ownership of Marie.
66
  
The notarial evidence also suggests that those fearful of enslavement sometimes 
utilized the social power and legitimacy conferred by the sacraments of marriage and 
baptism as tools to win and preserve liberty for themselves and their relatives.
67
 The 
vertiginous rise of French Saint-Domingue from a neglected backwater in the late 
seventeenth century to the world‟s most profitable colony less than a century later would 
be difficult to comprehend without accounting for the interlocking familial, professional, 
and social networks that bound together the diverse groups that comprised colonial 
society.
68
 In Ferrand-era Santo Domingo, freed people, “slaves,” and their advocates took 
                                                                                                                                                 
Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804: A Brief History with Documents (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 51 
(Article XIII of the Code).  
66 Ferrand to M. Fortier, 4 March 1808, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/45. In the original text: “Mon cher 
Fortier, le sieur Joseph Dias habitant d‟Azua a vendu a M. Francisco de Castro, une négresse nommée 
Marie Emilie, qui paraît être libre de naissance, d‟après les certificats qui le constatent et m‟ont été 
soumis.” 
67 Ghachem has argued that many masters and slaves in colonial Saint-Domingue had used baptism as 
another way to circumvent official restrictions on manumission. The apparent prevalence of this strategy 
derived in part from the “emancipatory connotations of Christian status and identity.” Ghachem, 
“Sovereignty and Slavery,” 65. These realities were not lost on Dominguan migrants such as the “nègre 
libre” Jean d‟Enblot. According to a 22 June 1806 notarial act created in Santo Domingo city, Jean 
deposited with the notary an “attestation” certifying that he and the “négresse libre” Marie had married in 
Artibonite (Saint-Domingue) in 1787. This act also affirmed that Jean and Marie had three children (Jean-
François, Jean-Baptiste, and Jean-Simon) in “Legitimate marriage” (Legitime mariage). These details 
suggest that Jean intended this notarial act to serve as an assurance of the freedom of his children as well as 
himself and his spouse, as their birth to a free mother in “Legitimate marriage” implies that they were both 
legally free and legitimate. Jean-François and Jean-Baptiste were listed as “N.L” (Nègre Libre). Dépôt of 
Jean d‟Enblot, 22 June 1806, ANOM DPPC NOT SDOM 1698. In the Siete Partidas, marriage to a free 
person (including one‟s master) automatically freed an enslaved spouse. Burns and Scott, Las Siete 
Partidas, 4:982 (Partida IV, Title XXII, Law V).  
68 See Garrigus, Before Haiti, esp. chapters 1-2; and Dubois, Avengers of the New World, chapter 1.  
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full advantage of such networks.
69
 Adroit exploitation of these networks and of the 
“markers” of free status (both document-based and otherwise) improved one‟s chances of 
both crossing the line between slave and free and of remaining on the right side of it.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Napoleon‟s decision to re-impose slavery in the French empire represented a 
tragedy of epic proportions. In deciding to abandon general emancipation and to deploy 
military expeditions to key colonies, Napoleon at once ruined his chances at significantly 
expanding France‟s imperial presence in the Americas and condemned thousands of 
human beings to servitude.
70
 The foundation of an aggressively racist slaveholding 
regime in Santo Domingo in turn reflected an attempt to erase the emancipationist past. 
These freedom acts nonetheless hint at a much more complicated situation.  
The strategies that these subjects employed were rooted in the slave societies of 
Santo Domingo and Saint-Domingue, yet their resonance and relevance extend far 
beyond Hispaniola‟s shores. The individual quests for freedom detailed in these notarial 
acts represented part of a “broader history of access to rights and to dignity, [a] history 
                                                 
69 Data from these freedom acts hint at the salience of familial relations in this society. For instance, just 
under a fifth (seventeen percent) of these acts involved the granting or recognition of freedom for at least 
one of the subject‟s children, while in eleven percent of these 103 acts, the subject was the freedom 
granter‟s own child. Moreover, the striking fact that that around seventy-seven percent of the freed subjects 
of these acts were women may in part reflect gendered patterns of manumission that had their roots in the 
familial and sexual dynamics of slave society in pre-1789 Saint-Domingue. According to Garrigus, women 
and children constituted about two-thirds of all subjects of manumission during the colony‟s history. 
Garrigus, Before Haiti, 40. Sue Peabody has likewise argued that enslaved women in the French Caribbean 
had more opportunities for manumission than slave men. Such opportunities included provisions in the 
Code Noir that manumitted slaves through marriage and testaments as well as provisions that allowed 
slaves to accumulate a “peculium” through market activity and other means. Sue Peabody, “Négresse, 
Mulâtresse, Citoyenne: Gender and Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1650-1848,” in Gender and 
Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World, ed. Pamela Scully and Diana Paton (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2005), 57-58. 
70 For discussions of these decisions and their consequences, see Girard, “Napoleon Bonaparte;” and 
Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 251-261. 
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rooted in knowledge born from personal and familial experience of vulnerability,” in the 
words of Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard.
71
 The fragments of life histories contained in 
these records evince the multiplicity of means by which those in a position of acute 
“vulnerability” in French Santo Domingo sought to better their condition by exploiting 
the openings that existed or that they could create.   
Though they had witnessed the death of a theoretically race-blind political project 
that had guaranteed in principle the political equality of all before the law, “slaves” and 
freed people in French Santo Domingo sought to realize the powerful promise of 
universal emancipation in using the notarial system to archive their freedom. Their 
example ultimately represented part of the crippling blow that the Haitian Revolution 
dealt to the transatlantic slave trade and American slavery itself.  
                                                 
71 Scott and Hébrard, “Servitude, liberté et citoyenneté,” 4.  
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Epilogue 
 
For five years during the first decade of the nineteenth century, the land that 
would later become known as the Dominican Republic hosted a short-lived but brutal 
project of re-enslavement which saw thousands of individuals cheated of the benefits of 
emancipation. However unequal and exploitative the regime of emancipation had been in 
French Saint-Domingue from 1793 to 1802, freed people there had at least in theory been 
able to claim rights such as payment for their labor, protection from cruelties such as the 
whip, and ownership over their own persons. Ferrand by contrast sought to disenfranchise 
those persons of color who could document their freedom and to enslave those who could 
not. In this tragic epilogue to a story of slave revolution, emancipation, and the defeat of 
three empires by former slaves and formerly free people of color, some men and women 
nonetheless inscribed into the archival record an alternate history: that of the struggle for 
liberation, which drew upon the legacies of the truncated first French Republican 
emancipation. They helped to make Santo Domingo an important arena of conflict over 
the terms of servitude and freedom during an era in which slavery faced great challenges 
but also found fertile new grounds where it could thrive.  
Having come to power partly as a result of Napoleon‟s ill-conceived decision to 
deploy the Leclerc expedition to Hispaniola, the Ferrand regime collapsed five years later 
due in large part to an equally infamous decision by Napoleon. Though the loss of Saint-
Domingue had crushed Napoleon‟s aspirations to significantly expand the French empire 
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in the Americas, he crowned himself Emperor of France in 1804 and proceeded to deploy 
conquering armies to all corners of the European continent. In early 1808 one of these 
armies invaded Spain, deposing King Charles IV and installing Napoleon‟s brother 
Joseph on the Spanish throne. This created a crisis of political legitimacy that brought 
partisans of Napoleon into conflict with those loyal to King Charles‟s son Ferdinand VII. 
These developments had profound effects on the Spanish-American colonies, as juntas 
(governing councils) professing loyalty to Ferdinand VII sprang up in many colonies in 
opposition to Napoleon‟s agents in Spain. The destabilizing influence of these 
transformations proved too much for Spain to reverse even after the defeat of Napoleon 
and the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1814.
1
 
Napoleon‟s invasion of Spain also provoked a strong reaction against “French” 
settlers in Cuba and Santo Domingo. In 1809 the government of Cuba ordered the 
expulsion of the French from this island, leading thousands of individuals to migrate to 
New Orleans and other places.
2
 In Santo Domingo, where the French controlled the 
central government, a succession of uprisings by anti-Napoleon factions beginning in 
1808 led to an armed conflict that resulted in the collapse of the Napoleonic regime in 
                                                 
1 While most scholars of Spanish-American independence see Napoleon‟s invasion of Spain in 1808 as a 
watershed, some newer scholarship has emphasized the deep continuities between the “empire” prior to 
1808 and the “nations” that emerged in the following decades. In perhaps the best-known such work, 
Jeremy Adelman contended that “[t]he passage that began in the eighteenth century [in Ibero-America] did 
not end with the triumph of something new...Rather, the beginnings, middles and ends of the epic described 
in this book were above all the ways in which history remained—and remains—unresolved, and therefore 
political.” Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 1. See also Brian Hamnett, “Process and Pattern: A Re-Examination of the Ibero-
American Independence Movements, 1808-1826,” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 2 (May 
1997): 279-328. For an important article that discusses French reactions to the political crisis in Spanish 
America that Napoleon‟s invasion of Spain precipitated, see Rafe Blaufarb, “The Western Question: The 
Geopolitics of Latin American Independence,” American Historical Review 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 742-
763. 
2 Rebecca Scott, “„She…Refuses to Deliver Up Herself as the Slave of Your Petitioner:‟ Émigrés, 
Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws,” Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 
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July 1809 and a British-negotiated transfer of power over the island‟s eastern part back to 
Spain. 
In 1810, a former military officer who had served under Ferrand named Gilbert 
Guillermin printed in Philadelphia a work that is perhaps the most detailed extant first-
hand account of this war, which is preserved in the Collection Moreau de St Méry in the 
Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer. According to Guillermin, “by its topographical 
position, and the nature of its population, [Santo Domingo] found itself thrust into the 
center of the fermentation” when many of its inhabitants revolted against the “alleged 
usurpation of the house of Napoleon, and...the imagined oppression under which the 
Spanish Royal family languished in France.”3 
Politics on the island of Hispaniola during this war were saturated with fear, a 
circumstance that became exacerbated by shifting alliances among several parties that 
desired the ouster of the Ferrand regime. While officials in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
deployed troops to assist the Spanish in Santo Domingo, the British entered into an 
“offensive, and defensive alliance” (une alliance offensive, et defensive) with Puerto 
Rico‟s Governor Toribio Montes in 1808.4 Upon learning of events in Spain, Montes had 
authorized the capture of French ships, justifying this action as part of the “War” 
(Guerre) that the Supreme Junta of Seville had declared on Napoleon, according to a 2 
                                                                                                                                                 
no. 24 (2009), 126; Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos, Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba: El gobierno del 
Marqués de Someruelos (1799-1812) (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2008), 295. 
3 Gilbert Guillermin, “[Illegible] Journal of the Revolution of the Eastern part of St Domingue beginning 10 
August 1808,” 1810, note of 10 August 1808, Archives Nationales d‟Outre-mer (hereinafter ANOM), Aix-
en-Provence, France, Collection Moreau de St Méry (hereinafter CMSM) F3 121. In the original text: “...la 
partie de l‟Est de St Domingue, qui par sa position topographique, et la nature de sa population, se 
trouvait placée au milieu du foyer de la fermentation. Les habitants de cette contrée, devenus français par 
le traité de Bâle, ne [illegible] pas se prévaloir, à l‟Exemple des Sujets de S.M.C. des motifs de 
mécontentement résultant de l‟usurpation prétendue de la maison de Napoleon, et de l‟oppression 
imaginaire sous laquelle la famille Royale d‟Espagne gémissait en France.” 
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August 1808 letter from Montes to Ferrand.
5
 Furthermore, the Haitian leaders Henri 
Christophe and Alexandre Pétion, who were engaged in a bitter internal conflict that 
pitted Christophe‟s northern kingdom against Pétion‟s fledgling southern republic, each 
sought to exploit the conflict in the neighboring territory to gain an advantage over his 
rival.
6
 Pétion moreover feared that the victors in this war would have designs on parts of 
Haiti, while Governor Montes instructed General Juan Sánchez Ramírez, the leader of the 
anti-French resistance in Santo Domingo, to not admit any “French Blacks and mulattos” 
(Nègres et mulâtres français) into any Spanish military units due to anxieties concerning 
a possible Haitian invasion. Sánchez nonetheless “contract[ed] an alliance with 
Christophe, who sent him 300 men [serving as] auxiliary troops.”7  
 Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico, Cuba and elsewhere seeking to recruit troops 
to fight the Ferrand regime knew that they wielded a potent weapon in stirring up anti-
French sentiments. Nevertheless, in an early example of a tendency that would recur 
repeatedly in the later mainland independence wars, these elites sought to prevent these 
mobilizations from transforming into a significant challenge to the social and racial order. 
They were perhaps mindful of what had transpired in Cuba when the Marquis de 
Someruelos had deliberately exploited “popular anxieties” to mobilize many of the 
island‟s residents against the French. This had, in Guillermin‟s recounting, unleashed a 
wave of unrest that targeted not only French settlers but also “rich Spanish landowners” 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” “Details on the revolt of 26 September to 12 October 1808, and 
on the principal leaders,” ANOM CMSM F3 121.  
5 Montes to Ferrand, 2 August 1808, in Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” ANOM CMSM F3 121.  
6 Pétion and Christophe both vied to succeed Dessalines, who had died in 1806, as ruler of Haiti.   
7 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” Fifth Note, ANOM CMSM F3 121. In the original text: 
“Cependant Sanchez vient de contracter une alliance avec Christophe, qui lui a envoyé 300 hommes de 
troupes auxiliaires.”  
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whose properties in Havana were sometimes subject to pillage.
8
 Salvador Felix, who had 
been sent by Montes to instigate rebellions in Santo Domingo, tried to walk this thin line. 
While he succeeded in helping to ignite uprisings in Neyba and Azua in late September 
and early October 1808, he was compelled by necessity to engage in trade with Pétion, 
exchanging cattle for munitions and arms.
9
 
Ferrand was also caught in a vise, as his regime‟s militant racism was at odds with 
its need to employ non-white soldiers. Yet his use of such troops was in a sense a 
continuation of the reliance of eighteenth-century French Saint-Domingue on free-
colored soldiers for its defense and security. Throughout its short existence, the Ferrand 
regime depended on the services of a non-white military unit known as the Légion 
Coloniale. In Guillermin‟s words, “the Légion Coloniale was composed of men of color, 
and of Free Blacks, who since the beginning of the Revolution have given to the French 
Government unfailing proofs of their loyalty, courage and Devotion,” while the Légion‟s 
leaders Repussard and Savari had acquired a “reputation for Bravery” in eighteen years 
of service. “This corps has always formed the avant garde of the columns,” Guillermin 
declared, “and has had the greatest part of the Glory that the Garrison of Santo Domingo 
acquired in the numerous sorties that it made during the siege of this post.”10 The Légion 
                                                 
8 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” ANOM CMSM F3 121. In the original text: “Le Marquis de 
Someruelos, par la proclamation que nous avons citée, avait donné l‟éveil à l‟inquiétude populaire; il ne 
fut plus le maître dans la suite d‟en modérer les Effets: elle se manifesta d‟abord contre quelques français, 
mais elle fut bientôt dirigée contre les riches propriétaires Espagnols de la Havane, dont les hôtels furent 
livrés au pillage.” 
9 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” “Details on the revolt of 26 September to 12 October 1808, and 
on the principal leaders,” ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
10 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” Forty-Fourth Note, ANOM CMSM F3 121. In the original text: 
“La Légion Coloniale était composée d‟hommes de couleur, et de Nègres Libres, qui des le principe de la 
Révolution ont donné au Gouvernement français des preuves inalterables de fidélité, de courage et de 
Devouement. Ce corps a toujours formé les avant gardes des colonnes et a eu la plus grande part à la 
Gloire que c‟est acquise la Garnison de Santo Domingo dans les nombreuses sorties qu‟elle a fait pendant 
le siege de cette place. Les Sieurs Repussard, Savari, Theard, D‟aux, ont particulièrement soutenu cette 
reputation de Bravoure dont ils ont donné des preuves multipliées pendant 18 ans.” 
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indeed comprised a sizeable portion of the armed forces of Ferrand. One military record 
from 23 September 1804 lists ninety-nine troops (out of 862 total) serving in the 
Légion.
11
 On 1 January 1809, there were 183 men in the Légion out of a total force of 
1,361, while the Légion represented just fewer than fourteen percent of the troops who 
were listed as being in the service of the French regime upon its fall in July 1809.
12
 
Some of the non-whites who served as soldiers and officers in this conflict may 
have seen this service as an opportunity to improve their lot, as some free-colored 
Dominguan militiamen had before them. In an October 1808 letter to two Spanish 
officers, a “man of color” (homme de couleur) and Chef de Bataillon named Carreaux 
lauded the efforts of the Spanish in a recent victory in Azua. “The details of your 
Victories have strongly interested our compatriots, who ardently wish to see the natives 
of the country recover their former rights, and Expel a government of usurpers,” declared 
Carreaux in what may well have been a thinly-veiled critique of the racist laws of the 
Ferrand regime.
13
 Such sentiments may have helped to mobilize opposition to the 
Napoleonic government, which by November 1808 was losing the war. Early that month 
a force of six hundred “insurgents” (insurgés), of which two hundred were “French 
Mulattos, or Blacks” (Mulâtres, ou Nègres français), defeated a French regiment of 250 
men in Azua. By 3 November 1808, according to Guillermin, “all the districts of the 
East” (tous les arrondissements de l‟Est) had witnessed uprisings. The Spanish had 
                                                 
11 Listing of troop numbers under Ferrand, 1 Vendémiaire an 13 (23 September 1804), ANOM Troupes et 
Personnel Civil (hereinafter TPC) D2C 371. 
12 Listing of troop numbers under General Joseph Barquier, 1 January 1809, ANOM TPC D2C 371; listing 
of troop numbers under Barquier, 11 July 1809, ANOM TPC D2C 371. 
13 Carreaux to Christóbal Huber and [Illegible], October 1808, in Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” 
ANOM CMSM F3 121. In the original text: “Les détails de vos Victoires ont vivement intéressés nos 
compatriotes, qui désirent ardemment voir les naturels du pays recouvrir leurs anciens droits, et Repousser 
un Gouvernement usurpateur.” 
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around 1,800 troops at this time, of whom twelve hundred were infantrymen and the rest 
were cavalrymen.
14
 
Ferrand‟s misapprehension of the tide of this war cost him his life and accelerated 
the demise of the regime. According to a report to Napoleon composed by a man named 
E. Paillier, who claimed to have been serving with Ferrand on his final mission, Ferrand 
had assembled a contingent of six hundred men (of which half were regular infantrymen, 
one hundred were “French militia,” and two hundred “Spanish militia”) to attack an 
enemy force in Seybo led by a turncoat officer whom Ferrand had once entrusted with 
command of the area. Believing that “all would return to order upon his appearance, and 
in case of resistance, the dispersion of the rebels would be easy,” Ferrand‟s men were 
unprepared for the 2,100 soldiers from Havana and Puerto Rico who greeted them in 
Seybo on 7 November 1808, and the ensuing battle quickly became a rout. For a veteran 
of a quarter-century of warfare and three revolutions, such an ignominious defeat 
apparently proved too much to bear. After ordering the survivors of his troop to retreat, 
Ferrand reportedly exclaimed, “I am the victim of my overconfidence,” then seized a 
cartridge from one of his aides before any of his men could react. “He primed his pistols, 
and, at the moment when it was least expected, he destroyed his head.”15 
Ferrand was succeeded as commander-in-chief by General Joseph Barquier, who 
could not stave off the regime‟s defeat. Indeed, by the time of Barquier‟s accession it had 
become evident that the Napoleonic government was facing political as well as military 
                                                 
14 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
15 E. Paillier, report to Napoleon, 29 November 1809, Centre d‟Accueil et de Recherche des Archives 
Nationales (hereinafter CARAN), Paris, AF/IV/968. In the original text: “Quoiqu‟il en soit, il partit le 1er 
9bre avec 600 hommes dont 300 de troupes de ligne, 100 de milice française, et 200 de milice Espagnole. 
Le Général était persuadé que tout rentrerait dans l‟ordre à son apparition, et qu‟en cas de résistance, la 
dispersion des rébelles serait facile...il rompit le silence que gardait sa troupe en disant « Je suis victime de 
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defeat. On 18 December 1808, nineteen deputies formed a “Junta” in Santo Domingo city 
that recognized Ferdinand VII as the “Legitimate King and natural Lord” and that named 
General Juan Sánchez Ramírez the “political and military Governor, and interim 
intendant.”16 At this same time, anti-French forces placed Santo Domingo city under a 
siege that prompted massive emigration. Guillermin asserted that as of 30 December 
1808, 3,300 women and children had fled Santo Domingo city; this almost halved the 
pre-siege population of eight thousand.
17
 
The inability of the French regime to defeat the insurgency owed to a combination 
of profound anti-French sentiment following the 1808 invasion of Spain; the lack of 
French reinforcements due to extensive military commitments in many other theaters; the 
weaknesses of key leaders, such as Ferrand‟s overconfidence; and crucial infusions of 
troops and arms from outside parties to the Spanish side.
18
 In particular, the British, based 
in nearby Jamaica, saw these uprisings as a chance to inflict a defeat on their 
archnemesis.
19
 British ships transported a military regiment from Puerto Rico to Santo 
                                                                                                                                                 
mon excès de confiance »...il dit « mettons nos armes en état, » et prit une cartouche d‟un de ses guides. Il 
amorça ses pistolets, et, au moment où l‟on s‟y attendait le moins, il se cassa la tête.” Emphasis in original.  
16 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” details on the formation of the junta, 27 November-18 
December 1808, ANOM CMSM F3 121. In the original text: “La Junte, au nom des habitants de la partie 
Espagnole de St Domingue, qu‟elle représente, reconnaît (ainsi qu‟elle l‟a déjà reconnu) Don Ferdinand 
VII pour son Roi Légitime et Seigneur naturel, et par conséquent, la Suprême Junte centrale de Madrid, en 
qui réside l‟autorité Royale. Art. 2: En considération du mérite que s‟est acquis Don Juan Sanchez 
Ramirez, commandant Général de l‟armée Espagnole de Saint Domingue...La Junte le nomme Gouverneur 
politique, et militaire et intendant par intérim.” 
17 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” Forty-Sixth Note, ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
18 By early 1809, the French were sorely outnumbered. As noted above, they fielded only 1,361 troops as of 
1 January 1809, while according to the Bulletin Officiel de Santo Domingo, as of 22 February 1809 the 
Spanish had 2,320 men. Bulletin Officiel de Santo Domingo, 22 February 1809, in Guillermin, “Journal of 
the Revolution,” ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
19 Though he had returned to France in 1808, Joseph Ruiz, Ferrand‟s trusted subordinate who had 
participated in actions against the Maniel enclave and in Ferrand‟s enterprise of enslaving Haitians, became 
a prisoner of the British by early 1810. The État de Service (military service record) of Joseph Ruiz 
indicates that he was listed as a “prisoner in England” (prisonnier en Angleterre) in a 29 March 1810 listing 
of officers who were under consideration for the Legion of Honor. États de Service for French veterans, 
undated, CARAN Colonies CC/9c/21. 
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Domingo in April 1809, and on 11 May 1809, eleven British warships arrived in the 
harbor of Santo Domingo city.
20
 
At this point the Napoleonic regime‟s fall was essentially a fait accompli. The 
British disembarked near Santo Domingo city on 28 June 1809 and penetrated the city 
walls the following day under the command of Commodore William Pryce Cumby.
21
 
This led General Barquier and his British and Spanish counterparts to begin to negotiate a 
surrender agreement. On 6 July 1809, the British Major General Hugh Lyle Carmichael, 
the Spanish General Juan Sánchez Ramírez, and Barquier signed an accord for the 
capitulation of the French in Santo Domingo. This agreement stipulated that French 
troops must evacuate Santo Domingo city and all other important posts and sail for 
France within twelve days; British troops were to occupy these posts until this evacuation 
was complete; and a prisoner exchange was to commence immediately. While this accord 
allowed all individuals, of whichever “sex, condition, or color that they may be, French 
or Spanish,” to emigrate from Santo Domingo to another Caribbean island or to the 
United States at the expense of the British government within ten days, the accord 
contained another provision that could be interpreted as a confirmation of slavery: “All 
individual and personal properties of all Descriptions shall be respected.”22  
Though the fall of the Ferrand regime marked the beginning of a brief new period 
of Spanish rule in the eastern part of the island, Santo Domingo‟s experience under 
French rule had significant implications for the collapse of Spanish rule over most of the 
                                                 
20 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
21 Guillermin, “Journal of the Revolution,” Seventy-Eighth Note, ANOM CMSM F3 121. 
22 Accord of capitulation of the French in Santo Domingo, 6 July 1809, ANOM CMSM F3 284. In the 
original text: “Tous les individus de tel sexe, condition, ou couleur qu‟ils soient, français, ou Espagnols, qui 
ne voudront pas Rester à Sto Domingo, seront dans ce délai de dix jours, transportés aux frais du 
Gouvernement anglais, aux États-Unis, ou aux Isles du Vent, ou Sous le vent...Toutes les propriétés 
individuelles des personnes de toutes Descriptions seront respectées.”  
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American empire by 1830. The 1795 cession of Santo Domingo to France created a crisis 
of political legitimacy in what had been Spain‟s oldest colony. Moreover, the presumed 
legal emancipation of Santo Domingo‟s slaves represented the most severe legal 
challenge to the enslavement of Africans and their descendants that had emerged in a 
Spanish-American colony. In this light, Spanish America‟s nineteenth-century 
“liberators,” who sometimes initially supported gradual emancipation schemes, appear 
less visionary and pioneering than their reputations suggest.
23
 
In 1795, the French Republic had articulated a new vision of “empire” in 
promulgating a new constitution that declared the colonies to be an “integral part” of the 
French empire. Efforts to incorporate Santo Domingo into this new political order gave 
rise to conflicts that tested the boundaries of this doctrine of legal integration. When 
Napoleon subsequently dismantled the “integral part” doctrine in his 1799 constitution 
which stipulated that the colonies were to once again be subject to “particular laws,” he 
ironically helped to pave the way for Toussaint Louverture‟s promulgation of his own 
1801 constitution that in a sense represented a defiant logical extension of the principle of 
“particular laws” for the colonies. Clashes between these divergent conceptions of empire 
and the metropole-colony relationship helped to bring about the Haitian war of 
independence, which resulted in the complete rejection of colonialism in Haiti and the 
establishment of the renewed colonial regime of Ferrand in Santo Domingo.  
The radical political vision of the Haitian Revolution was of a polity where 
nobody could be held as a slave and where all possessed equal citizenship. While the 
effects of the Haitian Revolution on Latin American political independence and anti-
                                                 
23 One such figure was the Venezuelan independence hero Simón Bolívar. For a discussion of this leader‟s 
views on slavery, see John Lynch, Simón Bolívar: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 
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slavery were complex and perhaps even contradictory, the foundation of the 
emancipationist nation of Haiti provided the revolutionary leaders Francisco de Miranda 
and Simón Bolívar with both moral and material support for the emancipation of both 
nation and slave.
24
  
The Ferrand regime, by contrast, appears to have offered support to those who 
wished to preserve Spanish colonial rule in the hemisphere. In a 15 April 1806 letter to 
the Minister of the Navy, Ferrand stated that he was willing to deploy three hundred men 
to assist the “Governor” in Venezuela in his efforts to defeat the anticipated invasion 
force of Francisco de Miranda, a globe-trotting Venezuelan insurgent leader who led an 
ill-fated invasion of his homeland in 1806 and later served in the government of the 
short-lived First Venezuelan Republic in 1811-1812.
25
  
In further weakening Napoleon‟s position in the Western Hemisphere, the defeat 
of the French regime in Santo Domingo in 1809 may have played a small role in 
                                                                                                                                                 
chapters 5 and 7.  
24 For a discussion of the effects of the Haitian Revolution on slavery and race relations in Latin America, 
see David Geggus, “The Sounds and Echoes of Freedom: The Impact of the Haitian Revolution on Latin 
America,” in Beyond Slavery: The Multilayered Legacy of Africans in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
ed. Darién J. Davis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 24-32. 
25 Ferrand to Minister of the Navy, 15 April 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/42. In the original text: “...je 
n‟ai pas cru devoir balancer, dans cette circonstance importante, à offrir à Monsieur le Gouverneur de la 
Côte Ferme trois Cents braves, qui y étant rendus, si l‟occasion s‟en présente, donneront aux Espagnols la 
mesure du parti que l‟on peut tirer de pareils alliés.” Emphasis in original. It is well known that, in the 
midst of the independence wars, Bolívar sought refuge in Haiti in 1816 and received from Haitian President 
Alexandre Pétion munitions, guns, money, transport and soldiers in exchange for a promise to abolish 
slavery in areas that he wrested from the Spanish. Less well known is the stopover in Haiti of Francisco de 
Miranda. In a letter to a subordinate dated 21 March 1806, Ferrand wrote that after recruiting two to three 
thousand “Mulâtres” in New York, Miranda traveled to the “South of St Domingue” (Sud de St Domingue). 
Ferrand to Franco, 21 March 1806, CARAN Colonies CC/9a/43. According to Karen Racine, in his 
stopover in the harbor of Jacmel, Haiti to prepare for his invasion of Venezuela, Miranda was prevented 
from setting foot on land due to the suspicions that Dessalines and Pétion held towards “light-skinned 
troops arriving off their shores”—a rich irony given the prohibitions in Cuba and elsewhere of the entrance 
of non-whites associated with Haiti. Nonetheless, while in Haitian waters Miranda first hoisted his new 
Venezuelan flag and printed several thousand copies of an important manifesto on South American 
independence. Karen Racine, Francisco de Miranda: A Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 160-161. For more on Miranda, who participated in the 
French Revolution, see Michael Zeuske, Francisco de Miranda y la modernidad en América (Madrid: 
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hastening the French emperor‟s ouster. In removing the French beachhead in Hispaniola, 
it also further reduced the possibility of a French re-conquest of Haiti, which would have 
had profound geopolitical implications for Latin American independence and North 
American expansion. Finally, the period of French rule in Santo Domingo gravely 
undermined Spain‟s ability to reassert its authority after 1809 by eliminating most of the 
old slaveholding elite, powerfully demonstrating the political and military weakness of 
the metropole, and facilitating the flight of Dominican “slaves” from the control of 
purported masters to lives of independent subsistence in the countryside.
26
  
In some respects, Santo Domingo represented a prototype for the disintegration in 
Spanish America of a political system that had endured for three centuries. Yet Santo 
Domingo‟s own distinct circumstances made its trajectory in the nineteenth century 
exceptional. As the only Spanish-American nation to declare independence three times 
(in 1821, 1844 and 1865) from two powers (Spain and Haiti), the Dominican Republic 
followed a path that diverged dramatically from those of the mainland Spanish-American 
countries as well as those of Cuba and Puerto Rico, where slavery and Spanish 
colonialism endured until the final third of the century.
27
  
In the Haitian Revolutionary era, a succession of French Republican and imperial 
regimes tried to unify the island under their rule, first in the name of universal 
emancipation, and then in an effort to re-impose slavery. Santo Domingo was integral in 
struggles over the political, economic and moral dimensions of the unstable categories of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fundación Mapfre Tavera, 2004). On Bolívar and Haiti, see Lynch, Simón Bolívar, 97; and Geggus, “The 
Sounds and Echoes of Freedom,” 30-32. 
26 Richard Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican 
History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 44-45. 
27 The Dominican Republic first became known by this name in 1844, when it gained independence from 
Haiti. 
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“slave” and “free person.” The numerous freed Dominguans who fled the restrictions of 
the emancipationist regime in Saint-Domingue to resettle in what Bonaparte termed the 
“enslaved part” of the island, for instance, unsettled concepts of slavery and freedom that 
many French and Spanish officials supported. Moreover, the freed individuals who 
created the notarized liberty acts left traces of “emancipation” in the official records of a 
regime that sought to re-enslave thousands of people.   
When contextualized within the longue durée of the island‟s history, some of the 
apparent ruptures of the Haitian Revolution begin to appear less pronounced. The nearly 
“invisible” emancipation in Santo Domingo from 1795-1801 involved the swift 
repression of “slave” revolts, carrot-and-stick tactics employed by both French and 
Spanish authorities against “maroon” communities, and continuing disputes over the old 
colonial border and over migration between the two parts of the island.  
Yet in other respects, this revolution did represent a radical break from the past. 
Most notably, the uncertain situation of those held in bondage in Santo Domingo after 
1795 brought to the fore the Haitian Revolution‟s central question: Can a viable polity 
exist where nobody is held in chattel slavery? Even as he tried to resuscitate the 
plantation economy in Saint-Domingue and to impose a plantation system in Santo 
Domingo, Toussaint Louverture offered an affirmative answer to this question. 
Furthermore, despite their participation in slaving during the Franco-Spanish war in the 
mid-1790s, the slaves-turned-officers Jean-François and Georges Biassou played 
important roles in bringing about the general emancipation decrees in Saint-Domingue in 
1793. 
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On the eve of the French and Haitian Revolutions, Spanish Santo Domingo was 
among the most neglected of Spain‟s American domains, yet it became deeply involved 
in an episode whose reverberations in Caribbean, Atlantic and global history were 
profound. While simple geographical proximity to Saint-Domingue helps to account for 
Santo Domingo‟s importance in the Haitian Revolution, patterns of state formation, 
slavery, race relations, resistance to enslavement, and peasant cultivation that were rooted 
in Dominican history also represented vital contexts for this revolution. The central goal 
of this dissertation has been to elucidate these contexts and to show that Santo Domingo 
was a central theater in the political and social transformations of the Haitian 
Revolutionary era.  
By presenting this revolution as an island-wide episode, I have sought to 
contribute to the goal of bringing historical scholarship on the Dominican Republic into 
greater dialogue with that on Haiti. I have also contributed new perspectives on “post-
emancipation societies” in my examination of conflicts over the boundaries of 
“emancipation” in French Santo Domingo. During the fourteen years of formal French 
rule, uncertainty concerning the colony‟s political status and the legal condition of those 
claimed as slaves led to disputes in which the legal and perceived moral legitimacy of 
enslavement—and of the radical new doctrine of universal emancipation—were at stake. 
Santo Domingo was a crucial battleground in struggles to define the meaning of French 
Republican emancipation. 
For five centuries, the island of Hispaniola has been a crucible in the political, 
economic, and social processes that have shaped the development of the modern world. 
From the sixteenth century, when it was the first site of debates over the rights and 
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humanity of indigenous Americans, to the twenty-first, when the profound neglect of the 
rights of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic has called into question the extent 
of modern states‟ commitments to human rights (especially those of non-citizens), this 
island has held an importance that far outstrips its relatively small size.
28
 The Haitian 
Revolution was shaped by decades- or centuries-old phenomena, such as the fight for the 
equality promised by the Code Noir, Dominicans‟ carving out their own versions of 
freedom in forging new modes of cultivation and settlement, and conflicts over the 
colonial border and “maroons” on the island. At the same time, this revolution created 
radically new concepts of citizenship and liberty, epitomized by its fundamental 
challenge to slavery. Slaves and freed people in both parts of the island were at the center 
of this story. In foregrounding the long and interconnected histories of resistance to 
slavery and struggles against racism in both parts of the island, I have shown that 
emancipation in revolutionary Hispaniola was not, in fact, a completely failed enterprise, 
for those who had the most at stake bequeathed powerful legacies for the struggles for 
equality, liberty and basic human dignity that continue to this day.  
                                                 
28 On these early debates on Native Americans and the nature of empire, see Patricia Seed, “„Are They not 
Also Men?‟: The Indians‟ Humanity and Capacity for Spanish Civilization,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies 25, no. 3 (October 1993): 629-652. On Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, see Samuel 
Martínez, “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic,” Latin American Research Review 34, no. 1 (1999): 57-84. 
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